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Introduction
On a clear day in the winter of 2009, I boarded a bus leaving Guadalajara, the 
second-largest city in Mexico, and headed toward the municipality of Comarga 
nestled high in the northern mountains of Jalisco. The bus hugged the shoulder of 
the two-lane highway and zigzagged its way through switchbacks along Route 23. 
Agave fields, old Catholic churches, and rural villages punctuated the rural coun-
tryside. Every so often the bus stopped to collect and drop off travelers. I welcomed 
these little pauses in the journey, precious moments to recover from vertigo, take in 
the local scenery, and buy fruits and veggies soaked in lime and chilies from sellers 
who hopped on the idling bus. Each town we passed had its own history and feel—
San Cristóbal de la Barranca, Teul, Tlatenango, and Momax. Rows of tomatoes, 
beans, greens, and livestock farms lined the road leading into the municipal town 
center where local residents congregated in plazas with round pavilions and mar-
ket stalls.1 Chickens, goats, and lambs milled about the courtyards of adobe and 
concrete flat-roofed houses that lined the roads. I saw cars and trucks with license 
plates from California, Texas, and Illinois. And peppered throughout the towns, 
alongside more modest dwellings, sat renovated houses with grand new additions, 
gable roofs, circle driveways, and buffed wooden garage doors. Many of these 
improvements were funded with remittances earned in the United States and sent 
home to migrant families in Mexico. In each town we passed, signs of northern 
migration to the U.S. commingled with familiar features of the rural countryside.
Along the bus route I also saw big placards that noted sites of new public infra-
structure. In connection with the Mexican government, migrants also financed 
public goods and services with remittances. They pooled resources in the U.S. and 
built schools, bridges, and health clinics in their hometowns. They paved roads 
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and sidewalks; supplied school buses and ambulances; constructed parks; and 
extended public electricity, water, and drainage for residents left behind. Between 
2002 and 2016, migrants implemented more than 26,000 public works projects 
in half of all Mexican municipalities, many in localities classified as “poor” and 
“very poor” by the Mexican government. Some migrants in the United States 
from a common place of origin have formed voluntary associations where they 
express shared ties to the people and places they leave behind and invest collective 
resources back home. These hometown associations (HTAs) (clubes de oriundo) 
exist around the globe—from Ghana to Germany, Japan to Cuba—and go by dif-
ferent names—sons and daughters of the soil, landmanshaftn, kenjinkai, cabildos 
de naciones.2 But Mexican HTAs are different in one important way. In response 
to their collective, grassroots mobilization, these migrant groups and the Mexican 
government developed a federal social spending program that matches migrants’ 
collective resources to coproduce local public goods and services. The program is 
called the 3x1 Program for Migrants (Programa 3x1 para Migrantes) (hereafter “the 
3x1 Program”).
While scores of studies have documented migrant hometown groups and their 
role in development,3 little is known about how partnerships with the sending state 
Figure 1. Road pavement project completed through 3x1 Program in Guanajuato.  
Photo by author.
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affect local democratic governance. What are the political consequences that result 
from migrant transnational partnerships with the sending state? Who is involved 
in these transnational partnerships and how do they differ from place to place and 
over time? What can migrant participation in public goods provision tell us about 
who makes decisions in local governance and how those decisions are made? This 
is why I came to study in Mexico.
The answers to these questions lie in the underlying social and political condi-
tions in which transnational partnerships are situated because they contribute to 
partnerships being organized differently. Some migrants remain socially embed-
ded in the hometown by maintaining diverse social ties and constructing new 
social relationships with important stakeholders. Migrants who are more socially 
embedded also practice meaningful cultural repertoires that confer their commu-
nity membership even while living abroad. In the political sphere, the bureau-
cratic capacity and electoral considerations of local governments also affect the 
organization of transnational partnerships. Together, these social and political 
factors determine how involved local residents and political officials are in the 
provision of transnational public goods and yield different political consequences. 
For example, when broadly inclusive of the local citizenry and when local govern-
ment is also engaged, partnerships induce a form of transnational participatory 
governance in which both territorial and extraterritorial citizens articulate inter-
ests, exercise rights, meet obligations, and mediate conflicts4 through deliberation 
and cooperative decision-making. This kind of synergetic partnership entwines 
migrants, local citizens, and government representatives in a network of demo-
cratic decision-making, which leads to more socially accountable and responsive 
government authorities. Participatory governance also expands the array of non-
state actors who are involved in democratic decision-making and empowers many 
local citizens to participate in local civic and political processes for the first time.
By contrast, different combinations of community inclusion and government 
engagement reflect more corporatist, substitutive, and fragmented types of trans-
national partnership and are associated with different political outcomes such 
as outright corruption and partnership failure. For example, in many cases of 
corporatist and fragmented coproduction, political clientelism results.5 Broadly 
conceived, clientelism refers to the exchange of goods for political support and 
involves an asymmetric power relation between patrons and clients in which cli-
ents receive targeted, nonprogrammatic spending (e.g., bags of rice, gift cards, 
cash) in exchange for their political support come election time. In more sub-
stitutive cases of coproduction, local political officials offload responsibility for 
public goods provision entirely onto migrant groups. And in cases of corruption, 
resources that migrants commit to cofinancing public goods “disappear” from 
state coffers, which often leads to project and partnership failure.
Over the last eight years, I examined when, why, and how people who left their 
countries of origin collaborated with state actors to provide public goods back 
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home through transnational partnerships. During my fieldwork, I visited munici-
palities across Mexico and studied the interactions between government officials, 
migrant groups, and residents as they unfolded over time. I listened to residents, 
current and former migrants, priests, business owners, mayors, political party offi-
cials, civic leaders, state and federal political officials, and learned that migrants’ 
involvement in public goods provision had unintentional, yet profound political 
effects. I found that migrant actors, when more socially embedded, facilitated 
new modes of inclusive, democratic engagement that made local government 
more responsive to the citizenry. A focus on how migrants organize transnational 
partnerships reveals not only the conditions under which public service delivery 
increases and democratic participation and government performance improves 
in high-migration locales, but also how the process of coproducing public goods 
across national borders changes relations between state and society.
MOTIVATING EMPIRICAL PUZZLES
Although official Mexican statistics classified the municipality of Comarga as 
middle-income, like many of the 196,000 localities in Mexico with less than 
2,500 inhabitants, the village of Atitlan was much poorer and greatly in need of 
public goods, especially when compared to the more densely populated county 
seat.6 Atitlan is one of Comarga’s five main localities and home to 340 residents. 
Despite democratization and decentralization reforms over the last 30 years, resi-
dents could not recall a single public works project in Atitlan since the late 1970s. 
As soon as I got off the bus this was evident—little improvement could be seen. 
Unlike the county seat where streets and sidewalks were paved, most streets in 
Atitlan were compacted dirt that flooded during the rainy season and swelled 
with garbage and sewage. Since the public drainage system reached just half of the 
households, those without access either purchased piping with their own money 
or disposed of sanitation in the old stone latrine that snaked its way through the 
back part of town. There were also few light posts in the village. Residents gave me 
a flashlight to navigate the streets at night. I had never experienced such darkness 
before my first night in Atitlan. But for the stars in the sky, it was pitch black. It was 
hard to tell where one’s body ended and blackness began.
In 2004, the mayor (presidente municipal) of Comarga traveled to U.S. cities 
to meet paisanos, fellow countrymen and women, who had emigrated abroad.7 
During dinners and meet and greets, the mayor asked migrants to form clubs, raise 
money, and help the municipal government provide public works through the 3x1 
Program. Four clubs formed after the mayor’s trek across U.S. cities. Emilio and 
Esme, migrants from Atitlan, agreed to form a club and worked with the mayor 
on his proposed project: a concrete vehicle bridge. The mayor proposed the bridge 
project because the town was separated by a river. The only way for residents on 
the west side to access the main route into town was to cross a rickety, wooden 
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footbridge or wade through the river on horseback or donkey and in small boats, 
which often capsized. After they recruited other paisanos, Club Atitlan planned 
the bridge project with the mayor’s administration.
When the bridge was finished, club members in the United States were proud 
and felt like they contributed something important in their absence that locals 
appreciated. I was a bit taken aback, then, when residents told me they resented 
migrants’ involvement. Many locals were initially confused—who were these 
migrants? Why had the paisanos not discussed their plans with leaders of the 
town’s most important civic association, the Patronato, the patron saint festival 
group? Why did locals not have the same privileges, the ability to access political 
officials and get them to deliver goods and services they needed in their town? 
Residents felt slighted. After all, they lived there, they had voted for this mayor, 
and they had their own ideas about what the village needed. Relations further 
deteriorated when residents who were left out of discussions about 3x1 projects 
became increasingly suspicious of migrants’ intentions. At the height of tensions, 
residents of Atitlan prohibited the club from participation in local public affairs 
and mobilized to vote against the incumbent mayor’s political party to punish the 
administration for their alliance with the migrant club.
The turmoil unleashed by Club Atitlan’s cross-border participation in public 
goods provision had several unanticipated impacts on political participation and 
relations between local government and Atitlan society. Residents mobilized a col-
lective effort and punished the incumbent’s party for privileging migrants’ voices 
over that of local citizens. Their social exclusion from project governance moti-
vated short-term political activism. Atitlan voters banded together and cast ballots 
for the opposition in the 2010 election, which likely played some role in the defeat 
of the incumbent in a close race. But the initial wave of political activity petered 
out and turned into political disenchantment. Frustrated with members of the 
migrant club who residents perceived as allies of the local government, residents 
turned away from politics and refocused their energy on the social and religious 
activities of the community.
The case of Atitlan and its paisanos in the U.S. raises important questions 
about how international migration reconfigures local democratic engagement in 
origin countries. Migrants who use material resources collected abroad mobilize 
new mechanisms of voice and make political decisions in their places of origin 
that affect migrant and nonmigrant households alike. The cross-border partici-
pation of migrants and migrant groups upends traditional modes of local gover-
nance because although migrants have exited, some never really leave. Migrant 
loyalty and social connectivity to the hometown catalyzes the collection of new-
found resources acquired abroad, which they use to participate in public affairs 
back home.
A 30-minute drive along a potholed road took you from Atitlan to El Mirador, 
another locality in Comarga. Because a bus could not safely navigate the high 
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mountain road, El Mirador was only accessible by all-terrain vehicles such as trucks 
or jeeps, or on horseback. It was also a poor village with a substantial portion of its 
population living abroad, mostly in Chicago and southern Indiana. I hitched a ride 
to El Mirador with a local crew going up to finish the most recent transnational 
project between Club El Mirador and the municipal government; the last bits of 
corrugated metal roofing were being installed on a new recreation court (cancha). 
More geographically remote and higher up in the Sierras, I thought El Mirador 
would be worse off than Atitlan because the town’s geographic isolation meant the 
provision of public goods was more difficult to implement up in the mountains. 
But after entering through the tall gates of the long paved road into town, I saw 
this was not the case at all. Every street in El Mirador was newly paved with a 
hydraulic drainage system underneath. Almost every house was connected to the 
electricity grid. A new kindergarten school room was recently constructed. And 
while only half the town had use of the public water system every other day, a well 
had recently been installed to meet local needs. In addition to the new recreation 
area, a new rodeo ring (lienzo charro) was built for neighbors to enjoy horseback 
competitions and festivals. All of the new infrastructure was provided through the 
collaboration between migrants from El Mirador and the local government with 
matching funds from state and federal 3x1 Program partners.
Yet, none of the tension or political turmoil between residents, migrants, and 
political officials in Atitlan was present in El Mirador. Residents spoke highly of 
HTA members—as friends, paisanos, and community members—and said their 
relationship with the club was copacetic. Local residents of El Mirador were 
actively engaged in the selection and implementation of projects and visited the 
municipal government building (ayuntamiento) in Comarga. There they discussed 
project budgets, timelines, materials, and labor contracts with political officials. 
Local residents even fundraised and donated resources to a few projects. The first 
year into the transnational partnership, residents formed their own public works 
committee in El Mirador, the first of its kind in recent memory. The contrast in 
number of public services between Atitlan and El Mirador was stark. The nature 
of the interactions between key social and political actors was also qualitatively 
different. The Atitlan partnership was mired in conflict and cleavages that divided 
residents, migrants, and municipal officials. After a short burst of political interest 
and activity, citizens recoiled from politics and from involvement with “outsiders” 
(dubbed fuereños). In contrast, citizens of El Mirador formed a civic association, 
solved local problems through deliberation, and became more politically aware 
and active through the process of providing public goods.
Why were transnational partnerships between organized migrants and local 
government in the two communities within the same municipality so differ-
ent? The same mayor organized and worked with the clubs. Both villages were 
similar in terms of population size and level of economic development. Both vil-
lages had high rates of out-migration. And both villages were “strongholds” of 
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the incumbent party in which a plurality of voters regularly turned out to sup-
port the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN). Furthermore, El 
Mirador did not benefit from any favoritism from the mayor, who, in fact, had 
been born and raised in Atitlan. Unlike in Atitlan, Club El Mirador recruited local 
residents to participate in public goods projects and residents regularly engaged in 
deliberations with municipal officials. Since El Mirador was more geographically 
isolated, there was more trust and cooperation among neighbors,8 and migrant 
club members regularly engaged in festivals, home ownership, the local Catholic 
church, and maintained the dress, traditional customs, and mannerisms of their 
rural community. Migrants, in other words, continued to practice cultural reper-
toires of community membership while living abroad in ways that were meaning-
ful to friends, family, and strangers who remained behind. Despite their physical 
distance, they remained socially embedded in the local community from beyond 
national borders.
In comparison, migrant club members from Atitlan did not remain well inte-
grated into the social life of the hometown after exit. Time away from Atitlan taxed 
the breadth and depth of social ties, and migrants’ quest for social status and an 
alliance with political authorities created animus with residents. Migrants still felt 
connected to Atitlan even though they had emigrated. They also had a common 
bond with each other in the U.S. as they shared a migration experience. But their 
physical absence and social location outside the hometown network prevented 
them from exercising legitimate voice in the community in which they were no 
longer inhabitants. In turn, the process of public goods provision created contests 
for recognition between migrants, migrant families, and residents in relation to 
the municipal government in Atitlan, while the process broadened civic engage-
ment in collective decision-making practices in El Mirador.
The transnational partnership case of El Cerrito, a larger locality in the munici-
pality of Selvillo, Guanajuato, was organized differently and produced different 
political dynamics over time. Unlike in Atitlan and El Mirador, where political 
officials were enthusiastic about coproducing public goods with migrant groups, 
the PAN administration in Selvillo was initially inactive. Club El Cerrito produced 
its first few projects without the involvement of local government because the 
mayor who had promised support never delivered on it. The migrants relied on 
cofinancing from state and federal tiers of the Mexican government and imple-
mented projects on their own. Club El Cerrito selected the projects, hired the 
contractors, sourced the materials, and coordinated all facets of project implemen-
tation. In the early years of migrants’ investment in El Cerrito the club substituted 
for local government provision with limited involvement of El Cerrito residents.
Living far away from their homelands, migrants from El Cerrito were able to 
improve public goods without support from local officials and community res-
idents, but doing so presented two challenges. The first obstacle was logistical. 
Accountable to the migrant members who invested their own scarce resources to 
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better conditions back home, club leaders feared that poor management and inad-
equate implementation of projects discouraged future investments. Since the club 
leaders and members had moved far away from their hometowns, they lacked the 
capacity to monitor projects during and after implementation. Moreover, monitor-
ing was crucial, as the projects were targets of predators of various sorts, whether 
laborers or contractors who shirked on quality and failed to supply materials on 
time or outside parties who tried to seize the materials bought for the projects that 
the association funded. Club El Cerrito, like many hometown clubs, faced the con-
stant risk that unscrupulous local actors, such as local political bosses referred to 
as caciques and organized gangs connected to criminal drug-trafficking networks, 
would take advantage of the migrants’ absence.
The second obstacle concerned legitimacy.9 While the migrants’ distance from 
their hometowns made them vulnerable to local opportunists, it also potentially 
undermined their legitimacy, as they claimed to belong to a community in which 
they no longer resided. Just as in Atitlan, residents in El Cerrito were suspicious of 
the club’s motives and publicly challenged the migrants’ involvement in the deliv-
ery of public goods. The migrants still had family and friends in El Cerrito, but 
they had limited social ties beyond their immediate social circles and only a few 
residents knew those migrant leaders who served as the visible ambassadors of the 
club. Since migrants were no longer embedded in hometown social life, residents 
did not initially recognize them as social actors with a legitimate voice to make 
decisions in public affairs. Moreover, low levels of trust that were pervasive in the 
town spilled over into migrants’ efforts. However meritorious Club El Cerrito’s 
project proposals were to the migrants and their close circle of familiars, since a 
broader swath of local residents did not have a direct stake in the outcome and 
they did not believe that migrants represented their interests, the proposal was 
insufficient and illegitimate.
But just three years later the local government and residents were active con-
tributors in the transnational partnership. By 2013, close to 30 public works proj-
ects had been completed throughout El Cerrito such as road pavement, sidewalks, 
electricity, street lamps, a computer lab, and a recreation area for the elementary 
school to name a few. Migrants’ horizontal ties in the community and vertical 
ties to local government facilitated new modes of interaction and deliberation 
between local citizens and elected representatives through the process of coordi-
nating public goods with migrants. Migrants constructed meaningful social ties 
with different citizen groups in El Cerrito through social events such as rodeos, 
dances, and fundraising dinners and actively recruited residents into project gov-
ernance. Three new civic associations were created to work with Club El Cerrito, 
but they also completed their own projects and solved local problems on their 
own. In turn, when they witnessed increased involvement of residents (voters) 
and experienced fiercer competition from opposition political parties, local gov-
ernment scaled up its engagement in the process and continued to be supportive 
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even as the administration switched political party from PAN to the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institutional, PRI) and then back 
to PAN. The completion of highly visible public projects in which incumbents 
claimed credit became a politically expedient method that shored up public sup-
port in hotly contested municipal elections. The case of El Cerrito shows that the 
organization of transnational partnerships is not set in stone. Community inclu-
sion and government engagement change in response to social outreach and polit-
ical conditions in the hometown.
These cases generate important questions for researchers of international 
migration, political sociology, and participatory development. Who has the legiti-
mate authority to speak for whom in a political community? Can migrants who 
exit use their voice in hometown public affairs as if they were still residents? What 
are the political consequences of doing so? Does it matter if cross-border political 
participation is materially conditioned by remittances? How does “doing” devel-
opment enable and foreclose opportunities for political inclusion, activism, and 
equality in places with high migration? These questions motivate this book.
HOME-C OUNTRY LOYALTIES AND MIGR ANT 
TR ANSNATIONAL PR ACTICES
Many of the 244 million migrants located around the world who leave their home-
lands for economic opportunity and safe haven abroad realize their dreams in a 
promised land.10 Individuals and families leave their countries of origin when stay-
ing is no longer a sensible option and when an economic and political system in 
which they feel they have no ability to change strips them of security and oppor-
tunity.11 Many people do not want to go but do so when it seems like they have no 
choice. When the price of crops plummets, when cities overflow, when factories 
cut wages and stop hiring, when children need food to eat, and when families are 
threatened by violence, migrants make the difficult decision to leave loved ones 
behind. They do what Albert O. Hirschman and others call “voting with their 
feet.”12 Given the choice between staying and using their voice to induce political 
change and availing themselves of the freedom to exit, many individuals see the 
latter as the chance for a better life, albeit a life abroad.
Once migrants cross a border into a destination country, they do not cease to 
feel attached, to meet social, ethnic and religious obligations, and to express soli-
darity with the people and places they leave behind. As Rainer Baubock explains, 
migration is an international phenomenon between states insofar as it involves a 
movement of persons across the territory of sovereign states; however, it becomes 
transnational when it creates overlapping memberships, rights, and practices 
that reflect migrants’ belonging to two different political communities.13 Not all 
migrants are “transmigrants” who regularly communicate, exchange resources, 
ideas, and behaviors, and visit the origin country.14 Loyalty to the hometown and 
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the people in it takes various forms and is felt to different degrees. Some migrants 
remain fervently engaged transnationally, others more sparingly. Some keep up 
with the major news of the day back home and speak their mother tongue. Others 
send their children back in the summer so that their kids know what life is like 
in their parents’ and grandparents’ hometowns. Other migrants return to attend 
annual community festivals and ethnic and religious holidays. For many, though, 
the strangeness of a new land, the foreignness that shadows them, and the discrim-
ination they face create trepidation, a longing for home, and generate new kinds 
of political interests that can be channeled to the hometown.15 Many migrants sim-
ply hope to return one day to the place of their birth and where their parents are 
buried. Feelings of separation and nostalgia grow with time and compound when 
immigrants face exclusion in their adopted countries. Motivated by different ratio-
nales, many migrants remain loyal and engage in multiple “ways of being” and 
“ways of belonging” in transnational social and political spaces.16
Migrant cross-border engagement is not a new phenomenon. Before Western 
Union, social media platforms, cheaper air travel, and long-distance telecommu-
nications, Italian, German, Chinese, and Polish immigrants wrote letters to fam-
ily, kept up with news from the homeland, formed mutual aid societies, and sent 
money via post or in person on steamships.17 While people today are more likely 
to exchange messages on social media platforms and through text and video mes-
saging, migrants’ dual loyalties spanning borders are a modern facsimile of earlier 
historic periods. But the advance of the internet and ability to see the faces of 
loved ones, old neighbors, and government partners on device screens in the palm 
of one’s hand means that cross-border practices occur with greater ease and in 
real time. In the case of Latinx migrants in the United States, the majority sustain 
some degree of cross-border engagement, with only a minority detaching from the 
homeland altogether.18
THE FORMATION OF MIGR ANT HOMETOWN 
ASSO CIATIONS
Migrant hometown associations are a common transnational practice enabled by 
international migration that allows migrants to act out their loyalty to the home-
land. HTAs arise in destination countries around the world and date back to the 
industrial era of migration and even earlier.19 Hometown clubs arise because, in 
addition to economic motivations, social network ties lead migrants to concen-
trate in destination places where other members of their social network reside.20 
The social-networked nature of international migration results in the formation of 
“daughter” or “filial” communities.21 In these filial communities, migrants fortify 
a social connection based on a shared sense of belonging and attachment to a 
common origin. Paisanos come together in voluntary spaces to chat, dance, play, 
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reminisce, celebrate holidays, and provide support to each other. Massey and col-
leagues refer to this kind of social organization as paisanaje:
Origin from the same place is not a meaningful basis of social organization for people 
while they are at home. In general, within the community itself, the concept of pai-
sanaje does not imply any additional rights and responsibilities to other paisanos that 
are not already included in the relationships of friend, family member or neighbor. 
It is not a meaningful concept until two paisanos encounter each other outside their 
home community. Then the strength of the paisanaje tie depends on the strangeness 
of the environment and the nature of their prior relationship in the community.22
The concentration of migrants from a common place of origin and shared pai-
sanaje form the seedbeds for the emergence of migrant hometown associations.
Not all HTAs are involved in financing public works in their hometowns. Some 
are more akin to mutual aid societies of the past, which are societies, organiza-
tions, or voluntary associations that provide mutual aid, support, and benefits 
to their members. Other HTAs focus more on promoting culture and folk tradi-
tions, recreation, and social gathering. And those migrant HTAs that do become 
involved in cross-border development projects often begin with a more social or 
cultural mission and adopt public goods provision as a secondary goal.23
Migrants who are members of development-focused HTAs do so for many rea-
sons. Some do so for purely altruistic reasons and a love of the homeland. Others 
finance public goods to fulfill ethno-religious obligations. And there are those who 
contribute resources for instrumental reasons such as securing better living condi-
tions for when they eventually return home and having their social status elevated 
and valorized by acting as patrons for resident clients who remain behind.24 But the 
motivations of migrants are not static. The reasons for participating in HTAs and 
the goals of the associations change over time as people’s circumstances change—
increased social mobility, assimilation into the destination society, new obstacles 
encountered in their adopted countries, natural disasters striking back home. The 
motivation to create HTAs and invest in public goods is also encouraged by actors 
in the sending state eager to channel remittance resources toward public ends.
TR ANSNATIONAL PR ACTICE OF FINANCIAL AND 
SO CIAL REMIT TANCE SENDING AND EFFECT S
In addition to hometown clubs, migrants engage in other ways across borders and 
their practices have numerous effects. Financial remittance sending is perhaps the 
most visible and quantifiable transnational practice. Since migration enables a 
modicum of social mobility, migrants can save a portion of their savings and send 
it home. In 2016, migrants sent more than $601 billion across borders to support 
families, of which $441 billion went directly to developing countries.25 If informal 
remittances flows could be captured, totals are estimated to be much higher. India, 
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China, Mexico, and the Philippines are the top recipient countries with remit-
tances ranging from $73 billion (India) to $27 billion (Mexico). But as a share of 
gross domestic product (GDP), smaller countries including Tajikistan and Kyrgyz 
Republic (30 percent), Nepal (28 percent), Tonga (28 percent), and Moldova (26) 
are the largest recipients.26 A stable form of international finance, remittances are 
more than three times the size of official development aid (ODA) and mitigate the 
adverse effects of economic shocks and natural disasters as demonstrated by the 
massive influx of remittances to the Philippines in the wake of two typhoons in 
2009 and Super Typhoon Haiyan in 2013.27
Migrant remittances finance household consumption such as educational 
expenses, medicine, food, clothing, housing construction, appliances, and elec-
tronics. They also go toward productive investments and savings28 and have myriad 
effects on the political economy of origin countries including economic growth and 
poverty alleviation; inequality; monetary policy; skill formation; and institutional 
quality.29 Given the sheer volume of remittance flows globally, it is no wonder this 
source of foreign income has been hailed by the development banking community 
and policymakers alike as a new panacea for development in sending countries.30
Beyond economic transfers, migrants also exchange ideas, behaviors, norms, 
and social capital between origin and destination referred to as social remittances.31 
Migrants remit cultural, social, political, and economic worldviews and practices 
they acquire abroad back to their places of origin through their roles in families, 
communities, and organizations.32 Social remittances affect how people rear their 
children, divide labor in the household, and determine right from wrong. Social 
remittances also alter political attitudes and behaviors, religious rituals, and burial 
practices.33 While distinct, social and financial remittances are also intimately linked.
Financial transfers are “communicative acts”34 that relay information about 
migrants’ social positioning in places of origin and sustain social ties between 
migrants and nonmigrants.35 Like other forms of monetary transactions, financial 
remittances are motivated by social relations, and social relations, in turn, affect 
financial remittance sending practices.36 When transfers assume a collective form 
and are sent by transnational migrant associations for public goods provision, the 
ideational and material effects go beyond interpersonal relationships; they also 
affect social relations and local politics. Remittances have these community-wide 
social and political effects because they enable migrants to use voice in decision-
making about public goods in the hometown. Collective remittances convey infor-
mation about migrants’ experiences in the destination country and are situated in 
preexisting social relationships that affect how collective resources are used and 
who else is involved in determining their use.37 These decisions are distinctly polit-
ical acts in that public goods provision is a core function of government, especially 
subnational governments in decentralized political systems such as Mexico.
As such, a small but growing area of research is focusing more on the politi-
cal consequences of different facets of international migration, most notably 
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individual out-migration, remittances, and their effects on domestic politics in 
the homeland. Research on “political remittances” suggests migration can have 
democratizing effects and stabilize authoritarian regimes at the national level.38 
Micro-level research shows that as more migrants leave their places of origin, 
formal political participation, such as voting in elections, decreases while other 
studies show no effect on nonmigrant political behaviors.39 Other research argues 
that migrants can be agents of democratic diffusion who transfer ideas back to 
their hometown communities through their social ties, which improves nonmi-
grants’ social tolerance and civic engagement.40 While rich and instructive, how 
individual pathways of migration affect national and subnational politics is still 
up for debate.
Research on how migrant collective participation affects politics at home is also 
incipient and similarly mixed. Studies marshal evidence that cross-border partici-
pation can be both “good” and “bad” for democracy.41 Migrant-led development 
projects have been shown to have democratizing effects when migrant groups 
demand higher political standards from authorities,42 introduce fiercer political 
competition,43 and ensure political accountability.44 By contrast, migrant clubs 
have been found to work at cross-purposes with the state and local citizens,45 and 
local government often pursues partnerships with an eye toward electoral payoff 
in lieu of development goals.46 Research on the effects of migrant associations on 
democracy has come a long way, but we know little about the conditions under 
which migrant associations produce more positive (or negative) political effects 
for local democracy.
SENDING-STATE MIGR ANT OUTREACH
The migrant population’s desire to stay connected to the people and places they 
leave behind and their ability to send money home is not lost on sending coun-
try governments. While migrants maintain social ties “here” and “there,” sover-
eign states also fundamentally shape the relationships between migrants and their 
countries of origin.47 The exit of individuals from state control poses a constraint 
on sending states. Since migrants are no longer territorial residents, sending states 
have limited capacity to use coercion, extract resources, and make migrants com-
ply with state demands.
As a result of these constraints on control, sending country governments reach 
out to their nationals abroad and attempt to attract remittances and homeland 
engagement through both symbolic tools and public policy initiatives. States 
acknowledge emigrants as “absent sons and daughter” and “heroes” in national 
discourse. Political officials visit expatriates abroad, expand consular presence 
and services in destination countries, lobby banks to lower transaction fees for 
sending money home, adopt dual citizenship policies, and host specials events 
with migrants to cultivate ties. Sending states’ proactive efforts to encourage their 
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expatriates to remain connected and channel resources home have been instanti-
ated in diverse ways from cabinet positions to federal ministries. In the case of 
economic development in Mexico, the 3x1 Program was developed with migrants 
to direct their resources toward public ends. For every project that receives 
approval, each tier of the government—local, state, and federal—matches migrant 
resources, three-for-one, for the provision of local public goods and services. The 
matching grants schema creates an interesting tension for migrant HTAs and pub-
lic agencies in the sending state.
Migrants, through the process of emigrating to new political jurisdictions, par-
tially invert the power relationship between “state” and “society” because migrants’ 
evolving resource base generates new sources of political leverage back home. The 
sending state has no administrative authority to instruct private parties, even 
if citizens, on how to spend income earned abroad that is sent back directly to 
households. Household financial remittances are private resources for private use 
and all the sending state can do is encourage migrants to maintain social con-
nections and continue sending those remittances back to families. But collective 
remittances amassed by migrant HTAs are different. Since collective economic 
remittances are intended for public goods provision, it not only creates the oppor-
tunity for migrants to use voice in local public affairs, it also creates new political 
opportunities for sending states to determine, in part, how collective resources are 
used. When sending-state actors become coproduction partners in the provision 
of public goods and match migrants’ remittances with public funds, the sending 
state regains some control over how those resources are used in the homeland for 
community and, potentially, personal political gain. Political officials often claim 
credit for public goods that are conjointly funded by extraterritorial migrant citi-
zens living abroad.
But sending states that want to harness collective remittance resources toward 
public ends must relinquish some control and negotiate with migrants when 
investing in development projects for public use. Local government cannot com-
pletely dictate how funds are used, what projects are chosen, and how labor and 
supplies are coordinated without some input from migrant actors because each 
party contributes resources. For organized migrants, emigration grants them 
access to U.S. wages that generate resources to use voice in local public affairs. 
Emigration also liberates migrants to express a voice that might otherwise be con-
strained or coerced at home.
The devil, however, is in the details. In decentralized systems like Mexico, how 
migrant and state actors navigate the transnational relationship is not the same 
across partnerships because local-state capacity and electoral incentives vary and 
motivate local political actors differently. Moreover, these incentives may not align 
with the goals of federal and state authorities providing matching contributions 
to public works projects in programs like the 3x1 Program.48 Furthermore, while a 
growing number of countries have adopted matching grants programs similar to 
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Mexico’s 3x1 social spending program, many others have no administrative over-
sight with regard to migrant investment in local projects or an institutionalized 
method of organizing public-private partnerships between migrant groups and 
the sending state. In Mexico’s 3x1 Program and in other countries where HTAs 
are active, local, state, and federal authorities respond to migrant remittance-led 
investments according to their own political incentives, which drives the extent of 
their participation and cooperation with migrant groups differently across geogra-
phy and time. Research has yet to fully account for the ways in which government 
actors’ participation varies across transnational coproduction partnerships.
Understanding why and how migrant involvement in public goods provision 
varies is important because it tells us a great deal about the quality of governance in 
origin countries with substantial emigration. The origin and evolution of matching 
grants programs that draw on external migrant resources for development proj-
ects serves as an important window into social and political institutional dynamics 
in local democracy. It also reveals how migrant nonstate actors, with and without 
the support and involvement of local citizens and the state, propel new modes of 
civic and political interest and engagement in public service delivery.
POLITICS OF PUBLIC GO ODS PROVISION  
AND LO CAL GOVERNANCE
Public goods and services such as potable water, electricity, health services, safety, 
education, sidewalks, and roads are intrinsic components of people’s well-being. 
Inadequate provision of clean drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene, for exam-
ple, often leads to disease outbreaks. Access to quality healthcare services reduces 
complications during maternal childbirth and infant mortality rates. Paved, easily 
navigable roads connect important market centers where agricultural producers 
locally sell commodities and export them abroad to earn a living. In short, public 
service delivery is an essential component of economic development and poverty 
alleviation everywhere.
Traditionally, the state provides public goods to people in exchange for their 
quiescence to authority and taxation.49 Assuming a group of interested citizens 
has the requisite time, energy, skills, and resources, they could cooperate to 
build water wells, put up street lamps, pave roads, and erect bridges themselves. 
However, because public goods benefit everyone, private provision suffers from 
classic free-rider problems of collective action.50 When everyone can benefit from 
clean drinking water whether or not they contribute to get the system up and 
running, few are willing to sacrifice private time and resources to supply a public 
good that others will enjoy for free. Certainly, a limited number of goods can be 
provided this way and citizens have found creative solutions to collective action 
problems including informal institutions that govern common pool resources.51 
But generally, private provision of public goods leads to underprovision. This is 
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why government is tasked with supplying public service delivery—to ensure that 
citizens gain access to the basic goods and services they need to live healthy, pro-
ductive lives.
In consolidated and recently transitioned democracies, citizens vote in elec-
tions and hold officials to account for public goods delivery. Participating in free, 
fair, and contested elections informs representatives of constituents’ preferences 
and serves as the central mechanism to demand political change.52 But many 
democracies suffer from political and institutional distortions that undermine for-
mal instruments of political accountability.53 First, casting a ballot is a less infor-
mative instrument for public officials to learn what kinds of public goods citizens 
want and need. Second, decentralization reforms that devolve authority over pub-
lic goods to lower tiers of government frequently fail to improve efficiency and 
bring citizens closer to the political process. Inefficiencies result because resources 
transferred from state and federal governments are politically manipulated.54 
Throughout the world, decentralization is unevenly implemented and fiscal 
authority to collect income taxes and finance social spending lags behind reforms 
that decenter administrative and political responsibility to subnational govern-
ments.55 Getting government to provide public goods is indeterminate in recently 
transitioned democracies and nondemocracies because local electoral institutions 
are absent or are often weak instruments of what political scientists call “verti-
cal political accountability.” By vertical accountability I am referring here to the 
means through which citizens, mass media, and civil society enforce standards of 
good performance on political authorities through popular control.56
A lack of political accountability fuels skepticism among the citizenry that elec-
toral institutions can do anything to improve their lives and leads some to fret over 
a crisis of faith in political parties and the return of more authoritarian forces.57 
In periods in which participation and contestation are in flux, nonelectoral forms 
of political participation and coproduction arrangements become critical in the 
provision of public services.58 Migrants, with their newfound collective resources 
earned and pooled abroad, leverage their remittances and become political actors 
who decide what kind, how much, and where public goods are provided in con-
junction with and in place of local government authorities.
PARTICIPATORY DEMO CR ACY AND THE 
C OPRODUCTION OF PUBLIC GO ODS
Citizens counteract the weakness of electoral institutions through informal, that 
is, nonelectoral forms of participation in which they communicate information, 
demand political action, and engage directly with political officials and help make 
decisions about how the local government operates. These informal forms of civic and 
political engagement introduce a measure of social or horizontal accountability— 
an approach toward building good governance that relies on ordinary citizens and 
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civil society organizations participating directly or indirectly in exacting account-
ability through bottom-up, demand-based efforts.59 However, not all citizens par-
ticipate equally. Some citizens have more resources, are more motivated, and are 
part of recruitment networks that create and foreclose opportunities for engage-
ment.60 Some civic cultures are more propitious for civic engagement while oth-
ers emphasize private entitlements.61 The large social capital literature shows how 
norms of trust and reciprocity are imbued in social relationships that promote 
cooperation and membership in civic associations, and this civic associational-
ism, in turn, correlates with good government in liberal democracies.62 But who or 
what nurtures social trust and reciprocity and brings about citizens’ engagement 
in politics is rather elusive. And the mechanisms through which social networks 
of trust, reciprocity, and cooperation cause government officials to behave better 
while in office also remain an open question.63
In many cases, citizen participation in public life is determined by costs, ben-
efits, and expectations of democratic engagement64 and shaped by states. States 
have enormous power to scale up citizen engagement by opening up new spaces 
in which citizens propose, deliberate, and help make public decisions alongside 
elected officials.65 These participatory spheres not only improve service delivery, 
but also nurture the emergence of new actors and subjectivities involved in local 
governance. And as citizens’ interest and exposure to political life increases, so 
too may their sense of personal political efficacy, that is, the belief that they can 
understand and influence political affairs and bring about a more responsive gov-
ernment through purposeful action.66
Since this kind of participatory sphere brings ordinary people into government 
decision-making, it also has the transformative potential to improve social inclu-
sion and more equitable allocation of public resources. Drawing on citizens’ local 
knowledge and resources harnesses their agency to make them what Gaventa calls 
“makers and shapers” rather than simply “users and choosers.”67 And being open 
to the role of “co-governance” or “coproducer” in providing public goods and ser-
vices creates opportunities for citizens to “cut their political teeth”68 and be more 
inclined to engage in other arenas that bring about social and political change. 
Public goods are a kind of problem that sometimes cannot be solved by govern-
ment actors alone, but also may not be solvable without them.
In turn, citizens and the state can create new institutional arrangements for 
public goods delivery when either entity is incapable or unwilling to do so alone. 
These public-private partnerships between state and society arise to coproduce 
public goods and services.69 Each public (state actors in public agencies) and pri-
vate (social actors in civil society) entity supplies complementary resources to 
conjointly organize the provision of public goods. Coproduction partnerships 
between public and private actors can also have democratizing effects when the 
quality of deliberation and who is engaged in public decision-making expands to 
include more marginalized, previously excluded voices.
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While ostensibly beneficial for local democracy, our collective understand-
ing of how public-private partnerships emerge, are structured, and affect politi-
cal and civic engagement from beyond national borders remains undertheorized 
and empirically systematically underexamined. To date, research on coproduc-
tion partnerships has not fully examined the transnational dimensions of pub-
lic goods provision and the conditions under which this kind of transnational 
institution injects political change in places with extensive emigration. This book 
does just that.
WHY TR ANSNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS MAT TER FOR 
LO CAL DEMO CR ATIC GOVERNANCE
The great variety and significant effects of transnational public goods projects are 
most fruitfully understood when they are situated in the preexisting social and 
political contexts of both the destination and place of origin. While prior research 
has emphasized how transnational practices are embodied in larger social struc-
tures and political institutions, few studies have systematically linked how these 
spheres of influence interact to structure the ways in which transnational practices 
are forged and organized and lead to success and failure.
My observations do not depart from the voluminous migrant transnationalism 
research that emphasizes the role of social ties and relations in facilitating cross-
border practices, specifically transnational development and public goods provi-
sion. It is the case that migrants’ “multipolarity” in two social worlds, the society of 
origin and destination, widens their field of existence such that they embody new 
identities and assert rights and duties of belonging and citizenship both “here and 
there.”70 Asserting continued belonging and attachments to places of origin is the 
very foundation of many migrant social groups’ involvement in public goods pro-
vision. Migrants, through the translational act of sending collective remittances 
through hometown organizations, relay messages about increased social position, 
status, and prestige to nonmigrants at home while simultaneously claiming what 
Carling and Lacroix refer to as the “repayment of communality” and “lifeworlds” 
and the reassertion of “villageness” that helps migrants meet their social and eth-
nic obligations to community and allegiance to the hometown through the provi-
sion of development projects.71
However, my project is not an excursus of migrants’ multidimensional motives 
to engage in this particular form of cross-border engagement with the homeland. 
Rather, this is my point of departure. All of the migrant actors I observed were 
involved in hometown associations and remain, to varying degrees, “loyal” to the 
homeland to borrow Hirschman’s canonical language.72 How I build on previous 
research is to start from the premise that all transnationally engaged migrants and 
their hometown clubs are not similarly situated in the hometown social network 
after departure. This is the half of the equation that needs to be explained. I heed 
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Levitt and Glick Schiller’s call to focus on spatially embedded relations or net-
works, which puts the emphasis on the fluidity and openness of social relations. 
In doing so, it is incumbent on me to explain why migrants’ social embeddedness 
in the hometown varies from place to place and over time and how this varia-
tion produces different kinds of cross-border partnership. By theorizing and test-
ing how the structure of migrant social ties varies, I am able to show when local 
citizens are included in transnational development activities in ways that improve 
democratic participation and governance. Drawing on the migrant transnational-
ism literature provides a starting point for analyzing what kinds of migrant social 
relations structure how public goods projects are carried out, who is involved in 
selecting and managing projects, and how interactions are negotiated over time to 
expand the range of actors participating in and influencing decisions about goods 
and services that directly affect their lives.
But unpacking the variation in migrant social embeddedness to discern who is 
involved in making decisions about public goods provision in origin locales is just 
half of the analytic puzzle that requires explanation. The transnational practice I 
study necessarily involves state actors and government agencies in the sending 
state who become more or less engaged in the coproduction of public goods with 
migrants according to key political incentives and institutional climates. Across 
space and time, the political institutional context stymies and encourages local, 
state, and national government actors to forge public-private ties to emigrants 
and their organized groups abroad. It is thus also incumbent on me to theorize 
and empirically examine the political factors that structure coproduction partner-
ships. By disentangling the political and social conditions that interact to structure 
the transnational partnerships in which migrants, nonmigrants, and government 
actors provide public goods across national borders, I account for how different 
transnational partnerships shape and transform local democratic governance.
While there is a large and growing literature on the relationships between 
migration and development and the political consequences of international 
migration for both sending and receiving countries, we lack a good answer for 
why some partnerships are better or worse for local democracy. I argue the lacuna 
stems from three sources. First, the focus on single cases for exploratory theory 
and confirmatory analysis cannot test how conditions varying across different 
migrant-sending communities affect the transnational partnerships that migrant 
associations seek to promote.73 Comparative analysis is better suited to isolate and 
contrast factors that influence the nature of transnational partnerships and cata-
lyze political dynamics in diverse hometown settings.
Second, when research does capture variation in migrant development efforts, 
it examines either the role of political institutions or social factors without con-
sidering how both arenas interact to affect outcomes or change the nature of 
transnational partnerships over time.74 In other words, how might social and 
political relations between relevant state and migrant actors change as a function 
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of coproduction activities? There is very little research that theorizes and empiri-
cally examines why and how social and political conditions at origin shape and are 
shaped by transnational partnerships and how these partnerships are responsive 
to changes in relations at home and abroad.75
There are reasons to be concerned with how political and social institutions 
interact to successfully coordinate public goods with migrant groups. Public goods 
decisions made between state and migrant actors may not be compatible with the 
needs of local citizens who are not passive recipients of public projects, but actors 
with a stake both in their voices being heard (the democratic process) and in poli-
cies that directly affect their quality of life (development outcomes). Moreover, 
government engagement in partnerships cannot be taken as a given since political 
officials face fiscal constraints, shirk responsibilities onto migrant groups, and use 
matching resources for personal gain. And changing conditions in both origin 
and destination locales including rising violence and economic recession may tax 
migrants’ capacity to engage in coproduction regardless of any favorable initial 
conditions that create more synergetic partnerships. Explaining how partnership 
types change over time and break down in response to changing social and politi-
cal conditions at origin and destination requires systematic and in-depth, micro-
level exploration.
Finally, compared to their household counterparts, collective remittances sent 
by migrant groups are a drop in the bucket and virtually impossible to system-
atically track. Few researchers have examined the conditions under which HTAs 
and their development partnerships with the sending state alter democratic 
participation because there is skepticism that the small sums invested in public 
goods, when compared to household remittances, have observable political effects. 
Additionally, the lack of large-n data limits the ability of researchers to challenge 
this skepticism.76 But the empirical gap in research does not mean that the politi-
cal effects are negligible. As I show in the chapters ahead, migrant groups and 
their transnational partnerships with the sending state are a fruitful window for 
assessing how external nonstate actors, and the intermediary arrangements they 
help create, change the way people take part in government and its operation by 
“doing” development. It is not the amount of money sent across the border that 
matters as much as how that money affects and is affected by social and political 
structures and agency in origin and sending communities.77
SCALING UP DEMO CR ATIC ENGAGEMENT FROM 
ABROAD BY D OING DEVELOPMENT
People are on the move engaging in politics across national borders. So who is 
involved in development and how development happens are no longer confined 
within the domestic walls of the nation-state. Using newly acquired resources 
abroad made possible through the act of emigrating, transnational migrants and 
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their social groups upends traditional modes of political engagement because 
while people exit, some still use voice.78 Spaces for civic and political participa-
tion are created with one purpose in mind such as public goods provision, but 
during the process social actors renegotiate boundaries of recognition, belong-
ing, and community membership. And once migrants (re)negotiate their mem-
bership in the hometown community by creating and replenishing social ties and 
overcoming perceived status differences with hometowners, local and transna-
tional citizens work together to directly and indirectly oblige political officials to 
answer for their actions while in office and sanction them for poor performance. 
The increase in civic and political participation of citizens supplements their role 
as voters and watchdogs of government to create more social actors involved in 
local governance.
Spearheaded by transnational migration, the widening of deliberation and 
inclusion constructs a politics of engagement in which previously excluded and 
dormant citizens and citizen groups have the opportunity to use voice in the local 
democratic process. In doing so, citizens make their concerns legible to the state 
through political participation in formal electoral institutions as well as informal 
modes of engagement including participation in protest activities, petitions, polit-
ical campaigns, rallies, marches and protests, town halls, and civic associations.79
But since some migrants do not remain embedded in the social base of the 
hometown after exit and some local officials are unwilling and unable to engage 
migrant partnerships, competition for resources and recognition can lead to fric-
tion between migrants, residents, and political officials. While sometimes bursts 
of political activity occur in response to contests for power, contests for status and 
recognition between social actors, more often than not, lead to political disengage-
ment. Apart from the substantive merits of a project proposal, be it a schoolhouse 
or health clinic, when residents and migrants do not share mutually intelligible 
meanings of community membership required of decision-making authority in 
public affairs, migrant-state partnerships may be deemed illegitimate and suffer 
contention and breakdown.
Furthermore, not all civic associations have democratic ideals. Migrant groups 
fall prey to opportunism, much like political officials, and transnational partner-
ships devolve into patronage for the local government or succumb to outright cor-
ruption. Migrant groups use resources acquired abroad and invest in public goods 
across national borders, improving citizens’ access to essential services,80 but the 
organizational structure and social learning inherent to ongoing relations in trans-
national partnerships reveals when it is effective at deepening political engage-
ment and inducing more responsive governance.
The political dynamics unleashed by migrant groups’ investment in local pub-
lic goods are not the goal of transnational partnerships with the state. Rather, I 
argue they are unintended consequences. As I show in the chapters ahead, migrant 
actors are overwhelmingly apolitical and the principal objective for most clubs is 
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implementing the project—building the school, paving the road, and construct-
ing the bridge. But through the complicated process of coordinating projects in 
transnational space, migrants, local citizens, and political officials realize different 
motivations for participating (or not) and they become constrained and enabled 
by social relationships and local-state capacity. In other words, public goods pro-
vision through transnational partnerships is a window into seeing how actually 
existing local democracies work. The process shows who is involved in making 
decisions about goods and services essential for well-being, whose interests are 
being represented by whom, and who is excluded. It also shows how institutional 
arrangements emerging from outside the boundaries of the nation-state can 
scale up political participation but also exclude marginalized groups. And finally, 
the transnational process shows when and how political authorities are willing 
to shirk their primary responsibilities and offload service provision to migrant 
groups abroad that wield resources acquired through the act of emigrating abroad.
THE STR ATEGIC CASE OF MEXIC O
In few places are issues related to public goods provision, migration, and democ-
ratization more salient than in Mexico. Over the last century, Mexican migrants 
have crossed the 2,000-mile border into the richest country in the world to find 
jobs and reunite with love ones abroad. As of 2016, the Mexico–U.S. migration 
corridor is considered the most heavily traveled in the world.81 Between 1970 and 
2013, more than 10 million Mexican immigrants came to the U.S., an increase of 
about 1,000 percent, and are the largest share of the foreign-born population. 
While out-migration from Mexico was traditionally concentrated in states in the 
rural, central-western part of the country, as of 2010, few municipalities in Mexico 
remain untouched by U.S.-bound migration.82
Over the same period, Mexico has also experienced subnational changes in 
political development. Subnational democratization occurred throughout the 
1990s and culminated in national democratization in which the PAN defeated the 
PRI after 71 years of uninterrupted rule. During this time in which more opposi-
tion parties effectively competed for state and local office, the federal government 
adopted decentralization reforms. These decentralization reforms introduced 
important variation in subnational political authorities’ interest and ability to pro-
vide public goods. First, there are subnational differences in levels of economic 
development, which a vast literature has shown is highly influential in shaping 
public goods provision and democratic governance.83 Second, while civil society 
organizations have strengthened over time after being lulled by decades of author-
itarian rule, recent evidence suggests a stall: only 16 percent of all municipalities 
report the presence of a citizen assembly; 27 percent, a citizen council or board; 
12 percent, representation of municipal delegations (delegados) in localities; 
20 percent, a comptroller for social welfare and public works projects; and just 
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over a third of municipalities report the presence of citizen committees of any 
kind.84 Since previous levels of political engagement and social capital inherent to 
civic associations shape and are shaped by transnational partnerships, observing 
variation across these dimensions is key.
Given the complete lack of systematic data on collective remittances, annual 
data kept by the Ministry of Social Development (Sedesol) that administers the 3x1 
Program provides a rare opportunity to assess the political effects of transnational 
coordination in a variety of local settings. Between 2002 and 2013, HTAs helped 
alleviate municipal poverty and increased citizens’ access to drainage, sanitation, 
and water compared to places without active HTAs.85 Moreover, since three tiers 
of the Mexican government (local, state, and federal) match migrants’ resources, 
funds for public works are significantly amplified; in a quarter of 3x1 participat-
ing municipalities, remittances and matching contributions from the government 
accounted for more than half of local public works budgets.86 Many municipalities 
have come to rely on the 3x1 Program to fund public works. And although collec-
tive remittances dwarf household remittances in sheer volume of flows, since these 
resources are used for public goods they benefit not just migrant households but 
also those citizens who cannot or choose not to go. Mexico provides an unpar-
alleled opportunity and critical case for analyzing the emergence, variation, and 
effects of transnational processes in different social and political settings while 
holding macrostructural features constant.
EMPIRICAL STR ATEGY:  AN INTEGR ATIVE  
MULTI-METHOD APPROACH
Findings for this book are based on original qualitative and quantitative data used 
in a multi-method research design. This strategy can be thought of as integrative 
in that one method provides an initial summary of knowledge about a problem of 
causal inference, while the additional methods test assumptions behind the initial 
summary but also discover new material.87 I used each method for what it is espe-
cially good at, which helped overcome the inherent weakness in the other meth-
odological approaches. Data was collected from a representative original survey of 
Mexican hometown associations, comparative fieldwork in Mexico, publicly avail-
able data for panel analysis of Mexican municipalities, and longitudinal survey 
data sourced from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS).
TR ANSNATIONAL SURVEY INSTRUMENT,  
CASE SELECTION,  AND C OMPAR ATIVE  
FIELDWORK IN MEXIC O
The process of data collection and analysis followed a specific sequence. First, 
I developed and disseminated a survey to all Mexican hometown associations 
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registered with the Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME). The survey instru-
ment was informed by 30 face-to-face and telephone interviews with home-
town association leaders in North Carolina, California, Illinois, and Texas and 
pilot tested with two clubs. The survey respondents were migrant club leaders 
located in 25 U.S. states from 23 states in Mexico (and the federal district) and 
230 different municipalities.
I then collected additional data that situated clubs in transnational space; that 
is, I gathered a sociodemographic, political, and fiscal statistical profile of each 
U.S. destination and Mexican sending municipality that corresponded to migrant 
club respondents. This transnational data effort represents, to my knowledge, the 
first survey to link migrant associations with places of origin and destination.88 
This additional step of data collection was important to decipher how destination 
and origin characteristics made transnational partnerships both more common 
and more successful while informing the organizational features of migrant clubs. 
For example, migrant clubs in U.S. rural locales were more isolated and unable to 
join state-level federations of migrant clubs that aided the dissemination of best 
practices regarding fundraising, membership recruitment, and leadership know-
how for improving club capacity to deliver public works.
Additionally, in Mexican places of origin, long histories of local authoritarian-
ism and escalating violence related to the drug trade and the spread of criminal 
organizations exacerbated distrust in political officials. In turn, local citizens were 
more reticent to work with migrant partners in transnational partnerships with the 
state. U.S. and Mexican place-based characteristics informed how migrant clubs 
emerged and were structured, but also the extent to which partnerships were likely 
to be more inclusive of local residents and local government more fully engaged.
Initial analysis of survey responses showed that community inclusiveness and 
government engagement varied across clubs and were highly correlated with politi-
cal outcomes. To understand why these factors differed across clubs, I selected five 
municipalities from three traditional migration states to conduct fieldwork. The 
geographic locations of the field sites are mapped in Map 1. Guanajuato, Jalisco, 
and Zacatecas have in common a storied history of migration to the U.S., active 
HTAs, and participation in the 3x1 Program. In these three states alone, 10,405 
coproduction projects were completed between 2002 and 2013, representing over 
half of all 3x1 projects across Mexico and 44 percent of 3x1 Program expenditures.89 
Over the full time period, approximately $288 million (USD) was spent on 3x1 
projects in just these three states.
The transnational partnerships I selected in each municipality maximize dif-
ferences in community inclusiveness and government engagement and are exem-
plary of different organizational types. Some key factors including club capacity 
such as resources, time, energy, and interest of the club membership base were 
held constant, but the cases were initially stratified by economic development and 
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were of active migrant clubs and one municipality was the site of a failed trans-
national partnership. More detailed information about the case selection process, 
including a distribution of the cases by organizational type, and the transnational 
survey appears in Data Appendixes A and B.
After the cases were selected, I conducted fieldwork during 2009 and 2010. In 
every municipality I visited, I spoke to past and present government officials, the 
director of the office of migrant outreach (if there was one), local residents, lead-
ers of civic associations, business and shop owners, migrant households, political 
party candidates and operatives, church pastors, locality delegates to the munici-
pal government,90 and members of local public works committees. I also regularly 
attended local public works meetings, town halls, assemblies, social and religious 
events, and ceremonies for public works installations. In most cases, I stayed with 
host families and participated in social events and weekly Catholic mass to build 
familiarity and trust with locals. The fieldwork generated 60 semi-structured 
interviews with key informants and hundreds of informal chats. I followed up with 
individuals with whom I had been unable to meet during fieldwork over email 
and telephone and participated in several HTA fundraising events and meetings 
in Illinois and California. This was necessary because in one case, Santa Catarina, 
drug violence made it unsafe for me to stay as long as I had planned.
I also interviewed state and federal political officials in Jalisco, Guanajuato, and 
Zacatecas, and the director of the 3x1 Program in Mexico City. In the U.S., I inter-
viewed 3x1 Program officials at the Chicago and Los Angeles Mexican consulates 
and several migrant HTA leaders, club members, and HTA federation leadership. 
Many states have organized state-level federations composed of several home-
town clubs from the state across U.S. cities. The states of Michoacán, Jalisco, and 
Zacatecas have the oldest and most well-organized federations in Texas, California, 
and Illinois, but most states in Mexico have at least one state-level federation of 
migrant clubs in the U.S.
The multi-sited fieldwork and interview data offered support for my initial 
intuitions about the factors that shape transnational partnerships. But the quali-
tative data revealed to me more concretely that migrant social embeddedness 
and continuous interactions between migrants, political officials, and residents 
that led to social and political learning were the key underlying mechanisms 
that explained why and how community inclusion and government engagement 
changed over time and accounted for different political outcomes. The compara-
tive fieldwork also showed me that in places where social ties between migrants 
and local residents had decayed or were limited to begin with, social ties could 
be constructed when migrants recruited locals into the coproduction process 
and when they reengaged in repertoires of community membership. The kinds 
of membership activities included, for example, meetings with civic association 
leaders and pastors, participation in social and religious events including festi-
vals, rodeos, dances, church meetings, dinners, and town halls, and social interac-
tions in person and over social media, video chats, texting, and phone calls with 
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residents in the hometown. Thus the survey and fieldwork were complementary. 
The survey helped to identify cases for in-depth analysis of micro-processes while 
the fieldwork provided evidence in support of the initial hypothesis and unearthed 
new information about causal mechanisms, which I could then test using addi-
tional data sources and methods.
SURVEY,  PANEL DATA,  AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
With fresh insights garnered from fieldwork, I then revisited the survey data and 
more closely examined organizational variation in transnational partnerships 
using cluster analysis and determined whether organizational types were linked 
with civic and political engagement before and after the start of transnational part-
nerships. Since the survey data is cross-sectional, I also evaluated aggregate effects 
of transnational partnerships across all Mexican municipalities from 1990 to 2013 
to assess the effects longitudinally. In the final phase of the analysis, I compiled 
data on the sociodemographic, political, fiscal, and migration characteristics for 
Mexican municipalities and assessed, with statistical techniques tailored to the 
quasi-experimental nature of the data, how places with and without transnational 
partnerships differed in political participation and government responsiveness. 
Additionally, I looked to the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), a longitudi-
nal survey, and analyzed how transnational partnerships affected more informal 
forms of civic engagement and nonelectoral modes of political participation across 
a representative sample of Mexican municipalities.
The integrative multi-method research strategy provides compelling evidence 
that migrant transnational partnerships improve political and civic engagement 
under certain conditions. The comparative case study method, initially selected to 
confirm hypotheses, became more exploratory when it revealed new information 
about why the structure of transnational partnerships varied, which then required 
closer scrutiny. The close examination of the micro-process of public goods provi-
sion showed that migrant social networks and political institutions shaped how 
involved local actors and political officials were in the transnational partnership 
with migrant groups. Moreover, observations of variation within cases over time 
showed me how different organizational forms of partnership were linked to dif-
ferent political consequences for local governance. Examination of cases like El 
Cerrito brought to light how migrant actors who lacked social embeddedness in 
the hometown constructed social ties to community stakeholders through out-
reach across multiple projects, which culminated in a process of social learning.
While the small-n method can neither be used to generalize effects in the 
aggregate nor control for the great variation that exists in the real world, without 
it, I would not have known to examine processes of social learning or even have 
known to look for it in the large-n data had I used that method alone. Without the 
large-n data, I would not be able to say with confidence that the political conse-
quences I observed on the ground were not confounded by other factors I could not 
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account for in the field. The integrative multi-method design allowed each method 
to  complement the other methods and each was crucial to the demonstration of 
how transnational partnerships shape and transform local democratic participation 
through the process of public goods provision in migrant places of origin.
THE CHAPTERS AHEAD
In chapter 1, I describe why coproduction has different organizational forms and 
how this variation affects political and civic participation and government respon-
siveness. This part of the book provides a foundation upon which to then analyze 
the process and effects of transnational partnerships across and within Mexican 
communities. In chapter 2, I use a historical institutional approach, original quali-
tative interviews, and secondary data to present the evolution of the Mexican 3x1 
Program and sending-state outreach policies with the Mexican migrant popula-
tion in the U.S. The goal of this chapter is to present a macrostructural analysis of 
why and how transnational partnerships emerge.
The next four chapters comprise the empirical heart of the book. Chapters 3, 
4, and 5 provide a bird’s-eye view of the social and political contexts that organize 
partnerships and draw on six comparative case studies in five municipalities in 
Zacatecas, Jalisco, and Guanajuato. In each of the cases, I trace how community 
inclusion and government engagement interact to produce four organizational 
partnership types—synergetic, corporatist, fragmented, and substitutive—and the 
associated political consequences. In chapter 6, I scale up from micro-analysis to 
the meso-level of the migrant association. Here, I draw on original survey data to 
describe how partnerships vary across survey respondents using cluster analysis. 
Using the transnational survey data, I also test how club-specific factors affect the 
organization of partnerships. I next turn back to the hometown community and 
examine how transnational types observed in the survey data are associated with 
political changes on the ground in Mexico. The chapter then moves beyond cases 
in which transnational coproduction is known to occur to assess the systematic 
effects of partnerships in places with and without them over a 30-plus-year period 
(1990–2013) using statistical analysis.
The conclusion summarizes the central findings based on the case of Mexico. 
I situate transnational partnerships in Mexico with contemporary issues related 
to organized crime and violence spreading into more regions of the country 
and assess how voluntary return and deportations from the U.S. interior back to 
Mexico may affect local governance. I also contemplate what remittance-led devel-
opment means in the globalized world. Finally, I discuss how well the framework 
I offer may travel beyond Mexico to decentralized democracies and authoritarian 
countries with substantial emigration.
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Local Democratic Governance and 
Transnational Migrant Participation
While mobilized from abroad, migrant partnerships with the sending state are 
coordinated in preexisting social and political conditions in places of origin. Local 
social relations and political factors shape who becomes involved in partnerships, 
whose interests are represented, and the quality of the deliberations during project 
negotiations. How involved local citizens and government authorities are in the 
transnational process with migrant partners organizes partnerships differently. In 
this chapter, I argue that the combination of community inclusion and govern-
ment engagement shapes transnational arrangements, creating four main types of 
partnership: synergetic, corporatist, substitutive, and fragmented.
The central argument is that transnational partnerships that are broadly inclu-
sive of residents’ input and reflect the full engagement of local political officials 
facilitate new modes of interaction between local citizens and elected represen-
tatives. This interactive process entwines state and society in local governance. 
Migrants’ horizontal ties in the community and vertical ties to local government 
create conditions ripe for a more politically engaged local citizenry and more 
responsive governance. Other factors such as the length of time migrants have 
been abroad, the intensity of emigration in the hometown, and the size of the ori-
gin community are important, but these factors neither straightforwardly deter-
mine successful coproduction of public works nor determine changes in local 
political and civic engagement. Rather, the ability of migrant leaders to overcome 
the array of challenges inherent to collective action from abroad hinges on social 
and political institutions and resources in the hometown and are captured through 
the concepts of community inclusion and government engagement.
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C O ORDINATION OF TR ANSNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 
IN THE SO CIAL BASE OF THE HOMETOWN
The coordination of public goods provision between migrant actors (and their 
groups) and political officials is a fluid process that occurs in the social base of 
the hometown.1 By “social base” I am referring to the structure of the relational 
setting composed of a set of social ties and interactions among a set of actors that 
enables them to act collectively.2 Migrants’ collective remittance resources create 
vertical ties to government actors that contribute complementary resources for 
local public goods provision, which forms the organizational basis for transna-
tional coproduction to occur. But migrants are also socially embedded in their 
places of origin to varying degrees. I argue the extents to which migrants maintain 
and construct horizontal ties and practice cultural repertoires that confer commu-
nity membership are the most important determinants of the breadth and depth of 
community inclusion in the coproduction process. When migrants participate in 
public goods provision, how well they remain integrated into the social base of the 
hometown and their ability to overcome perceived differences in status brought 
about by migrating abroad play significant roles in how effective their partnerships 
with sending state actors will be and the political outcomes that result.
EFFECT S OF INTERNATIONAL MIGR ATION ON 
SO CIAL TIES AND C OMMUNIT Y MEMBERSHIP
Distance from the place of origin and exposure to new influences, attitudes, 
behaviors, and customs create separation from people remaining behind. Some 
migrants are fundamentally changed by the migratory experience, which intro-
duces modes of disconnection between sojourners and stay-at-homes. The length 
of time abroad attenuates migrants’ web of contacts in the home place, constrict-
ing individual ties to more narrow circles of familiars. Demands on time, cost of 
travel, and legal status barriers to regular home-country visits reduce HTA mem-
bers’ exposure to and knowledge of conditions in the home place. Migrants’ social 
and physical distance from the hometown leads to ideational gaps between “here” 
and “there” that likely constricts migrants’ social ties to a diverse set of social actors 
and stakeholders in the hometown community.
The social distance created by emigration is not so different from other kinds 
of departure. Take, for example, changes in social status that occur when people 
go away for college. While going to college is a privilege in its own right, some 
high school graduates have the additional luxury of being able to go to a school 
in a different part of the home state or in a different state altogether. Time away in 
some different place exposes sojourners to new experiences, ideas, and behaviors. 
College-goers meet new friends across campus from different parts of the country, 
they become more mature, and they learn new things about themselves and about 
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the world they live in. As people get older, work, and play together, they develop 
meaningful relationships that continue to inform who they are and where they 
want to go. Like college-goers, migrants often see their hometowns and the people 
remaining behind through a new lens after experiencing life in a new place.
Sometimes the distance produces nostalgia and a strong desire to return to 
familiar ways of life. But for others the psychological and emotional journey to 
somewhere else and the experiences afforded to them in new places create social 
divisions and noticeable differences between those who go and those who stay. 
When migrants, like college grads, have achieved some upward mobility because 
of their emigration, their material resources and ideas about the world that result 
from living abroad may affect social status at home. Migrants’ experiences living 
abroad and acquisition of income lead some to adopt new attitudes and enables 
them access to land, new language, manners, customs, and dress.3 These differ-
ences between here and there arising from migration may exacerbate social divi-
sions already present and generate new cleavages between those who stay and 
those who go, which complicates migrants’ claims to continued membership in 
the hometown community after they go abroad.
Places of origin are not frozen in time during migrants’ absence either. While 
migrants work and live in the destination, people go on living, working, and engag-
ing in the social, economic, cultural, and political life of the sending community. 
Children go to school. Political incumbents win and lose. Families invest in hous-
ing improvements, start businesses, and care for the sick and elderly. Couples 
marry and break up. Scandals, gossip, festivals, celebrations, traditions, and all 
manner of social and cultural life continue even as migrants come and go, video 
chat with family and friends, and build more permanent lives in the destination.
In some places, as emigration increases, communities become more trans-
nationally oriented.4 Residents with migrant ties or in places with high rates of 
emigration become more aware of and interested in the culture and society of 
the destination country. Substantial emigration changes many immigrants and it 
changes people remaining behind as well. These changes that accompany substan-
tial emigration mean that some migrants are more likely to be embedded in the 
social base of the hometown after exit while others are less so.
Moreover, it is not enough to have social connections. Migrants must also 
be able to overcome perceived status differences between them and the stay-at-
homes. When migrants continue to partake in cultural norms and values that are 
meaningful for group solidarity in the homeland, they signal to those at home that 
even though they have left and have become more prosperous they still belong. 
Migrants who are more socially embedded have both breadth and depth of social 
network ties in the hometown community and they are more likely to include 
local residents as active partners in the transnational process of coproducing pub-
lic goods. Community inclusion has important consequences for civic and politi-
cal engagement in local governance.
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MIGR ANT SO CIAL EMBEDDEDNESS AND 
MEMBERSHIP IN THE HOMETOWN C OMMUNIT Y
Migrant embeddedness depends on the maintenance and construction of social 
ties and continued engagement with cultural repertoires that signal community 
membership. In this context, the relevant migrant actors are those individuals 
who are the active leaders or ambassadors of the migrant club in the hometown. 
Migrants’ social embeddedness is key to understanding which residents are active 
participants in the coproduction process because it informs whose interests are 
being represented in negotiations with local government actors. This inclusiveness 
has important implications for the scaling up of local civic and political engage-
ment in project governance and the likelihood that local participation spills over 
into other forms of democratic engagement.
Embeddedness is also crucial because it mitigates legitimacy issues that arise 
when migrants make decisions in town affairs from abroad. I expect that migrants 
who are more socially embedded will be able to substantively participate in the 
public affairs of the hometown as if they were territorial citizens because residents 
and community leaders still perceive them as members of the social and politi-
cal community. In other words, making legitimate political decisions in public 
affairs from beyond borders is predicated on the belief of those remaining behind 
that migrants still belong to the community in a meaningful way. Migrants who 
maintain or construct more extensive social ties in the hometown, fulfill social, 
religious, and ethnic obligations, and practice quotidian cultural repertoires of 
social solidarity are more likely to be perceived as group members regardless of 
their territoriality and to include residents in the coproduction process. And while 
migrant individual characteristics and cultural practices matter for their belong-
ingness so too does the structure of social ties in the hometown community.
By “community,” I am referring to territorial (local resident) and extraterritorial 
(migrants who live abroad) citizens who share common attachment to the terri-
tory of the municipality or locality where public goods projects are provided in the 
coproduction process.5 In this context, the concept of community extends beyond 
the confines of the political territory of the nation-state to those who are citizens 
abroad and who have a juridical claim to citizenship based on jus solis (birthright 
citizenship, or “right of the soil”) and jus sanguinis (one or both parents being 
citizens, or “right of blood”) laws. The important distinction here is that while 
migrants may retain juridical citizenship claims to participate in their places of 
origin, their absence calls into question whether or not they still belong.
Since public goods decisions are not binding on migrants because they live 
abroad, when migrants take an active, collective role in making decisions regard-
ing public projects by mobilizing their remittance resources, residents may not 
perceive those decisions as legitimate if they have not had a meaningful part in 
their formation.6 To increase the likelihood that public goods project decisions 
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have legitimacy when they are transnationally coordinated, either local citizens 
are included in the decision-making process, or migrants who represent commu-
nity interests are perceived as social and political members of the hometown such 
that when they make decisions about public goods projects, their decisions are 
articulations of local residents’ interests.7 There is an inherent tension in extrater-
ritorial migrant citizens acting on their juridical citizenship claims to substantively 
participate in local political decisions in places where they no longer physically 
reside. As such, the recruitment of local citizens into the coproduction process 
is an important factor in determining the successes and failures of projects and 
possibilities for more democratic participation in local governance. We need to 
know who is involved in helping migrants and political officials make public goods 
decisions to know how egalitarian the process is. Understanding the structure of 
migrant social ties in the hometown shows us the way.
MIGR ANT B ONDING AND BRID GING SO CIAL TIES IN 
THE HOMETOWN
The structure of migrant social ties in the hometown determines the degree of 
community inclusion. Migrant ties are best characterized by a combination of 
two types of social ties: bonding and bridging ties. The migrant bonding network 
includes people who are similar in terms of their demographic characteristics 
such as kin (consanguine and affinal) and fictive kin relationships.8 Most often, 
migrants are bonded to family and close friends remaining behind as well as other 
migrant households in the origin community as these relationships entail trust 
and reciprocity. Bonding social ties are also the most likely to endure after emigra-
tion. When migrants needed help with transnational public projects, they most 
often initially recruited from this network.
By contrast, bridging ties are social ties to people who do not share many char-
acteristics and tend to be beyond migrants’ immediate social circles.9 Bridging 
ties are more outward looking and encompass people with diverse socioeconomic 
characteristics, whereas bonding ties are more inward looking and reinforce 
exclusive identities and more homogenous, similar characteristics. Bonding ties 
undergird reciprocity and mobilize solidarity, but bridging ties serve as links to 
external assets and improve information diffusion by generating broader identities 
and nurturing relationships of reciprocity.10
The bonding and bridging ties11 that make up migrants’ social base are not 
either-or categories that neatly divide social networks. Rather, the membership 
of migrant HTAs has both bonding and bridging ties; however, bridging ties tend 
to be in shorter supply. Assessing the inclusiveness of coproduction in terms of 
the extent of bonding and bridging social ties in the hometown is key to under-
standing how reflective the coproduction process is of different interests and 
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needs in the hometown setting, especially those of more marginalized citizens 
and citizen groups.12
Robert Putnam argues that without bridging ties, such as those that cross vari-
ous social divides based on religion, class, ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic 
status, bonding ties can become the basis for the pursuit of narrow sectarian inter-
ests.13 Community inclusion that is reflective of both bonding and bridging ties 
is indicative of greater representation of societal interests. Smaller communities 
and those with strong ethno-religious institutions like usos y costumbres, a tradi-
tional self-governance system based on indigenous customary law, may be more 
likely to have preexisting bridging ties with migrants abroad. Moreover, destina-
tion country place-based characteristics, including the size of the hometown clubs’ 
membership base, may influence the extent of the bonding and bridging ties in the 
social base that migrants can draw on to coordinate public goods projects.
In sum, the extent to which migrants are socially embedded in the hometown is 
defined by the social ties they retain after their departure. Those ties are most often 
bonding social ties to family, close friends, and neighbors. While some migrants 
maintain social connections to a wider network of people in the hometown, these 
ties are often in shorter supply and most likely in places with ethno-religious insti-
tutions. The combination of bonding and bridging social ties connects migrants to 
their hometown community and determines the initial recruitment of local citi-
zens in the transnational process of planning and implementing public goods. The 
overall structure of these ties matter for understanding the effect of transnational 
partnerships on changes in political and civic participation in the hometown 
because who is involved in the process determines whose interests are represented 
and which groups gain access to political officials.
If bridging ties are limited or nonexistent in the migrant social base they can 
still be created. Some migrant club members may forge new bridging ties through 
community outreach and recruitment initiatives through existing institutions, 
elites, and infrastructures.14 In other instances, local residents may request access 
to project planning or insert themselves into the coproduction process if they feel 
excluded. Locals who are stakeholders or leaders in public affairs in the hometown 
may challenge the legitimacy of migrant club involvement in public goods provi-
sion if club members do not seek their consultation or respect their social status. 
Recruitment of bridging ties with key stakeholders in the community is critical if 
migrants want their hometown investment and participation to have broad sup-
port and they want to thwart contests for power and authority.
Social interactions with residents outside migrants’ bonding network in the 
hometown may lead to the expansion of bridging ties and the incorporation of a 
broader swath of societal interests into the coproduction process. Through recruit-
ment initiatives, introductions, and repeated social interactions with local residents 
beyond migrants’ immediate social circle, bridging ties are often constructed. And 
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these new social actors representing diverse interests in the community are incor-
porated into the public goods process.
To summarize, the construction of new bridging ties in the migrant social 
network that accompanies repeated, cumulative interactions over the course of 
coproducing public goods projects enables migrants and stay-at-home citizens 
to learn ways to confront conflict and problem-solve through deliberation and 
negotiation. Since the construction and maintenance of both bonding and bridg-
ing ties that embed migrants in the social fabric of the hometown community 
can be quite challenging, community inclusion is more likely to reflect migrants’ 
narrower bonding network to the exclusion of others. While I argue that, on aver-
age, community inclusion is more likely to be narrower, I also emphasize that 
social learning through repeated coproduction projects does allow for the expan-
sion of social network ties that leads to increases in community inclusion in the 
coproduction process. The construction of more heterogeneous social ties in the 
hometown is possible, even if migrant social embeddedness is rather limited at 
the outset.
CULTUR AL REPERTOIRES,  C OMMUNIT Y 
MEMBERSHIP,  AND MUTUAL REC O GNITION
Social relations between migrants and territorial residents are important, but the 
basis of social membership is also instantiated, in part, on the practice of cultural 
repertoires that are meaningful to community members. By “cultural repertoires” 
I am referring to cultural ideas, rituals, customs, traditions, activities, pastimes, 
and practices that convey social solidarity and community. Social ties and interac-
tions between migrants and residents in the social base of the hometown are easier 
to have when migrants continue to practice cultural repertoires that are meaning-
ful to the residential members of the hometown.
In this formulation, cultural repertoires emphasize what Amy Binder and 
colleagues refer to as the constitutive elements of culture, including “the diverse 
meanings and beliefs that individuals and groups adopt to interpret their life 
experiences and, equally important, how such life experiences are in turn conse-
quential in their social lives.”15 Migrants’ who continue to participate in different 
materialist and recreational activities, ways and manner of communication, and 
social institutions including the Catholic Church and neighborhood associations 
while abroad reproduce and, therefore, reaffirm their membership in the social life 
of the hometown. Engaging in cultural repertoires of community also deempha-
sizes perceived or actual status differences that often accompany migrants’ upward 
social mobility brought about by living and working abroad. Since the migration 
experience changes the material status of migrants, individuals who participate 
in club activities in the hometown have to strike a delicate balance in how they 
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display their wealth and social status difference and maintain social solidarity and 
mutually recognized ideas of community with residents.
For example, when migrants go abroad they often learn a new language (e.g., 
English), adopt a new style of dress typical of the destination country, adopt new 
cultural practices perceived as “modern” (e.g., tattoos, piercings), and engage 
in conspicuous forms of consumption that together signal ascendance to a new 
social location, which may create social distance and sometimes jealousy. The 
social status differences affirmed by the migration experience are partially coun-
teracted by practicing cultural repertoires and sharing their wealth and success 
with hometowners. When migrants maintain residences, visit frequently or for 
extended periods, continue to operate businesses from abroad, send remittances, 
bring home gifts for family, close friends, and acquaintances during visits, speak 
their native tongue, meet ethnic obligations (e.g., tequios or faenas) and wear tra-
ditional dress, they communicate solidarity, even if the activities are enabled by 
social mobility abroad. Migrants also partake in and host parties, rodeos, and 
church celebrations, financially support cultural traditions and community festi-
vals (e.g., the annual patron saint festival) from abroad, and buy drinks and din-
ners for friends and acquaintances. These activities help preserve solidaristic ties 
with residents and influence recognition of social membership in the hometown 
community when membership is no longer tied to territorial residence. Engaging 
in cultural repertoires helps preserve imagined meanings of community that tres-
pass national political borders in places that experience and are influenced by 
international migration.16
The reproduction of cultural repertoires enables migrants who achieve new lev-
els of social mobility abroad to preserve their social position as a member of the 
community even while residing abroad. I expect that those migrants who practice 
cultural repertoires are also those who are more likely to have or are willing and 
interested in constructing bridging ties.17 Those migrants who have wider social 
network ties or are able to construct ties anew, and who participate in cultural prac-
tices, norms, and values that communicate solidarity, are those most likely to have 
the highest degree of community inclusion in transnational partnerships despite 
achieving new levels of wealth and experience relative to those remaining behind.
C OMMUNIT Y INCLUSION IN TR ANSNATIONAL 
PARTNERSHIPS
Community inclusion refers to the extent to which locals are involved in the 
transnational coproduction of public goods—selecting, volunteering, monitoring, 
negotiating, planning, and donating labor and resources to projects. Community 
inclusion is important to transnational partnerships for two reasons. First, the social 
base provides migrant club leaders absent from the hometown with local resources 
that help achieve project goals. Migrants’ social ties support the coproduction 
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endeavor in migrants’ absence in several important ways. Local citizens monitor 
coproduction projects, ensure timely completion and quality standards, volunteer 
labor and contribute personal and community resources, put pressure on local offi-
cials to meet matching contributions, and regularly interface with local officials 
regarding project selection, materials and machinery, implementation, and tech-
nical planning. Without local support from the social base, migrant clubs must 
attempt to manage coproduction partnerships entirely from abroad or have the 
means to visit (e.g., legal status, time, energy, resources to cross the border) to meet 
with officials and plan and execute public goods projects. Without the “eyes and 
ears” of local citizens, transnational projects are vulnerable to corruption by local 
government and other nonstate actors.18 Reliable local community partners pro-
vide an important check on public agents and improve the likelihood that transna-
tional collective action achieves the desired project goals.
Second, community inclusion, especially the inclusion of bridging social ties, 
increases the legitimacy and representativeness of the coproduction process since 
it includes more social actors and interests of different social segments of the com-
munity. Limited bridging ties can be problematic for a couple of reasons. Limited 
bridging ties may mean migrant club members are more likely to be perceived as 
social outsiders who lack information about norms of reciprocity and obligation, 
and the needs of the local citizenry. These “social gaps” of trust beyond migrants’ 
social base of support undermine collective action efforts because citizens may 
rally to challenge the HTA as the representative voice of the community and work 
at cross-purposes.19 When social ties are lacking, the selection of coproduction 
projects with the local government reflects migrant desires and those of their close 
social ties to the exclusion of other societal interests. This exclusion may renew or 
create social divisions between migrant and nonmigrant households in the home-
town and ignite questions about who belongs and who is really a member of the 
community with the authority to make decisions in public affairs when territorial 
residence is not the only factor that determines membership.
From the perspective of territorial citizens, exclusion from the coproduction 
process may undermine their social and political location. Exclusion from copro-
duction sends the message that political participation is hierarchical, and that 
one’s access to and influence in political deliberations is materially conditioned. 
And because coproduction involves the state, when elected representatives privi-
lege the voice of migrants over their constituents, they diminish the inherent value 
of (territorial) participation in politics. In places with substantial emigration, an 
active, organized group of migrants with resources to wield power and influence 
can diminish political membership and participation of territorial residents when 
residents are excluded from the coproduction process. When the voices of emi-
grants are louder than the voices of territorial citizens, or when they represent 
a narrow group of interests based on migrants’ close social ties, migrant groups’ 
transnational collective action becomes an instrument of what Weber called 
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social closure—the process by which social collectives seek to maximize rewards 
by restricting access to resources and opportunities or in which resources and 
opportunities are restricted to a limited circle of social actors who are eligible.20 
Transnational coproduction creates social closure when migrants act as if they 
are still territorial residents of the hometown without renegotiating their social 
membership in the community through the maintenance and construction of a 
wide array of social ties and practice of cultural repertoires and speak on behalf of 
the community of territorial residents without the legitimate authority to do so.
When emigrants exercise political voice after exit and that political voice is not 
predicated on mutual recognition of community membership, coproduction dis-
tances residents from making the decisions that affect their quality of life. Migrant 
transnational collective action that is exclusionary may displace residents from 
participation in the democratic political process, which is supposed to serve as a 
vehicle for interest representation and mechanism of social and political account-
ability in local governance. To overcome the inherent paradox in exercising voice 
and exit simultaneously, migrants must renegotiate their membership in the 
hometown community, which is facilitated by their degree of social embedded-
ness in the hometown community and includes local residents in coproduction; 
the broader the social network, the more successful the partnership.
LO CAL GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT IN 
TR ANSNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS
The structure of the social base in origin communities explains the degree to which 
transnational partnerships are inclusive of a broad, representative group of local 
citizens. However, since coproduction is a public-private partnership between 
organized migrant groups and local government, I also consider the factors that 
incentivize (and disincentivize) local government authorities’ engagement in the 
process. Since coproduction requires complementary public financing from local 
government it is also necessary to assess what factors affect the quality of govern-
ment engagement.
The degree to which local government provides complementary inputs to 
coproduction in the form of monetary and in-kind resources, project selection 
and planning, technical support, labor, and quality control is likely to vary across 
hometown settings. I argue two distinct but related factors affect local govern-
ment engagement. First, government capacity determines political officials’ abil-
ity to provide complementary inputs and their capacity depends, in part, on the 
organizational competence of local officials such as the public resources in the 
budget, their level of expertise, training, and professionalism. Second, when politi-
cal officials are facing the possibility of their political party gaining or losing office 
and voters are actively engaged in making requests (or demands) for public goods, 
local political officials are likely to be more engaged in coproduction projects. In 
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democratic systems with multiparty elections, government officials’ incentives 
to cooperate with HTAs are likely shaped by local electoral incentives.21 In the 
Mexican system, local officeholders cannot run for reelection for municipal presi-
dent. As a result, competition between political parties is an important factor in 
determining when local government takes an active approach toward the trans-
national partnership. Taken together, both demand-side and supply-side factors 
explain the degree to which local government officials engage in the coproduction 
project process.
On the supply side, government contributions to partnerships are most often 
shaped by local budget constraints and the size of the origin community, but also the 
training and professionalism of local government officials and staff.22 Government 
engagement suffers if local officials do not have the training and skills to provide 
technical plans and organize project budgets, or the ability to maintain authority 
and provide security over their political territory. In short, government engage-
ment in coproduction is more likely in political contexts in which local govern-
ment has what Michael Mann calls “infrastructural power.” Infrastructural power 
refers to the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and imple-
ment logistical political decisions through those realms.23 Furthermore, as Wendy 
Pearlman argues, state capacity is an important factor to be evaluated rather than 
a property to be assumed when analyzing sending-state experiences with mass 
migration.24 Explaining variation in local government engagement necessitates a 
description of the real and effective authority of the government, which is cap-
tured by the size of the origin community, fiscal budgetary constraints, and the 
degree of professionalization of political officials and their staff.
On the demand side, attention to the ways in which electoral systems channel 
societal interests for social spending and public goods delivery determines when 
local government officials are more likely to be engaged. Since electoral compe-
tition has become fiercer with subnational democratization, incumbent political 
parties interested in electoral victory may use public spending and remittance 
matching for public goods as a strategy to curry political favor in local political 
districts. Incumbent political officials may respond to increasingly competitive 
elections by using spending strategies that either win over swing voters or reward 
loyal party supporters.
Whether incumbents use broad, programmatic, or targeted spending to gar-
ner political support happens according to two separate logics according to the 
distributive politics literature. According to the first logic, incumbents use pro-
grammatic spending on public works to win over swing voters in highly competi-
tive districts.25 Programmatic spending increases public goods provision, which 
benefits everyone including both loyal constituents and swing voters. We should 
expect, then, that in highly competitive municipalities, incumbent political offi-
cials will by more engaged in transnational partnerships that provide public goods 
to win over a larger share of the electorate in order to win elections. According 
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to a second logic, in political party strongholds incumbent parties may choose to 
reward core supporters with targeted spending because they only need to win by a 
small margin called the selectorate.26 Targeting goods directly to core constituents 
allows incumbents to reward those who consistently turn out to the polls to sup-
port them. If political officials follow this strategy, we should expect less govern-
ment engagement in party strongholds where incumbent officials need not rely 
on programmatic spending on public goods as a winning strategy. To understand 
the variability in municipal engagement in coproduction projects, I also assess 
how municipal officials respond to changing municipal electoral pressures and the 
competitiveness of multiparty elections.27
In short, understanding the variation in local government engagement requires 
a careful evaluation of the political conditions that incentivize officials’ degree of 
participation and the real and effective authority that they have while holding 
office. Local government must use public resources and know-how to meet their 
obligations in coproduction projects, but how much they complement the copro-
duction process with time, energy, and resources is a function of their capacity 
and the perceived political payoff of doing so. But why can’t HTAs simply provide 
public goods and services on their own? Why do they need government partners 
and the support of public agencies in the sending state?
There are a few reasons why HTAs need some engagement from the local or 
subnational government in decentralized political systems. First, migrant HTAs 
are made up of immigrants in the destination country who volunteer their free 
time, energy, and resources to improve social welfare in their hometown com-
munities. While some associations have become formal organizations with 501c(3) 
status and maintain high levels of capacity (e.g., stable and growing membership 
and resource base, skills in organizing and fundraising, membership in state-level 
federations of clubs with information and resources to draw from), very few HTAs 
are likely to have the requisite training, support, energy, resources, and economies 
of scale to independently coordinate public goods without input and support from 
government authorities. Most HTAs are social groups that range in size but have 
a core group of leaders with a less involved membership base. This means that 
club leaders are most often the ones who do the bulk of the activities required to 
produce public projects back in the hometown. Migrant leaders organize, fund-
raise, and oversee development projects often in their spare time, on weekends, 
over telephone and email, and in meeting places at one another’s houses. These 
club leaders are rarely professionally trained engineers and public administrators 
and typically do not have a full-time staff to support transnational efforts. HTAs 
need the financial and technical support of local government in order to meet the 
demands of implementing public works projects from beyond national borders.
Second, local government in many decentralized federal systems bears the 
administrative and political responsibility to provide public goods and services to 
the citizenry. Local government is the entity charged with caring and administering 
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public lands. For many public goods projects, HTAs, at a minimum, need the 
approval and legal permission from local government to access public territory to 
build cemeteries, bridges, roads, sidewalks, water pipes, light poles, and the like, 
in the hometown.
Third, as competition for local public office becomes more competitive, local 
incumbents must build a base of support to secure electoral victory. If migrant 
HTAs are providing public goods without the cooperation of local government, 
elected officials may perceive migrant groups as a challenge to their legitimate 
authority and work to demobilize HTA development efforts or seek to offload 
responsibility completely onto migrant groups. In this vein, the size of the ori-
gin community where coproduction projects are proposed and carried out is a 
likely factor in the degree of local government engagement. In larger, wealthier 
communities in which political officials face fewer fiscal constraints to spend on 
public goods, local government actors may be less inclined to commit resources 
to the coproduction effort because officials do not need migrants to fulfill their 
administrative and political obligations. It may be more likely the case that smaller 
communities and those with more restricted social spending budgets are more 
inclined to support transnational coproduction projects with migrant groups 
abroad in order to subsidize local social spending initiatives with complementary 
resources from abroad.
Finally, if migrants’ social bases are diffuse networks of engaged citizens and 
their civic associations, lack of government engagement signals to a segment of the 
voting public that local administration is wanting, which may harm incumbents 
come election time or create more discord and distrust in politicians. The local 
political context, including the preexisting character of political competition and 
institutional capacity, helps explain the extent to which local government engages 
in coproduction projects with migrant transnational partners.
HOW C OMMUNIT Y INCLUSION AND GOVERNMENT 
ENGAGEMENT ORGANIZE PARTNERSHIP T YPES
How do partnerships organizationally vary? I conceive of the coproduction pro-
cess as a relational space in which migrant and political actors interact in differ-
ent social and political settings.28 Figure 2 represents a conceptual space in which 
community inclusion (horizontal axis) and government engagement (vertical 
axis) intersect at different points and times along the two dimensions. The two 
dimensions of coproduction are dynamic, as are the interactions between differ-
ent sets of agents (migrant groups, political officials, local citizens, and citizen 
groups). I emphasize that it is this dynamism, this variation, that determines polit-
ical outcomes.
Different combinations of community inclusion and government engagement 
yield coproduction “types” identified in the four quadrants of the diagram. When 
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inclusion and engagement are high (quadrant I), I call this a synergetic partner-
ship. Synergetic coproduction is characterized by cooperative engagement among 
migrant HTAs, local government, and local citizens. All groups collaborate to coor-
dinate projects, including deliberation over project selection, implementation, and 
oversight. I argue that as coproduction partnerships become more cooperative 
and inclusive, the likelihood that positive spillovers from coproduction affect civic 
and political participation in the hometown beyond project governance increases. 
In turn, as more local citizens participate in civic and political  institutions—for 
example, voting and community associations—more citizens’ interests will be rep-
resented in the political sphere of decision-making and government responsive-
ness will improve.
Synergetic coproduction is more likely to lead to greater civic and political 
engagement because citizens and government actors become embedded in more 
routinized forms of interaction and participation. Since citizens are more involved 
in making and shaping social welfare decisions that directly affect their lives, they 
are more likely to engage in politics as they learn what the democratic process can 
do to improve their lives and solve local problems that affect the citizenry. In other 
words, more participation in coproduction is likely to increase the political efficacy 


















FIGURE 2. STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF TRANSNATIONAL COPRODUCTION 
Figure 2. Conceptual diagram illustrating how community inclusion and government 
 engagement interact to produce four organizational types of transnational coproduction.
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elections. More civic and political engagement of the citizenry, in turn, will yield 
a more responsive government apparatus since citizens are willing to put pressure 
on government actors through social mechanisms. Information that citizens have 
about public budgets and the kind of decisions government actors make occur in 
closer proximity to their constituents. When citizens, migrants, and elected repre-
sentatives are more enmeshed in decision-making over public goods and services, 
more local democratic engagement and responsive governance ensues.
By contrast, when both indicators are low (quadrant III), a fragmented partner-
ship emerges. This form is inherently vulnerable to co-optation by the state and, 
in some instances, the HTA. The exclusion (intentional or unintentional) of local 
residents and low government engagement coupled with migrants’ interrupted 
presence or physical absence from the hometown during project activities often 
leads to project mismanagement, appropriation of funds, and ultimate  failure. 
Fragmented coproduction is most often associated with a worsening of state- 
society relations and a decline in citizen trust and engagement in local political 
life.29 Fragmented partnerships signal less information sharing between migrants 
and residents about local government. When citizens are less involved in the 
coproduction process there are fewer social actors to monitor local government 
and provide oversight in project planning, implementation, and quality control. 
The lack of monitoring by residents and migrants who live abroad makes corrup-
tion and rent-seeking behaviors more likely, which often leads to the failure of the 
transnational partnership.
I discuss two additional intermediary cases in which either inclusion or engage-
ment is low (or high) along the continuum of the axes. These intermediary forms 
I refer to as corporatist partnerships (quadrant II) and substitutive partnerships 
(quadrant IV). Corporatist coproduction is an organizational form in which high 
government engagement but low citizen inclusion links migrants’ organized inter-
ests directly with the decisional structure of the local government. Cooperative 
relations between HTAs and local government grant HTAs privileged access 
to political officials to set the local public policy agenda. When migrants’ pub-
lic goods preferences predominate, the unequal distribution of resources toward 
migrant- and state-preferred public projects crowds out the voices of residents 
with a stake in public goods decisions that directly affect their lives. I hypothesize 
that corporatist coproduction affects local democratic engagement in two ways: 
political disengagement or short-run political activism.
Corporatist coproduction, characterized by low levels of community inclusion 
but high government engagement, suggests a narrow representation of interests 
reflected in project selection and implementation. If the migrant club lacks the 
ability or desire to retain some autonomy from the state, then migrant and state 
interests become the same and migrant groups may be vulnerable to clientelistic 
capture. On the one hand, citizen exclusion may trigger short-run political activ-
ism. When citizens perceive migrant groups’ participation being privileged by the 
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local government or perceive migrants as agents of the state, this crowding out 
may induce greater political awareness, interest, and mobilization to participate 
in formal politics. Citizen exclusion may introduce more short-term political par-
ticipation at the local level as opposition political parties seize the opportunity 
to garner disaffected citizen voters. Citizens may be more encouraged to use the 
ballot box to punish incumbents for poor performance while in office (and reward 
incumbents who perform well) because they witnessed government mismanage-
ment firsthand. On the other hand, citizen exclusion from the coproduction pro-
cess may lead locals to distrust political (and migrant actors) and politics more 
generally. This decline in political interest may create disenchantment with local 
politics and a decline in political engagement.
Finally, substitutive coproduction refers to low government engagement and 
high community inclusion. In substitutive coproduction, local government pro-
vides some, albeit minimal, complementary inputs to public projects. Since cofi-
nancing from other levels of government (state and federal) often accompanies 
coproduction, higher tiers of government and migrant HTAs subsidize local gov-
ernment provision. HTAs, in coordination with local citizens and citizen groups, 
organize project selection, planning, and implementation, leaving local govern-
ment largely off the hook for service provision. In substitutive coproduction, gov-
ernment responsiveness is likely to wane as HTAs, citizens, and state and federal 
cofinancing partners subsidize local public works provision through coproduc-
tion.30 In extreme cases, migrant groups may begin to challenge local officials 
for political power and authority and become the apex provider of local public 
goods and services. Substitutive coproduction is most likely to affect government 
responsiveness in public goods provision. If migrant groups subsidize social wel-
fare spending and complete the lion’s share of effort in coordinating public works, 
local governments are likely to allocate less resources for public social welfare, thus 
allowing them to shift spending patterns to alternative budget categories.
It is important to stress that coproduction cases are likely to be situated at other 
points along the conceptual continuum. The four cases I analyze reflect extreme 
combinations of inclusion and engagement and provide a set of testable hypothe-
ses for the empirical chapters that follow. Additional cases of coproduction include 
transnational partnerships that come together for the purpose of one and only one 
project. I do not discuss such cases of one-off coproduction, but they frequently 
emerge. Other cases of coproduction are also likely affected by local factors that 
are not directly related to political institutions and social embeddedness includ-
ing, for example, economic crisis and drug-related violence, which affected the 
United States and Mexico in the period of study. These hybrid cases are likely 
closer to reality than the stark characterizations I present here. I explore the role of 
economic crisis and public insecurity and violence more in the qualitative empiri-
cal chapters ahead.31
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HOW U.S .  AND MEXICAN CHAR ACTERISTICS SHAPE 
TR ANSNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS
Certainly, other factors are important to coproduction processes, including 
migrants’ length of stay in the destination country, ecological features of the des-
tination locale such as membership size, network dynamics, proximity of HTAs 
to other clubs and home country consulate, membership in state-level federa-
tions (especially in the Mexican case), as well as the internal structure of club 
decision-making. All of these factors vary across transnational partnerships. The 
point is not that other factors are irrelevant. Rather, I argue they are most likely 
to affect the configurations of partnerships through their effect on community 
inclusion and government engagement. In other words, the role of HTA capacity 
and U.S. and Mexican place-based characteristics, for example, may be endog-
enous to the community inclusion and government engagement that structure 
transnational partnerships.
One could imagine that the capacity of HTAs to carry out coproduction activi-
ties, most notably their fundraising ability and club internal organizational struc-
ture, is conditioned, in part, on the very factors that I argue affect migrant social 
embeddedness and thus community inclusion, including the size of the U.S. des-
tination membership base. HTAs with more club members have access to more 
social ties from which to draw support. Since they are embedded in larger social 
bases they may expand community inclusion beyond their immediate bonding 
network. And because they have larger social networks to draw on for fundraising 
and coproduction support, they may also have a larger resource base to invest in 
public works from abroad.
Additionally, clubs that are members of state-level federations may develop 
more direct vertical links to political officials in the home country, enabling more 
opportunities to interface with elected representatives in the origin and destina-
tion country. More opportunities to interact with political authorities through 
state-level federations may, in turn, encourage more government engagement by 
way of leveraging bargaining power over municipal authorities with the collec-
tive power and voice of many migrant clubs from the same state of origin. In the 
theoretical framework I offer here, I hold HTA club capacity constant in an effort 
to maintain parsimony. I analyze greater variation in HTA capacity and the size of 
the membership network of the HTA abroad, among other factors, in the upcom-
ing empirical chapters and report their effects on the organization of partnerships 
in chapters 4 and 6.
SUMMARY
In this chapter, I lay the foundations for the subsequent empirical analysis of 
migrant collective engagement in local public goods provision. I propose that 
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transnational partnerships produce systematic effects on local political engage-
ment and responsive governance. The typological theorizing I present describes 
the reasons why partnerships vary and how more synergetic, corporatist, substitu-
tive, and fragmented partnerships change local democratic governance including 
state-society relations and political engagement. The argument advanced here is 
not meant to be a model that replaces the role of other factors that affect civic 
and political engagement and government responsiveness. Rather, I seek to bring 
greater attention to the role of transnational migrant actors and the variation in 
organizational forms of a transnational institution (coproduction partnerships) to 
better understand how civic and political engagement waxes and wanes in local 
democracies experiencing international migration. This theory is not meant to 
replace theories of electoral institutions, economic development, and social capital 
whole cloth but is instead intended to complement existing theories and explain 
more variation in political participation and the sources of change in government 
performance.
In the next chapter, I describe the macrostructural factors that gave rise to the 
Mexican sending state’s outreach policies with the migrant diaspora in the United 
States, which culminated in the 3x1 matching grants program. The 3x1 Program 
administers coproduction projects between migrant clubs and the local, state, and 




and the Feedback Effects of Sending 
State Outreach
In 2002, the Mexican federal government unveiled the 3x1 Program. The 3x1 
Program is a national social spending program whereby each level of  government—
local, state, and federal—matches the collective remittances that migrant clubs 
send home, peso for peso, for public goods provision. Between 2002 and 2017, 
more than 28,000 public goods projects have been financed through transnational 
partnerships between migrant clubs and the Mexican sending state and range 
from urbanization and public infrastructure to parks and schools. These public 
goods projects are overwhelmingly implemented in poorer, rural localities in mid-
dle-income municipalities where many Mexican migrants originated and public 
goods are lacking. Mexico is a pioneer in the creation of public policy in which the 
sending state matches migrant resources for local development purposes. Since its 
inception, the 3x1 Program has served as a social spending public policy model to 
emulate in other countries with substantial emigration interested in tapping the 
diaspora for hometown investment.
When are transnational partnerships between organized migrants abroad and 
political officials representing the sending state more likely to occur? Specifically, 
why did the Mexican sending state, which historically had a laissez-faire policy 
toward the migrant diaspora, cultivate ties with migrant clubs to spur development 
in Mexico in the late 1980s and 1990s? In this chapter, I show that transnational 
partnerships with migrant clubs are not automatic outgrowths of international 
migration despite the prevalence of HTAs around the world. Rather, the processes 
that encourage the formation of HTAs in destination countries are affected by the 
particular history of migratory waves out of the origin country. I use the strate-
gic case of Mexico to trace the historical institutional conditions that explain the 
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emergence of transnational coproduction partnerships in the 1980s and 1990s and 
the formalization of these partnerships into the federal 3x1 Program in 2002 that 
continues through 2018.
First, migrant grassroots organization predated Mexican sending-state out-
reach. The networked nature of Mexican immigration to the United States reached 
a tipping point in the 1980s and 1990s and led to concentrations of Mexicans with 
shared ties to places of origin, which helped create HTAs and paved the way for 
political mobilizations in hometown communities. Moreover, during this period, 
factors internal to the country led to democratization and decentralization and 
changed conditions in ways that facilitated migrant HTA intervention in local 
public goods provision. In doing so, organized migrants’ mobilization impelled 
political officials at the subnational level of government to craft new ways of 
engaging migrants abroad in informal coproduction schemas and later in state-
level matching grants programs. Subnational cross-border partnerships between 
organized migrant clubs and state-level federations of migrant clubs preceded a 
series of federal outreach initiatives beginning in President Salinas de Gortari’s 
administration. The convergence of interests between migrant groups who were 
eager to effect change in their hometowns and that of the Mexican state led to an 
iterative process of negotiation that shaped the nature of the federal 3x1 Program 
that was eventually implemented. Eager to mobilize migrant resources toward 
public ends and appease migrants’ discontent with the sending state, political offi-
cials at all levels of government in Mexico seized upon migrant hometown associa-
tions’ bottom-up organizing and responded with top-down outreach at a critical 
juncture in Mexico’s specific institutional history.
Data for this chapter is based on secondary data, in-person interviews, and 
transnational survey data. From 2009 to 2011, I interviewed local mayors in 
Mexico, directors of state-level 3x1 Programs, and political officials in local and 
state migrant affairs offices in Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Zacatecas. Additionally, 
I interviewed the director of the federal 3x1 Program in Mexico City and 3x1 
Program coordinators and migrant outreach officers at the Los Angeles and 
Chicago Mexican consulates. Finally, I conducted participant observation at 3x1 
project validation committee meetings (called COVAM) in Guanajuato’s name-
sake capital and the Zacatecas State Federation building in Chicago, Illinois.
THE MEXICAN–U.S .  MIGR ATION C ORRID OR
Over the last century, Mexican migrants crossed the 2,000-mile border into the 
richest country in the world to find higher-paying jobs and reunite with family 
who had previously made the sojourn abroad. Recruited by American industry 
during World War II, braceros (manual laborers from Mexico) worked in facto-
ries and agricultural fields throughout the Southwest, Chicago, and California on 
guest worker contracts. Many laborers came on guest worker visas for temporary, 
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seasonal stretches and other workers permanently stayed. Many of these individu-
als, almost exclusively men, were directly recruited by U.S. employers. The Bracero 
Program brought close to 4.6 million immigrants to the U.S. and another 3 million 
entered in the same period without guest worker status.1
After the Bracero Program (1942–64) ended, many migrants made the bru-
tal, dangerous journey across the Sonoran Desert and Rio Grande without papers 
to try and improve their lot in life. During this period, emigration from the tra-
ditional states of the rural center of Mexico was predominantly undertaken by 
male “pioneers” who left the countryside for jobs in the north where they made 
more money working the same kind of job and diversified their family income.2 
Up until 1965, U.S. immigration policy restricted Mexican immigration through 
formal channels. But with the passage of the Hart-Cellar Act that eliminated 
national origins quotas for U.S. entry and the Immigration Control and Reform 
Act (IRCA) in 1986, more Mexicans applied for travel visas to the U.S. through 
family reunification provisions. Many more migrants crossed into the U.S. without 
documentation.
Concomitant with U.S. immigration policy changes, a series of economic 
shocks occurred in Mexico including the oil crisis in the late 1970s, debt crisis in 
the 1980s, peso currency devaluation, and passage of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990s. These economic shocks and the trade 
agreement not only imperiled the Mexican economy, but also had substantial con-
sequences for international migration. Between 1965 and 2012, about 5–7  million 
Mexicans immigrated to the U.S. in search of economic opportunity and family 
reunification.
The IRCA was passed by Congress during the Reagan administration and was 
the first large-scale legalization program in U.S. history. The policy legalized the 
status of 2.7 million immigrants who met requirements and created a path to citi-
zenship. Once naturalized, immigrants were granted the right to petition for fam-
ily members to join them in the U.S., which had large unanticipated consequences 
for the number of Mexican persons immigrating through formal channels.3 
Additionally, the policy increased border security, established penalties for hiring 
undocumented laborers, and made it a criminal offense to cross into the U.S. with 
fraudulent documentation or without papers. Despite enhanced border security 
and immigration enforcement, the structural demand for low-wage immigrant 
labor in the U.S., family reunification concerns, and economic crises in Mexico 
encouraged significantly more emigration to the U.S. after 1986.
Changes to U.S. immigration policy coincided with the financial crisis in 
Mexico referred to as “The Lost Decade” (La Década Perdida). Until then, the 
Mexican economy largely relied on windfalls from crude oil and a strategy of 
import substitution industrialization in which high trade barriers protected 
domestic companies against foreign competition. The country suffered severe set-
backs when the price of petroleum plummeted in the late 1970s and Mexico’s entry 
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into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1985 exposed the economy 
to increased financial risk. Rampant inflation led to currency devaluation (peso 
crisis) and subsequent restructuring of the economy to an export-led growth strat-
egy and loans from international banks that required conditions including scal-
ing back federal social spending, a policy shift known as state retrenchment. The 
further penetration of the Mexican economy into international trade occurred 
in 1994 when NAFTA—the trilateral trade agreement among Mexico, the United 
States, and Canada—went into effect.
The elimination of trade barriers between the North American countries had 
important consequences for international migration. While the treaty benefitted 
several aspects of the Mexican economy, it was controversial legislation for the 
Mexican agricultural industry. Farmers were displaced from the land when staples 
of Mexican agriculture such as corn, beans, strawberries, and livestock could not 
compete with cheaper, heavily subsidized U.S. crops. Agricultural production and 
livestock that were once mainstays of states in the central-western region of the 
country ceased to be tenable employment. In response to sagging agricultural 
wages, droves of Mexicans left for the U.S. during this period. By 2012, about 11.4 
million Mexican foreign-born persons resided in the U.S.4
The negative effects of economic instability were felt throughout Mexico and 
expanded the number of states sending Mexican nationals abroad in search of 
economic opportunity. Between 1920 and 2010, the Mexican states of Michoacán, 
Zacatecas, Jalisco, Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, Durango, Guerrero, Aguascalientes, 
Nayarit, and Colima accounted for about half of all Mexican immigrants to the 
U.S.5 However, as the economic crisis spread and affected more regional econo-
mies in Mexico, emigration rates increased in the southern states such as Veracruz, 
Yucatán, Chiapas, and Oaxaca in the latter half of the 1990s and early 2000s. Just 
as the spatial distribution of Mexican migrant sending states changed, so too did 
immigrant destinations in the U.S. Previously, Mexican immigrants to the U.S. 
were concentrated in the Southwest border states and the Chicago metropoli-
tan region. These popular immigrant destinations are referred to as traditional 
immigrant gateways.6 Before 1990, 85 percent of all Mexican immigrants lived 
in three states—Texas, Illinois, and California7—but after 1990, migrant settle-
ment expanded beyond traditional gateways into the Southeast, Northwest, and 
Northeast regions. New immigrants went directly into new destinations includ-
ing Georgia, North Carolina, Utah, Washington, Iowa, Nebraska, Tennessee, and 
Oregon. And those immigrants already in the U.S. moved internally to new des-
tination states and especially to the suburbs with the acquisition of more social 
mobility. Mexican migration became less regionalized and more of a mass phe-
nomenon on both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border.8
Understanding the causes of international migration in the contemporary 
period are important for understanding the formation of hometown associations in 
the United States. Mexican-based immigrant organizations were first documented 
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in the 1920s and 1930s in the U.S., but these early organizations focused mostly on 
support and aid to Mexican immigrants in the U.S. and Mexican cultural apprecia-
tion such as folk art, dance, sports, other recreational activities, and religion.9 These 
early associations were not organized around hometown ties as Mexican migration 
to the U.S. had not yet amassed concentrations of people who shared paisanaje—
meaningful social connections based on a shared sense of belonging and attach-
ment to a common origin that emerges when immigrants encounter each other 
outside of the homeland. Paisanaje is a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
formation of migrant hometown clubs. While a few early transnational immigrant 
clubs were documented in U.S. gateway cities in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it 
was not until the passage of U.S. immigration policy legalizing immigrant status in 
the U.S. that migrant transnational social networks diversified and concentrations 
of immigrants from the same places of origin built up over time and matured, lead-
ing to the formation and multiplication of hometown associations across U.S. cities.
MEXICAN MIGR ANT HOMETOWN ASSO CIATIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES
Generally, the formation of voluntary civic associations based on paisanaje is 
a particular feature of social networked–based migration. In the Mexican con-
text, the social network character of international migration was a dominant fea-
ture of U.S.-bound migration but reached an apex in the 1980s and 1990s. Once 
migrant transnational social networks expanded and matured and concentrations 
of migrants from the same hometown communities proliferated, more HTAs 
emerged in diverse destinations across the U.S. The social network nature of U.S.-
Mexican migration created the conditions for filial communities in the U.S., and 
when it reached a tipping point, there was a widespread formation of Mexican 
hometown associations.
By 2003, over 600 Mexican migrant HTAs had formed in 17 U.S. states from 
26 states of origin and the Mexican federal district.10 Ten years later, over 1,200 
different Mexican clubs had partnered with the Mexican government for a public 
goods project at least once through the federal 3x1 Program, although more than 
3,000 HTAs are registered with the Institute for Mexicans Abroad.11 Contemporary 
migrant clubs did not begin with the singular focus of investing in the development 
of their hometowns. Rather, collective resources were sent back initially to support 
the annual patron saint festivals and church renovations in migrants’ hometowns. 
The Catholic Church and ethno-religious institutions were an important catalyst 
for the formation of migrant clubs. Itinerant priests sought out paisanos from pre-
dominantly rural hometowns in the U.S. and asked them to become partners in 
church improvement projects.12 Other HTAs, predominantly from Chiapas and 
Oaxaca, formed clubs around ethno-religious obligations to the community of 
origin as part of the system of usos y costumbres.
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The system of usos y costumbres in indigenous Mexican communities is a sys-
tem of village-based traditional governance that requires community members 
abroad to meet social obligations called faenas and tequios despite their physical 
absence.13 Making cross-border investments through hometown clubs allowed 
absent migrants to meet their ethno-religious obligations from the U.S., which 
was often a requirement for maintaining membership in the social community.14 
Many migrant groups also came together on their own, first, as social, cultural, 
and prayers groups, soccer clubs, and rotating credit associations (referred to 
as tandas or cundinas). Clubs later changed their primary focus and adopted 
cross-border development projects, especially after emergencies and natural 
disasters in their hometowns. Survey data I collected of a representative sample 
of Mexican HTAs shows that the majority of HTAs formed on their own (67 per-
cent) after 1990, while other clubs said they formed at the request of the Mexican 
local government (17 percent). Prior to 1990, before select states adopted state-
level matching grants schemes, migrant clubs that supported projects in their 
hometowns did so on a more informal and spontaneous basis and projects were 
small in scale.15
WHY D O MEXICAN MIGR ANT S PARTICIPATE IN 
HOMETOWN ASSO CIATIONS?
The reasons for migrant participation in HTAs are multifaceted and often change 
over time with social mobility and experiences in the destination and origin soci-
ety. While such participation is often motivated by altruism and loyalty to the 
hometown, it also reflects the adoption of new views brought about by the migra-
tory process.16
Movement to a richer country provides migrants with better access to public 
services in addition to higher wages. As they acclimate more into U.S. society they 
come to expect, for example, that in an emergency a phone call to 911 summons an 
ambulance that will take them to a hospital. In many rural Mexican towns, there 
are no ambulances. In El Cerrito, Guanajuato, residents told me they had to “wait 
and ask a friend for a ride” or “ride horseback” to get to the closest hospital when 
there was an emergency. Migrants also observe and adopt new norms of behavior 
while living in U.S. society, bringing into starker contrast the lack of public goods 
provision in their places of origin. Living in the U.S. alters migrants’ expectations 
about what kinds of public goods and services citizens in Mexico should have 
access to, and many start or join HTAs to modernize their hometowns in accor-
dance with these new views.
But while speaking the language of community, migrant HTA activities also 
articulate that they are no longer the same as those remaining behind.17 For some 
migrant groups, sending money home is more akin to patronage and residents 
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are viewed as the beneficiaries of migrant generosity. This view of HTA participa-
tion as a strategy for personal or group advancement is not typically the primary 
objective when forming or joining a club, but many migrants come to derive social 
status and enjoy their newfound prestige over time. Migrant clubs’ development 
efforts sometimes come to reflect a calculated strategy aimed at cementing social 
differences in the origin community.18
The context of reception in U.S. society plays another role in shaping the forma-
tion of HTAs. Since many immigrants live in precarious and exploitative working 
conditions in the U.S. in which their identities are criminalized and marginal-
ized, HTA engagement helps combat the vagaries of how they are perceived in the 
destination place. This “reactive transnationalism,” as it is sometimes called, is an 
opportunity for migrants to feel socially connected and valued in a social com-
munity while managing the rigors of daily life abroad.19
Finally, HTA engagement may be based on the prospect of future return to the 
hometown. Some migrants invest in public projects for future enjoyment or to 
ensure that their good deeds obligate community members to care for them in old 
age. Migrants form HTAs to celebrate culture and play soccer and eventually adopt 
development projects as the central mission. Once development goals are adopted, 
collective remittance sending also does “relational work” for migrants.20 It signifies 
migrants’ expressive, affective ties and serves as a tool for social status valorization 
in towns in which they want to eventually return.
The degree to which Mexican immigrants are involved in HTA activities also 
varies. For some people, occasional donations to fundraising efforts or attendance 
at club meetings and social events constitutes the whole of their participation in 
the club. Others assume a leadership role, which requires significant time, energy, 
skills, and resources to coordinate projects across borders. The core leadership of 
migrant clubs is most likely male, married, between the ages of 30 and 44 years old, 
with a high school degree or equivalent, and living in the U.S. between two and 
ten years (55 percent), although a sizable percent of the survey sample had lived 
in the U.S. just two years (18 percent) and longer than 11 years (25 percent). Legal 
status and the size of the paisano social network are all factors that help determine 
the scale of HTA participation. While some clubs negotiate public goods provision 
from afar without visiting, those individuals with legal status and who can visit the 
homeland more easily are more likely to be involved in the day-to-day activities of 
their HTA. The degree of formality of club organization and overall membership 
activity also varies across clubs. On average, clubs had around 100 members, but 
some clubs were made up of just a few families and some had up to 5,000 active 
members. The largest clubs were most likely to be located in California, Texas, and 
Illinois with a long history of Mexican immigration from the traditional sending 
states of Jalisco, Guanajuato, Michoacán, and Zacatecas. More information about 
Mexican HTAs is presented in chapter 6 and Data Appendix B.
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FROM A “POLICY OF NO POLICY ” TO SENDING-STATE 
OUTREACH INITIATIVES
During the period of mass Mexican immigration to the U.S., Mexican emigra-
tion policy changed from a “policy of no policy” to acercamiento—the adoption of 
several state outreach initiatives intended to bring Mexican immigrants back into 
the national imaginary. Mexican state outreach policies eventually culminated in 
the federal 3x1 Program in 2002 for reasons only tangentially related to migra-
tion. Economic crisis spelled the beginning of the end of the PRI’s 71 years of 
uninterrupted control of the presidency when opposition political parties began to 
effectively compete for state and local government. In an effort to retain national 
control, the PRI adopted a series of decentralization reforms devolving authority 
to subnational government over three terms (sexenios).21
Subnational democratization and decentralization represented two critical 
periods in Mexico’s historic-institutional context that help explain the formation 
of Mexican sending-state outreach initiatives. Because of these internal politi-
cal developments, Mexican leaders looked to migrants abroad and extended the 
reach of the corporatist state beyond the border in an attempt to appease migrants’ 
political discontent.22 The Mexican sending state’s acercamiento project, in turn, 
increased the capacity of migrants to bring additional pressure on Mexican politi-
cal officials to have migration programs reflect their needs and interests. The nego-
tiation between organized migrants and state and federal Mexican officials led to 
the adoption of remittance matching grants programs and subsequent changes in 
how the programs operated.
Prior to World War II, the Mexican government’s emigration policy restricted 
emigration through exit controls. Mexican migrants were often castigated by 
Mexican officials and called pochos, a derogatory term designated for “deserters” 
who left the homeland and lost their Mexican culture.23 In the postwar period, 
restrictive emigration gave way to more careful attention to those who left to par-
ticipate in the Bracero Program in the U.S. labor market. However, the end of the 
Bracero period and failure of emigration policy to control departure ushered in a 
more laissez-faire attitude toward emigration that was accompanied by what many 
have dubbed an emigration “policy of no policy.”24 The lack of policy was itself a pol-
icy that performed both as an economic, political, and demographic escape valve 
following severe macro-economic crises and a political crisis for the long-standing 
PRI, and as an interest in releasing the pressures of rapid population growth.25
Rather than attempting to regulate departure through exit controls, emigration 
policy in the 1980s and 1990s focused instead on embracing emigrants already 
beyond the border. The discursive shift from denigrating emigrants as pochos 
to extolling them as hijos ausentes (absent sons) and heroes was accompanied 
by changes to emigration policy that encouraged and nurtured social, political, 
and economic ties to the Mexican homeland. It is in this period of acercamiento 
that Mexican emigration policy concentrated more on promoting development 
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through remittances, extending dual nationality and absentee voting, and cement-
ing a Mexican ethnic lobby in Washington, DC.26
Thus the ramped-up efforts of Mexican outreach to the emigrant population 
in the U.S. was precipitated by decentralization reforms and democratization, two 
critical junctures internal to Mexico that paved the way for formal development 
partnerships with migrants and the 3x1 Program. First, changes to the system of 
intergovernmental relations brought about by a series of decentralization reforms 
devolved political and administrative authority over public goods provision to 
local government. While these reforms de-centered decision-making over pub-
lic service delivery to local (municipal) political officials, authorities still had to 
rely heavily on federal and state revenue-sharing arrangements to finance public 
expenditures. Looking abroad to their paisanos, municipal, state, and eventually 
federal tiers of government capitalized on the changing resource base of migrants 
abroad to help fund public works investment through transnational partnerships. 
Second, the opening of the political system to opposition parties at the subnational 
levels of government in the late 1980s and 1990s created political opportunities for 
government actors to further encourage migrant investment in hometown devel-
opment. As political competition became fiercer and incumbent parties faced 
legitimate threat from the opposition, delivery of public goods took on greater 
importance for local electoral victory. For many municipal leaders, providing pub-
lic goods with matching funds from state and federal partners closed the gap in 
funding constraints and allowed municipal leaders to adopt more programmatic 
spending agendas with migrant partners.
DECENTR ALIZ ATION AND THE PROVISION OF 
PUBLIC GO ODS IN MEXICAN MUNICIPALITIES
The De la Madrid Sexenio (1982–88)
Prior to the defeat of the PRI in the 2000 national presidential election by the 
popular PAN candidate Vicente Fox, the Mexican political system was dominated 
by one-party rule. Mexico was a strong central state with a weak federal system. 
Subnational political units lacked autonomy and resources and political power 
was concentrated in the presidency with the PRI. Until 1988, the PRI controlled 
all Senate seats and before 1989 no opposition party had ever won a gubernato-
rial election. Between 1982 and 2000, however, the PRI’s lock on political control 
changed. Mexico experienced dramatic changes to its political institutions, spear-
headed by President de la Madrid’s 1984 Municipal Reform in the wake of the 1982 
debt crisis.
De la Madrid’s presidency initiated a profound shift from the import-substi-
tution industrialization policies of his predecessors, which could no longer be 
supported by loans financed by international capital investors. During this period 
in which the economic system shifted to a neoliberal export-led growth strategy, 
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Mexico had zero economic growth, unemployment reached 35 percent in 1985, 
income inequality worsened, and workers’ salaries and real wages dropped to 1966 
levels. While the economic crisis that began in 1982 had somewhat abated by 1990, 
the economic woes that crippled Mexico during the “Lost Decade” were exacer-
bated again with the 1994 currency devaluation of the peso. The PRI’s mismanage-
ment of the economy galvanized calls for democratization and affected the ruling 
party’s iron grip on political power. The national election in 1988 brought these 
demands to a head. Incoming president Salinas de Gortari, who succeeded De la 
Madrid, confronted the difficult task of restoring the PRI’s power while continu-
ing to implement free-market economic reforms and scale back the welfare state 
as a condition of financial loans from Washington and the international develop-
ment banking community. The strategy deployed by the PRI administration was 
to decentralize authority to subnational levels of government in order to maintain 
central power and authority in the presidency.27
The economic crisis that rattled Mexico in the 1980s had iterative effects on 
pluralist representation at state and local levels. It also catalyzed De la Madrid’s 
decentralization reforms. Rodriguez recalls, “by the 1980s, the façade of Mexican 
democracy had deteriorated so badly that the entire political system was in dire 
need of a facelift.”28 The 1984 Municipal Reform was the regime’s first response to 
regional economic and political imbalances that were a threat to political stabil-
ity and the strength of the PRI. The processes of political opening, recognizing 
opposition party victories, and fiscal decentralization policies of the De la Madrid 
administration were pursued on the general premise that by strengthening gov-
ernments at the subnational level the power and stability of the PRI presidency 
could be preserved. To accomplish this, the PRI recognized a smattering of oppo-
sition victories in the 1980s and responded to demands to decentralize adminis-
trative responsibility over the delivery of public services and social welfare. The 
devolution of power to subnational units of government was best characterized as 
“unintended decentralization” and a reactive strategy: to maintain political power, 
the PRI had to give some away.29
The De la Madrid decentralization reforms of 1984 granted greater autonomy 
to municipalities and fundamentally changed the character of intergovernmental 
relations in Mexico. However, it was far less risky politically because it could be 
selectively implemented. The municipal reforms were ostensibly to pacify munici-
pal desires for financial and political autonomy, but while the reforms granted 
some political power to municipal governments, lower levels of government 
never received full financial autonomy; subnational government did not receive 
an increased percentage of revenue-sharing allocations but were responsible for 
social spending on public goods and services.
Officially, the initiative to reform Article 115 of the Constitution, which deals 
with municipalities, granted administrative responsibility in the domain of pub-
lic service provision for the following services: potable water and drainage, street 
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lighting, street cleaning, markets and supply centers, graveyards, slaughterhouses, 
street paving and maintenance, parks and gardens, public security and traffic. The 
reform also granted municipal governments all revenues collected from property 
taxes (predial), fees and licenses but these revenues were marginal. Additionally, 
the reforms gave municipalities administrative power to design and implement 
development initiatives and the freedom to make formal assistance and coopera-
tive agreements with the state and federal governments for the efficient provision 
of public services, if necessary. According to De la Madrid, the decentralization 
reforms emphasized: “Centralization in an earlier period [that] allowed the coun-
try to accelerate its economic growth and social development has outlived its 
usefulness and become a serious limitation on the country’s national project . . . 
Centralization has seized from the municipality the ability and the resources 
needed for development and the moment has come to stop this centralizing ten-
dency” (Cámara de Diputados 1983: 8).
In practice, decentralization reforms transferred administrative authority to 
subnational governments but ultimately allowed the PRI to maintain control. The 
national presidential election held in the midst of economic crisis in 1988 and calls 
for more political aperture culminated in the greatest threat to the PRI’s power 
since the creation of the party. During this period of economic and political crisis, 
the incoming administration looked to the Mexican migrant community abroad 
as one of the foreign policy strategies to improve domestic relations.
The Salinas de Gortari Administration (1988–94)
The electoral victory of Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1988 was one of the most con-
troversial presidential elections in Mexican history. Many people cried foul, both 
inside Mexico and across the border in the U.S. When Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, 
former governor of Michoacán and longtime member of the PRI, failed to be 
nominated as the PRI’s presidential candidate, he splintered from the party and 
coordinated a coalition to run an opposition party ticket under the National 
Democratic Front. The party later become the Party of the Democratic Revolution 
(Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD), a major political party contending 
for power at all levels of government. Veteran Chicano groups, Mexican labor 
unions in the U.S., exiled students and activists from the 1968 antigovernment 
revolt, grassroots organizations, human rights advocates, and others rallied behind 
Cárdenas’s campaign. Cárdenas was an outspoken supporter of absentee voting 
rights for Mexicans in the U.S., workers’ rights, economic stability, and democra-
tization in Mexico. Cárdenas also traveled several times across the border to large 
emigrant and Mexican American communities in the U.S., where he campaigned 
in the run-up to the election.
In California and the southwestern states of Arizona and New Mexico, 
Cárdenas energized and mobilized an international democratic movement in his 
favor, enough to establish formal branches of his opposition party in the U.S. called 
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comités de base (base committees). These PRD base committees fundraised exten-
sively in select U.S. cities and encouraged PRD immigrant supporters to persuade 
family and friends in Mexico to cast their vote for Cárdenas. Absentee suffrage 
was not extended to the Mexican emigrant community during the 1988 election, 
despite Cardenas’s efforts. However, Cárdenas’s project to mobilize an active and 
vocal oppositional voice to the PRI on both sides of the border was effective. His 
engagement with migrants and Mexican Americans made it difficult for the PRI to 
ignore the mobilized population after 1988.
The defeat of opposition candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas created widespread 
political division. Especially vocal were immigrants and Chicanos in the United 
States who supported the Cárdenas presidential campaign. While cardenismo 
started as a social movement, the support garnered from “discontented and disaf-
fected” Mexicans living throughout the U.S. culminated in the emergence of the 
PRD as a major political party and greater support for national democratization in 
Mexico mounted.30 Mexican immigrants in the U.S. driven from Mexico because 
of economic and political problems became a natural constituency of the PRD 
and Cárdenas. This mobilization around the PRD forced Mexican PRI officials to 
recognize resentments in the Mexican community in the U.S. that felt forgotten 
and disenfranchised by their government.31 Cárdenas’s presidential campaign in 
1988 created competition between the parties for the loyalty of their compatriots 
as both parties searched for constituencies and allies in the U.S.
In an effort to reinforce the exceedingly fragile legitimacy of his electoral vic-
tory, Salinas revived and broadened the Mexican federal government’s historically 
on-again, off-again acercamiento with the Mexican emigrant population. Salinas 
resuscitated the Mexican federal government’s emigrant incorporative strategy, 
although he used a different mode of incorporation than in the post-revolutionary 
period.32 Whereas the 1917–32 period was characterized by a policy of encouraging 
return, the Salinas administration directly courted migrants and their resources 
abroad. Salinas’s contentious electoral victory mobilized opposition voices on 
both sides of the border that unleashed new pressure on the PRI administration 
to appease discontent.
The strategy adopted by the PRI was to extend services to the immigrant popu-
lation in the U.S. through a series of policy initiatives including the International 
Solidarity Program and the Program for Migrant Communities Abroad (Programa 
para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Extranjero, PCME). Salinas conceived of 
the International Solidarity Program as a way to create coproduction partnerships 
between civil society (nonstate private actors) and state officials and agency (public 
actors and agencies) in the Mexican government. This strategy sought to enhance 
state legitimacy in a way that previous coproduction programs had undermined.33 
The PCME was created in 1991 as part of the division of the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations (SRE). The PCME was directed by ministry staff in conjunction with 
consulates and Mexican cultural institutes abroad and officials regularly reached 
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out to Mexican immigrants throughout the U.S. The program delivered educa-
tion, community outreach, culture, recreation, and business services to migrants 
in the U.S. The community program, in particular, focused on helping migrants 
form HTAs and state-level federations of clubs and promoted state offices for 
migrant affairs. One of the chief activities of Mexican state offices for migrant 
affairs was to collect information on immigrants’ whereabouts in the U.S. and 
publicize state-level matching funds programs to them in the states of Zacatecas, 
Guerrero, Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Durango.34 It is no coincidence that the number 
of migrant clubs surged during this period of Mexican state outreach through the 
PCME and International Solidarity Programs.35
The social spending cornerstone of the Salinas administration was the National 
Solidarity Program (Pronasol, Spanish acronym). Pronasol was originally con-
ceived as a poverty alleviation and regional development program. The objec-
tives of the Solidarity Program were to improve living conditions in marginalized 
groups, promote balanced regional development, and strengthen the participation 
of social organizations and local authorities through further decentralization.36 
The Solidarity Program (“Solidarity”) established community participation in the 
selection and implementation of projects through local Solidarity committees that 
provided a mechanism for greater citizen involvement. It also led to the creation 
of municipal Solidarity councils. These councils promoted greater municipal and 
state control over fiscal resources, autonomy over public service delivery, and social 
welfare programs.37 Solidarity decentralized fiscal resources and decision-making 
authority by allocating federal funds directly to project committees and their 
municipal councils instead of going through state government. While Solidarity 
did provide some fiscal resources directly to the municipalities for social invest-
ment, the federal revenues from income taxes were allocated to states and then to 
municipal government. Even as municipal governments obtained more autonomy 
over the administration of local budgets, they were almost entirely dependent on 
state and federal revenue sharing to run their jurisdictions.
The system of state-to-municipality revenue sharing called participaciones was 
problematic for some municipal authorities, namely rural municipalities, because 
of considerable variation in the actual proportional allocation of resources they 
received from state governments. Urban municipalities, for example, tended to 
receive the largest allocations of fiscal transfers, and municipalities governed by 
political parties other than the dominant PRI did not fare as well. Some political 
officials decried that the program was a mechanism for the PRI to exercise politi-
cal manipulation. By rewarding PRI strongholds with public resources, munici-
palities financed public goods in areas with potential swing voters to capture 
a plurality of votes to win local elections, allegations that have been supported 
by extensive research on the Pronasol program.38 Solidarity funneled resources 
directly to municipalities for the production of public works; however, they still 
relied extensively on state and federal governments for financing, and the funds 
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were politically manipulated in places with different state and municipal political 
party affiliation.
The International Solidarity Program was one of the central, although less pub-
licized, components of Pronasol and directly engaged the Mexican migrant dias-
pora in the U.S. International Solidarity was administered as a separate branch 
of PCME that offloaded a significant portion of infrastructure development costs 
to organized migrants interested in being partners in hometown development. 
Salinas’s Solidarity programs replaced a large component of the social safety net, 
which was abandoned during the neoliberal shift. The programs also led to the 
creation of citizen committees, which contributed 50 percent to financing and 
implementing projects in a public-private partnership schema best described as 
an early form of coproduction. Migrant hometown associations were not viewed 
differently than citizens living in Mexico; migrant HTAs regularly served on citi-
zen committees (albeit in the U.S.) and entered into collaborative public-private 
partnerships with the federal government. Between 1993 and 1997, International 
Solidarity coproduced 211 projects transnationally with migrant HTAs predomi-
nantly from the traditional sending state of Zacatecas.
While several migrant hometown associations predate the creation of PCME, 
the outreach program was another important reason why the number of HTAs 
and public-private partnerships increased throughout the 1990s. Immigrants 
who visited consulates for regular business were given information about the 
International Solidarity Program and PCME and how they could help develop 
their places of origin with collective remittances in partnership with the Mexican 
government. In addition, the PCME hired staff to document existing HTAs and 
created a directory of sports, social, religious and cultural clubs that could be 
converted to clubs that supported infrastructure development.39 PCME, in con-
junction with the Mexican consulates, also arranged visits between governors of 
migrant sending states, municipal presidents, and their paisanos in the U.S.
According to my survey, almost a quarter of club respondents reported forming 
HTAs at the request of local and state Mexican officials and officials at Mexican 
consulates in the U.S. Moreover, PCME was responsible for the administration 
of applications for the consular identification cards to Mexican migrants called 
matricula consular cards. Federal officials collected the names and contact infor-
mation of migrants who had applied for the ID cards in the U.S. That contact 
information was then shared with state-level agencies in Mexico, and states then 
combined this information with their own registries of paisanos abroad in order to 
have a comprehensive list of the whereabouts of migrants from home states of ori-
gin across the U.S. Additionally, at lower tiers of government, municipal adminis-
trations interviewed relatives and neighbors of emigrants to learn where they had 
settled in the U.S.40 Together, state officials and municipal presidents coordinated 
efforts, contacted their paisanos abroad, and encouraged collaborative partner-
ships for public goods provision using collective remittance resources.
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The PCME acted as the organizational vehicle through which municipal, state, 
and federal officials tapped into the financial resources of migrants for develop-
ment purposes in the 1990s. The Mexican federal government’s outreach efforts, 
administered through the PCME, were a central catalyst of migrant-state copro-
duction of public works through transnational partnerships with Mexican migrant 
HTAs. This state outreach coalesced during a period of political and economic tur-
moil in Mexico. During the 1980s and 1990s, municipal governments had greater 
political and administrative responsibility, but lacked fiscal autonomy. Creating 
collaborative partnerships with migrant hometown associations and using collec-
tive remittances to finance local public works was an effective strategy for many 
municipalities searching for innovative ways to liberate additional resources for 
use at local levels of governance.41
Municipalities had extraordinary opportunities to introduce changes into their 
political jurisdictions because of the weak institutional context in which they 
worked.42 During the 1990s newly elected municipal officials had little of what 
Merilee Grindle referred to as “institutional memory”: lack of useful records of 
expenditures, few instructions of how offices were to be run, lack of organizational 
manuals and information about pay structures for public officials or the debts of 
previous administrations, and no documentation of civil registry.43 These limita-
tions inspired many municipal presidents to seek creative alternatives to the sys-
tem of revenue transfers to finance public works as electoral competition increased 
at the local level. Even as municipal and state governments were responsible for 
more than half of national expenditures, they only collected around 5 percent of 
revenue and needed to depend on federal transfers for most of their fiscal budgets. 
Incomplete fiscal decentralization to subnational levels of Mexican government 
created the impetus for municipal and state political authorities to find creative 
solutions to finance their public goods mandate.
Zedillo and Nuevo Federalismo (1994–2000)
By the mid-1990s Salinas’s successor, PRI president Ernesto Zedillo, continued the 
decentralization reforms of his predecessors with the introduction of the Program 
of New Federalism (Nuevo Federalismo). Mexican municipalities were, by and 
large, responsible for the design, selection, and implementation of public ser-
vice provision for their territorial jurisdiction, but still relied heavily on the fiscal 
resources from the state government to realize local development goals and public 
service delivery. The decentralization reforms that began after the economic crisis 
in 1982, again in 1994, and through the New Federalism under the Zedillo admin-
istration, granted municipalities more political and administrative autonomy than 
ever before. While political conditions changed rapidly during the 1990s as a result 
of top-down changes, the federal system of revenue sharing did not change in step; 
political institutional changes were not part of an overarching fiscal scheme to link 
local, state, and federal levels of government in a strong federal system.44
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Zedillo’s decentralization strategy extended not only to lower tiers of govern-
ment, but also to other branches including the judiciary and legislative branches. 
His administration also implemented other reforms including several procedural 
rules that changed the composition of Congress to reflect more proportional rep-
resentation and public financing increases for opposition parties. Additionally, 
the access of opposition parties to mass media increased; the National Electoral 
Institute, the autonomous electoral management authority, became fully indepen-
dent; and the powers of the federal electoral court were enhanced. The Zedillo 
administration continued to pursue decentralization as a means of holding onto 
power—in order to maintain power in the presidency they further devolved power 
to local and state levels of government.45
Decentralization was a politically expedient method of PRI survival. But by 
the midterm elections in 1997 the PRI faced a serious threat. For the first time 
in PRI’s history they had lost control of the lower house to opposition parties. 
They also lost six gubernatorial elections including the important states of Jalisco, 
Nuevo Leon, and Guanajuato, six state legislatures, and nearly all of the largest 
Mexican cities to the PAN; and they also lost Mexico City to Cárdenas and the 
PRD. The Chamber of Deputies and other important elections to opposition par-
ties ushered in new mandates for further dispersion of power and fiscal resources 
to subnational units of government. As opposition party politicians took office, 
they demanded more autonomy and resources from the federal government. By 
this point, the PRI had to concede to opposition party demands.
The economic crisis that rattled Mexico in the Lost Decade of the 1980s and 
early 1990s caused a series of political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization 
reforms that gave subnational governments more power and autonomy than ever 
before. The market-oriented reforms implemented during the Zedillo administra-
tion changed political incentives for the ruling elites and made it more necessary 
to pay increased attention to the needs of the poor. The electoral competition at the 
subnational level required political candidates to honor the wishes of the elector-
ate in order to preserve party success in future elections. By 1999, the major oppo-
sition parties governed 45.5 percent of Mexico’s population at the municipal level, 
more than 10 state governors, and the Federal District. And, state and municipal 
government carried out more than half of all national expenditures through the 
system of federal revenue sharing and transfers.46
By the end of the Zedillo administration, the PRI’s protracted rule in Mexico 
had started to severely wane. In order to keep the presidency, De la Madrid, 
Salinas, and Zedillo decentralized power to subnational levels of government. But 
by the late 1990s, opposition parties governed municipalities across Mexico and 
were directly responsible for the provision of public goods and services to the elec-
torate, although autonomous sources of income were hard to come by. Collective 
remittances from migrant HTAs became a new source of revenue that municipal 
and state governments tapped into through the development of public policies 
Decentralization, Democratization, Outreach    63
directed at organized migrants in the U.S. Decentralization and democratization 
across local and state governments were critical antecedents in the cultivation of 
transnational partnerships in the provision of public works between Mexican pub-
lic agencies and migrant hometown clubs abroad.
STATE REMIT TANCE MATCHING FUNDS PRO GR AMS
Migrant hometown associations’ sponsorship of small-scale infrastructure and 
other community social welfare projects predate Mexican federal, state, or munici-
pal outreach. Migrant transnational collective action was principally a grassroots 
phenomenon that was fairly informal and project support was sporadic across 
Mexico in the 1980s. But as a result of federal emigrant incorporative strategies 
described above, the number of HTAs and the scope of their projects increased 
throughout the 1990s. One of the most important reasons why hometown associa-
tions multiplied was sending state outreach and the development of state matching 
funds programs.
The first matching funds program originated in the state of Zacatecas. In 1986, 
when Genero Borrego took office as PRI governor of Zacatecas, the long-term 
state engagement with Zacatecano migrants in the U.S. began. Borrego actively 
courted migrant support for his election and during his campaign made several 
trips to Los Angeles and Chicago to meet with migrants and discuss the problems 
they confronted in the destination. One of the central tenets of his platform was 
to protect and advance the issues that faced Zacatecano migrants. After Borrego 
became governor he kept his word to migrants, declaring, “I am the governor of 
Zacatecas over here [in the United States] just as much as I am the governor of the 
Zacatecanos over there [in Zacatecas].”47 He declared November 11 the Day of the 
Migrant (dia del migrante) and promised to return every year to celebrate with 
Zacatecanos in the U.S.48
Working with a coalition of Zacatecano migrant clubs in Los Angeles, which 
would later become the powerful Federation of Zacatecan Clubs in southern 
California, Borrego and migrant leadership developed a series of matching funds 
programs. The state matching funds program first started with a 1x1 program in 
which the state cofinanced public works projects with Zacatecan migrant clubs. 
The state programs planted the seed for the federal 3x1 matching funds program 
still active today. During the Borrego administration, the informal 1x1 program 
would coproduce about 100 projects in 35 municipalities with 20 migrant clubs. 
The entire state budget for the program was only about $200,000.49
Borrego’s successor, Governor Romo, was determined to continue the state 
relationship with organized migrant clubs. Romo met with Zacatecan HTAs early 
in his governorship and expanded the nascent matching funds program to an 
additional matching contribution from the federal government, which turned the 
informal 1x1 program into the official 2x1 state program. Both Borrego and Romo 
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lobbied President De la Madrid and President Salinas to develop programs for 
Mexicans abroad. To combat the abuse and discrimination migrants were facing 
in the U.S., Romo advocated the expansion of the matching funds program to 
include a municipal contribution. Close to the end of his tenure, Romo’s sugges-
tions were heard. In 1997, the 3x1 matching funds program was formally launched in 
the state of Zacatecas and soon after other states including Guanajuato, Guerrero, 
and Jalisco followed suit.
The state 3x1 program in Zacatecas formalized an existing relationship between 
migrant clubs and the state of Zacatecas and was the beginning of a contractual 
commitment from the state to support migrants in the U.S. and their communities 
of origin. Zacatecas officially adopted a model of local economic development that 
not only explicitly recognized migrants, but also built on migrants’ economic and 
social connection to their communities of origin in order to provide basic services 
and reduce the isolation of villages throughout the state.50 Other states including 
Guerrero, Jalisco, and Guanajuato implemented versions of the Zacatecas match-
ing program during the late 1990s. Migrants were no longer passive recipients 
of Mexican government services. Through the matching grants programs orga-
nized migrants became active negotiators in the development of social spending 
policies. Migrant leaders worked directly with municipal and state authorities to 
include provisions in the program that would give them a voice in the selection 
and implementation of projects.
FEDER AL 3X1 PRO GR AM FOR MIGR ANT S
Before he became the opposition candidate to defeat the PRI in the presidency, 
Vicente Fox was the PAN governor of Guanajuato. Fox built relationships with 
paisanos from Guanajuato, although the mode of emigrant incorporative rela-
tions was different than that employed by the PRI and PRD governors of Zacatecas. 
Augmenting the outreach initiatives of his predecessor, Fox was more focused on 
tracking, tabulating, and measuring migration and remittances. His strategy sought 
to channel the resources of migrants to meet state-centered priorities for eco-
nomic growth and political development. For example, Fox championed the Casas 
Guanajuato initiative launched in 1992. Casas were a series of centers placed in large 
emigrant communities in the U.S. that provided services to Guanajuatense migrants 
similar to services provided by consulates.51 Fox’s administration also established 
the Direccion General de Atención a Comunidades Guanajuatense en el Extranjero 
(DAGCE). The DAGCE was a separate state government agency that helped 
migrants “connect, communicate, support, and serve” their communities of origin.52 
In reality, it tracked emigration and assessed the impact on high migration commu-
nities in Guanajuato. During his governorship, Fox created 18 Casas Guanajuato.53
Governor Fox also launched the Mi Comunidad program in addition to the 
state 2x1 matching funds program. Mi Comunidad directed remittances toward 
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investment for small maquiladoras (maquilas) to be established in migrants’ com-
munities of origin. Maquilas are production plants that employ Mexican work-
ers and import U.S. materials and equipment duty-free and tariff-free in order to 
assemble and finish products for export back to the U.S. The state raised initial 
capital investment for the maquilas and migrant clubs invested an initial $60,000. 
Of the 13 maquilas that opened, 10 failed almost immediately and three continued 
for a couple of years after Fox left office, but only through additional subsidies 
from migrant clubs. Guanajuato’s 2x1 remittance matching grants program cre-
ated a similar arrangement in which transnational partnerships between migrant 
groups and the state government worked together to coproduce public works, 
although the state program did not include a federal matching contribution. By 
this point, Fox was in the throes of a heated contest for president against the 
PRI and the interim governor did not wish to ask for federal resources for state-
migrant investment.
While the Guanajuato state 2x1 program was not as successful as other match-
ing funds programs in Zacatecas, Guerrero, and Jalisco, for example, it was an 
important part of Fox’s presidential campaign platform. Fox promised to take the 
2x1 program nationwide and proposed to raise the matching funds to three pesos 
for every peso contributed by migrant HTAs. In an informal public opinion sur-
vey taken after Fox won, the promise to expand the matching funds program and 
existing programs for migrants in the U.S. was one of the main reasons respon-
dents cited for backing the PAN.54 Fox was known to have invoked the 3x1 Program 
during presidential campaign stops in Chicago and California.55 Fox seized upon 
his predecessor’s outreach with organized migrants abroad who wanted to engage 
in cross-border public goods provision in their hometown and scaled up program-
matic initiatives to affect all migrants across the U.S. and their engagement with 
local, state, and federal levels of government.
Fox kept his promise to nationalize the 3x1 Program. Once he was elected to 
the presidency, he set up a cabinet position to address the demands and needs 
of migrants directly. Several hometown association leaders were also invited to 
inaugural activities and 15 leaders attended the inauguration itself. When the fed-
eral 3x1 program was launched in 2002, initially titled the Programa 3x1 Iniciativa 
Ciudana (Citizens Initiative), it was met with opposition from migrant HTA lead-
ership. The migrants claimed the program was another watered-down version of 
Salinas and other presidents’ poverty alleviation programs such as Pronasol.
The initial version of the federal program, formally administered by the Ministry 
of Social Development, allowed local citizen groups to also propose public goods 
projects and receive matching funds from municipal, state, and federal govern-
ments in addition to migrant HTAs. But this upset organized migrants’ groups 
who had negotiated the program to be exclusively for migrants at the state level. 
In response, many migrants traveled to state capitals in Mexico to remind state 
government authorities how the program originated and pressured authorities to 
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change the rules of operation. Guadalupe Gomez, president of the Federation of 
Zacatecan Clubs in southern California, told the state governor: “Keep the proj-
ects for the migrants. This is our program. We started it and we negotiated it … 
you need to help us out.”56 Raquel Sandoval, HTA president and a founding mem-
ber of the Zacatecan federation, recalls: “We told them that clubs were disbanding 
because they no longer felt motivated to participate in a program that didn’t take 
our voices seriously. We were frustrated with all the red tape.”57 Migrants’ concern 
was that the federal government would become further co-opted by other social 
and political actors and resources would be redirected from migrant-initiated 
projects to other groups.
Early collaborative partnerships between state authorities and migrant groups 
were instructive as to how a federal version of the program would be implemented. 
Migrants I interviewed that participated in the early years of the Zacatecan match-
ing grants program were frustrated that state officials made decisions on project 
selection and implementation without much input from migrant actors. Organized 
migrant groups felt like they were there to subsidize the political officials’ preferred 
projects without any decision-making authority. Early promoters of the matching 
grants programs wanted assurances that their autonomy would be preserved. In 
order to put pressure on political officials, migrant hometown association lead-
ers threatened a remittance boycott as Fox and the 3x1 program lost credibility 
with the influential and increasingly organized migrant emigrant community in 
the U.S. Juan Hernandez, president of the Office for Mexicans Abroad, was heard 
telling the minister of foreign relations: “This is our last chance and there won’t be 
another one. We have to get this right or we will have lost the migrants forever.”58 
Migrants used their organizational might to change the sending state’s corporatist 
approach to cross-border public goods partnerships.
The Ministry of Social Development, the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and 
Fox’s cabinet official for the President’s Office for Migrants worked with frustrated 
migrant groups to amend the program and they made several concessions. First, 
preference for project selection was granted to migrants and not ordinary citizens 
in migrant hometowns. In practice, this meant that local residents were prohibited 
from proposing projects for cofinancing without the support and participation of 
a migrant club from the municipality. Second, political officials reversed initial 
course and allowed migrants to continue funding churches, plazas, rodeo rings, 
and other recreational projects in addition to public infrastructure and social wel-
fare projects like schools and health clinics. And finally, the program was renamed 
the 3x1 Program for Migrants. After 2002, the number of migrant clubs across the 
U.S. skyrocketed. Survey respondents reported overwhelmingly that they started 
their clubs after the 3x1 Program launched (75 percent of clubs formed between 
2002 and 2008).
The exit of individuals from state control posed an interesting challenge and fun-
damental constraint on sending states.59 Emigrants, no longer territorial residents 
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of the polity, limited the sending state’s capacity to use coercion, extract resources, 
and comply with state demands. Through the process of emigration to new political 
jurisdictions migrants inverted the power relationship between “state” and “soci-
ety” because migrants’ evolving resource base generated new political leverage—
sending states wanted to harness remittances, but lacked power to control how 
migrants spent their savings.60 Sending states tried to mobilize migrant resources 
toward particularistic goals in line with state preferences, but they were met with 
an organized migrant leadership that demanded autonomy over how their comple-
mentary resources were spent on projects in their hometowns. The formalization 
of transnational partnerships between organized migrant groups in the U.S. and 
the Mexican state through the 3x1 Program institutionalized ties between state and 
nonstate migrant actors for local development and granted HTAs considerable 
negotiating leverage in transnational partnerships.
SUMMARY
The network nature of international migration generated new forms of community 
based on shared social ties to place of origin commonly expressed in the formation 
of migrant hometown associations. As this chapter shows, specific historical waves 
of international migration are more likely to build up concentrations of migrant 
filial or sister communities in the destination country. In Mexico, the social net-
work features of international migration followed a period of economic crises and 
U.S. immigration policy change, which led to family reunification through formal 
channels and through unauthorized entry to the U.S. Throughout the 1990s and 
2000s as migrants settled in destination places based on social ties, proximity to 
other migrants built paisanaje community and fortified shared bonds and mutual 
interest to help the homeland.
This process produced HTAs in the late 1990s. While many HTAs started out 
with a cultural, religious, and recreation focus, many clubs amended their goals 
to also include public goods provision in their hometowns informally and most 
often autonomously. As migrants’ observations and expectations for public goods 
access changed with time spent in the U.S., social mobility led to the acquisition 
of resources that made it possible to improve hometowns. Through this process 
migrants also recognized that greater social status could be garnered through the 
provision of development projects back home. Many clubs shifted focus to phil-
anthropic investments in their places of origin through the hometown club in this 
period of sending state outreach and the expansion of the matching grants pro-
gram at the federal level.
While many HTAs formed through grassroots mobilization, evidence presented 
in this chapter also showed that the sending state became an important force in the 
formation of new clubs and public policy formation. Sending state outreach was 
preceded by political and economic factors internal to Mexico, which changed 
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local conditions that facilitated migrant intervention in public goods provision. 
These domestic changes incentivized the Mexican sending state to develop new 
ways of relating to their citizens living abroad.
Decentralization reforms spearheaded in the late 1980s and 1990s and subna-
tional democratization over the same period impelled the creation of Mexican local, 
state, and federal sending outreach initiatives aimed at cultivating ties to organized 
migrant groups abroad. Outreach programs like the PCME, International Solidarity, 
and the state- and federal-level remittance matching programs encouraged home-
town clubs to form throughout the U.S. and send money home for public goods 
projects in municipalities of origin. The growing role of migrant hometown asso-
ciations in their communities of origin, along with the timing of decentralization 
and democratization in Mexico’s political history, created an opportunity struc-
ture in which political officials looked abroad to Mexican immigrants to develop 
the homeland with resources acquired in the destination. With savings and social 
networks, organized migrants helped liberate resources for municipal officials and 
their public works budgets.
The institutionalization of transnational partnerships that accompanied the 
federal 3x1 program in 2002 did not develop either from migrant-led transnation-
alism or state-led outreach policies. Formal cross-border partnerships occurred 
at a critical juncture through a process of institutional reconfiguration. Tracing 
critical historical events that precipitated the federal launch of the subsequent 
3x1 Program for Migrants, the chapter demonstrates how the process of decen-
tralization and democratization in Mexico and the economic crisis that rattled 
the regional economies of migrant sending states were preconditions that explain 
Mexican government actors’ interests in looking outward to the organized dias-
pora in the U.S. The formation of partnerships occurred in a window of time in 
which already-organized migrants were actively involved in hometown devel-
opment projects. But the attention of public agencies in the sending state gave 
organized migrant groups new political leverage to negotiate policy changes that 
benefited the migrants. Sending state activities including the tracking of paisa-
nos abroad, the formation of migrant affairs offices across Mexican states, and 
increased consular presence in the U.S. The 3x1 Program also worked to organize 
hometown associations where they did not exist before, which led to the wide-
spread formation of over 1,500 active hometown clubs coproducing public goods 
and services with the sending state in half of all municipalities by 2013.
The historic-institutional analysis presented in this chapter provides a macro-
structural picture of the conditions that led to the formation of transnational part-
nerships between migrant groups and the sending state. While the 3x1 Program 
administered the matching funds from local, state, and federal partners for local 
public goods, the program left project coordination entirely at the discretion of 
migrant groups and local government actors with no oversight from higher tiers of 
government. All facets of project coordination including the selection, budgeting, 
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implementation, and oversight of projects were determined at the local level 
between migrant HTAs and municipal authorities. The lack of regulations regard-
ing who made decisions on public goods projects and oversight from higher tiers 
of government meant that transnational partnerships varied considerably across 
municipalities and with many local leaders motivated to work with migrants 
according to electoral considerations. Local government officials and migrant 
clubs had to negotiate levels of engagement in project coordination across national 
borders, which opened up the transnational coordination of public goods process 
to political manipulation.
In the next three chapters, I examine why and how transnational partnership 
varied from place to place and over time, paying particular attention to the ways in 
which political institutional factors and social network relations affected the orga-
nization of coproduction partnerships. I use a processual analysis to unpack the 
micropolitical and social factors that combine to organize transnational partner-
ships. In doing so, I trace how community inclusion and government engagement 
interact to produce four distinct types of coproduction—substitutive, synergetic, 
corporatist, and substitutive partnerships—which each had important political 
consequences for local democratic governance across Mexican locales.
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Micro-Politics of Substitutive and 
Synergetic Partnerships
In 2007, a group of residents in Telepi, Zacatecas, mobilized swift opposition to 
the new mayor when he began paving over the cobblestone streets near the central 
plaza. “The pavement projects were ruining the provincial feel of our town, so 
we made him [the mayor] stop,” said Umberto, a local resident. Citizens circu-
lated a petition throughout Telepi and collected the signatures of all those against 
the pavement project. A resident wrote a position piece in the local newspaper 
that called on the mayor to cease the project. And active members of the church 
group, Rotary club, and parent-teacher association organized a town hall meeting 
to voice opposition to the mayor’s administration. The political opposition was 
successful and the mayor ended the pavement project. Telepitense residents used 
the social connections and skills they had developed during coproduction activi-
ties with previous municipal administrations to hold the mayor to account for 
his unpopular actions while in office. Residents mobilized collective action as a 
mechanism of social control and, for all those who opposed the pavement project, 
it made them feel politically empowered.
Citizens had serious objections to the pavement project because they enjoyed 
the quaintness of the main courtyard and cobblestone streets where, on week-
ends, sellers hawked their wares from market stalls and families strolled with their 
children, popsicles (paletas) in hand, while musicians played and friends chat-
ted. Residents did not want their plaza any more “modernized” than it already 
was. Intense out-migration to the United States had brought back customs and 
American culture that many nonmigrant residents disliked. Since citizens had pre-
viously engaged in selecting, funding, and coordinating public goods projects with 
previous municipal administrations through a transnational partnership with a 
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popular migrant club, the new mayor’s dismissal of the active involvement of civil 
society in decision-making of public works was disconcerting to residents. Because 
residents had become accustomed to discussing and influencing public projects, 
the mayor’s top-down directives were an insult to the participatory spirit in which 
more than 30 projects were implemented in Telepi over a six-year period. Citizens 
involved in coproducing public works with migrants and municipal officials came 
to value political deliberation, and when they felt like their participation was being 
threatened by a dismissive mayor, they did something about it.
What role did the transnational partnership play in residents’ political engage-
ment? How did Telepitenses develop the capacity and political will to mobilize 
for a cause they cared about? The political opposition organized by Telepitenses 
in response to the actions of an unpopular mayor and his preferred public works 
project offers a lens through which to analyze how synergetic transnational part-
nerships have unanticipated effects on citizens’ political engagement in public 
affairs in and beyond the coproduction process. Citizens of Telepi were empow-
ered to voice their concerns directly to the mayor and his administration because 
interactions with municipal officials had become routine and they learned that 
they could influence public decisions by speaking out.
I have two central objectives in this chapter. First, I describe the conditions 
under which two organizational forms of transnational partnership—synergetic 
and substitutive—emerge in hometown settings. I trace the transnational pro-
cess of producing public goods over time to show how community inclusion and 
government engagement combine to produce synergetic and substitutive types. 
If one’s research goal is the search for causal mechanisms, it is vital to study 
not a static network but one that changed, and then to identify dates of change. 
Because inclusion and engagement change over time with the expansion (and 
decay) of bonding and bridging social ties and the electoral incentives of political 
officials, so too does who is involved in the process of coproducing public goods 
wax and wane.
The second goal of the chapter is to identify how synergetic and substitutive 
partnerships affect citizens’ participation in civil society and the local political 
process. In each case, I describe how the two types of transnational partnership, 
substitutive and synergetic, affect participatory engagement and government 
responsiveness. The two cases in this chapter represent distinct transnational part-
nerships in different municipal contexts but share similar organizational forms. By 
comparing similar partnership cases, I show how migrant social embeddedness 
and political institutions shape migrant-state collective action and the spillover 
effects of cross-border public goods provision across hometowns over time.
In the first case of El Cerrito, Guanajuato, I explain how the absence of migrant 
bridging ties and government engagement in the early stages of coproduction 
led to a more substitutive partnership. In the first two years of coproduction, the 
migrant group substituted for government provision of public services with the 
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support of state and federal matching funds. But over time, migrants learned to 
construct social relationships with key community stakeholders through social 
events and recruitment activities. The construction of bridging ties and renegotia-
tion of community membership through quotidian participation in social life of 
the hometown expanded who was involved in the coproduction of public works. In 
return, the increase in community inclusion triggered more government engage-
ment, which changed the partnership to a more synergetic organizational form. 
As a result, an increase in local participation in civic and governmental affairs 
resulted and municipal responsiveness in El Cerrito improved.
By contrast, in the second case of Telepi, Zacatecas, members of the migrant 
club were more socially embedded in the hometown community from the start 
and the municipal administration was actively engaged in project deliberations 
and coordination. However, the synergetic partnership was disrupted when elec-
toral transition introduced a mayoral administration that was uninterested in the 
participation of civil society in public affairs. Residents and migrants drew on the 
trust, reciprocity, and social network ties forged during the synergetic period to 
continue public works projects without municipal financing and technical sup-
port, which led to a period of substitution. Additionally, citizens censured the 
mayor’s performance and forced him to change his behavior while he was still in 
office, introducing a measure of social accountability in local politics. Residents 
had learned how to use democratic mechanisms to voice their opposition to an 
unpopular mayor during the synergetic period that paid dividends at a later date.
While migration intensity, poverty levels, and club capacity are relatively con-
stant across the cases in this chapter, sociodemographic and political charac-
teristics of the hometowns vary. Where relevant, I identify how local historical 
conditions such as land tenure arrangements, political scandals, and social cleav-
ages affect the formation and evolution of transnational partnerships through 
their effects on community inclusion and government engagement. I present a 
more detailed description of the case selection method for all the partnership 
cases in Data Appendix A.
SYNERGETIC AND SUBSTITUTIVE TR ANSNATIONAL 
C OPRODUCTION IN EL CERRITO,  GUANAJUATO
Located 30 miles outside the Selvillo municipal county seat is El Cerrito, one of 
the more populated localities in the county and home to about 4,000 residents. 
Reymundo and Francisco, two migrants who left El Cerrito in their teens for the 
northern border, formed a migrant club in 2005. The acquisition of green cards 
and stable, well-paying jobs allowed the migrants to cross the border and visit 
their hometown more regularly. These visits, more frequent as the friends grew 
older, made them miss the traditional ways of life of the Guanajuato countryside, 
but also brought into sharper contrast the lack of public goods provision in their 
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native El Cerrito. They knew El Cerrito lacked jobs, as the two migrants had emi-
grated with over a third of the adult male population amidst severe economic crisis 
in the early 1990s, but the experience of growing up in a major U.S. city with paved 
roads, sanitation, garbage collection, and good public schools revealed just how 
forgotten El Cerrito was to the municipal government. The tipping point came, 
though, when a schoolmate of Reymundo’s was involved in a car accident and 
died on the side of the road due to a lack of emergency medical care. The migrants 
were motivated to act. When they heard about the 3x1 Program during a visit to 
the Mexican consulate, they decided to form a club after doing some research on 
the internet.
Club El Cerrito’s goals were modest at the outset. The migrants hoped to com-
plete a few projects through the 3x1 Program. But the club exceeded their expec-
tations and coproduced more than 30 public goods projects such as paved roads, 
sidewalks, drainage, and a recreation area for a local school, among other proj-
ects. Additionally, the club grew from a few core members to a membership base 
that was about 1,000 paisanos strong, with migrant members spread out across 
the U.S. where Cerritenses resided.1 In seven years, the club committed more than 
$2 million (USD) in collective remittances, one of the highest totals in the state 
of Guanajuato.2
Perhaps more striking to the migrants and Cerritense residents was how much 
more involved local residents became in public goods provision in their commu-
nity as more projects were completed. Decades-old political scandals and corrup-
tion had depressed political participation in El Cerrito and community residents 
were divided along party lines, which negatively affected coproduction activities 
in the beginning. But as Reymundo, Francisco, and other migrants reintegrated 
into the social life of the hometown while living abroad, residents began to trust 
them more and felt comfortable taking part in coproduction activities with them 
and, later, the local government. The scaling up of community participation in 
public goods provision had positive spillover effects on local government engage-
ment. As more residents became involved in project activities, municipal officials 
increased their involvement and recruited a resident from El Cerrito to join the 
administration to coordinate 3x1 projects across all of Selvillo’s localities and the 
county seat. By 2011, residents directly engaged with municipal government offi-
cials without much involvement from the migrant club and created three new civic 
associations to solve local problems.
SCARCIT Y OF BRID GING TIES AND THE “MAÑANA 
MENTALIDAD” OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
After migrating at the age of 14 with his mother Rosalia, Reymundo was miser-
able in the U.S.—he did not speak the English language well, and he missed his 
home, friends, and the slower pace of life. Everything felt foreign and awkward 
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to him. But after he learned English, finished high school, then college, and 
became a teacher in San Diego, he felt more attached to the U.S. and remained 
connected “there,” to El Cerrito. “Because I left as a teenager,” Reymundo said, 
“the umbilical cord was still attached. I am an American citizen now. But I’ve 
never stopped being from El Cerrito.” During years of public schooling in the 
U.S., and through friendships with immigrants and native-born Americans alike 
in college classrooms and in the Latino fraternity that he founded, Reymundo 
slowly developed an American identity while he maintained deep attachments 
and a few friendships in his hometown. While five of his six siblings decided 
to stay permanently in California, Manuel, one of his brothers, was deported 
and returned to El Cerrito with his wife and five-year-old son. Tragedy struck 
in 2008 when Reymundo’s father passed away. When her husband died Rosalia 
returned to help Manuel with the family pig farm (ganaderia) and opened a small 
store (abarrote) with remittances the family had saved up in the U.S. Even though 
Reymundo felt strongly connected to El Cerrito—he owned a home, visited regu-
larly, had a few close friends from elementary school and family—his absence 
eroded more extensive social ties in the community beyond his close circle of 
friends and relatives.
When the club began working with the municipal government on the first 
two coproduction projects, public lighting and the extension of the electricity 
grid, popular residents of the hometown were suspicious of the club’s intentions. 
The residents of El Cerrito did not hold high opinions of political officials in the 
municipal government or the local delegate who represented their interests in the 
municipal administration.
Until the late 1990s, the PRI dominated municipal elections, with many in the 
political opposition accusing the PRI of vote buying and outright corruption. 
The PAN’s growing base of support across Selvillo, especially in El Cerrito, was 
increasingly vocal about the PRI’s wrongdoings. Political differences were further 
entrenched by local political scandal. Between 1988 and 1994, the PRI delegate of 
El Cerrito allegedly stole money from the patron saint festival funds and used the 
town’s resources for political activities. The delegate and his supporters vehemently 
denied these allegations, but residents took sides along party lines. Although 
10 years had passed and the PAN had successfully won an election during that 
period, Cerritenses still had misgivings about anyone in the delegate position and 
about political officials more generally. As a result, few residents wished to hold 
the office for fear that residents would blame them for any issues that might arise 
in the course of their tenure. A history of distrust in the local government3 and 
the municipal delegate position had accumulated over the previous 15 years and 
created social cleavages along party lines in El Cerrito. When locals heard that 
some migrants from El Cerrito were working with the local government and the 
delegate on public lighting and electricity projects, they were skeptical about the 
migrants’ intentions given residents’ misgivings about public officials.
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In addition to general distrust of political officials, El Cerrito neighbors did not 
have high levels of what Putnam and others refer to as social capital, trust, and 
norms of reciprocity in the social base of the town. Contributing to social divi-
sions in El Cerrito was the system of land use for agricultural production, one of 
the pillars of economic activity in Selvillo and the surrounding area. In El Cerrito, 
unlike many other localities in Guanajuato, land use was not based on ejido, one 
of the hallmark achievements of President Lázaro Cárdenas’s agrarian reforms in 
which over 18 million hectares of land were redistributed to the peasantry for com-
munal use.4 Rather, in 1992 with the introduction of neoliberal economic reforms, 
large parcels of land were sold to private companies and agricultural production 
was increasingly industrialized in this part of Guanajuato, which upset tradi-
tional modes of economic production and displaced Cerritenses from domestic 
cultivation and subsistence. The privatization of land became very expensive in 
El Cerrito and only a few families, including Reymundo’s, owned private parcels. 
The change in land tenure in the early 1990s was a significant factor in the mass 
emigration from El Cerrito that accompanied macroeconomic crisis. Those who 
owned local land were viewed as elites, and El Cerrito was separated into the haves 
and have-nots.
Mass emigration further exacerbated social inequality in the locality because 
exit allowed many families to subsist on remittances from the U.S. Migrant fami-
lies acquired new sources of revenue and were not dependent on employment in 
local agriculture. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, migrant households fixed 
up their homes, sent more children to school, and purchased creature comforts 
that many in El Cerrito without migrants abroad could not afford. For those resi-
dents like Jessy, a construction worker who had previously emigrated to Texas and 
then returned to El Cerrito because of hardships in the U.S., migrants who had 
“made it” in the U.S. were often “showoffs” who made life for nonmigrant fami-
lies even harder than it already was. The social and political context in El Cerrito 
made coproduction challenging for the migrant club. Allegations of political scan-
dal, alleged political corruption and rent-seeking that accompanied high levels of 
unemployment, pockets of intense poverty, and perpetual migration, which intro-
duced jealousy and competition between migrant and nonmigrant neighbors, had 
reconfigured citizen-state relations in El Cerrito. The combination of these local 
factors created severe challenges for the cross-border provision of public goods for 
migrant clubs like Reymundo and Francisco’s.
In 2005, most local residents who were aware of the new HTA were suspicious 
of the migrants’ motives. Members of Club El Cerrito had migrated many years 
ago and although they still had a few family members in town and friendships 
from elementary school, the migrants lacked bridging ties to key stakeholders in 
the community. Jessy was someone in El Cerrito who “knew everybody” according 
to many residents, but not Reymundo and Francisco. He had not heard about the 
3x1 Program or about what the migrant club planned to do in the town. So when 
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he saw the migrants talking to construction crew members in El Cerrito who were 
there to dig holes for new electricity lines, Jessy was suspicious and asked other 
residents about the paisanos and the projects. No one Jessy talked to knew about 
the club or the project, further raising his suspicions. “Before I knew Reymundo 
like I know him now, I thought there must be something going on because where 
did the paisanos get the money for the project? And how was it happening so fast? 
Nothing happens fast in El Cerrito and if it involves the municipality you have to 
wonder because they do nothing here,” he said. The lack of recognition between 
community stakeholders such as Jessy and migrant HTA leaders actively working 
to improve public goods provision in the town reflected low levels of bridging 
social ties.
Furthermore, pervasive mistrust of local officials responsible for public goods 
provision made residents suspicious of the cooperation between the migrant club 
and local government, even though the municipal government was not actively 
involved in the 3x1 project at all. Local residents did not have accurate information 
about who was involved in the project. From their vantage point, the migrants’ 
cooperation with local government made them guilty by association given the his-
tory of political opportunism and scandal in El Cerrito. And gossip about the club 
and the migrants while they were back in the U.S. created a circle of negativity 
around the club early on.
Additionally, Reymundo and Francisco’s long absence from the hometown, 
despite annual visits, had eroded their social ties beyond their close circle of 
friends and family. While the migrants felt connected to El Cerrito and claimed 
to have good intentions, residents had no reason to trust them. As Juanita, a local 
shop owner, told me, “People in El Cerrito keep to who they know. It’s chang-
ing more now, I guess. But when Jessy and Miguel (a local schoolteacher) told us 
about the migrants doing projects with the municipio, I first thought they were 
crazy. Maybe they just don’t know about politicians here anymore because they 
live in California.” The deficiency of migrants’ social ties made popular residents 
like Jessy publicly question whether Reymundo and Francisco had the authority 
to be involved in public goods provision in El Cerrito. It led others, like Juanita, to 
question their decision-making authority given the general skepticism locals had 
of political authorities in Selvillo.
Reymundo and Francisco lamented not talking to Jessy and other residents 
about what the 3x1 Program was and what they wanted to do in El Cerrito before 
they started the projects. Reymundo said:
People are so used to the government not delivering that we thought we had to do 
a quick and easy project. We extended the electrical grid to a street that had never 
had electricity. We did the whole project in 20 days without the municipio. And still 
people didn’t trust us. They were so suspicious. They would say, “How come it hap-
pened so fast? They must be corrupt; they are lunatics.” . . . I even had to show Jessy 
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the receipts and the check we wrote for 3x1 just to get them to believe that we weren’t 
trying to steal the money that we had fundraised for the town in the U.S.5
The migrants learned from the first two projects that they had to communicate 
more effectively with locals and give residents a stake in the public projects if they 
wanted to succeed. “We don’t want to be associated with being nontransparent. We 
learned that we had to inform the town what 3x1 is and who we are if we wanted 
to keep going with projects; otherwise it’s just more gossip (chisme) and negativ-
ity (negatividad),” said Reymundo. Migrant club leaders recognized that in future 
projects they needed to give residents “a piece of projects that means something 
to them” and that the coordination of projects should be “more interactive.” While 
Francisco and the other migrant leaders genuinely believed more active involve-
ment of the community would help reduce suspicion and criticism of their club, 
they also thought that if more citizens became involved, it could stimulate more 
engagement from the local government. Although the migrants learned from 
conversations with residents about how much they disliked government officials, 
the migrants also did not think they could do the projects on their own without 
municipal matching funds.
In the first few projects, local government shirked their responsibilities and held 
up completion of the public lighting project, which the migrants worried would 
further cast doubt on their involvement in El Cerrito with residents. Reymundo 
said that the municipal officials “had a mañana mentalidad, everything was, ‘We’ll 
get it to you soon, tomorrow, tomorrow,’ but nothing ever came. And since we 
weren’t in El Cerrito we had to just keep calling and bugging them and nothing 
ever happened.” The migrants’ absence from the hometown made monitoring gov-
ernment activity nearly impossible. And without local residents to follow up with 
contractors and officials about project activities, the migrants feared they would 
not finish any projects, or worse, the remittances they collected from paisanos in 
the U.S. would disappear from the local treasury, which would surely end the club’s 
development activities in the hometown.
While the 3x1 Program is designed to have all contributors match collective 
remittances one-to-one, the first municipal government (PAN) that Club El 
Cerrito worked with failed to deliver its 25 percent share of project costs and mate-
rials they promised the migrants as part of the 3x1 project approval process. The 
mayor and his administration stalled technical plans, neither delivering materials 
nor committing their share of matching funds. Additionally, migrant club mem-
bers believed the officials tried to inflate project costs. “When we approached the 
mayor about the public lighting project and matching some funds for 3x1, he (the 
mayor) kept saying, ‘Well, how much money does your club have? Tell us how 
much you have and then we can put together a budget.’ But we were not stupid, we 
were not going to do that,” said Reymundo. This was frustrating to the migrants 
because they talked to other migrant club leaders in nearby municipalities (Yuriria 
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and Acambaro) who told them about how many projects they completed with the 
municipal administration through the 3x1 Program. This perplexed them since 
they knew Selvillo was a richer municipality and had resources to contribute to 
public works projects.6
The 2005–7 PAN administration was focused, however, on projects primar-
ily in the county seat. Although the former mayor said he wanted to support El 
Cerrito and 3x1, he added, “What am I going to do, give projects to the little old 
ladies who live there? It is not a big population and I can do more with public 
resources in the cabecera.” With skepticism growing from prominent townspeo-
ple about the migrants’ involvement in public works, a reticent local government 
“partner,” and the need to be accountable to paisanos across the U.S. who had 
fundraised and donated resources for the projects, Club El Cerrito worked with-
out a municipal partner and substituted for the local government for the public 
lighting project, electricity project, and a street pavement project. “The longer 
the projects took (electricity and pavement) and we waited for the municipality 
to do nothing, the more the residents and paisanos in the U.S. thought we had 
something to hide. It was getting to be too hard. We talked about it and we said 
our time and reputation is more important than the municipality’s 25 percent 
share, so we did it without them, just with state and federal matching funds,” 
said Reymundo.
Due to internal political considerations at the local level, the initial phase of the 
transnational partnership was one of substitutive coproduction. For the electric-
ity, public lighting, and pavement projects, Club El Cerrito contributed 33 percent 
to project costs even though the Selvillo administration had pledged support as 
part of the 3x1 Program approval procedure. With complementary funding from 
the state and federal governments, the club hired their own architect, and got 
help with technical planning from state-level officials they came to know at the 
COVAM project validation meetings. Beyond their agreement to participate in the 
3x1 Program, the Selvillo municipal government was uninvolved in the early years 
of the club’s activities. But this did not stop municipal officials from trying to take 
credit for projects. Residents of El Cerrito said that while the migrants were in the 
U.S., the municipal government had a car with a loudspeaker circulate through the 
town, listing the public projects they had completed in El Cerrito. When I asked 
the former director of social development about the credit claiming for projects, 
he gave me a candid response. He said, “Look, we did participate in 3x1, we let 
them use the municipio’s truck for the projects. And we approved the projects 
for 3x1. It is not good if the migrants are doing projects and showing us up.” With 
municipal elections around the corner and fiercer competition between the PRI 
and PAN, the local government did not want residents to perceive a municipal lack 
of engagement in El Cerrito.
The year 2009 marked a significant shift in the way in which coproduction 
projects were organized in El Cerrito and Selvillo more generally. Over the course 
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of a year, Club El Cerrito changed how projects were selected, funded, and imple-
mented in the hometown, which scaled up community inclusion and government 
engagement. Club El Cerrito recruited residents including Jessy and Miguel into 
club activities, an effort to get the prominent locals on “their side.” The develop-
ment of bridging ties to these key social actors in the hometown led to broader 
civic engagement and inclusion of an expanding segment of Cerritense residents 
in coproduction activities with the migrant club. The increase in citizen inclusion, 
in turn, prompted more engagement from local government in the coproduction 
of public goods.
C ONSTRUCTING SO CIAL TIES THROUGH SO CIAL 
EVENT S AND CITIZEN RECRUITMENT
Manuel, Reymundo’s brother and friend of migrant club leader Francisco, rec-
ommended club leadership meet with Jessy, Miguel, Dionisio, and other local 
residents who were critical of the club’s involvement in town affairs to discuss 
the 3x1 Program. Since Manuel had moved back to El Cerrito, he knew who had 
bad-mouthed the migrant club around town. When Reymundo and Francisco 
approached the men during a visit to the town they decided to cohost a town hall–
style meeting where the club members would come and speak directly to local 
residents about public goods projects. At the meeting, the migrants explained to 
the 70 residents in attendance what the 3x1 Program was, how it worked, and what 
the club hoped to accomplish moving forward.
During the meeting, Reymundo solicited volunteers to participate in the selec-
tion and implementation of projects. This effort built the club’s credibility and 
expanded the density and heterogeneity of social ties throughout the town. About 
20 residents volunteered to form a mirror association they called the Public Works 
Committee (PWC) to work alongside the club. Additionally, Jessy and two of his 
close friends, informally referred as the “Hawks” (halcones), appointed themselves 
the watchdogs of both the migrant club and political officials. This additional com-
mittee effort was meant to ensure local residents that political officials involved in 
any 3x1 projects would not attempt to pocket the town’s resources, which was still 
a concern of many residents at the meeting.
The construction of new social ties to Jessy and Miguel, the veteran school-
teacher, facilitated a number of additional bridging ties to the principal of the 
elementary school, teachers at El Cerrito’s schools, and members of the church 
group, all of whom the club was interested in working with on different proj-
ects. Since many in the parent-teacher association and church group knew “the 
Hawks,” when they put in a good word for the migrants, other residents were will-
ing to chat with club leaders about coproduction activities. The branching out of 
the migrant social base to community stakeholders increased the HTA’s visibility, 
credibility, and overall reputation. As a result, residents became more involved in 
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the everyday tasks required of coproducing public works including fundraising, 
selecting projects, and monitoring the implementation of projects.
In addition to constructing social ties between migrant club leaders and promi-
nent members of El Cerrito, Reymundo and Francisco sponsored social events 
in the hometown that helped raise funds for development projects. They threw 
rodeos (jaripeos), hired popular local bands to play, and sold tickets at a low price 
so that most residents could afford to attend. In an effort to be as inclusive as pos-
sible, residents recommended that the club use chicken wire around the bleacher 
seating so that poor residents without tickets could still watch the events through 
the wire. These kinds of small details went a long way toward improving migrant-
resident social relations in El Cerrito, especially with poorer citizens like Gloria. I 
asked her if she had attended the 3x1 meetings and spoken up about what kinds of 
projects she wanted for the town. She replied that she and others did not think it 
was appropriate to say anything about what they wanted because they did not have 
money to contribute to projects and did not have remittances to use for their share. 
But she reflected, during our chat, that when the PWC members walked around 
town, knocked on doors, and asked people what kinds of projects they would like, 
she felt more comfortable. The PWC member told her that she would not have to 
worry about paying if her family did not have the money and they could contrib-
ute labor or help at the fundraiser instead. Gloria felt more comfortable at this 
point, she said, and told the PWC member she thought drainage was a big issue 
in her part of town. Since the PWC members had a better understanding of the 
cleavages around poverty and migration in El Cerrito than the migrants did, they 
were able to strategize new ways to get people who were more reticent to vocalize 
their concerns about town issues.
The migrant club members credit a particular rodeo with really changing the 
townspeople’s awareness of the HTA and their reputation in the town. Reymundo 
described the change this way:
After working together on a few projects, we (hawks, migrant club, and PWC) all 
realized we had to make the projects even more inclusive. We threw a huge jaripeo 
where we got the most popular banda in all of Guanajuato to perform. We sold tick-
ets in the U.S. and Mexico for $100 each (MXN pesos) and after we covered the costs 
of everything we made enough money to finance a recreation area for the school-
children. This was something the principal really wanted, and being in education, 
this was a project really close to my heart. And it was my elementary school too, 
which was special to me . . . The whole town came, like 3,000 people! It really showed 
people that we could do things together. Things really changed after that.
Over time, more local residents became interested in contributing to fundraising 
efforts for town projects, especially if it was a project they proposed. But not all 
projects were equally popular. Reymundo and a principal of the elementary school 
discussed building a computer lab at the school. When the parents heard about 
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the idea some of them balked at the need for computers. “What do kids need with 
computers?” a parent remarked. But after the computer lab was installed, more 
parents asked the migrant club if they could have a computer lab at the schools 
where their children attended (middle school and elementary). To purchase more 
computers, the parents made food and sold dinner plates for a small fee to con-
tribute resources to the 3x1 costs. In one of the fundraising events, the townspeople 
raised a hefty sum when they raffled off a mule. Social events helped raise money 
for public works projects, and as more townspeople became aware of and involved 
in projects, they felt more comfortable taking the initiative on their own.
The process of working out project selection with migrants, the PWC, and 
other parents had an additional social effect. Fundraisers and meetings about the 
projects became sites of social exchange and camaraderie for the residents of El 
Cerrito, which helped smooth over some of the previous political divisions across 
town. People who had never spoken before now had a reason to chat. The social 
events held for public goods projects also aided migrant club leaders’ reintegra-
tion into the social life of the hometown. As one of the elementary school teachers 
noted, “Now, it’s like they had been here. And when Reymundo comes, everyone 
likes to go to his parties.” Over time, the paisanos’ involvement in public affairs 
in the hometown was normalized, and increased social interactions and activities 
in the town helped to reintegrate their cultural membership in the community 
despite their residence in the U.S.
In addition to fundraising events in El Cerrito, the migrant branches continued 
to fundraise across the U.S. Over time, Cerritense paisanos had developed sophis-
ticated networks that they mobilized for their social events in each branch and 
their fundraisers became more successful. Most raffles generated between $3,000 
and $4,000 (USD). The migrants also learned after talking with other clubs in the 
Guanajuato federation that they could purchase trucks with lines of credit opened 
in the U.S. and raffle them off before they needed to make the first payment. For 
example, in one fundraiser, Reymundo purchased a truck in Mexico on credit, 
drove it back to California, and sold raffle tickets to Cerritenses in the U.S. The 
raffle fundraised the entire cost of the truck plus additional funds for future public 
projects. By 2011, Club El Cerrito had a working annual budget of about $100,000. 
Between 2008 and 2013, in addition to expanding social network ties through-
out El Cerrito, paisanos learned how to improve participation at their fundraising 
events when they joined the Guanajuato state federation of migrant clubs. On both 
sides of the border, Club Cerrito expanded the depth and breadth of their social 
ties to include more participants in coproduction activities. They also held social 
events that helped fundraising efforts, which gave migrants and nonmigrants 
spaces to socialize and expand their solidaristic ties to other Cerritenses in Selvillo 
and the U.S.
The expansion of migrants’ bridging ties to different social circles in El Cerrito 
through active recruitment and social events embedded migrants back into the 
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social life of the hometown. As a result, the degree of community inclusion in 
coproduction activities escalated after the town hall meeting in 2009. In addi-
tion to owning homes while living abroad and supporting development projects, 
migrant club members were regular attendees and sponsors of parties, dinners, 
and meetings during their annual visits to El Cerrito. Even though the migrants 
were absent for much of the year, when they were in town they acted as if they 
still lived there and engaged in everyday activities. When they were back in the 
U.S., they still communicated with residents through social media, texts, phone 
calls, and video chats. And their social participation in the quotidian facets of 
Cerritense life—roasting pigs in the backyard, driving around town with friends 
and visiting neighbors, sitting in the plaza and catching up with old acquaintances, 
having beers at jaripeos, attending mass, visiting godparents, and gossiping—not 
only reduced any concerns among residents about the migrant club members’ 
intentions in the town; this participation went a long way toward building soli-
darity between citizens with different economic and political backgrounds. The 
migrant club’s sponsorship of social and cultural events brought social segments 
of the hometown together to socialize and chat and solve problems together in 
new ways.
When migrant club leaders were in El Cerrito, they altered their dress, speech, 
and mannerisms to reflect local customs. In my observations, these subtle changes 
did not seem contrived. Rather, migrant club members learned how to move in 
and out of rural, small-town life and engage in a form of code-switching, which 
helped them forge social relationships that escalated community inclusion in pub-
lic goods provision. Even though migrants’ experiences living abroad had changed 
them—they spoke English, had American citizen children, became more educated, 
and attained social mobility—because they maintained and constructed solidar-
istic social ties with different segments of local society (bridging ties), migrant 
club members were seen as leaders in the community, social actors with legitimate 
voice to negotiate and coordinate with public officials to provide public goods for 
their fellow Cerritenses through the transnational partnership.
C OMMUNIT Y INCLUSION AND THE ESCAL ATION OF 
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT
As migrants became more socially embedded in the hometown, expanding their 
bridging social ties and recruiting more active stakeholders into the coproduction 
process, municipal government engagement in the transnational provision of pub-
lic goods also increased. Prior to more extensive citizen inclusion, local officials 
were virtually absent from the coproduction process, although they attempted to 
claim credit for the provision of public projects funded through the 3x1 Program. 
Witnessing how effectively the HTA worked with the town to produce projects, 
the new administration elected into office after the substitutive period became 
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more engaged in coproduction activities. Local elections became more competi-
tive in El Cerrito and the difference in vote shares between the PRI and the PAN 
narrowed in the 2007 municipal race. When I asked the new Panista mayor about 
the change in attitude between the previous and current administration, he said:
We aren’t a rich municipio, but we aren’t a poor one either. We have a public works 
budget that allows us to do maybe one project in each pueblo, but most of the proj-
ects are completed in the county seat because that’s where most of the people live. 
But when you have a really active HTA like Reymundo’s, it looks bad if the municipio 
is not involved. The 3x1 Program gives us the extra funds we need to do projects in 
towns like El Cerrito, where not a lot of residents live.
As local residents participated in the coproduction process, local government 
became more interested in providing public works through the 3x1 Program. The 
mayor said, somewhat in jest, his new PAN administration did not want to com-
pete and be “showed up” by El Cerrito’s migrant club and instead wanted to work 
with them to improve public works using the additional matching funds from the 
state and federal governments.
Club Cerrito’s active effort to construct social ties and recruit participation 
had substantial effects on not only the quality and quantity of coproduction proj-
ects, but also the extent of local government engagement and citizen-government 
interactions. As local government became more involved in coproduction, pub-
lic officials had more occasion to discuss problems in El Cerrito and learn what 
Cerritenses needed in their town. Both high community inclusion and govern-
ment engagement changed the substitutive transnational partnership into a more 
synergetic partnership. Residents’ willingness to work with public officials did 
not happen overnight. And their skepticism of political officials never fully disap-
peared. Rather, in the first year of the new PAN administration, Reymundo and 
Francisco worked primarily with municipal officials on projects and acted as rep-
resentatives of El Cerrito in their discussions and deliberations that concerned 
project governance.
After a few street pavement projects were successfully completed with the 
municipality’s active involvement, some residents were more willing to interact 
with public officials. When migrant club members were back in the U.S., the PWC 
and the Hawks increasingly went to city hall and worked on technical plans with 
municipal engineers, collected local donations, and fundraised across town for 
projects the citizens wanted. In this manner, civil society leaders of El Cerrito 
(Miguel, Pepe, and Jessy, for example) completed another public lighting project, 
recreation areas for other schools, and several pavement and sidewalk projects. 
When workers hired by the municipality failed to report to work on time or mate-
rials did not arrive, Cerritense citizens complained directly to their contacts in the 
government. El Cerrito’s local leaders provided much needed oversight to copro-
duction implementation with migrants in the U.S.
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Additionally, improved community inclusiveness led to more pronounced 
spillovers in local political participation as well as citizen relations with the local 
government. Coproduction drew attention from local residents who felt increas-
ingly comfortable contacting the HTA and PWC leaders directly to report social 
problems in the town. To meet citizens’ requests, the PWC and the HTA asked 
residents to form “citizen block committees.” Each organized group of neighbors 
fundraised and helped pay for road pavement of their respective street. Many 
households used family remittances from the U.S. for their contribution, while 
others volunteered labor or had other families cover their contribution. The PWC 
worked directly with political officials and block committees to fund road pave-
ments projects throughout town. In three years, almost every road in El Cerrito 
was paved.
The popularity of the 3x1 Program in the community led to another political 
development: the El Cerrito mayor created a new municipal 3x1 Program position 
and hired Jessy onto his staff.7 Jessy built connections within the local government 
and effective working relationships with the director of public works, the director 
of social development, the mayor, the director of the Office for Migrant Affairs, 
and the state and federal officials who approved 3x1 project proposals. Since the 
creation of the 3x1 municipal liaison position, Jessy has become embedded in the 
local municipal government, charged solely with working with citizens to coordi-
nate coproduction projects—a kind of organizational entwining par excellence. As 
a result, a local resident who was seen as a de facto leader of the town represented 
El Cerrito’s interests directly to the elected municipal administration. This munici-
pal embeddedness further escalated residential involvement in public decisions 
about projects that affected the quality of their lives.
Moreover, as members of the PWC felt more confident in their role as com-
munity leaders, they decided to tackle some local problems on their own, inde-
pendent of the 3x1 Program. After the town hall in 2009, the Hawks and the PWC 
worked on a series of coproduction projects with the HTA. But as more streets 
were paved and 3x1 signs were posted around El Cerrito, more residents wanted to 
voice their concerns about issues in the town. Jessy and Octavio, speaking to me 
over lunch one day in El Cerrito, recalled how residents texted them and posted 
messages on Facebook asking the new associations to help with different problems 
in the town, especially an uptick in crime and petty theft in a particular neigh-
borhood. Residents contacted migrants in the U.S., the Hawks, and the PWC to 
complain about the crime problem and ask if they could hire more police patrols 
or private security for the town. Since Reymundo and Jessy had learned from a 3x1 
representative at one of the COVAM meetings that this kind of project could not 
be funded by 3x1, residents took it upon themselves to form an additional commit-
tee to address the rise in local break-ins.
Some members from the Hawks, Club El Cerrito, the PWC, and 35 other 
residents formed the Public Security Committee, a kind of neighborhood watch 
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group. They conducted foot patrols, broadcasted their presence in the neighbor-
hood, approached the suspected thieves and threatened them with further pun-
ishment if they continued their activities. Soon after, the break-ins ended. With 
newfound confidence that they could solve problems on their own, members of 
the security committee continued to meet regularly and discussed other issues. 
This was an especially important development because members of the security 
committee included political party operatives for both the PRI and PAN who were 
not well acquainted.
In one of the meetings, residents discussed concerns that the doctor of the local 
health clinic was no longer keeping regular hours and was charging for services 
that were supposed to be free. Residents alleged he had also inflated the cost of 
medicine. Problems with the local health clinic caused serious consternation in El 
Cerrito because if the clinic was not open, residents had to travel 30 miles to the 
county seat to see a doctor and ambulances could not be counted on to travel to El 
Cerrito. On a few occasions, residents who were hurt when the clinic was closed 
had to pay for expensive taxis to get to the municipal hospital or had to travel on 
horseback while injured since many Cerritenses do not have their own cars. Other 
residents were unable to get their medicine and pregnant women often went with-
out prenatal care when the doctor tried to charge them for routine services that 
were previously free. The PWC leaders organized a meeting between the clinic 
doctor and members of the municipal administration to coordinate a regular, con-
sistent schedule of hours for the local clinic and the cost of services. The PWCs 
efforts were successful, and residents began to feel more confident going to the 
PWC to help with problems that surfaced in town.
The security group also began to work with members of the 2011 PRI municipal 
administration to bring social programs and services to El Cerrito. In 2011, the 
members of the Public Security Committee and the PWC worked together with 
the municipal government to coordinate information sessions on proper hygiene, 
domestic violence prevention, and nutrition for Cerritenses. By 2013, the civic 
associations of El Cerrito had registered with the municipal government and they 
worked on projects through other state-level programs beyond the 3x1 Program 
with and without the migrant club.
POLITICAL C ONSEQUENCES OF SYNERGETIC 
C OPRODUCTION IN EL CERRITO
In the first few years of the transnational partnership between Club El Cerrito 
and the Selvillo municipality, neither local residents nor municipal government 
officials were active contributors to the coproduction of public goods and services. 
The migrants were only able to complete the public lighting, electricity expansion, 
and some road pavement projects because they had the resources to contribute the 
municipalities’ share of total 3x1 project costs, had complementary resources from 
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the state and federal governments, and decided to hire their own labor, contractor, 
and materials when the municipality stalled project support they had previously 
promised but never delivered. High levels of HTA capacity allowed Club El Cerrito 
to substitute for municipal government engagement in coproduction activities.
Knowing that they would be unlikely to sustain the high level of engagement 
to compensate for an absent municipal government and involved local citizenry, 
the migrant club met with longtime residents outside of their bonding network of 
old friends and family to actively recruit key community stakeholders like Jessy, 
Miguel, and Pepe (leader of the Public Security Committee) into the transnational 
partnership. Through the formation of bridging social ties, the HTA expanded the 
number of local inhabitants involved in coproduction and improved the visibility 
and reputation of the migrant leaders of the club. Through the sponsorship of 
social events, such as rodeos, dances, raffles, and dinners, migrants and citizens 
began to work together on public goods projects, re-embedding migrants back 
into the social fabric of El Cerrito after having been gone for more than 15 years. 
As migrant leadership reinvigorated their social ties in the hometown, they were 
increasingly seen as cultural members of the community, which allowed them to 
recruit and work as collaborative partners with local residents on an array of pub-
lic works projects.
As community inclusion escalated, Club El Cerrito worked extensively with 
local residents to fundraise, select, and coordinate all facets of public goods proj-
ects through the 3x1 Program, but without the engagement of local government. 
This early phase of the transnational partnership is best described as substitutive. 
However, as residents were increasingly involved in development projects, and 
political competition became fiercer between the PRI and the PAN in Selvillo, the 
2007–9 municipal administration became more willing to contribute resources, 
offer technical planning support, hire labor, and deliberate with migrants and resi-
dents over project selection. To do so, the mayor created a new salaried position 
in the municipal government administration that worked directly with Club El 
Cerrito to coproduce public goods and services in localities throughout Selvillo.
The creation of a new participatory sphere of decision-making between 
migrants, residents, and municipal officials improved civic and political engage-
ment in El Cerrito and led to the strengthening of citizen-state relations and gov-
ernment responsiveness. Cerritenses became more willing to work with migrants 
and no longer believed they had corrupt intentions. Scaling up of citizen inclu-
sion led to the formation of three new community groups: public works, citizen 
block, and public security committees. Even though El Cerrito was a poor local-
ity in a middle-income municipality with low levels of trust between residents 
and migrants and government officials, the coproduction process improved state-
society relations and citizen political participation as a result of increased citizen 
inclusion that evolved over time. And, as more local residents were integrated into 
the coproduction process and told their representatives what they wanted and 
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needed in their town, municipal political officials became increasingly engaged. 
The migrant HTA’s links to the local government and residents of the town created 
an alternative mode of participation in which citizens had more routine inter-
actions with elected officials and felt more empowered to participate in solving 
problems through deliberation and democratic decision-making. Citizens did not 
necessarily start trusting political officials, but they were willing to work with them 
to advance Cerritense interests through a process of social and political learning 
that evolved over the course of several years of coproduction activities.
Moreover, residents reported that after they became more involved in copro-
duction and saw that the local government shirked their participation in the 
early substitutive period of coproduction, they felt compelled to vote against 
the PAN, even though they had been longtime PAN supporters. The PAN’s vote 
share declined 11 percent in the El Cerrito district in the election after substitutive 
coproduction. The PAN still won the mayoral election, but the mayor and his new 
administration knew they would need to change their strategy from the previous 
PAN administration or face more opposition in a locality previously counted on 
as a Panista stronghold.
Relatedly, local government responsiveness improved in the change from sub-
stitution to synergy in the transnational coproduction process. Municipal govern-
ment increased the average total share of expenditures on public works by three 
percent as well as public works spending by $466 pesos (per capita) between the 
2007–9 and 2009–11 municipal administrations. Most of the increase was attrib-
uted to matching funds from the 3x1 Program’s state and federal partners and dis-
tributed to localities in Selvillo that had active migrant clubs including El Cerrito. 
The integration of a broad swath of local citizens voters into the coproduction pro-
cess altered the local government’s political incentives to engage in transnational 
activities as more citizens voiced their opinions about public goods decisions and 
were eager to participate in politics. Local residents participated in public life in El 
Cerrito at first indirectly through leadership of the HTA, but as citizen inclusion 
increased, more residents directly engaged in regular meetings and negotiations 
with elected representatives over development projects. Even though the political 
party of the mayor changed from PRI to PAN and back to PRI again, the synergy 
created between Cerritenses citizens and the local government carried over to the 
new PRI administrative authorities who were eager to work with the residents of 
El Cerrito and gain their political support.
SYNERGETIC C OPRODUCTION,  INTERRUPTED,  IN 
TELEPI ,  Z ACATECAS
Telepi is a rural municipality with about 9,000 residents located in the southwest-
ern part of Zacatecas. The rural municipality is off of Route 23 and nestled between 
municipalities in Jalisco and Zacatecas as the geographic boundaries between the 
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two states zig and zag in this area. Most residents live in the cabecera municipal, 
but about 500 residents are scattered across the municipality’s 26 localities that 
locals affectionately refer to as ranchitos. Telepi has a long history of emigration 
to the U.S. Many residents are proud of the fact that relatives first went to the U.S. 
as braceros in the late 1940s and 1950s. Since then, emigration intensified dur-
ing Mexico’s macroeconomic crisis in the 1980s and 1990s, similar to El Cerrito, 
and migration has been viewed as an unfortunate necessity. Declining domes-
tic agricultural production due to an extended draught in the 1990s and farmers’ 
inability to compete with American corn production after the implementation 
of NAFTA pushed more people to leave in search of jobs or scrape by on milpa 
crops for subsistence and sale in local and regional markets. A milpa field typically 
includes a dozen complementary crops including the “three sisters” (maize, beans, 
and squash).
Many Telepitenses initially left for Guadalajara, but eventually went to the U.S. 
Since the late 1980s, Telepitenses also went straight to the U.S. to find agricultural 
work in California and Oklahoma and manufacturing and construction jobs in 
Dallas, Chicago, and Atlanta. While more than a quarter of the Telepi community 
emigrated to make ends meet, many residents, both migrants and nonmigrants, 
describe it as a necessary evil. According to one local business owner named Julia, 
migrants bring back American culture (for example, tattoos, bad manners, focus 
on income and consumerism, less religiosity), which has upset traditional culture 
and the local values associated with rural life.
Telepi is a poor municipality with a high migration rate according to official sta-
tistics and has one of the oldest hometown associations investing in public goods 
projects in the state of Zacatecas.8 Familias de Telepi started as an informal group 
of families that all lived in the greater Los Angeles area (San Pedro, Bell Gardens, 
and Norwalk). Martin, an immigrant from Telepi who lived in San Pedro, formed 
a social group of migrants from Telepi who also lived in the area. Martin’s club, 
called Club Social de Telepi, was mostly an informal group of several families who 
came together for social solidarity. Together the families enjoyed picnics, played 
soccer, and supported new migrants from Telepi when then arrived in the Los 
Angeles area.
About eight months after Club Social formed, Sarita and Leo, a married couple 
from Telepi, joined the club when they heard about it through a mutual friend at 
their church in San Pedro, California. Both Sarita and Leo were born and raised in 
Telepi and emigrated together 30 years ago. While Leo was from a farming family 
on the outskirts of town, Sarita was from a more prominent family who lived for 
generations in the center of the municipality. Her father, Ricardo, was a telegra-
pher who brought Morse code to the area and was considered a leader in the town 
who raised money for the first public light post. Sarita was a lot like her father, 
popular in her church group, and she was friendly with many families around 
town. Sarita said it was hard to leave Telepi, but the drought hurt Leo’s crops and 
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they could not see a way forward staying on the land. Reluctantly, Leo and Sarita, 
high school sweethearts who loved Telepi, emigrated first to Texas, where Leo’s 
friend helped him get a job, and then to San Pedro, where he started his own small 
business. During their years in the U.S., Sarita and Leo started a family and had 
three American citizen children, two of whom served in the U.S. Army. Although 
she said she enjoyed her immigrant community in San Pedro where many resi-
dents from Zacatecas also lived and she knew how fortunate they were to be able to 
give their children opportunities they never had in Telepi (mainly, attend college), 
she never fully incorporated into U.S. society and always felt more “at home” in 
Zacatecas. In Telepi, the pace of life was slower and more traditional, which suited 
Sarita more than American culture in southern California. When she and Leo 
joined the social club, her nostalgia for rural life bloomed. As the years progressed 
and their children grew up and moved out of the house, the couple realized they 
wanted to do more for their hometown.
Part of what made the couple’s cross-border involvement in Telepi possible was 
their ability to regularize their immigration statuses after the passage of IRCA in 
1986. Soon after acquiring their green cards, the couple started to visit the home-
town every summer, sometimes staying for a few months at a time with their chil-
dren. Permanent residency eased the burden of crossing the border and enabled 
the family to maintain social relationships throughout the town. As a result of 
their frequent and extensive summer visits in Telepi, Sarita had both bonding 
and bridging social ties throughout Telepi. For example, her sister was a nun who 
worked in the region and still lived in Telepi. She also stayed a member of her 
beloved church group even from afar. Members of the church group were from 
all corners of Telepi and Sarita got to know many families in pueblos across town 
through her work in the group. Her active involvement in the local church groups 
was a key driving force in the development of the new hometown association that 
she would later form.
During one of their Christmas holiday visits, Sarita got the idea with her church 
friends to raise small amounts of money and donate it to the church for a new roof. 
The friends decided to do small fundraisers on both side of the border. Sarita and 
a few of her immigrant friends in Los Angeles made buttons and tamales to sell at 
festivals, picnics, and other social events held by Zacatecan immigrant organiza-
tions. Residence in the U.S. did not prevent Sarita from staying active in an asso-
ciation she had come to value and where she had made deep connections to other 
parishioners she left behind when they moved to the U.S.
After the church roof project, Sarita and Leo wanted to continue supporting 
their town. Since they had stayed in touch with friends and family across Telepi, 
they kept abreast of the problems in town. Friends of Sarita’s who worked in the 
municipal government frequently complained that they had no vehicle to pick up 
trash and to use for public works projects in town. Eager to support the provision 
of a dump truck for the Telepi government, Sarita discussed the idea with the 
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other families of Club Social in San Pedro. But while Sarita, Leo, and a few other 
members wanted to take on bigger public works projects, Martin and the original 
members of Club Social preferred the club remain more of a social group. With 
the blessing of the original founders of the club, Sarita, Leo, Fernando, and a few 
other members left the group and formed a new migrant hometown club, Familias 
de Telepi. Familias planned to focus exclusively on fundraising collective resources 
for public goods projects throughout Telepi that would help improve the residents’ 
quality of life.
Since the late 1990s, Familias de Telepi worked to mobilize resources for pub-
lic goods projects. In the early years of the club, Sarita and the members raised 
the money, purchased goods, and sent them back to Telepi without support or 
coordination with the municipal PRI government. But a trip to Telepi during the 
Christmas holiday in 2001 changed the scale of the club’s focus and eagerness to 
improve social welfare in the hometown even more.
Over the Christmas holiday, Sarita and her church group went caroling in a 
pueblo outside the county seat. They made food and brought plates to all the poor 
households. House after house, Sarita and members of the church group found 
people living in squalor. Elderly grandparents of migrants living in the U.S. had 
stopped receiving remittances and had very little to eat. In one ranchito, they were 
invited into the home of an elderly woman whose eyesight had deteriorated so 
much she could not see the bugs and cockroaches embedded in the tortillas she 
was making for the carolers. In another home, they met an elderly man who joked 
he had to “fight the rats for his food.” Sarita and her friends were devastated after 
the visit. When she returned to San Pedro in the new year, she recounted what she 
saw to the members of the Familias group and they all agreed they must do more 
for the people of Telepi whose migrant families in the U.S. had “forgotten” their 
relatives after living abroad for so long. Familias and the church group decided to 
work on an ambitious project together in the months after the caroling visit to the 
ranchitos of Telepi. They set out to build a nursing home (asilo de ancianos) for the 
poor, elderly residents of Telepi.
Even though Sarita was a migrant herself, she shared many of the criticisms 
nonmigrant residents had about the ways in which migration changed local social 
life. Residents bemoaned the consumerism that remittances supported and looked 
down on migrants’ displays of wealth (designer handbags), habits (cursing), and 
dress (tattoos and piercings) that some residents thought migrants flaunted when 
they returned in December for prolonged visits. There was a great deal of pride in 
the rural Telepi lifestyle, and some residents were concerned Telepi boys and girls 
would be lured to the U.S. by materialism instead of finishing high school in town. 
When I asked about how migration had changed life in Telepi to a group of women 
in a knitting circle one afternoon, they said American culture eroded Catholic val-
ues, neighborliness, and made migrants look down on more traditional customs 
and practices such as charreada (equestrian competitions similar to an American 
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rodeo) and patron saint festivities. Many local residents understood migration to 
the U.S. as necessary for families’ economic well-being, but also associated the 
migratory process with the introduction of “modern” values and disrespect for 
rural, traditional modes of cultural life.
Women in the knitting circle acknowledged the tension between migration and 
cultural values head-on. Martina, a nonmigrant resident, said, “Listen, I under-
stand why people leave. It is a necessarily evil. And paisanos work really hard. My 
friend’s husband has been there [U.S.] for 10 years and he never sees his kids. It is 
really hard for her. But now it is like they go just for the money and the trucks, and 
they come back to say how much better it is there. It is not for me.” Many of the 
women nodded their heads when Martina spoke, including Sarita. The selection 
of the nursing home project was reflective of this concern about migration chang-
ing social values in Telepi. Church group members thought the elderly residents 
who had been cared for by remittances had been “forgotten” by their families. The 
women identified this issue as one in which they could make a real difference. 
Sarita shared this view and the nursing home project became the core mission 
of the group. Sarita and Leo’s maintenance of both bonding and bridging ties to 
residents throughout Telepi and their shared concerns about the disruptive nature 
migration had on traditional values in the hometown created a common connec-
tion and solidarity between the active residents of Telepi and Sarita, the visible 
ambassador of the migrant club in the hometown.
EXPANSION OF SO CIAL NET WORK TIES DURING 
THE NURSING HOME PROJECT
Sarita was embedded in the social base of Telepi and her concern for the people of 
Telepi was equally matched by her commitment to the migrant club. Sarita said, 
“This is not like a hobby or something to me. I take this very seriously. We take 
this very seriously. I will work for this club and for the people of Telepi until I am 
dead.”9 The breadth and depth of both bonding and bridging ties meant that local 
residents were highly involved in coproduction activities from the very start. Her 
embeddedness in Telepi after migration meant that the projects the club pursued 
in Telepi were framed as contributions by and for Telepitenses.
Sarita’s social embeddedness was apparent after spending a few weeks in Telepi. 
It seemed like everyone knew her even though she lived most of the year in the U.S. 
When she was in town and we walked around town to different project sites, peo-
ple constantly stopped to say hello or waved to her from across the street. During 
a bus trip to an outdoor Catholic mass for residents of several nearby munici-
palities, people rushed to sit next to her and ask after her family. On several occa-
sions, I visited her house to chat and have lunch. During these visits, she either 
had company already or a neighbor, friend, teacher, or relative knocked on the 
door for a visit. Because Sarita was still perceived as a member of the community, 
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the coproduction of public goods projects her club spearheaded was perceived by 
most residents as a cross-border extension of social solidarity and community. The 
strong base of support in the hometown also allowed migrant club members and 
local partners to more easily recruit residents to take on more active, leadership 
roles in the coproduction process with the municipal government as the number 
and scale of projects escalated over time.
Sarita and Leo used both their bridging ties to members of the church group 
and bonding ties to relatives who remained behind in Telepi as active partners 
in club activities. Members of the church group included her sister, Elena, the 
museum director, staff in the ayuntamiento, an owner of a popular fresh juice 
stall, neighbors on her block, and parents and teachers of the local technical high 
school. Additionally, Leo recruited his friends from high school who worked in 
the municipal administration and with whom he shared a migratory experience. 
They then became involved in the nursing home project. As Sarita, Leo, and the 
other club members fundraised and planned for the nursing home on the U.S. 
side of the border, the church group in Telepi fundraised in Mexico. The asilo de 
ancianos was a huge endeavor even with the support of the local Catholic church. 
Familias needed financing and technical support from the government to see the 
project through, since a project of this magnitude was beyond the technical capac-
ity and economies of scale of the migrant group. Sarita decided to meet with a 
friend and former migrant who had returned to Telepi to work as an engineer for 
the PRI municipal administration. She hoped he would provide advice and per-
haps technical support for the nursing home project.
Ignacio (“Nacho”) was an engineer and director of social development for the 
municipal administration at the time he met with his old friends Sarita and Leo 
to discuss the nursing home in 2003. A former migrant himself with social ties to 
Sarita and other HTA members in the federation (his brother-in-law later became 
the Zacatecan Federation president), Nacho was intrigued by the 3x1 matching 
grants program he had heard about from his brother in the U.S. When Sarita dis-
cussed the nursing home with Nacho and recommended proposing the project 
through the new federal version of the 3x1 Program, he jumped at the opportunity 
to be involved. Nacho organized a meeting with the mayor, Sarita, Leo, and mem-
bers of the church group to formally propose the nursing home project for the 
municipal partnership. The PRI mayor supported the idea and instructed Nacho 
to regularly meet with Sarita and travel to Los Angeles when necessary to plan 
and implement the multi-stage project. A project of this scale would need to be 
completed over several phases, and Nacho and the director of social development 
would have to use resources from several different funding streams to make the 
municipality’s 25 percent share. Telepi was a poorer municipality without much 
capacity to provide more than a few public works projects a year. The 3x1 Program, 
with cofinancing from the state and federal governments, was viewed by the PRI 
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administration as a new resource that could extend their public works budget 
beyond its limited scope.
While the planning of the nursing home project was underway, Nacho con-
vinced the mayor to work on several additional projects with the migrant club 
through the 3x1 Program. Since Sarita and Leo could not be in town to help with 
all the planning of the nursing home, they decided, along with members of the 
church group, to help form a mirror club (club espejo) in Telepi that would work as 
the Telepi counterpoint to the Familias efforts in Los Angeles. One of the members 
of the church association, Umberto, was also the director of social communica-
tions for the Telepi government and a friend of Leo’s from high school. Together 
with his friends and neighbors, which included a few teachers, store owners, and 
members of a defunct Rotary club, Umberto recruited everyone to the mirror club 
that planned to work together with the municipal government and Familias to 
implement phase one of the nursing home projects. Out of the church associa-
tion, a new civic association was created to work directly with the migrant club 
to fundraise materials for the nursing home resident’s bedrooms. As more people 
became involved in the project, they spun out new, smaller committees to work on 
particular aspects of the project that were meaningful to them.
Sarita’s bonding and bridging social ties in Telepi helped to expand the number 
of residents involved in the coproduction process, and Umberto’s connection to 
Sarita through the church group extended the social network of the migrants in 
Telepi when he recruited other active residents into the coproduction partnership 
through his bonding social network of close friends and family. Migrant social 
embeddedness in Telepi led to high levels of community inclusion in coproduction 
activities. As a result of their active involvement in coproduction, more residents 
developed skills and interest in forming their own groups to work on the nurs-
ing home project and some projects of their own. For example, the Rotary club, 
after they raised money for nursing home materials, decided to organize a baseball 
league for residents to play against other nearby towns. They used the fundraising 
skills they learned in the migrant club to collect resources for the baseball club’s 
uniforms. High levels of citizen inclusion were characteristic of the transnational 
coproduction partnership early on and produced positive spillover effects on other 
forms of civic engagement in Telepi as the partnership took on more 3x1 projects 
with the municipal government.
A FRIEND AND FORMER MIGR ANT BEC OMES MAYOR
In the first phase of the nursing home project, the PRI controlled the state gover-
norship in Zacatecas. Every year, the PRI state transferred revenues to municipali-
ties across the state. Municipalities relied on federal and state revenue transfers to 
supply public works in their jurisdictions. But as Nacho came to discover, a change 
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in the governing party of the state sometimes upset the reliability of municipal 
funding sources. Nacho recalled, “The [municipal] government did not have 
much trouble getting funds back then to do a couple projects with the migrant 
club, but things changed when the PRD took the state from the PRI. It got a lot 
harder to get money at the local level after that  .  .  . With the state and federal 
3x1 Program we saw a way to get more money for projects than relying on Ramo 
20 alone [revenue-sharing funds called fund 3 and fund 4].”10 The 3x1 Program 
allowed poorer municipalities including Telepi to overcome fiscal constraints to 
supply public goods through the amplification of public resources from the state 
and federal governments.
Relying on his experience as social development director, Nacho ran as the PRI 
candidate for mayor in the municipal election and won. He campaigned on the 
success of the infrastructure projects he completed with the migrant hometown 
club and promised to continue public goods provision throughout Telepi when 
elected. Even though the distribution of revenue transfers became more precari-
ous during his mayorship, Nacho used coproduction and the 3x1 Program to liber-
ate additional resources for municipal development during his tenure as mayor of 
Telepi from 2006 to 2009.
Nacho’s relationship with the migrant leadership of the HTA was an impor-
tant component of coproduction success during his six-year service in municipal 
government, first as director of social development and later as mayor. While he 
sought to prioritize water and electricity projects and job creation in accordance 
with his development plan, the HTA and local citizens had their own ideas for 
public projects. The migrant club, local citizen committees, and local government 
negotiated the selection of projects and worked in tandem at every stage from 
project design to hiring contractors to monitoring quality standards during imple-
mentation. While there were frequent disagreements about which projects to fund 
as citizens and public officials had different spending priorities, the municipal 
government, residents, and migrants learned to deliberate. Residents like Lula 
explained, “Listen, we don’t always get the government to agree to all the projects 
we want, but they seem to try and work with us; like if they say no for a certain 
project this year, then maybe next year we can do it.” The process of coproduc-
ing public goods created a new participatory space in which public officials and 
citizens negotiated project selection and planning, even when it sometimes meant 
citizens did not get their preferred projects funded the first time.
Nacho designed his entire budget around the 3x1 Program, leading to 30 proj-
ects over the course of the two administrations he served.11 Public works expendi-
tures (per capita) between 2000 and 2003 averaged $416 pesos compared to $1,082 
in the following electoral cycle. By the end of Nacho’s term as mayor, total public 
works expenditures (per capita) increased to $1,500 on average. Coproduction 
in Telepi increased public expenditures for public goods and services for local 
residents, improving government responsiveness to social spending in a poor 
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municipality, but in which the mayor and his staff had an “entrepreneurial spirit,” 
as one resident described them.
While Familias had special projects they promoted and pursued (the nursing 
home) through the 3x1 Program in Telepi, they learned in informal conversations 
with citizens of Telepi that people had project ideas of their own. Familias began to 
invite citizens—friends, family, and strangers alike—to initiate project proposals 
to be funded through the 3x1 Program while they worked on different phases of 
the nursing home. When a few residents were excited about a project, they were 
encouraged to form coordinating “citizen committees.” Each project committee 
oversaw planning and project implementation in concert with municipal staff. 
Residents wanted ownership over their proposed projects, which was supported 
by the migrant club and the mayor. Over Nacho’s three-year term as mayor, 10 
citizen committees proposed, fundraised, and supported projects by monitoring 
hired contractors and making sure materials arrived on time. The invitation and 
recruitment of interested citizens into the coproduction process led to the cre-
ation of new civil society groups in Telepi. In response to the inclusion of the local 
citizenry, transnational coproduction helped activate new interest in local politics 
and more engagement.
Local residents appreciated the increase in civic engagement emanating from 
the coproduction process in addition to the projects themselves. Eduardo, the 
director of the technical high school, told me:
The paisano club is kind of like an institution here . . . We had some of this kind of 
infrastructure before, but it didn’t reach all of the communities and it was very old 
and needed to be redone . . . the club helps makes things happen here. We make a list 
of priorities and meet with the club and the mayor and we focus together on the most 
important ones. That is how we got the two new buses for the schoolchildren . . . we 
all donate some money and the parents help to collect donations from their neigh-
bors too. It makes us feel like a real community.
The increase in civic engagement in Telepi had additional spillover effects in 
the municipality. Citizen committees inspired residents to form neighborhood 
sports clubs and a Lions Club. In addition to the Lions Club primary activities, 
they also fundraised and donated washers and dryers for the second stage of the 
nursing home project. Coproduction based on both citizen inclusion and gov-
ernment engagement had ripple effects. Synergetic coproduction created and 
scaled up citizen participation in local politics, but it also had important state-
society effects. Locals who participated in citizen committees met regularly with 
officials in the local government and said they felt more comfortable interacting 
with local officials than they did before, even when they disagreed. These citizen 
committees would prove to have additional import in the community when 
the PRD, an opposition party, narrowly defeated the PRI in the contentious 
2007 election.
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DECLINE OF GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT DURING 
POLITICAL PART Y TR ANSITION
The PRD won the 2009 election in a close race and many residents alleged cor-
ruption. While Sarita thought of herself as a Priista, she and other club members 
refused to allow partisan politics to influence club business and their transna-
tional partnership with the municipal government. As soon as Mario, the new 
PRD mayor, took office, Sarita and the leaders of the three new migrant clubs from 
Telepi (including Club Social) invited the mayor to a breakfast. At the event, the 
migrant club leaders hoped to discuss new coproduction projects for collaboration 
through the 3x1 Program. Sarita recalled that the new mayor was not receptive 
to their ideas. At the close of the meeting Efrain, another club leader, said they 
were “skeptical of this new administration” and said Mario was “dismissive” of 
their past accomplishments. Moreover, Sarita did not think Mario had the req-
uisite professionalization to be an effective leader and coproduction partner. She 
explained, “He just wanted us to pay for the projects that he wanted. He doesn’t 
even know what the people of Telepi want or need. I don’t even think he graduated 
high school.” Familias was not interested in funding projects dictated by the new 
municipal administration.
The migrants felt slighted that they were not being taken seriously after copro-
ducing more than 30 projects in six years, more than any municipal administra-
tion had done in their tenure in Telepi. When migrants and residents began to 
meet after the meeting with the mayor to discuss future projects, residents were 
worried that citizens of Telepi would not stay active in town affairs.
The PRD government’s dismissal of the projects that the migrant club suggested 
and the lack of recognition of the club and citizen committees’ contributions to 
public goods provision in Telepi was not well received either by paisanos in the 
U.S. or residents in Telepi. Ricardo, the museum director, who had voted for the 
PRD mayor because he did not like the PRI candidate, said he “did not believe 
[anything] this mayor said.” When the mayor began to pave over the cobblestone 
streets in the main part of town, residents used their network of social ties created 
during the synergetic period and mobilized against the administration’s actions. 
Umberto explained: “All the projects the mayor wanted to do were pavement proj-
ects because they get concrete for free from the state through Coprovi (Consejo 
Promotor de la Vivienda Popular). All they have to do is pay for some labor and 
additional supplies. We thought the pavement projects were ruining the provincial 
feel of our town, so we made him stop.”
Local residents circulated a petition in each of their citizen committees and 
took it door to door to households in their neighborhoods. A member of a citizen 
committee also wrote an open letter in the paper demanding that the mayor stop 
the pavement projects. The swift mobilization of local residents in opposition to 
the mayor’s policy through the citizen committees was effective. The municipality 
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suspended the concrete pavement projects in response to the political activism 
of local residents and civil society groups in Telepi. The trust and social network 
ties to a broad swath of citizens throughout Telepi generated through the syner-
getic transnational partnership forced the municipal government to change policy 
course in real time. Residents achieved a measure of social accountability by mobi-
lizing collectively to censure the mayor’s actions while in office.
While the residents put a stop to the mayor’s unfavorable pavement project, the 
electoral transition to a new mayor and political party upset the synergetic copro-
duction partnerships between Familias and the other two main migrant clubs that 
worked with Nacho’s administration. The PRD mayor declined to participate in the 
3x1 Program and did not work with any migrant clubs during his tenure as mayor. 
However, like the Panista mayor in El Cerrito, he tried to claim credit for many 
of the migrant clubs’ projects during the electoral campaign. In my discussion 
with the mayor, he told me about ten 3x1 projects he completed during his tenure, 
although I understood from my conversations with many residents of Telepi and 
3x1 records that these projects were initiated and funded by Nacho’s administra-
tion and were simply completed after Nacho left office by the PRD regime. During 
the substitutive period of the PRD administration, the HTAs continued to join 
forces with citizen groups. They worked together to purchase new drainage pipes 
that connected a locality to the public system and bought materials to refurbish 
parts of the local dam. With support from citizen committees created during the 
synergetic period, the migrants and local citizens completed two projects without 
municipal government. The only complementary input the municipality provided 
was right-of-way access to public land to complete the infrastructure projects. This 
period of low government engagement brought about by the municipal electoral 
transition halted participatory engagement between citizens and the state but did 
not affect Telepi residents’ interest and desire to continue being civically engaged 
in local projects with migrant club partners.
POSITIVE SPILLOVER EFFECT S OF SYNERGY AND 
SUBSTITUTION IN TELEPI
The case of Telepi demonstrates how synergetic coproduction characterized by 
strong government and local citizen engagement creates new opportunities for 
state and nonstate actors to solve local problems through participatory action. 
Since Sarita had maintained membership in the social life of Telepi, she drew on 
the resources of her social network to recruit community residents as cooperative 
coproduction partners. Community participation permitted the exchange of ideas 
directly between citizens and local government officials and helped citizens gain 
ownership over the coproduction process. The contributions of the migrant club 
and citizen committees and the healthy engagement of local representatives led to 
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the completion of 30 projects in six years, a marked increase in municipal public 
works expenditures, and the creation of new civic associations.
When an unengaged municipal administration assumed the mayorship, the 
organizational partnership form changed. The decline in government engage-
ment, alongside high community inclusion, led to substitution in which migrant 
clubs in concert with local citizen groups provided public goods independent of 
the local government. During this period, the local government worked exclu-
sively on pavement projects, but attempted to take credit for coproduction projects 
without contributing resources, providing public resources, or technical support.
Although the local government was uninvolved in public works provision 
with migrant and local civil society partners, the increase in civic engagement 
facilitated by the synergetic partnership had politically efficacious spillover effects 
in Telepi. When the mayor pursued an unpopular public project, citizen groups 
mobilized opposition through the social network ties that they had crafted with 
people around Telepi who worked on public projects with migrants and the PRI 
local regime. The skills that residents had developed by working together on proj-
ects was repurposed to pressure the municipal administration to end the pave-
ment plans throughout town. Even through a period of substitution, citizens 
identified nonelectoral strategies to levy social control on an unpopular mayor 
who was dismissive of participatory governance. Locals also used the formal polit-
ical process to hold the unpopular mayor and his party to account. After learning 
about the decision-making style of the mayor and lack of support for community 
civic engagement in public goods affairs, residents reelected the PRI back into the 
mayorship in the subsequent election. Voters casted ballots in record numbers in 
2010, with over 98 percent of the voting-age population turning out to the polls. 
The PRI resumed the municipal presidency and the PRD experienced an 18 per-
cent decline in vote share in Telepi.
With the ousting of the PRD administration, the synergetic partnership 
between Familias, citizen groups, and the municipal government resumed. The 
new PRI administration invited migrants and local leaders to a series of meetings 
even before they officially took office and sought project proposals from inter-
ested actors. Familias continued to engage with residents and the municipal gov-
ernment in coproduction projects through the 3x1 Program. In 2010, the third 
phase of the nursing home project was completed and became home to 30 elderly 
Telepi residents.
SUMMARY
When migrants are embedded in the social base of the hometown community or 
when they forge social ties to community stakeholders beyond their immediate 
social circles, citizen inclusion is higher and ordinary citizens are more included 
in the coproduction process. When government engagement is also high, migrant 
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HTAs’ complementary remittances link them and residents directly to govern-
ment representatives responsible for supplying public goods.
Attaining the “best” match of citizen inclusion and government engagement 
can be difficult to achieve. The case of Telepi shows how government engage-
ment can wane, which upsets synergy and leads to more substitutive partnerships. 
Municipal electoral transitions between political parties may disrupt coproduc-
tion partnerships. The decline or absence of government engagement requires 
migrant groups and local civil society, if they are involved, to compensate for the 
lack of official participation. Paisanos and their partners in civil society either 
work together with state and federal cofinancing partners, or complete public 
works projects independent of the Mexican state altogether by selecting, coordi-
nating labor and materials, and overseeing the implementation of public works.
But substitutive coproduction may still have some benefits for local democ-
racy. We see in Telepi how citizen inclusion can become politically efficacious for 
democratic quality outside of the coproduction project arena. Citizen groups drew 
on social connections to mobilize in response to unpopular municipal decisions 
and exert more pressure and social control over elected officials they perceived 
to be behaving badly. Citizens were able to draw on social resources generated 
in coproduction—social ties, connections, trust, information—to hold public 
officials accountable for their decisions while in office. Synergy created through 
coproduction allowed social groups to induce a measure of popular control over 
local government outside the formal electoral process of electing political parties 
into power.
In the case of Telepi and El Cerrito, low government engagement led to periods 
in which the migrant club completed public works projects with very little support 
from the municipal administration. But as new municipal administrations transi-
tioned in and out of office and different political parties identified electoral incen-
tives to participate more fully, the level of government engagement changed. In 
El Cerrito, municipal officials ramped up engagement in coproduction as citizens 
became more involved in the process. As citizens worked directly with paisanos, 
they were more aware of political officials’ performance while in office and had 
more complete information about public goods funding and provision. Not want-
ing to be outdone by the migrant HTA in El Cerrito, political officials increased 
their participation in the coproduction process, allowing them to interface more 
directly with citizens and claim credit for public goods provision through copro-
duction in the highly competitive municipality.
When both organizing factors of coproduction are high, more synergy often 
leads to improved citizen-state relations, more responsive local government, and 
greater civic and political engagement in migrant hometowns. When migrant 
social bases provide the HTA heterogeneous links in local society, residents and 
local government become embedded in a cooperative decision-making appara-
tus for public goods provision, capturing more of a plurality of societal interests. 
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The social ties that bind the state and society provide institutionalized channels 
for the negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies.12 This nonelectoral 
mode of political participation expands the institutional terrain in which citizens, 
migrants, and public officials communicate, negotiate, plan, budget, and imple-
ment public works projects that solve local problems through deliberative demo-
cratic mechanisms. And in some cases, as El Cerrito and Telepi demonstrate, it 
also increases voters’ interest and willingness to participate in the formal electoral 
process to reward representatives for performing well while in office and punish 
others who are less responsive.
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Effects of Violence and Economic Crisis 
on Hybrid Transnational Partnerships
Violence related to the drug trade had moved into the southeastern part of Jalisco 
when I arrived in August 2009, although I did not know that at the time. When I 
selected the case of Santa Catarina, I had intended to learn about a case of failure. 
The migrant club from Santa Catarina that completed the transnational survey 
reported they were inactive. When I looked more closely at survey responses, the 
answers to questions about resident involvement in coproduction activities was 
low and the club reported problems receiving funds on time from the municipal 
government. When I followed up with club leaders, they told me the remittances 
the club had deposited in the municipal treasury for their very first coproduction 
project—a street pavement project—had gone “missing” when the new municipal 
administration took office six months after they agreed to participate in the 3x1 
Program. The club disbanded shortly thereafter.
I was eager to understand whether low levels of community inclusion and gov-
ernment engagement indicative of a fragmented partnership led to failure and 
the extent to which this failure had observable spillover effects on local political 
engagement. Conversations with paisanos from Santa Catarina confirmed ini-
tial support for the hypothesis that fragmentation left migrant clubs vulnerable 
to unscrupulous political actors, especially when local residents were uninvolved 
in coproduction activities and did not provide on-the-ground oversight. What I 
also learned was that residents were uninvolved in the 3x1 project because the 
program required municipal government engagement and residents suspected 
the administration was either directly or indirectly implicated in drug violence. 
In the case of fragmented coproduction in Santa Catarina, community inclusion 
was impacted by both migrant social embeddedness and drug-related violence. 
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Increased violence related to the drug trade was a factor that affected the organiza-
tion of a transnational partnership in Santa Catarina through its negative effects 
on community inclusion.
In this chapter, I present two intermediary cases of transnational coproduction: 
synergy in Ahuacatl, Guanajuato, and fragmentation and failure in Santa Catarina, 
Jalisco. In each case community inclusion was impacted by migrant social embed-
dedness, but also by additional factors in Mexico and the United States. I contrast 
hybrid forms of synergetic and fragmented coproduction to show how crises in 
the place of origin (drug violence) and destination (the U.S. economic recession) 
can affect the ways in which residents and local government respond to migrant 
cross-border investment in hometown communities, which shapes their level of 
participatory engagement in project governance and public life more generally. 
Drug violence in Santa Catarina deterred community involvement through its 
effect on both community inclusion and government engagement, while the reces-
sion in the U.S. handicapped Club Ahuacatl’s capacity to raise collective remit-
tances for their hometown, which necessitated further escalation of community 
involvement to continue coproduction projects.
The two transnational partnerships produced different political consequences 
in Ahuacatl and Santa Catarina. In Ahuacatl, more residents became civically 
engaged in hometown public affairs and developed a new civic association to solve 
public goods problems with the local government without the financial support 
of the migrant club when HTA capacity waned as a result of the U.S. economic 
downturn. During the synergetic period, migrants created vertical links between 
community leaders in Ahuacatl and the municipal government in the county seat 
that allowed them to continue coproduction projects directly with the citizens of 
Ahuacatl with matching funds from the state and federal governments. In Santa 
Catarina, residents did not become more involved in local public affairs and the 
failed transnational partnership confirmed their suspicions of municipal corrup-
tion. The partnership reinforced the status quo—high levels of distrust in the local 
political process and low levels of participatory engagement. But in the case of 
Santa Catarina, the drug trade played an independent role both in the way it dis-
couraged community involvement in club activities in 2006 and, after 2012, when 
it depressed civic and political engagement even more.
Drug violence and economic crisis in the U.S. are likely to play significant roles 
in migrant cross-border investment and coproduction of public goods through 
their intervening effect on community inclusion, government engagement, and 
club capacity as the cases in this chapter illustrate. This is especially true after 2009 
when the U.S. recession severely impacted the labor market in employment sectors 
that heavily relied on low-wage immigrant labor including services, construction, 
and agriculture. Migrant clubs that had previously invested collective remittances 
in hometown projects had difficulty retaining club members and raising funds. 
Energy, time, and resources of migrant club members and leaders were severely 
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taxed during the economic crisis, which strained their capacity to organize, coor-
dinate, and fund public goods projects across national borders.
Additionally, after 2006 Mexican president Felipe Calderón declared war on 
drug trafficking and the cartels. In migrant hometown settings in Michoacán, 
Jalisco, Guerrero, Durango, Guanajuato, Estado de Mexico, and other cen-
tral western states, criminal organizations splintered and new organizations 
formed, which created competition for territory and revenue in places in which 
the drug trade was previously less of a concern. In response to the growth of 
criminal activity in some high migration areas where coproduction was an 
everyday affair, some HTAs temporarily halted their efforts and adopted a “wait 
and see” approach. I learned in follow-up interviews with migrant contacts that 
after 2012, paisanos and municipal officials that participated in the 3x1 Program 
became targets for extortion by gangs. This was routine practice in parts of 
Guanajuato by 2012. To coproduce public goods projects, gangs required kick-
backs or bribes, which were paid by the municipality and migrant groups. In 
other locales, some HTAs shifted their support from public infrastructure proj-
ects to public security initiatives including armed vigilante militia groups called 
autodefensas to protect their hometown communities alongside local residents. 
Still in other cases, I learned from key informants that some HTA members 
were implicated in criminal activity and had direct links to criminal organiza-
tions, with some ties forged voluntarily and others by force. Across Mexican 
sending communities, drug trafficking and criminal organizations affected 3x1 
projects directly and indirectly through their effect on citizen and government 
participation in coproduction and when organized crime inserted itself into 
project governance.
A note about the case of Santa Catarina. Unlike in other hometown settings 
where I conducted fieldwork, residents of Santa Catarina were more closed off. 
Some residents accepted invitations for informal interviews, while others declined 
to chat about migration and political life in the town. I did not know before I 
arrived that residents were fearful that violence that stemmed from cartels had 
come close to Santa Catarina and they were intent to keep a low profile. Before I 
arrived, word had begun to spread that migrant families were being threatened, 
targeted for kidnappings and ransom. Given the public security concerns, I left 
Santa Catarina before I would have liked.1 As a result, the case relied more on 
interviews with paisanos in the U.S. and fewer key informants in Santa Catarina 
than in other cases. Some questions I was not able to fully resolve; I note them in 
the presentation of the case. This case, more than others, is thus skewed toward 
migrants’ perspectives as I was unable to learn from as many locals about how they 
experienced the coproduction project compared to other cases. Even though the 
case has limitations, I include it because it helps account for more organizational 
variation in transnational partnerships and reflects empirical realities in Mexico 
that migrants and Mexicans have been forced to confront.
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FR AGMENTED C OPRODUCTION IN SANTA  
CATARINA,  JALISC O
Santa Catarina is a rural municipality in the southern region of Jalisco2 and one of 
the poorest municipalities in the state. In 2000, almost 20 percent of the popula-
tion over the age of 15 was illiterate and only about a quarter of the population 
finished primary school. In the five main localities, between 8 and 15 percent of 
residents lacked access to basic services such as potable water, sewerage, and elec-
tricity. The majority of residents raised cattle and other animals including pigs, 
sheep, and goats and grew sugar cane, sorghum, and beans. While the land was 
once fertile, severe drought in the late 1980s hurt agricultural production. The 
macroeconomic crisis in the 1990s further compounded economic hardships from 
low crop yields as farmers had not yet recovered from droughts that hampered 
their crops over the previous five years. To cope with massive economic down-
turn, many residents of Santa Catarina left for the U.S. By 2005, about a quarter of 
the working-age population was unemployed and most households had a family 
member who lived abroad.3
High rates of emigration altered society, economy, and politics in the munici-
pality. With few prospects for economic security, the social base of Santa Catarina 
was dramatically altered as entire families left the municipality for permanent 
settlement abroad. Over the span of a decade, siblings, spouses, children, and 
grandparents reunited with family members in Houston, Chicago, Riverside, Los 
Angeles, and San Jose after several years of separation. Those who stayed behind 
were primarily spouses and parents of migrants who cared for children and relied 
on remittances sent home. Most of the other families that remained were too poor 
to emigrate and felt tied to land passed down to them over generations. They 
worked as subsistence farmers and sold any surplus crops at the local market. The 
households that were more economically secure in Santa Catarina were the fami-
lies affiliated with the cacique (informal system of boss politics) that supported 
the PRI.
Poverty and unemployment were cause and consequence of migration in the 
rural municipality of about 5,000 residents. While emigration provided economic 
security for many families in Santa Catarina, it also meant that the economically 
productive workforce lived in the U.S. and parts of Santa Catarina were virtual 
ghost towns. Some residents I spoke to also thought migration made young 
men in Santa Catarina vulnerable to the drug trade. When teenagers saw how 
migrant families were able to improve their homes with remittances dollars and 
could purchase more material goods (clothes, shoes, appliances, and electronics, 
for example) they wanted to leave for the northern border too. But when they 
could not afford a coyote (the name given to human smugglers) to help them cross 
the border and did not see education as a mechanism of social mobility, many 
were believed to have joined local gangs with ties to larger, more organized cartel 
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networks in Jalisco and across the eastern border in Michoacán. A priest of the 
local Catholic church speculated that when they no longer saw a future in Santa 
Catarina they became vulnerable to gang recruitment, some soon swept up into 
the illicit activities of the drug trade and some suffering addiction as well. He 
recalled a significant turning point came in Santa Catarina in 2010 when the Cártel 
de Jalisco Nueva Generación took over the region.
Increasing drug violence and criminal activity related to the trade may have 
played a role in levels of community inclusion in coproduction activities in 2006 
and 2007 when the migrant club first sent collective remittances to Santa Catarina. 
But even before, Santa Catarina did not have high levels of trust and reciproc-
ity in the community, partly attributed to the disruption to the social base of the 
hometown caused by substantial emigration to the U.S. over the preceding decade. 
Social life in in the municipality focused almost exclusively on the fiesta patronal 
activities in May and religious celebrations in December. The only other active 
civic association residents knew of in the town was the local church group. Some 
residents said there used to be a baseball team that played a few seasons against 
nearby municipalities, but other than that, the town was quiet and residents mostly 
kept to themselves.
Unlike in other municipalities where I was invited to stay in the homes of local 
residents and migrant families, sometimes at their insistence, some residents in 
Santa Catarina were more distant. When residents agreed to speak with me, I was 
invited into the privacy of their homes, in their stores, or I met with them in the 
church. On its own, this was not unusual—I frequently spent time in the house-
holds of residents in other hometown communities. But in those other communi-
ties I also sat in people’s yards and accompanied them to work and weekly mass, 
on errands, and family visits. I also frequently joined residents for lunch in the 
plaza, attended family and community celebrations with them all over town, and 
walked with them through agricultural fields and on horseback. This occurred less 
frequently in Santa Catarina. Most residents and the priest spoke to me indoors. 
Those residents who were open to chatting with me also tried to connect me with 
their friends and families who were from migrant households. But when these 
residents reported back to me about possible meetings with other residents, many 
said they were “unavailable.” Instead, they gave me the contact information of their 
family members in the U.S. and said I should contact relatives abroad who would 
tell me about life in Santa Catarina. I sought out their relatives in the U.S. and 
talked with them over the phone and after I returned to Chicago. I began to more 
fully understand when I spoke to migrant relatives in the U.S. that locals were 
simply trying to keep a low profile at the time. For many, socializing with the light-
skinned American woman in town drew too much attention.
In other migrant hometowns where I conducted fieldwork, locals told me about 
social and political experiences in the municipality in addition to the migrants 
involved in hometown clubs and political officials. But for the case of Santa 
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Catarina I had to rely more on the secondhand accounts of migrant family mem-
bers, a few shop owners who did not have any relatives abroad in the town, the 
local priest, and members of the church group. I never asked anyone about the 
drug trade while I was in the town. However, some residents volunteered to me 
that they thought Santa Catarina had become unsafe. They worried about public 
security and told me stories of locals being kidnapped for ransom. As Yessica, a 
friend of the priest and wife of a migrant in Riverside, told me, “Nobody trusts 
anybody around here and you need to look over your shoulder more these days.” 
I learned from local residents how they made the sign of the “Z” on their hands 
to reference the cartel. The “Z” specifically referred to the cartel Los Zetas, which 
was rumored to be present in the region as early as 2006 as they expanded their 
territorial scope.
At the time I conducted my fieldwork, it was not clear to me that migrants 
knew about locals’ concerns about illicit activities and the presence of gangs in 
and around Santa Catarina. Migrants never mentioned criminal violence or gang 
activity when I first spoke with club leaders in 2008, the year after the club became 
inactive. When I returned to Chicago and told club members about local fears of 
the drug trade dating back to late 2006 when the club was active, they said they 
were unaware and did not know of any families that were targeted. It could be that 
club leaders intentionally kept this information from me or dismissed the infor-
mation as rumors, although I suspect they really did not know. The priest said he 
never discussed criminal activity with the migrants at any time because it was not 
something you talk about openly in Santa Catarina.
Migration also tangentially impacted local politics. The PRI maintained firm 
control of the municipal government and won most elections by double digits 
against a weak PAN opposition with the protracted support of a cacique. Before 
the elections in the summer of 2010, no opposition political party had won the 
municipal presidency. A few residents who were part of the church group believed 
that migration contributed to the PRI’s support. As more residents left for the U.S., 
they said, the more people became disinterested in politics. Residents believed that 
people who left for the U.S. were those who cared about politics and people who 
remained behind were either those who were ardent Priistas and connected to the 
cacique or poor and unlikely to participate in public life beyond attendance at the 
annual fiestas. According to official government elections statistics, on average, 
about half of the voting-age population in Santa Catarina turned out to vote in the 
previous three elections.
CLUB SANTA CATARINA AND THE FR AGMENTATION 
OF HOMETOWN SO CIAL TIES
In 2005, five friends living in Chicago (Aurora and Bolingbrook, Illinois) trav-
eled home and attended the fiestas guadalupas held in Santa Catarina in early 
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December. During their two-week visit the priest of the Catholic church 
approached the migrants and asked them if they would help finance a new church 
roof. The historic church was in disrepair and the priest was unable to raise the 
money needed for the roof on his own. The migrants knew many paisanos from 
Santa Catarina in the Chicago area and agreed to collect funds, mostly knocking 
on doors and taking a collection at church events in Aurora and Bolingbrook 
where many paisanos lived. The paisanos collected over $1,000 over the span of 
a few weekends from about 100 families that lived in the Chicago metro area. 
Miguel and Raul, two of the paisanos who visited their hometown during the 
festival and helped collect donations, never thought of themselves as a hometown 
club at the time. In fact, they organized to help raise money for the church project 
and thought that would be it.
Raul and Miguel were some of the few migrants who had returned for visits to 
Santa Catarina since departure. It was not as common in Santa Catarina as it had 
been in other communities I visited for migrants to return for visits and for longer 
stretches during the Christmas holiday season. But Raul and Miguel, unlike many 
of the paisanos from Santa Catarina, had secured green cards, which allowed them 
to traverse the U.S.-Mexican border with greater ease than undocumented paisa-
nos. Raul married a Mexican woman from Jalisco in the 1990s who had natural-
ized, which granted Raul the opportunity to apply for a green card after they wed. 
Miguel’s mother brought 12-year-old Miguel and his younger siblings to the U.S. 
in 1980 and rejoined their father who had found stable work in Aurora. Once he 
turned 18 and obtained his green card through provisions passed in IRCA, Miguel 
visited Santa Catarina a few times to see uncles who remained behind and worked 
the family’s agricultural land.
Other than a few distant relatives and a few family friends who never migrated 
that the men kept in touch with on social media, Raul and Miguel did not have 
many social contacts left in the hometown. They still had houses in the town, but 
the houses sat empty. Most of their close friends and family had joined them in the 
U.S. over the last 10 years. They did not know members of the church association 
personally and wired the donation money directly to the pastor, who coordinated 
the collection of materials and hired the labor for the job. The migrants only saw 
the completed church roof when they returned for the annual patron saint festival 
in May 2007.
The paisano-financed project efforts scaled up when the priest learned about 
the 3x1 Program from a pastor of another church nearby. A friend told him about 
the hometown club in his town that partnered with the municipal government on 
several public works projects. The priest hoped that the paisanos who had helped 
him with the church could be persuaded to propose projects through the 3x1 
Program and scale up their efforts. Over the phone, the priest encouraged Miguel 
and Raul to read about the 3x1 Program online and to ask about it at the Mexican 
consulate in Chicago and to their paisano friends from other municipalities in 
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Jalisco. Miguel and Raul asked a few paisano friends about the program and found 
out many Jalisciences in the U.S. were also members of a migrant club that com-
pleted projects through the 3x1 Program. Once they heard about other successful 
migrant clubs and the completion of projects through the program, Miguel and 
Raul said they would be interested in doing more projects, but they had serious 
reservations about working with the municipal government.
The paisanos wanted to do more projects for the town, but they were wary of 
proposing projects to the municipal government and did not like going to the 
Mexican consulate. Miguel said, “We can’t raise the kind of money that would 
have a bigger impact in the town by knocking on doors in Illinois. We needed 
the help of the government to do more ambitious projects.”4 But neither local 
residents nor the paisanos from Santa Catarina had many favorable things to say 
about political officials in the municipality and on several occasions the migrants 
had been treated poorly by Mexican government officials at the consulate. They 
were reticent to formally propose a project through the 3x1 Program if it required 
“dealing with the government,” Raul said. Moreover, they heard about the 3x1 
Program secondhand and only had a cursory understanding of how the program 
worked and the process by which coproduction projects were implemented in 
municipalities.
The final decision to participate in the program was made with the support of 
the large network of Santa Catarina paisanos with whom Miguel and Raul had 
become acquainted during the collections for the church roof. Since the men were 
still wary about the 3x1 Program, they decided to have a meeting with other pai-
sanos and get a sense of how interested other people were in doing projects with 
the Mexican government. The reluctant club leaders did not want to do it alone. 
At the meeting, the paisanos in attendance (about 20) decided to officially form a 
migrant club. Over dinner and drinks, they decided to pave the four main streets 
in town, which they saw were crumbling and badly in need of repair during their 
previous visit home.
Despite collective reservations about working with municipal officials, they 
said they felt reassured participating in the 3x1 Program because the state and fed-
eral governments were also involved in matching funds. The paisanos thought the 
involvement of higher tiers of government in the program was intended to inject 
more oversight into the coproduction process. The migrants did not understand 
that the 3x1 Program required matching contributions from the state and local 
governments, with the rest of project coordination falling to the migrants and the 
municipal government. Miguel recalled, “We didn’t want to interact with any kind 
of government official. You have to understand that they have treated paisanos 
badly in the past and we often get harassed at the border.” Despite their reser-
vations, they forged ahead and agreed to ask the mayor to work with them on 
the project at the fiesta patronal in May 2007. The priest helped them organize a 
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meeting with the mayor’s administration upon their return. In the meantime, pai-
sanos from the newly formed Club Santa Catarina fundraised through potlucks, 
picnics, and by soliciting donations door-to-door as they had done for the church 
roof project, and they registered their club with the Institute for Migrants Abroad.
BEGINNING AND ENDING OF THE TR ANSNATIONAL 
PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
At the outset, it appeared that local government officials were interested in copro-
duction projects with the migrant club, and migrants were cautiously optimis-
tic that they would complete the pavement project. In the meeting, the migrants 
explained what they knew about the 3x1 Program to the mayor as he said he had 
not heard of the matching grants schema. The PRI mayor agreed to work with 
the migrants on the pavement project the club had selected. From that point, the 
mayor said he and his staff would finalize the budget estimates for the project and 
send it via email to Miguel and Raul in Chicago for final approval.
The paisanos returned to the U.S. hopeful about the project and told the other 
paisanos about the mayor’s support of their pavement idea. The social develop-
ment director of Santa Catarina sent the $3,000 project proposal. They had already 
raised their $3,000 contribution and wired the money to the municipal treasury 
while they waited for final approval from the 3x1 Program. Once approved, the 
migrants, back in Chicago, waited to hear about how the project progressed. That 
is when the worry set in. Raul and Miguel began to second-guess themselves. 
Raul explained:
We had a lot of momentum going into the pavement project. I asked some residents 
what they thought of the street pavement idea at the fiesta patronal . . . they seemed 
in support of it. Officials put together the budget proposal and we put the money 
into the municipal treasury so we thought everything was going good, but we were 
in Chicago, we really didn’t know what was happening. And then we waited and 
waited and waited. Nothing happened. We called the mayor’s office and they never 
returned our calls. Our paisanos called some families to check on progress on the 
project, but nothing was happening and no one wanted to go . . . ask what was going 
on. We called the state 3x1 official, but nobody had any answers for us and told us to 
call a bunch of other people.5
For months, the migrants waited and called the director of social development in 
the municipality to no avail. Work commitments did not allow Miguel or Raul to 
visit Santa Catarina to have face-to-face conversations with the municipal admin-
istration. After several failed attempts to follow up with local officials, a new mayor 
was elected (PRI) and prepared to take office. The club’s $3,000 contribution to 
the proposed pavement project vanished. “No one would tell us anything,” Miguel 
said. “We lost all the money and had to tell our paisanos that we lost the money.” 
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Any hope Club Santa Catarina had to complete more projects with the municipal 
government vanished along with the money.
L ACK OF MIGR ANT SO CIAL EMBEDDEDNESS AND 
C OMMUNIT Y INCLUSION
Thirty years in the U.S. had depleted Miguel and Raul’s social ties to people who 
remained in Santa Catarina, and as a result community inclusion was low during 
the pavement project. It was low because neither migrant had a strong bonding 
network back in the hometown nor did they have bridging ties to anyone other 
than the local priest who helped them form the club. At the fiesta patronal, Miguel 
and Raul reconnected with school friends and cousins from before they migrated. 
The club leaders said they had a wonderful week and caught up with people whom 
they had not seen in many years. Even though both men had green cards, between 
the two of them they had only been back to visit Santa Catarina four or five times 
since their migration. Furthermore, much of their social connection to the town 
was only to distant family that remained behind—most of their close family 
and friends had migrated at some point between the 1990s and early 2000s. The 
breadth and depth of migrant club leaders’ social ties had shifted over time from 
the hometown to the paisanaje network in greater Chicago that comprised more 
and more of their bonding social network.
Some residents who knew about the paisanos’ plans to participate in public 
goods provision in the hometown were ambivalent, while others did not know 
anything about the migrant club or the proposed project. When I asked residents 
in Santa Catarina if they wanted to be involved in the pavement project, some said 
they thought the migrants were “crazy to work with the government” and “why 
do they still care about the roads [here]?” Other residents confirmed that they 
had met the paisanos and shared casual chit-chat about people they knew in com-
mon in Chicago, but that migrants did not formally try to recruit anyone into the 
project process. A member of the church group, Lila, expressed what many people 
told me during my visit. She said it was “fine if people want to donate whatever 
they can, but we were only focused on church activities like cooking for the poor.” 
Residents did not see a role for themselves in public goods provision and were 
agnostic about the migrant club’s involvement. It was not that residents did not 
care about the provision of public works. When I asked them what kinds of public 
works projects they needed in their town, everyone had opinions about what kinds 
of project would improve their quality of life, namely public security and better 
roads. But residents reported they were not recruited to participate in the project 
by the migrants nor did those who knew about the project proposal approach the 
migrants about becoming more involved.
Miguel reported that he wanted people to believe in the club and help them with 
the project, but he got the impression during his visit that people “did not really 
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seem to care.” In the case of Santa Catarina, even if the migrants had been more 
socially embedded into the hometown community it would likely have taken more 
than one project to get more people involved in cross-border public goods provi-
sion. Not only did migrants not know many people who still lived in town, their 
only visit was usually during the week of the patron saint festival. It would have 
been difficult to build bridging ties in a place with deep-seated mistrust of the local 
government. The social and political obstacles to successful coproduction were 
overwhelming in the case of initial transnational coproduction in Santa Catarina.
Club Santa Catarina disbanded after the failed attempt to coproduce a pave-
ment project with the local government through the 3x1 Program. Local residents 
I spoke to said they had little trust in elected officials before the failed pavement 
project and their suspicions were confirmed after rumors spread throughout town 
about the “missing” or “stolen” resources. Conversations with church members, 
business owners, family members of migrants, and a schoolteacher suggested 
efforts to coproduce public works with the municipal government confirmed what 
residents already suspected: the local government was corrupt. But the exposure 
of wrongdoing by the PRI exacerbated distrust in the local democratic process. 
“Look, you see why I told them they were crazy to give authorities their money,” 
a shop owner said when I asked him about his reaction to the news the paisano 
funds went unaccounted for. Residents had always suspected political officials 
were involved in outright corruption and cronyism, but some said that the failed 
3x1 project gave them “proof.”
Club Santa Catarina did not muster the support of community residents in 
the coproduction process and local government engagement was low. The local 
PRI government shirked their 3x1 matching responsibilities before the state and 
federal governments even deposited their contributions to the pavement proj-
ect in the local treasury. With the interruption of the municipal election in the 
midst of the project, officials in the new mayor’s administration said an “account-
ing error” occurred during the transition in power. I neither pressed my contacts 
in the municipal government for more information nor spoke with members of 
the cacique. Local residents discouraged me from questioning the elite families in 
town who were associated with the cacique out of concerns for my security.
In municipal history, no opposition party had successfully defeated the PRI 
for the mayorship in Santa Catarina. Even though Miguel and Raul were liked by 
some residents, they could not get residents interested in the 3x1 project, although 
there is little evidence that they tried very hard to recruit them into the process 
and residents seemed satisfied to have the migrant club complete projects without 
their involvement. Even the priest who introduced the paisanos to the program, 
set up the meeting with the PRI administration, and completed the church roof 
project with paisano donations did not want to take on any kind of leadership role 
in the pavement project when the municipal government was formally involved 
through the 3x1 Program.
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Miguel and Raul expressed interest in doing projects in the future but did not 
believe they could raise money from the paisanos after the original contributions 
disappeared. Some paisanos refused to work with the PRI after what happened. 
Upon further reflection, paisanos said they were “naive” (ingenuo) and “should 
have trusted their instincts.” I asked the priest about the prospect of future projects 
and he also expressed reluctance given rising public security concerns:
Paisanos work really hard in the U.S. It’s a sacrifice for them and for their families. 
And our residents here work hard too. I don’t blame our residents for not wanting 
to get involved in projects when officials are supposed to do it. We are a poor com-
munity. We have to do a lot for ourselves without help from anyone . . . and since 
the situation has worsened (referring to the drug trade), no one wants to bring any 
attention. Everyone tries to keep a low profile these days.6
The club became inactive in 2007. While Miguel and Raul still felt a strong con-
nection to Santa Catarina, they no longer expressed those affective ties through 
cross-border investments in the hometown any more. Rather, in their expansive 
paisano network in Chicago, they continued to participate in social events with 
other paisanos and replicated cultural repertoires rooted in hometown social life, 
but in the U.S.
POLITICAL CHALLENGE FROM AN UNLIKELY 
ALLIANCE AND A NEW TR ANSNATIONAL 
PARTNERSHIP
The PRI remained in office until a contentious election in 2010 that ended in 
the surprise victory of an unlikely candidate. The PAN and PRD, major opposi-
tion parties, formed an alliance and ran a mayoral candidate on a public security 
platform, promising to tackle the rise in drug-related violence in the area. This 
was a bold move as other mayors or mayoral candidates who openly challenged 
and confronted gangs became targets themselves, especially across the border in 
Michoacán in which there were both informal and formal accounts of threats to 
political authorities.7 In many cases, municipal authorities had to pay “fees” (cuo-
tas) to criminal organizations to conduct the everyday business of local govern-
ment. In extreme cases, authorities who did not comply or challenged criminal 
gangs were murdered.
While details of what ultimately led to the ousting of the PRI were still unclear 
after the close election, for the first time in municipal history, the PRI had lost. The 
alliance victory was momentous. I was not in Santa Catarina in 2010 and paisanos 
I spoke with only had theories about how the PRD-PAN alliance candidate had 
managed to defeat the cacique and the local PRI. One theory was that the PAN-
PRD candidate was funded by the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, which had 
formed earlier in the year and was quickly gaining ground in the region. Another 
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theory was the PAN-PRD candidate had been extorted by local gangs and he paid 
them what they asked. Paisanos said they “heard from locals” that the gangs would 
leave Santa Catarina alone as long as he paid what they demanded. The most pop-
ular explanation, though, was that the political boss became a target of the drug 
cartel himself and he was no longer in as much a position of power and authority 
in Santa Catarina. Most of the theories about the PRI defeat were related, in some 
way, to the presence of the drug trafficking and organized criminal activity in the 
region and its effect on local politics.
After the PRI was defeated in 2010, a different group of paisanos from Santa 
Catarina formed a hometown association in 2011, despite continued concerns 
related to drug violence. When I spoke with the club leaders in 2011 in Chicago, 
Club Unido had already completed two coproduction projects through the 3x1 
Program. With matching funds from the state and federal governments they suc-
cessfully coproduced public lighting (street lamps) along a bridge and purchased 
an electrocardiogram machine for a local health clinic. Martín and Alejandra, a 
married couple who emigrated from Santa Catarina in the early 2000s and formed 
the new HTA, were not affiliated with Club Santa Catarina in any formal way, but 
they did donate to the church project. This gave them the idea to form a club of 
their own when the time was right. When the PRI lost the election, they thought 
this was a good time and they approached the newly elected mayor about 3x1 
Program participation. They heard from some of their friends and family in Santa 
Catarina that locals thought highly of the new mayor, but they were still careful in 
how they did business with the municipal administration. They learned from the 
experiences of Club Santa Catarina:
We don’t put any money in the treasury. We do everything in a separate bank account. 
The new mayor is much better. He’s an engineer and has good ideas for the town, but 
he has a lot of work to do trying to get security under control. It will take a long time 
for us to gain the trust of local residents who have seen a lot of things happen in this 
town. We ask them what kinds of projects they want and they tell us, but they won’t 
donate funds or help very much . . . We have to work very hard to stay on good terms 
with the administration and communicate often through video chats and phone calls.8
Raul wished the new club the best of luck in their development projects with the 
new mayor, but former members of Club Santa Catarina were skeptical of the 3x1 
process and the lack of accountability. By 2010, drug violence was a well-known 
secret in Santa Catarina and some paisanos did not want to send collective remit-
tances back to the town because they feared that such public displays of migrant 
resources put themselves and locals in harm’s way. As Ricardo, a paisano from 
Santa Catarina in Aurora, told me over the phone, “You just don’t know who is 
who and whether doing projects and showing you have money puts a target on 
your back.” Ricardo was surprised Club Unido had completed any projects at all 
and hoped the “Lord protected them.”
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In the case of Club Santa Catarina and their fragmented partnership with local 
residents and the local government, the municipal administration took advantage 
of migrants’ physical distance and the migrants’ contributions to the pavement 
project budget disappeared. Without more participation from local residents, 
the migrant HTA in Chicago was unable to exert any pressure on the officials to 
meet their obligations9 and their location in the U.S. prevented them from hold-
ing local officials to account for their 3x1 contributions. Moreover, 3x1 officials 
lamented that they had no recourse to monitor local officials in these kinds of 
situations. Jaime Almaraz, a 3x1 state-level official in Jalisco and former mayor of 
Tuxcacuesco, Jalisco, explained to me that in situations like these in which out-
right corruption occurs, which he said in his experience was more rare, higher 
tiers of government will sometimes reimburse the club. This has happened only 
a few times in his recollection. Paisanos in Club Santa Catarina did not approach 
representatives of Sedesol for a reimbursement because they said they were done 
“dealing with the Mexican government. All of it.”10 The experience depleted this 
group of paisanos’ energy and interest in cross-border investment.
The fragmented partnership in Santa Catarina was characterized by low com-
munity inclusion and government engagement. Fragmented, weak organization 
between paisanos, residents, and municipal government produced a context ripe 
for organizational corruption in Santa Catarina. This is not always what transpires 
from fragmentation, but it is a likely outcome. Citizens were reluctant to engage 
in the coproduction process and their suspicions were confirmed when the 3x1 
Program resources disappeared. Without support from residents in the copro-
duction process, Club Santa Catarina was vulnerable. Local government officials 
were in a favorable position to take advantage of HTAs and their resources for 
their own benefit or at the behest of unscrupulous local actors involved in crimi-
nal organizations.
Corrupt, rent-seeking behaviors take many forms in the coproduction context. 
Public and private agents may shirk financial responsibilities and inflate project 
costs to extract additional resources from migrant, state, and federal partners. 
Political officials, local residents, and migrants collude with preferred contractors 
and construction companies for kickbacks and change technical plans and costs 
during implementation for mutual gain. Municipal government may also fail to 
monitor projects during implementation, which leads to poor quality or lack of 
project completion altogether. Although I did not witness this in any of the cases 
I studied for this book, I have heard from informants that in some cases migrants 
have colluded with governments, not simply to impose their view of what is 
good for the public, but to use public resources to further their own private ends. 
Informants’ anecdotal accounts often describe some HTAs as “mano negra.”11 In 
the case of Santa Catarina, municipal government officials appropriated the mon-
etary resources contributed by migrant groups. Local government officials were in 
a favorable position to capitalize on information asymmetries because members 
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of the migrant club lived abroad. Without support from local resident citizens, the 
migrant club had limited mechanisms to monitor political officials’ behavior when 
they were in the U.S. Fragmented partnerships characterized by limited govern-
ment and resident engagement often fizzle out and fail.
The fragmented partnership revealed to the citizenry the PRI mayor’s misdeeds 
in office. Citizens of Santa Catarina were already disillusioned with the local politi-
cal process prior to coproduction; this experience compounded their disillusion-
ment. But while political engagement was depressed in the wake of the failed 3x1 
project, more citizens turned out to vote in the 2010 election than in the three 
previous elections. While other factors were certainly at play in citizens’ decision 
to put their support behind the opposition candidate in 2010, paisanos thought, 
perhaps giving themselves too much credit, that their failed partnership had 
exposed government wrongdoing and citizens had punished the PRI in the next 
election. In the 2010 election, there was an 8 percent increase in turnout among 
the voting-age population compared to the previous election. Additionally, the 
PRI’s vote share declined 5 percent as citizens shifted their support to the opposi-
tion candidate of the alliance party. It is not clear if the failure of the transnational 
partnership played any part in local participation. In 2009 when I visited the town, 
public activities, especially those that displayed income, were kept to a minimum 
and citizens I spoke with said they had no interest in any sphere of participatory 
engagement with the local government.
SYNERGETIC C OPRODUCTION THROUGH THE 
EC ONOMIC CRISIS  IN AHUACATL,  GUANAJUATO
Uninterested in school, Juan left his hometown of Ahuacatl, Guanajuato, in his 
early twenties with six years of primary education. He left for the U.S. in pursuit 
of his version of the American dream—find work, raise a family, and return to 
Ahuacatl with enough savings to build a house of his own and care for his aging 
parents. Finding work in the locality of Ahuacatl or the municipal county seat of 
Corporeo where Ahuacatl was located was difficult. With no education and no 
prospects for decent work, Juan had gotten into some trouble with alcohol and 
decided to leave for the U.S. with the hope of a fresh start. Not many residents 
of Ahuacatl had emigrated when Juan made the decision to go, although many 
citizens of Corporeo had left for the northern border and many Ahuacatlenses left 
later on in the late 1990s. In his town, he was a pioneer of sorts. He saw migrants 
from nearby municipalities leave and then return with new trucks and remit-
tance dollars, which they used to fix up houses and start businesses. Juan wanted 
a chance at the same fortune. His parents were subsistence farmers, barely able to 
provide for their 11 children on the parcel of ejido land the family inherited from 
Juan’s grandparents. Juan was the first of his siblings to leave for the U.S. and made 
the perilous journey with a coyote alone. Six of Juan’s siblings eventually left for the 
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U.S. while four sisters and a brother remained in and around Ahuacatl to work the 
land with their parents.
Most residents, like Juan’s family, farmed former ejido land, worked in the bot-
tling plant of a popular Mexican beer company in a nearby municipality, or owned 
small shops and food stalls in Corporeo. Other residents of Ahuacatl traveled 
longer distances and worked in more economically active cities such as Irapuato, 
Celaya, or Leon. High levels of poverty and little attention from the municipal 
government meant that people had to rely on each other to solve local problems 
and find employment to support their families.
Despite its larger population than other localities in Corporeo, Ahuacatl was 
a rather tight-knit community and had a vibrant civil society before the arrival 
of the migrant hometown club. After a flood rattled the locality in a particularly 
rainy season, residents came together and collected donations across Corporeo for 
those who had lost possessions. In the town there was both a popular church orga-
nization that regularly met and an active and dedicated Patronato festival group. 
Additionally, residents had a favorable opinion of the local delegate who repre-
sented Ahuacatl to municipal authorities. Some residents affectionately called the 
delegate El Guaje.12
FORMATION OF CLUB AHUACATL AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF WEAK CAPACIT Y IN THE U.S .
Juan’s journey to the U.S. was not an easy one. His first trip across the border was 
unsuccessful and it took a few more attempts before he crossed into Texas on foot. 
His arrival in the U.S. was jarring. He knew not a soul and work was harder to find 
that he thought it would be. When times were really tough he knocked on doors 
and asked strangers for odd jobs. He lived in five U.S. states before he settled in 
San Diego, California, with his wife, Yesenia. Juan thought himself the luckiest 
man in the world to have found Yesenia, a Mexican woman of Nahua decent from 
San Luis Potosí, for he was lonely during those first 10 years in the U.S. On sev-
eral occasions he was tempted to return to Ahuacatl with nothing to show for his 
migration. His luck changed when Juan was hired as a security guard and custo-
dian at a private Jewish day school. Juan told me that some students and teachers 
joked that he was “half Catholic and half Jewish” because of his dedication to the 
school. By the time I came to know Juan, he had worked at the school for ten years. 
It was clear that the students cared about him as they practiced their Spanish with 
him and asked to hear about Ahuacatl and what life was life in Mexico when they 
saw him in the school hallways.
Once he became more settled in San Diego, Juan visited his hometown more 
regularly. He visited for long weekends, for a month over the summer break, and 
for three weeks in December. Juan was a regular figure in Ahuacatl and remained 
very close to his family and childhood friends. Juan became more accustomed 
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to life in the U.S., but he never felt truly at home. He was more comfortable in 
Ahuacatl, near his horses, on the land, and surrounded by people who shared the 
same small-town values.
Unlike the migrant clubs in El Cerrito and Telepi that came together on their 
own, Club Ahuacatl formed at the request of local residents in 2005 and was the 
first hometown association in the municipality of Corporeo. After Ahuacatlenses 
heard about a migrant club from the nearby municipality of Acambaro that had 
finished several public works projects by working with the municipal administra-
tion, residents hoped paisanos including Juan who had left in the 1990s would 
use their social mobility to support projects for the people in Ahuacatl. Leaders 
in Ahuacatl asked the paisanos who returned for the annual patron saint festival 
to partner with them and the local government to improve living conditions in 
Ahuacatl through cross-border collective action.
The patron saint festival was a celebratory time in Ahuacatl when migrants 
trekked back to Guanajuato from all over the U.S. During the July festival, resi-
dents asked Juan, Martin, and Ramon, migrants in town for the event, to form a 
club and request funds from the municipal government for public works projects. 
El Guaje knew the paisanos families well and had a friendly relationship with Juan 
especially, who was a frequent visitor. While paisanos and townspeople gathered 
together to enjoy música de banda, fireworks, street food, horse races, and the 
religious festival of candles at the historic Catholic church, El Guaje and the leader 
of the local church group pulled the paisanos aside and told them about their 
wish to have a migrant club that helped the town, like the club they heard about 
in Acambaro.
The paisanos liked the idea, but they had not the first clue about how to run a 
club or get other paisanos in the U.S. involved. The paisanos were a bit reluctant. El 
Guaje, a charismatic and charming leader, reassured the migrants that they could 
start small; “No pressure,” El Guaje told them, “it will be fun.” By the end of the fes-
tival week as the migrants prepared to return to the U.S., El Guaje and the church 
group met with the paisanos to decide next steps for the new migrant club. The 
migrants agreed to fundraise in the U.S. for their first official project, which was a 
common area in front of the church for festivals and other social events. They also 
decided together that it would be a good idea to install bathrooms for patrons to 
use in the plaza area.
El Guaje had a plan to raise the project with the municipal administration during 
their next meeting with the delegados and gauge their level of support. Local elites, 
namely the doctor and the dentist who lived in Ahuacatl, had strategized with El 
Guaje that municipal officials might be more inclined to support residents’ preferred 
projects if they brought the paisanos into the picture. Other residents, though, were 
wary of bringing the municipal government into the partnership with the migrants 
given the history of the soured public-private partnerships that occurred during 
President Salinas’s National Solidarity Program (Pronasol) in Corporeo.
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The eagerness of residents to work directly with the local government waned 
after a failed attempt at a public-private partnership for public works provision 
through the National Pronasol in the 1990s. Citizens in Ahuacatl told me how the 
resources they contributed to collaborative projects “went missing,” “projects were 
never finished,” and the people of Corporeo “no longer had confidence or really 
trust the municipal government.” But El Guaje and other locals thought that if the 
paisanos proposed projects through the 3x1 Program, the additional oversight from 
the state and federal governments would ease the concerns of anxious Ahuacatl 
residents. Ahuacatl elites, who knew the mayor’s family well since his wife was from 
Ahuacatl, thought he was different than previous administrations and would be less 
opportunistic with the locals and the migrant club. The mayor’s social connection to 
Ahuacatl gave them some reassurances that he would not risk his local reputation.
ROLE OF THE STATE AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT S 
IN THE TR ANSNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP
Corporeo municipality is located in the southeastern region of Guanajuato near 
Selvillo. It is a middle-income municipality of about 60,000 residents. Up until 
1986, the PRI maintained firm control of the municipality. But since the PAN 
opposition party wrested the mayorship from the PRI, the two parties have alter-
nated power in the last eight electoral cycles. Municipal elections were hotly con-
tested in Corporeo and Ahuacatl was considered a swing community because 
voters vacillated in their support for the PAN and PRI. As Oliver, a restaurant 
owner, said, “In Ahuacatl, we don’t vote for the party, we vote for the person.” The 
previous, current, and incoming mayors of both political parties repeated the sen-
timent. It was well known that during elections, the political parties worked hard 
for the votes of Ahuacatl and campaigned heavily in one of the most populated 
localities of Corporeo.
The year 2005 was the PAN mayor of Corporeo, Beto’s, second year in office. 
When El Guaje raised the church project proposal with Beto’s administration, he 
was not initially enthusiastic about the project, which was more social in nature 
and would do little to improve development goals in Ahuacatl. However, this initial 
meeting did reveal that he was eager to partner with the migrants on other pub-
lic works projects that focused more on public infrastructure. Beto had recently 
heard about the 3x1 Program from another PAN mayor and knew previous PAN 
administrations had tried, without success, to get paisanos to form clubs and coor-
dinate public goods provision with them using collective remittances. Beto asked 
to meet with Juan and El Guaje during his return visit to Ahuacatl. In the meet-
ing, they all agreed to first work on the church project through the 3x1 Program, 
but then they would also collaborate on a drainage project, an essential service 
that was underprovided in many neighborhoods in Ahuacatl, and a problem that 
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often wreaked havoc on the town during the rainy season when floods were more 
common. El Guaje urged the mayor in the meeting to reassure the residents of 
Ahuacatl that he would keep his word to support the church program and then 
move on to other coproduction projects. Beto was a young and enthusiastic mayor 
with aspirations to move up the party ladder and so he agreed to meet directly 
with the residents of Ahuacatl.
A few Ahuacatl residents were invited to the Corporeo ayuntamiento along 
with El Guaje. In the meeting, Beto reassured the citizens that they and the pai-
sanos would stay in control of the projects and the municipality would serve in a 
supportive role. Beto said that he told them, “The people here in Ahuacatl trust the 
paisanos more. They have a kinship and connection with them and believe them 
more than us. We respect that.” Residents also trusted Juan, leader of the migrant 
club, and believed he and El Guaje would serve as a conduit to the administration 
that represented the town’s interests.
When I asked residents why they had so much confidence in Juan, many resi-
dents said they felt reassured because he had so much family in Ahuacatl and 
visited frequently. Since he came back often during the year and stayed for much 
of the summer, worked on his house and on his family’s land with his kids, to some 
residents like Cindy, it hardly seemed like he had left at all. El Guaje and the town 
elites’ plan—to coordinate public goods provision between the migrants and the 
municipal government while maintaining a clear voice in the process—worked. 
Mayor Beto, the director of social development, and the director of public works 
recognized and publicly addressed the residual mistrust between citizens and the 
local government. When public officials acknowledged past misdeeds of Panista 
mayors, the new guard of the PAN was able to extend an olive branch to the citi-
zen voters of Ahuacatl. This effort was strategic by the savvy politicians because 
Ahuacatl was a swing district that had been known to make or break an election 
for the PAN. Political competition in Corporeo created incentives for the PAN 
administration to seek an edge over the PRI opposition through the provision of 
public goods.
At the meeting, in the presence of the residents, Beto instructed his staff to 
draw up technical plans, hire contractors, and source the necessary materials for 
the church patio. Once they received approval from the 3x1 validation committee, 
the project was completed in a few short weeks. Paisanos, El Guaje, and residents 
of Ahuacatl were proud of the project and the plaza quickly became a popular 
place for residents to congregate. El Guaje recalled:
Before the paisano club and 3x1 we tried to organize and do projects for Ahuacatl, but 
the municipality was difficult to work with. The mayors say they will help but never 
do anything or it takes a really long time. But with the migrant club the government 
doesn’t take as long to reply, we get a lot more attention from the municipal center. I 
think it’s because they know they can get funds from the state and federal government.
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Residents were still wary, but hopeful the migrants would spur more financial sup-
port for public works in Ahuacatl.
On the U.S. side, the club encountered many hurdles. State public officials from 
Guanajuato affiliated with the Casas Guanajuato program13 and the Mexican con-
sulate proved an important resource for the struggling, nascent club. Juan, Ramon, 
and Martin had a few friends from Ahuacatl in the U.S., but paisanos were scat-
tered all across California and Texas. The three migrants had strong bonding ties 
in Ahuacatl, but they did not know each other well, and their social connections to 
other Ahuacatl paisanos in the U.S. were even more limited. The club leaders had 
family who had migrated, but their social circles were not based on immigrants 
from their hometown in their places of settlement in the U.S. In Texas, Martin 
reached out to other paisanos from Ahuacatl with contact information he received 
from their families. Juan and Ramon reached out to paisanos in the same way in 
San Diego and Los Angeles. The three men conducted most of their club business 
over the phone and each collected donations for the project by knocking on the 
doors of other paisanos, most of them cold calls to strangers who shared a connec-
tion to Ahuacatl, but not to the migrant club leaders themselves.
The paisanos’ weak social ties to one another and lack of ties to other paisanos 
from Ahuacatl and Corporeo were challenges for the migrant club. They wanted 
Figure 3. Pavement project groundbreaking ceremony with mayor of Ahuacatl. Photo by author.
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to help the residents of Ahuacatl with projects, but they were inexperienced in 
leading a club and fundraising. Juan, in particular, thought fundraising was awk-
ward and he did not enjoy it. At this point, he thought the club might be able to 
raise the money for the church project, but then the club would disband. “It was 
going to be too hard to keep knocking on doors. And I’m kind of shy. I didn’t 
feel comfortable asking people for money back then. I thought, okay, we’ll do the 
one project that the residents want us to do and that will be it. It was taking a lot 
of time too,” he said. Martin and Ramon had difficulty drumming up support 
from Ahuacatlenses in the U.S. Ramon said, “It was hard to get anyone on the 
phone and when we did, they didn’t want to get involved in the club or donate 
resources.” Seeing Martin frustrated, his Guanajuatense friends in Texas recom-
mended he visit the Casa Guanajuato in Dallas and see if they could help his club 
get off the ground.
State officials in Texas and California became a key source of information 
about the 3x1 Program and the supply of contact information to paisanos from 
the hometown in the U.S. Personnel at the Casa Guanajuato in Dallas encour-
aged Martin to get his club registered at a Mexican consulate so that they could 
formally propose the 3x1 project to the validation committee at the next meet-
ing in Guanajuato. They also encouraged him to contact the state Migrant Affairs 
Offices in Guanajuato, which would be able to help them locate other paisanos 
from Corporeo. With guidance from the Casa Guanajuato and Guanajuato state 
officials, Club Ahuacatl expanded their network of paisanos from Corporeo in the 
U.S. and got their club officially registered with the Institute for Mexicans Abroad 
at the Mexican consulate.
The state government of Guanajuato was a major gateway for the survival and 
expansion of Club Ahuacatl. Members of the Casa Guanajuato in Texas invited 
Beto to Texas and set up meetings with other paisanos from the three major 
localities of Corporeo. The initial visit was successful. Three additional groups of 
migrants agreed to form clubs and work with Beto’s administration on develop-
ment projects in their respective hometowns. While previous mayors of Corporeo 
had encouraged paisanos to support development projects in their hometown with 
collective remittances, migrants declined, citing the corruption in previous part-
nerships between citizens of Corporeo and the municipal government. Beto was 
pleased the relationship to some paisanos had changed during his administration 
and was hopeful the next administration would continue the efforts he started.
Citizens of Corporeo reelected the PAN in the July 2006 elections. Ahuacatl 
residents overwhelmingly supported Bricio, the PAN candidate. Bricio was the 
director of social development in Beto’s administration and several Ahuacatl 
residents became acquainted with him working on the church pavement proj-
ect. Bricio campaigned on a public works platform. Building on the relationship 
formed with the paisanos during Beto’s last year in office, Bricio made the 3x1 
Program a key component of his development plan. He explained:
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The best mayors, the most successful mayors who do projects for the people of their 
towns, are not necessarily the ones with the most revenue. There are many mayors 
who have resources but they can be lazy or corrupt. But municipalities that want to 
improve the lives of citizens without resources have to go and find the resources and 
manage them well (gestion) to do things that help make the people happy. Part of 
the job is finding program after program that your municipality qualifies for and get 
more resources. The 3x1 Program is a program like that.
Working with Ahuacatl residents and paisanos on projects through the 3x1 
Program required concessions on the part of the municipal government. The 
church renovation project was not a priority for Beto and his team since they pri-
oritized the provision of basic services. But they identified the need to work with 
the migrants and residents and support some of their wishes so they could gain 
their trust and continue working together on drainage and potable water projects, 
which the public officials cited as the most pressing needs of Ahuacatl. As a result 
of this collaborative approach Beto and later Bricio completed several projects 
with Club Ahuacatl including the church pavement and bathroom project, street 
pavement and sidewalk projects, and new street lamps in the town.
MIGR ANT SO CIAL EMBEDDEDNESS AND  
C OMMUNIT Y INCLUSION
Juan was a well-known resident of Ahuacatl even though he had lived in the U.S. 
for many years. He had a strong bonding social network in Ahuacatl and continued 
to practice cultural repertoires of community membership when he was in town. 
Both parents, several siblings, and friends from elementary school with whom he 
had remained close after his departure all lived in Ahuacatl. Once Juan landed his 
job at the day school, his good pay and job security allowed him to build a house 
for his family, Yesenia and her two sons, just as he had dreamed. He built the house 
across the street from his childhood home where his parents still lived and where 
several siblings lived nearby with their own growing families. He bought a new 
truck that stayed in the garage to use during his visits. He purchased land for a 
brother outside of town. He fixed up his parent’s house. And when he came, he 
brought small tokens of affection to friends from elementary school and family 
members—Chargers baseball hats (the San Diego NFL team at the time), materi-
als to fix up their houses, and trinkets such as little bracelets and necklaces for his 
nieces. He liked to take long walks or ride on his horse when he was in town to say 
hello to people. When I accompanied him as he went through town, store owners 
came outside to greet him. Despite his absence and the new luxuries social mobility 
offered Juan and his family, residents did not seem to begrudge his success because 
he shared it with them. Juan was seen as a man of Ahuacatl, even though he no 
longer lived there year-round. He was still a part of his hometown community and 
the town’s favorable opinion of Juan was extended to the paisano club. This was 
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why El Guaje and local leaders wanted Juan to run the club. They believed he would 
represent the people of Ahuacatl because he was still one of them.
Juan’s popularity was also aided by the admiration citizens had for his older 
brother, Caesar. When I accompanied him into Corporeo, acquaintances who he 
did not know well, but who knew his brother, would yell “Brother Zamora! Órale!” 
Caesar lived in Celaya and he was a rodeo and party promoter throughout the 
region. Everyone around town knew about Caesar’s parties and traveled several 
kilometers to attend them, especially when he booked popular banda groups. In 
2007, after the migrant club had completed a few projects successfully and Juan 
had become more confident in his fundraising abilities, he started to throw rodeos 
in Ahuacatl with Caesar to fundraise for the town. When the brothers brought the 
popular regional social events to Ahuacatl, many residents credited the Zamora 
family for bringing positive attention to the small town. The rodeo gave residents 
something to be excited about and everyone wanted to chip in to make the event 
a success. The rodeo also further expanded Juan’s social ties throughout Ahuacatl 
and to other localities in Corporeo.
Juan had both bonding and bridging ties in Ahuacatl. His bonding social ties 
included kin (siblings, nieces and nephews, and their friends) and fictive kin rela-
tionships (godchildren and godparents), and he had bridging ties to stakeholders 
in the town, such as church leaders, El Guaje and Guaje’s elite friends (the dentist, 
doctor, and “el profesor,” a retired schoolteacher who catalogued the colonial his-
tory of Corporeo), and schoolmates who were small shop owners. Furthermore, 
residents who were active in the church group and worked with the club also drew 
on their social networks to support the club’s public works efforts. The paisanos’ 
social ties and embeddedness in the town were paramount to their success scaling 
up community involvement in public goods provision with municipal authorities, 
but it became even more important when the economic crisis in the U.S. decreased 
the club’s capacity to coproduce public works projects through the 3x1 Program.
EC ONOMIC RECESSION AND THE CHALLENGE TO 
HTA CLUB CAPACIT Y
The success of 3x1 projects in Ahuacatl invigorated local residents, who had many 
3x1 project ideas they wanted to see implemented in the town. In 2008, teachers 
from the local kindergarten asked for a meeting with El Guaje and Juan during 
his visit home during the Thanksgiving holiday. With the encouragement of the 
teachers and parents of the jardin de niños (kindergarten), the school group asked 
the migrants to help them with a problem in their school: excessive overcrowding. 
At the time, one teacher supervised 50 students. El Guaje suggested they build a 
new classroom addition to the school and hire one of the teachers who was laid off 
from a nearby school that recently closed. Juan and El Guaje thought it was a won-
derful idea. El Guaje organized a meeting with political officials to propose the 3x1 
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project and Juan agreed to bring the idea back to the paisanos in the club. Shortly 
after, the mayor agreed and worked with his administration to submit technical 
plans and approval through the 3x1 Program.
The mesa directiva (parent-teacher association) of the school met with 
Corporeo’s director of social development and El Guaje while Juan, Ramon, and 
other members of Club Ahuacatl fundraised back in the U.S. During the meet-
ing, parents expressed concern that construction during the school year would be 
dangerous for the children, but they did not want to wait until July when school 
ended because of the elections. Everyone in the meeting worried that the elections 
would stall the project. Residents’ concern was that if an opposition party took 
power there were no assurances that the new administration would complete the 
3x1 school project. The residents had good reason to be concerned about party 
turnover because the PAN candidate running for the mayorship was very unpopu-
lar with locals. Residents thought the PRI candidate, Carlos, was going to win 
even though they had developed strong partisan attachments for Beto and Bricio, 
Panista mayors of Corporeo, whom voters in Ahuacatl credited for the improve-
ment in public goods provision in their town.
Carlos served as mayor of Corporeo in the early 1990s and he opened the first 
Corona beer company bottling plant in the region, which brought many jobs 
to the people of Corporeo and the region. Paisanos and residents alike wanted 
to work with whichever party was elected, but they had concerns that Carlos’s 
administration might not honor projects started during the PAN incumbent’s last 
year in office. Bricio reassured everyone involved that they would start and finish 
the classroom project before the new administration took office. This was also a 
strategic decision by Bricio since he wanted to prevent the PRI administration 
from taking credit for his projects in order to sway unsuspecting voters during the 
election campaign season.
Martin, Ramon, Juan, and other paisanos tried to fundraise for the school 
expansion project as they had done for previous 3x1 projects. But in late 2008 
and 2009 the U.S. housing crisis was in full swing. The economic crisis severely 
dampened the club’s capacity to raise funds for their hometown. Martin, who 
worked in the construction industry, was worried he would lose his job and have 
to return to Mexico. This was the same predicament for many paisanos from 
Corporeo who also worked in housing construction. Club Ahuacatl was able to 
raise some contributions, but not the full 25 percent stipulated by the 3x1 Program. 
Embarrassed, Juan recalled how awful he felt when he returned to Ahuacatl and 
told the mesa directiva of the school that the paisanos were unable to raise project 
funds for the schoolhouse.
Members of the school group were disappointed. But they also understood too 
well the migrants’ difficulties since many of the children in the school had parents 
in the U.S. who feared the loss of their jobs and ability to send home remittances. 
Parents offered to fundraise to help cover the remaining cost in order to continue 
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the project. They held potluck dinners and took donations from willing families, 
whatever they could spare. Juan was adamant that the club never pressure the 
residents for money because he knew many of the families had a member in the 
U.S. and that times were tough. Juan was very vocal about this at the meeting I 
attended. Together with Juan’s brother, the mesa directiva, El Guaje, and the church 
association, citizen groups offered to pitch in.
When Juan told Caesar about the decline in the club’s capacity to fundraise for 
the school project, Caesar offered to throw the next jaripeo in Ahuacatl. Ahuacatl 
had never hosted a rodeo in their own town and everyone buzzed with excitement. 
Residents volunteered and sold tickets to the event all over Corporeo and nearby 
municipalities. Other residents posted fliers for the event in other municipalities 
to attract people from all over the region. The church group held a raffle for a fat 
calf they called “Miguel,” and made food to sell at the event. The rodeo was a huge 
success and raised more than enough to cover the 25 percent migrant contribu-
tion to the school project. As a result of the collective mobilization of residents all 
across town during a decline in the club’s capacity to raise 3x1 funds, construction 
broke ground in June and the entire project wrapped up in August. The ribbon-
cutting ceremony for the schoolhouse was an emotional event for the residents of 
Ahuacatl who were proud of their accomplishments, and for Juan, who was unsure 
if his club would be able to do any more projects with paisanos’ investment as they 
increasingly struggled to make ends meet in the U.S.
While the school classroom was being built in July, Carlos won the mayorship. 
Much to residents’ surprise, despite PRI party turnover in municipal govern-
ment, Carlos immediately set up formal meetings with Club Ahuacatl and com-
munity residents to plan 3x1 projects during his administration. At the meeting, 
Juan informed the mayor that Club Ahuacatl was unable to collect the remittances 
of paisanos in the U.S. as they had done before the economic crisis and would 
likely have to disband the club. By late 2009 and well into 2010, the economic crisis 
depressed the paisanos’ ability to raise funds for coproduction projects in Ahuacatl.
Hearing of the migrant club’s difficulty raising funds in the U.S., Chumo, the 
dentist who had been involved in earlier 3x1 projects, offered to organize a public 
works committee for the town. The comite de obras was a group of five Ahuacatl 
residents who wanted to keep up the momentum for public works projects even 
though the paisanos could no longer be actively involved in the partnership. 
Chumo explained that members of the comite “all share the same vision for the 
town . . . we can help the paisanos with the 25 percent and we can still do projects 
through the 3x1 Program.” With Juan, Martin, and Ramon’s blessing, the public 
works committee completely took over project selection, planning, and imple-
mentation efforts with the municipal government. The only involvement that 
Club Ahuacatl had in the coproduction process was to propose the projects to the 
COVAM for 3x1 Program approval so that the municipality could still quality for 
state and federal matching funds.
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Members of the public works committee did not believe that the municipal 
government would still want to engage in coproduction projects if they could no 
longer participate in the 3x1 Program. Enrique, a member of the public works 
committee, reflected on how town life has changed since Club Ahuacatl began 
supporting projects:
The two biggest problems in Ahuacatl are drinking water and drainage. We could 
not do these kinds of projects by ourselves . . . Listen, before people wanted to be in-
volved, but having the migrant club has definitely increased residents’ participation 
in the town . . . It is easier to get people in the town involved when there are incen -
tives like different state or municipal programs like 3x1. When the people know they 
don’t have to do the whole [project] by themselves and that they have the support 
from government officials, they are more likely to do something. Since 3x1, there are 
more requests for little projects. I think this is because people were not sure if the 
projects would actually happen, but now that they see the patio project done, and 
the school, and the roads, they have more confidence and will talk to our committee.
Before Club Ahuacatl, residents were active in the social life of the town, but the 
migrant club helped scale up participation in public works projects. This partici-
patory engagement in coordination with public officials created new terrain for 
democratic decision-making outside the electoral process.
While El Guaje and prominent members of Ahuacatl were the driving forces 
behind the formation of the hometown association, after several projects were 
completed in the locality, more residents became actively involved in the 3x1 
coproduction process. Juan’s social embeddedness in Ahuacatl meant that his 
leadership in the migrant club garnered support for coproduction projects that 
directly involved the municipal government. Members of the town knew Juan, 
who was perceived as a member of the Ahuacatl community, even though he had 
lived abroad for more than 20 years. Since paisanos had maintained solidaristic 
ties with residents of the hometown beyond their immediate social circles, a more 
heterogeneous group of citizens were involved in the coproduction process. And 
as community inclusion increased with the successful completion of 3x1 projects 
and more residents took ownership over public projects, they had more routinized 
interactions with elected public officials including Beto, Bricio, Carlos, and other 
political officials who were part of the PAN and PRI municipal administrations.
The fierce electoral competition in Corporeo created political incentives for 
the municipal administration to become engaged in the coproduction process 
with migrants, as in the case of El Cerrito. Beto and Bricio both pursued cam-
paign platforms based on the provision of public works. The mayors, including 
the PRI administration from 2009–12, viewed the 3x1 Program as an opportunity 
to expand social spending throughout Corporeo. The active involvement of com-
munity residents presented municipal officials with an opportunity to work with 
their constituents and develop relationships with stakeholders in the community. 
The process of coproducing public works helped to repair some of the mistrust 
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in local government. As Gema, a local Ahuacuatl resident, told me, “It’s better 
now, but it is always a good idea to keep a healthy distance when it comes to the 
Mexican government.”
The combination of high community inclusion and government engagement 
organized synergetic coproduction in Ahuacatl. During the U.S. economic down-
turn, residents of Ahuacatl scaled up their participation to help the migrants 
overcome financial constraints to continue working on projects through the 3x1 
Program. This escalation in civic participation had additional positive spillovers 
for democratic participation. Residents reported that their interactions with 
municipal officials of both parties showed them that the government responded 
to their needs when they made their voices heard, even if they never fully trusted 
politicians. Over the course of the three mayoral administrations in which Club 
Ahuacatl and community residents engaged in coproduction (2004–12), govern-
ment spending on public works was 3 percent higher, on average, compared to 
the previous period (2002–04). All of the localities with an active migrant club, 
including Ahuacatl, received a higher distribution of public spending than they 
did before. Although the PAN administration did not win the 2009 election, resi-
dents continued to work effectively with Carlos’s PRI administration, completing 
an additional four coproduction projects in Ahuacatl without collective remit-
tances from the migrant club. As a result of the synergetic partnership forged 
between citizens, migrants, and political officials, 10 coproduction projects were 
successfully completed in Ahuacatl in Carlo’s three years as mayor during the U.S. 
economic crisis. Coproduction created a new institutional venue through which 
citizens could participate more in social and political affairs of their community.
As of 2013, Club Ahuacatl continued to support the provision of public goods in 
Ahuacatl, but no longer with collective remittances. Juan used his status as a pai-
sano and proposed projects through the 3x1 Program for cofinancing from the state, 
federal, and municipal governments, but was no more involved than that. Instead of 
migrants’ remittance contributions, the public works committee of Ahuacatl con-
tributed the 25 percent share for projects. Club Ahuacatl never recovered their capac-
ity to fundraise and keep paisanos interested in coproduction activities through the 
economic crisis. In 2010, Martin and Ramon stopped participating in the club alto-
gether and said it took up too much time and attention. The club became inactive in 
2011 after seven years of successful coproduction in Ahuacatl, but 3x1 coproduction 
projects continued without them. Juan still visited several times a year and threw 
parties with his brother. He continued to enjoy everyday life in his hometown with 
friends, new and old, and his family and the people of Ahuacatl.
SUMMARY
The two cases in this chapter represent examples of intermediary organizational 
forms of transnational coproduction that differed in their levels of community 
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inclusion and government engagement. But in both cases additional factors 
beyond electoral incentives, local-state capacity, and migrant social embedded-
ness impacted levels of community inclusion and government engagement.
In the PRI stronghold of Santa Catarina, local residents were uninterested in 
direct involvement in coproduction so long as it involved public officials who many 
suspected of being corrupt or in cahoots with criminal organizations. Moreover, 
local political officials were all but secured electoral victory by the cacique in town 
and public goods provision was not part of the electoral calculus to turn out voters 
in municipal elections. In Ahuacatl, migrants, especially the HTA leader who was 
the most visible ambassador of the migrant club in the hometown, were socially 
embedded, possessing both bonding and bridging ties throughout the community 
despite having lived in the U.S. for decades. Moreover, local government was eager 
to work with paisanos on projects, in Ahuacatl especially, as they thought they 
could benefit from the amplification of resources for public spending through the 
3x1 Program in an electorally competitive locality that was known to support both 
PRI and PAN mayoral candidates. But when club capacity was severely contracted 
by the U.S. economic recession, because paisanos had helped forge network ties 
between community leaders in Ahuacatl and the local government through the 
coproduction process, 3x1 projects were able to continue with the increase in resi-
dents’ ownership and leadership in local public goods provision.
In the synergetic partnership in Ahuacatl in which both inclusion and engage-
ment were high, residents became active participants in the coproduction process 
with a fully engaged local government. Political officials in Corporeo supplied 
matching funds, proposed projects, provided technical planning and support, 
hired labor, and coordinated materials to the coproduction process. Because they 
were keen on receiving matching funds from the state and federal governments to 
provide public goods in a more politically competitive part of town, public officials 
were open to negotiation with the migrant club and resident actors. When the U.S. 
recession challenged Club Ahuacatl’s capacity to collect resources for coproduc-
tion projects and keep club members involved in club activities on the U.S. side 
of the border, residents increased their involvement in public goods provision to 
supplement the club’s investment. To do so, community members volunteered to 
form a public works committee, a new civic association in town, and work with 
the delegate and municipal officials to continue coproduction projects without the 
involvement of the migrant club, but still through the 3x1 Program. In sum, syn-
ergy, despite a decline in HTA club capacity, was associated with an increase in 
local civic and political participatory engagement.
By contrast, in Santa Catarina migrants were not as socially embedded in the 
town as paisano club leaders from Ahuacatl. The paisanos from Santa Catarina, 
who reluctantly formed a club at the request of the local priest and excited mem-
bers of the paisano network in Chicago, had weak bonding and bridging social 
networks. High rates of out-migration coupled with over 20 years away from 
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the hometown and few visits during those years eroded social ties to local resi-
dents. Most of the paisanos’ family, close friends, schoolmates, and neighborhood 
acquaintances had also emigrated and either joined the paisanos in the Chicago 
metro area or emigrated to other parts of the U.S., namely Texas and California. 
In other words, paisanos bonding networks relocated with them to the U.S. and 
paisanos only had a few social connections to people who remained behind.
Bridging ties were also in short supply because there were few community 
leaders in the hometown aside from the local priest. The popular local pastor 
introduced migrant club leaders to parishioners when they were in town for two 
different religious festivals, but locals did not want to be involved and club mem-
bers did not actively recruit them into project planning. Additionally, residents’ 
mistrust of local political officials also discouraged their involvement when they 
learned that participation in the 3x1 Program required municipal government par-
ticipation. And concerns about public security connected to the rise of criminal 
organizations and drug trafficking in the region further hampered local residents’ 
interest in becoming involved in public affairs, which could potentially draw atten-
tion to the presence of remittance resources flowing into town. Relatedly, residents’ 
concerns about the mayor’s connections to nefarious activities further turned off 
community involvement in the transnational partnership.
In both cases in this chapter, factors beyond migrant social embeddedness and 
political bureaucratic capacity and competitiveness affected levels of community 
inclusion and government engagement. Drug violence and the U.S. economic reces-
sion had an independent effect on the organization of transnational partnerships 
and also through their effect on community inclusion and government engage-
ment. Additional factors specific to the hometown setting needed to be accounted 
for to more fully explain variation in the organization of transnational partnerships.
In the next chapter, I present the final two cases of transnational partnership 
between migrant clubs and public agencies in the Mexican sending state. The cases 
of El Mirador and Atitlan are different than other cases in that both partnerships 
represent different localities that are in the same municipality, whereas the previous 
four cases were each in different municipalities. The benefit of a within-municipal 
case comparison is that it allows me to hold constant local bureaucratic capacity of 
the state and trace how migrant social embeddedness and electoral considerations 
in different localities shaped community inclusion and government engagement 
to different organizational forms of partnership (corporatist and synergetic) and 
to diverse political outcomes and effects on state-society relations.
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Synergy and Corporatism in El Mirador 
and Atitlan, Comarga
“We don’t need 3x1 or the paisanos, we live here. We have our own ideas about what 
this town needs,” insisted Lydia, member of the Patron Saint Festival Association 
and resident of Atitlan, Comarga. After a contentious year, residents of Atitlan had 
enough of paisanos’ directives to pay for a public goods project they had no part in 
choosing and of challenges to the autonomy of the Patronato as the representative 
voice of the community. The migrant leadership of Club Atitlan had formed an 
alliance with the municipal government and shut out local residents from mean-
ingful participation in the transnational partnership that organized public goods 
projects through the 3x1 Program, although the migrant-state partners demanded 
that the Patronato contribute resources. The corporatist coproduction partnership 
crowded out key community stakeholders from deliberation in the selection and 
coordination of a 3x1 pavement project that was neither a priority for the home-
owners nor something they wanted to help finance. As a result, state-society and 
paisano-resident relations became contentious, and residents mobilized political 
support for the opposition party to punish the incumbent for privileging the pai-
sanos’ remittances and voices over those who lived in the town and were repre-
sented by the Patronato.
Why were social relations between migrants and nonmigrants in Atitlan con-
tentious? Why were residents treated as clients of the migrants and the state and 
not included in the coproduction process as meaningful contributors? In Atitlan, 
members of the hometown association lacked social bridging ties to key com-
munity stakeholders and they did not attempt to create them as they prioritized 
social status and political power over social solidarity with local residents. By 
contrast, in another locality in Comarga called El Mirador, a migrant hometown 
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association successfully coproduced several public goods projects with the same 
municipal government in the same period of time. What was different in the two 
partnerships was that paisanos of El Mirador were still socially embedded in the 
hometown community after living abroad in the United States for more than 15 
years. Practices of cultural membership in the hometown community and exten-
sive bonding and bridging ties to local residents, especially migrant returnees to 
El Mirador, led to high levels of community inclusion. Residents were equal part-
ners in the transnational partnership and formed a new civic association to work 
directly with Comarga municipal officials on a cancha (recreational court), lienzo 
charro (rodeo ring), street and sidewalk construction, and pavement and drainage 
projects. El Mirador residents routinely had face-to-face contact with municipal 
officials and negotiated project selection and project planning with the directors of 
social development and public works in the ayuntamiento. Even though both clubs 
were formed at the same time and with the encouragement of the same mayor, and 
had similar levels of poverty, population size, and partisan attachments, the trans-
national partnerships were organized differently because migrants’ membership 
in the social community of their respective hometowns diverged.
In this chapter, I explain how low levels of community inclusion, but high lev-
els of government engagement, organized a corporatist transnational partnership 
that had important consequences for political activism and state-society relations 
in Atitlan. I also present the partnership case of El Mirador, a locality in the same 
municipality as Atitlan, but one in which migrant social embeddedness in the 
hometown community led to higher levels of community inclusion in the pro-
vision of public goods. The comparison of two cases of transnational coproduc-
tion, which holds local-state capacity and electoral incentives constant, allows me 
to isolate and trace the key role that hometown-paisano social relations have in 
determining the structure of partnerships, which produced different political out-
comes in the two hometown settings.
ATITL AN AND EL MIR AD OR ,  C OMARGA,  JALISC O
The municipality of Comarga is located four hours north of Guadalajara in the 
northern region of Jalisco in the Sierra Madre Occidental Mountains. The munici-
pality borders Zacatecas to the northwest and southeast. In 2005, the population 
was approximately 18,000; however, like many municipalities in Mexico, Comarga 
lost a significant portion of the economically active population to the U.S. labor 
market. Between 2000 and 2010, the intensity of international migration increased 
and changed Comarga’s classification from “medium” to “high.”1 About 70 percent 
of the total population of Comarga lived in the country seat and the remaining 
citizens inhabited one of the four main localities. Differences in the provision of 
public goods between the county seat and Comarga’s rural localities were striking. 
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For example, before 2005, the last time that rural communities like Atitlan and El 
Mirado received a public works project was when the PRI extended the electrical 
grid and potable water service in 1976.
According to official population statistics, Comarga is a middle-income munic-
ipality with a “medium” level of poverty, but the localities in Comarga are poorer.2 
In 2005, residents who lived on the outskirts of town lacked access to essential 
public goods such as drainage and sanitation. In both Atitlan and El Mirador 
about 8 percent of the population was illiterate. Many nonmigrant households 
had dirt floors and no plumbing in the home. Municipal administrations collected 
land taxes, license and water usage fees, and relied on revenue transfers from the 
state and federal governments to finance public works. But how mayors distrib-
uted those resources earmarked for public spending was entirely at the discre-
tion of municipal officials. In Comarga, most mayors focused public resources in 
the county seat where the majority of the population resided. This decision left 
many households who lived in localities outside the town center to finance public 
goods on their own, often with remittance resources, which was the case in many 
municipalities across Mexico.3
El Mirador and Atitlan were two very similar localities in Comarga. In the 
wake of the economic crisis and drought of the 1980s and 1990s, many people left 
the two localities for the U.S. in search of job opportunities. They settled mostly 
in Texas, Oregon, California, Indiana, and Illinois. In 2000, about 15 percent of 
households had a member of the household living in the U.S. and between 5 and 
10 percent regularly received remittances, although these households were more 
concentrated in the localities than the county seat. Some migrant households used 
a portion of remittance income to finance indoor plumbing and to build water 
wells because they did not have access to the public potable water system. Both 
locales had similar levels of emigration, household remittances, and public goods 
provision. El Mirador and Atitlan also had similar levels of poverty according 
to the Mexican Census’s marginalization index and population size. In terms of 
sociodemographic characteristics, the two localities were very similar, although El 
Mirador was more remote and higher up in the mountains than Atitlan.
Both locales were also supporters of the PAN political party and voters had cast 
their ballots overwhelmingly for the PAN incumbent since the party’s first munici-
pal victory against the PRI in 1992. In every subsequent election, the PAN won by 
double-digit margins. But in the 2005, 2008, and 2011 elections, PRI candidates 
made serious inroads and wrested votes away from the PAN, mostly in the county 
seat. Since the early 2000s, localities like El Mirador and Atitlan had become even 
more important political districts as the PAN incumbent relied on their core sup-
porters turning out to vote in increasingly competitive elections. In 2005, Pepe 
Coronado won the mayorship by a razor-thin margin against a popular PRI can-
didate, which put the PAN on the defensive for the first time since the early 1990s. 
Pepe made public works provision a central component of his campaign platform, 
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especially in localities like Atitlan where he was born. After he won the election 
he put these plans into action and identified paisanos in the U.S. with remittance 
resources as central to the achievement of this goal. Social spending through the 
3x1 Program was a political strategy to supply loyal supporters with public goods 
and encouraged their continued support for the PAN.
LEARNING AB OUT THE 3X1 PRO GRAM  
FROM MUNICIPAL NEIGHB ORS AND JALISCO  
STATE OUTREACH
The dissemination of information from Comarga’s mayor and nearby political offi-
cials was integral to Pepe’s exposure to the 3x1 Program and eventual participation. 
When Pepe observed several new public works projects in a nearby municipality, 
he was curious how the mayor—whom he believed worked with a similar budget 
and population size as Comarga—had the requisite public resources to provide 
so many new projects in such a short amount of time. When he asked the mayor 
in the Zacatecan municipality about the increase in public service delivery, offi-
cials told Pepe about their participation in the 3x1 Program and explained to him 
how a group of paisanos from their municipality collaborated on public projects. 
Members of the mayor’s administration took Pepe on a tour of the public works 
projects they had completed throughout the town. Since Comarga had a signifi-
cant population of paisanos in the U.S., Pepe was motivated to partner with them 
on projects and set out to expand the spending capacity of his administration 
through participation in the 3x1 Program.
The entrepreneurial Panista mayor contacted state-level officials in 
Guadalajara, the Jalisco state capital, to learn more about the 3x1 Program and 
how the state helped mayors locate and contact their paisanos in the U.S. It was 
in his correspondence with officials of the PAN governor’s office where Pepe 
learned about the Office of Migrant Affairs, an administrative unit of the state 
that kept organized records of emigrants from the state of Jalisco who were in the 
U.S. With the support of the Migrant Affairs Office, Pepe’s administration iden-
tified paisanos from Comarga across the U.S. Since the Migrant Affairs Office 
registered migrants in the U.S. when they visited the Mexican consulate, they 
supplied the Comarga municipal administration with paisanos’ contact informa-
tion. Pepe’s new administration identified a few U.S. cities where the majority of 
Comarga paisanos lived, reached out to them, and organized face-to-face meet-
ings with them in 2005.
Pepe and members of his administration visited paisanos from Comarga across 
the U.S. in one of his first activities after taking office. Although he was not success-
ful in every meeting, he convinced migrants from different localities in Comarga to 
form a club. Two of the HTAs created during that visit were Club Atitlan and Club El 
Mirador. Information about the 3x1 Program and contact information of paisanos 
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abroad allowed the mayor to recruit paisanos into a transnational partnership for 
public goods provision as political competition was heating up in Comarga.
FORMATION OF CLUB ATITL AN
Emilio was born in Atitlan and crossed into the U.S. with his mother when he was 
a newborn. She traveled alone to Texas after she separated from Emilio’s father. 
Coming to the U.S. with a new baby and not much else, she returned to Atitlan 
after a few short months and reconciled with her husband when it became too 
hard to support herself and the baby in the U.S. Emilio spent the first 13 years of 
his life in Atitlan. When he was in elementary school in the 1970s, children his age 
attended school for half-days because the school building only had a few rooms for 
instruction. Younger kids went to school in the morning and older graders in the 
afternoons. Emilio never finished his primary education. “I was never that good in 
school. I got bored even though we were only there half the day! I much preferred 
being out in the open in the fields with my father,” he said.
After Emilio’s father died unexpectedly, his mother and siblings left Atitlan and 
immigrated again to the U.S. She did not believe she could take care of her family 
subsisting on the land on her own and so with most of her family had gone to the 
U.S. This time she went to California where her uncle lived. He found her a job in 
the agricultural fields of Fresno County where he worked. At the age of 13, Emilio 
worked with his mother in the fields and helped support the family. When his sib-
lings were older and the family more settled in California, Emilio left and moved 
to Texas where many other paisanos from Comarga lived. He had grown tired of 
agricultural work and wanted to try something different. An old neighbor from 
Atitlan lived in San Antonio and he convinced Emilio to move there. Shortly after 
he moved to San Antonio he opened a small abarrote (convenience store), met his 
wife, and together they started a family in Texas.
It was in his store where Emilio was reunited with Esme. After more than 20 
years, the two Atitlan natives recognized each other, and during their initial small 
talk discovered they had attended the same primary school. After a brief court-
ship, Esme and Emilio married. They had three children together, all born in the 
U.S., which they said contributed to their permanent settlement in Texas. Both 
Esme and Emilio became proficient English speakers and practiced with their 
children in the evenings. By the time I met the Atitlan natives in 2009 in Comarga, 
they described themselves as “Mexican American.” While they had deep roots to 
Atitlan, they also had made the U.S. their home and had become accustomed to 
life in San Antonio. In many ways, Emilio and Esme had Americanized and they 
were proud to have done so. They cheered for their son at high school football 
games and celebrated American holidays with their non-Mexican neighbors as 
well as their hometown friends.
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When Emilio, Esme, and three other migrant families from Atitlan met with 
Pepe and the directors of social development and communications who accom-
panied the mayor on his U.S. voyage, Pepe’s desires to modernize Atitlan reso-
nated immediately with the paisanos. Emilio and Esme spoke at length about 
the poor quality of Atitlan’s roads, the lack of a recreation area, and other provi-
sions, which they thought the residents of Atitlan needed. Emilio said he told the 
mayor that Atitlan was “not beautiful” and when he recalled his hometown he 
“felt sorry” for the people who lived there who did not have access to the same 
kinds of services that they had in San Antonio. It was not difficult to convince the 
paisanos in the meeting to form a club and partner with the mayor on projects 
through the 3x1 Program.
Paisanos from Atitlan who lived in San Antonio described Emilio as the “natu-
ral leader” of the group and they unanimously agreed he should be the club leader 
after the municipal officials returned to Comarga. Four families from Atitlan that 
lived in San Antonio joined the club and they recruited some of their family mem-
bers to join who had recently moved to northern California and Wisconsin for 
more lucrative jobs. At the meeting with the Comarga administration, the mayor 
requested that the first project they work on together was a concrete vehicle bridge 
that would connect the east and west sides of Atitlan. Members of the club were 
ecstatic about the project proposal. Half of the families had been born on the west 
side of the community and knew what a hassle it had been to cross the wooden 
footbridge during the rainy season. The project was personal to the members of 
Club Atitlan. Before they had even started the project, they were excited that they 
would be responsible for building a bridge for the hometown.
THE C ONCRETE VEHICLE BRID GE PROJECT
The river that ran through the town of Atitlan prevented about a third of residents 
from access to the road that provided the main route into the county seat. Since 
Atitlan only had one abarrote, residents needed to cross the river to get to the 
main markets in Comarga. Residents reported that they had expressed the need 
for a reliable vehicle bridge for 20 years given how treacherous it was to cross the 
river during the rainy season. When I asked residents in Atitlan what they thought 
was the most important issue that faced the Atitlan community, residents said it 
was, before 2006, the bridge. Residents recounted how donkeys drowned, boats 
capsized, and neighbors needed to be rescued when their cars got stuck in the 
muds of the riverbed.
Pepe’s parents were both born in the west side of Atitlan. So when he cam-
paigned in Atitlan during the election, and residents broached the topic of the 
vehicle bridge, he promised them that if they raised matching funds to contribute 
to the project, he would “find the money through a program” and build the vehicle 
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bridge for Atitlan. After he heard about the 3x1 Program from the nearby mayor 
in Zacatecas, Pepe saw how he could make good on his promise to the local resi-
dents. He got the idea to ask paisanos from Atitlan to form a club, raise money, and 
help the municipality build the bridge with matching funds from state and federal 
government. The group of migrants from Atitlan initially formed to help build this 
vehicle bridge in their hometown.
Citizens, migrant paisanos, and the municipal government all contributed 
funds and together they built a vehicle bridge that connected east and west Atitlan. 
Residents of Atitlan had worked hard collecting donations, hosting raffles, and 
sponsoring dinners to fundraise their portion of the budget. They had formed a 
bridge committee that worked alongside the town Patronato, the patron saint fes-
tival committee, to raise their contribution.4 The involvement of the community 
residents was unknown to the migrant club, however. Since Emilio and Esme had 
not visited Atitlan in recent years and did not know many current residents, they 
did not know the extent of the town’s effort and financial contribution to the bridge 
project. Beyond four migrant families in the community that the San Antonio 
migrants kept in touch with, neither Emilio nor other club members knew many 
of the people in the hometown since most of their families had rejoined them in 
Figure 4. Vehicle bridge project completed through 3x1 Program in Atitlan, Jalisco. Photo by 
author.
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the U.S.. While many migrants from Atitlan kept a house in the community, the 
houses stayed vacant but for a few days of the year when they visited.
Initially, the bridge project felt like a victory for the Patronato, residents of the 
west side of Atitlan, and members of the bridge committee who worked together to 
fundraise and make a contribution to the project. During the ribbon-cutting cere-
mony for the bridge in 2006, the mayor publicly thanked the paisanos for building 
the bridge in front of the whole town but said nothing about contributions from 
the Patronato or the bridge committee. He said that the bridge project was made 
possible by the “sacrifice” of the paisanos who left their hometown of Atitlan, but 
still cared for “nuestro pueblo” to build the residents a bridge. Excluding residents 
from public praise in favor of the migrant club was a serious misstep that gener-
ated confusion among the townspeople. The mayor’s public praise for the HTA 
and the exclusion of their contributions upset locals involved in the bridge project 
who had spent time, energy, and resources fundraising with the Patronato. Atitlan 
resident Don Nel explained his reaction to the bridge ribbon-cutting ceremony:
I have personally asked each and every mayor for the bridge for 20 years. When I 
asked this mayor, he said he knew of a new program where we can get the money we 
need to build the bridge. We got together in the town and formed a bridge commit-
tee and raised money with the Patronato to help pay. Why the migrants are getting 
the credit for the bridge I do not understand. But this is typical. No one cares about 
us out here.5
Many residents who attended the bridge ceremony were initially confused about 
the mayor’s public focus on the paisanos for the bridge project. But confusion 
eventually gave way to scorn as coproduction projects continued and Emilio pre-
sumed a position of leadership and authority in Atitlan, a town he had not lived 
in for decades.
When I asked about the calculus for public praise of the HTA and omission 
of the town’s contributions at the ribbon-cutting ceremony, the mayor explained 
his political rationale. He wanted his and future Comarga administrations to 
implement many coproduction projects, and he identified the 3x1 Program as the 
way to make the municipal budget go further. Since the municipality only had to 
match 25 percent of the total cost of projects, he knew they could complete several 
more, albeit small public works projects in Atitlan, if they kept working with the 
paisanos. He wanted the people of Atitlan to realize the migrants enabled access 
to state and federal resources that made the bridge project possible through the 
3x1 Program. Public acknowledgment of the migrants’ contribution, he thought, 
would go a long way to encourage the club to continue participating in 3x1 projects 
and ingratiate Emilio to the residents of Atitlan. He had not intended to make the 
people of the town feel excluded.
Pepe assumed a level of familiarity and trust between himself and the residents 
of Atitlan because he, too, was raised in the town. He was friendly with many of the 
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community leaders, especially Daniel, who was the leader of the Patronato and his 
second cousin. He was well liked in Atitlan, even popular among the residents, and 
after many casual conversations with community members it was clear that they 
respected him and Pepe had earned their vote. However, Pepe rationalized that 
because locals “knew him” and “his character” and his parents were from Atitlan, 
public praise of the paisanos at the ceremony was nothing more than an overture 
and his platitudes toward the migrants would help the citizens of Atitlan become 
beneficiaries of more projects in the end.
DEPLETION OF B ONDING AND BRID GING TIES IN 
THE ATITL AN SO CIAL BASE
While Pepe had extensive social ties throughout the Atitlan community, the mayor 
did not appreciate that migrant members of the HTA were not as socially embed-
ded in Atitlan as in other localities where he helped form HTAs such as El Mirador. 
The mayor and the club leader both thought residents would applaud them for 
the completion of the bridge. After all, the bridge was an overwhelmingly popu-
lar project that residents wanted for years and it improved the quality of life for 
residents who lived on the west side of town. But instead of valuing the residents 
and the Patronato as equal partners and contributors, political officials and the 
paisanos had treated the residents of Atitlan as beneficiaries. Pepe took for granted 
that residents supported him enough that they would not interpret his lack of rec-
ognition of their contributions as a slight. Emilio and the migrant club members 
also assumed residents would credit the club for the provision of the bridge and 
that they would thank them when they visited the town. In reality, Emilio’s physi-
cal separation from Atitlan eroded his social ties to residents, but it also meant he 
had limited information about social relations and what public goods the majority 
of local citizens wanted in the hometown. Emigration and many years living and 
working in the U.S. left Emilio out of touch with social life in Atitlan.
Aside from the four migrant families whose relatives lived in San Antonio, 
Emilio and Esme lacked bonding ties with anyone else in the town. While other 
paisano club members reported they still kept in touch with some siblings back 
home and had a few acquaintances from elementary school whom they chatted 
with occasionally on social media, most of the club members’ families had moved 
to the U.S. and shifted their social life and contacts to people in their destina-
tion cities. By 2006, paisanos affiliated with Club Atitlan had few connections to 
nonmigrant residents outside of their immediate social circle of migrant families 
involved with the club in Texas and California. Bridging ties were also nonexistent. 
Neither Emilio nor Esme had bridging ties to members of the Patronato, the de 
facto governing body of Atitlan, nor did either of them try to construct meaning-
ful social relationships with Daniel or any others who were considered leaders of 
the Patronato.
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The Patronato by all accounts was the most important social institution in the 
locality. Rather than recruit the Patronato into discussions about 3x1 projects or 
even ask the members of the social group about their perceptions of residents’ 
desires for public projects in Atitlan, Emilio, Esme, and paisanos in the club 
thought they knew what the hometown needed and they did not solicit input from 
locals. In fact, they believed their experiences in the U.S. gave them a privileged 
perspective that the local townspeople could benefit from. They wanted to improve 
the image of the hometown and thought 3x1 projects should make it “more beauti-
ful” and “more modern.” Furthermore, Emilio had aspirations to become a leader 
of Atitlan and use his experiences in the U.S. to bring “prosperity” and “modern-
ization” to his hometown.
Quickly, Emilio developed a reputation in the town as arrogant, a sentiment 
shared by most of the town’s nonmigrant households. Residents did not have 
many opportunities to give him the benefit of the doubt since they only saw him 
in town for the bridge ribbon-cutting ceremony and at the fiesta patronal. Some 
residents thought the bridge project had inflated his ego. When Daniel and his 
wife, Lydia, chatted with Emilio after the bridge project, they said they approached 
him as an equal and told him they believed together they could accomplish many 
projects for Atitlan. Unfortunately, they left with an unfavorable impression. They 
said he seemed “full of himself ” (ser muy creído; lleno de sí mismo) and thought 
he was better than them because he lived in San Antonio and they lived in rural 
Atitlan. Lydia imitated how he walked with a puffed-out chest around Atitlan like 
he was the town’s “benefactor,” even though it was known to everyone in Atitlan 
that festival funds subsidized the bridge project and the bridge committee raised 
funds for the project too. Members of the bridge committee, including Don Nel, 
recalled that when Emilio introduced himself he said he was the “president” of the 
migrant club that “built the bridge in the town.” This rubbed Don Nel the wrong 
way because he was the head of the bridge committee. Emilio did not even know 
who he was or how he had been a vocal proponent of the bridge for decades. In 
short, Emilio and Esme were no longer socially embedded in the community and 
lacked both bonding and bridging ties in the social base of the hometown. When 
Emilio presented himself and the paisanos as the benefactors of the bridge project, 
some residents felt annoyed and it made others feel defensive about the contribu-
tions they made to the bridge project.
Emilio’s interpretation of Atitlenses as clients of the paisano club was rejected 
by the Patronato. Members of the Patronato were elected by residents of the town 
and saw themselves as the leaders of the town who represented residents’ inter-
ests. Even though their central activity was to organize the fiesta patronal and care 
for the town’s festival resources, the Patronato members knew all the members of 
the community and frequently discussed problems in the town at their meetings. 
Residents, they said, were not interested in recreation areas and basketball courts 
(championed by Emilio) because they had more pressing needs.
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First, residents wanted street lamps for corners of the town where “drunks” 
(los borrachos) camped out late in the evenings. Atitlan had no street lamps and 
it became pitch black at night, which made it difficult and sometimes dangerous 
for people to navigate back to their homes. Residents wanted street lamps because 
they thought better lighting would discourage people from congregating in dark 
corners and harassing residents. Second, parents of school-age children wanted 
to build sidewalks along the main road into Atitlan. Schoolchildren in Atitlan 
attended elementary and high school in the county seat and the bus dropped them 
off on Route 23. Children and parents had to walk down the main road into town 
without sidewalks and where cars sped by, which made it unsafe. Finally, half the 
residents of Atitlan did not have access to the public drainage system and had to 
expel sanitation down a stone latrine that emptied into the river a few miles down-
stream from the town, which often backed up. Improvements in drainage access 
to households in Atitlan was a public goods priority in Atitlan that most residents 
supported. None of these projects was proposed to Atitlenses and the paisanos 
were more interested in making the hometown they remember “beautiful” than 
either listening to or solving the problems that residents who lived in the town 
confronted daily.
C OMMUNIT Y EXCLUSION AND C ONFLICT IN THE 
ATITL AN SO CIAL BASE
During the patron saint festival, Emilio met with the newly elected PAN mayor, 
Antonio, who succeeded Pepe and they discussed future coproduction projects 
for his term. Emilio and Antonio decided together they wanted to pave streets 
in the town to make Atitlan “more modern.” Eager to continue the partnership 
with the HTA forged by his predecessor, the mayor agreed to the street pavement 
project and worked with his administration to draw up technical plans and secure 
approval through the 3x1 Program. In the visit, Emilio proposed to the mayor that 
since migrants “visit only three or four days a year” residents of Atitlan should be 
required to “pay their fair share.” The mayor agreed to this and told me he ratio-
nalized the requirement because it decreased the total cost of the project to the 
migrants and municipality. For Antonio, this was an efficiency gain and meant 
they could do more projects in Comarga if Atitlenses contributed resources. The 
two men decided to hold a meeting in Atitlan with the Patronato where they 
explained they would fund a road pavement project for the residents of Atitlan.
The director of social development, Jorge, invited Atitlan residents to a town 
hall–style meeting. At the meeting he sat at a table with Emilio and the town del-
egate, Ramon, at the front of the room while members of the Patronato and resi-
dents sat on benches or stood along the walls. Ramon informed them that after 
the success of the bridge project through the 3x1 Program, the migrant club and 
the municipality would begin to pave the three main crossroads of Atitlan. He told 
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citizens that to complete the project each household would have to contribute a 
small share. Club Atitlan and the representative of the municipal government pre-
sented themselves as partners working together for the betterment of the Atitlan 
community. Emilio told those in attendance that his club would work with the 
mayor and with Ramon to make Atitlan a beautiful town that they could all be 
proud of. He invoked the language of community and encouraged the residents 
to “work together” to help make the town a better place. This overture did not 
resonate with community residents and members of the Patronato in attendance. 
Many residents were upset that the paisanos and municipal officials unilaterally 
decided they should have to pay for a project they had no say in choosing.
At the meeting, many residents in attendance were still confused about what 
the 3x1 Program was, who made up the HTA, and why the HTA and municipal 
officials told them they had to contribute funds to the 3x1 pavement project. The 
municipal administration and Emilio had never explained the 3x1 Program to 
residents. There was a great deal of information asymmetry between residents and 
the Patronato, on the one hand, and municipal officials and Emilio, on the other. 
Some residents were hearing about the 3x1 Program for the first time. Don Juan, 
a longtime resident, asked the delegate, Ramon: “If this is a federal program, why 
are you telling us we should be paying? I’m not paying for this.” Others had heard 
about the program but did not know who Emilio was and did not understand what 
involvement the paisano club had in the federal program. Other residents began to 
focus on the pavement project: who decided it and how much would they need to 
pay? Residents wanted to know exactly what their money would pay for. As resi-
dents tried to figure out what was going on and whispered their questions to each 
other, Ramon, Jorge, and Emilio attempted to speak over the residents.
Daniel, president of the Patronato, stood up and moved to the front of the 
room. He stated he would not commit Patronato resources to the pavement proj-
ect before he met with members of the association to discuss it. They would not 
give the paisanos and the director any decision on the spot at the meeting. Other 
residents were also vocal about their opposition to the project because they had 
never been consulted about project selection and did not believe that they should 
have to contribute resources to a project of a federal program. Tension between 
residents and paisanos escalated and the meeting adjourned without a clear reso-
lution. After the meeting, Emilio asked me to go around town to people’s houses 
and do damage control. He wanted me to speak to my contacts and friends in the 
town and persuade them to support the club. I did chat with people around town 
after the meeting, but I listened to their concerns. I did not attempt to influence 
residents’ opinions of Emilio, Club Atitlan, or the 3x1 Program despite Emilio’s 
encouragement that I do so.
In the follow-up meeting of the Patronato to discuss the 3x1 pavement project 
that occurred after Emilio drove back to San Antonio, members were openly frus-
trated that the paisanos and the political officials had formed an “alliance.” “Did you 
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see how they sat up their like they were the kings?” Carla said. “They think we will 
just do whatever they say we should do,” said Don Juan, exasperated. At the close 
of the meeting to discuss the pavement project, the Patronato members arrived at 
a consensus. Patronato members decided they did not want “outsiders” (fuereños, 
gente de afuera) to determine what kinds of projects residents needed in Atitlan. 
At several points in the discussion, members of Patronato invoked territoriality 
and an “us/them” dichotomy in reference to locals who “lived here” and paisanos 
who “lived there.” Members were resolute. Money raised by the Patronato for the 
annual festival should be decided by the people who live in the town and resources 
would not be earmarked for public projects sponsored by the 3x1 Program.
While initially frustrated with the tone and presentation of the 3x1 Program, 
the pavement project, and Club Atitlan’s role in town affairs, some members said 
they appreciated what the paisanos were trying to do, but there was agreement 
that they had gone about it the wrong way. Moreover, longtime members of the 
Patronato were skittish about using festival funds for public projects because they 
tried it once before and it ended badly. The previous Patronato president used 
festival funds to help the local baseball team purchase new uniforms. However, 
after they donated the money, the team never purchased new uniforms. Some resi-
dents were upset with the Patronato and thought they should have known better 
than to get “scammed” (estafado). The Patronato worried that Atitlenses might 
lose trust in them if there was a repeat situation with the pavement project. At 
the close of the Patronato meeting, the members entrusted Daniel to reach out to 
the paisanos and Mayor Antonio’s administration. He told them that they would 
only contribute Patronato resources if the majority of the townspeople agreed to 
it. They concluded that the best way forward was to survey the townspeople and 
make sure everyone was onboard with the pavement project in the spirit of com-
munity inclusion.
PAISANOS’  ABSENCE AND THE DIFFICULT Y OF 
CROSS-B ORDER C OMMUNICATION
The conflict continued for several months, and relations between paisanos and 
residents and residents and political officials continued to sour. Up to this point, 
political officials had pledged support to the migrant club in private, and in public 
they applauded their efforts and came to their defense. Community inclusion was 
low, but the paisano club had the full commitment and support of the municipal 
government that was eager to complete several 3x1 projects with the migrant club. 
Political officials wanted the completion of public goods projects to reflect posi-
tively on their administration. But the transnational partnership was perceived 
by most local residents as an alliance between the local government and the pai-
sanos because residents’ involvement in the coproduction process was minimal. 
Additionally, as the paisanos’ local reputation became viewed as increasingly 
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exclusionary and even bullying by some, Atitleneses’ opinions of Antonio’s PAN 
administration was also negatively affected. When municipal officials privileged 
Emilio’s wishes, and by extension the members of Club Atitlan, over local resi-
dents’ call to be part of the decision-making process, residents felt further alien-
ated by their local government representatives. Since migrant and local officials 
had pressured the Patronato and residents to contribute financial resources to the 
pavement project, residents had become increasingly disenchanted and conster-
nation grew in Atitlan.
Since Emilio was back in the U.S., communication between the migrant club, 
residents of Atitlan, and the mayor’s office occurred via email. As many who use 
electronic mail know, this form of communication can lead to misinformation 
and misinterpretation of tone. This was certainly the case in the emails exchanged 
between Emilio, the mayor and officials in his administration, and Daniel. Part of 
the problem with this form of communication was that only Daniel received the 
emails because of his leadership position in the Patronato. Daniel forwarded the 
emails to other residents of the town, but because few residents had a computer 
with internet access in their home, most residents did not see the communica-
tions until he printed out the emails and brought them to Patronato meetings. To 
check email in Atitlan, residents had to use Doña Sofia’s computer at the corner 
store, which used a dial-up connection, or they had to travel to an internet cafe in 
Comarga, eight kilometers away, and pay a fee.
Another problem with email for communication and conflict resolution was 
that Daniel did not check email as frequently as the paisanos in the U.S. He and 
Lydia both worked as schoolteachers in different municipalities nearby and they 
had two teenage sons of their own whom they were raising. By contrast, Emilio 
was semi-retired. He owned his abarrote, but he had employees to oversee the 
shop. He focused more time on the club and sent frequent updates about pave-
ment project negotiations to the club listserv, Daniel, and municipal authorities. 
However, Daniel’s slower than expected response times to Emilio’s messages were 
misconstrued. Paisanos interpreted his silence as an attempt to stall the pavement 
project. Club members thought Daniel did not adequately appreciate the club’s 
philanthropy. Emilio’s nephew, for example, thought Daniel’s silence suggested 
Atitlenses resented the paisanos’ success in the U.S.
The paisanos wanted the townspeople to go along with their preferred projects 
and pay their small contribution “to make it fair” so that they could move on to 
the next 3x1 project, but within this ongoing conversation something deeper was 
taking place—a social rift between paisanos and nonmigrant residents of Atitlan. 
Paisanos spoke to each other over email and speculated that Atitlenses resented 
their patronage, were jealous of their success in the U.S., and blamed Daniel for 
not acquiescing to their demands. I was in Atitlan when Daniel received these 
emails, and because I regularly visited the internet café and was on the club’s list-
serv, I read all the emails sent internally among the paisanos. In fact, I had read 
144    chapter 5
most of the emails before any of the local residents of Atitlan had read them and 
witnessed residents’ first reaction to the emails when Daniel shared Emilio’s mes-
sages with the townspeople in attendance at the Patronato meetings. The residents 
were, in short, appalled, and were quick to defend Daniel as the “true leader” and 
“voice of the people” of the town.
What club members in Texas failed to grasp was that the pavement project was 
not a priority in Atitlan and email was not a mode of everyday correspondence. 
The last straw came when Emilio and the brother of a local Atitlense man who 
lived in El Paso rhetorically questioned in a series of emails whether the Patronato 
really represented the “best interest” of the people of Atitlan. Paisanos in the U.S. 
began to call into question the need for the Patronato, which was the single most 
important social institution in Atitlan.
Club Atitlan and the municipal government of Comarga received approval 
for the street and sidewalk pavement projects from the 3x1 Program and all the 
funds from the coproduction partners (municipal, state, and federal governments 
and migrant club) had been deposited in the municipal treasury. Members of the 
migrant club did not understand why the townspeople refused to contribute a 
share to the 3x1 project via the Patronato. Emilio wrote a contentious letter to 
Daniel and asked, “What was the function of the Patronato  .  .  . was it to pun-
ish the paisanos, our donations, and our sacrifices? . . . What was the role of the 
Patronato after all?”6 One of Emilio’s nieces, located in Texas, openly questioned 
the role of the Patronato: “Why was the Patronato punishing [them]? All [they] 
wanted was to do good things for our town.” Residents of Atitlan and leaders of 
the Patronato became increasingly worried that the HTA and their “allies” in the 
municipal government wanted to steal the Patronato’s money. Patronato leader-
ship was also distressed that paisanos invoked membership in Atitlan and justified 
their demands for town contributions to the 3x1 pavement project. Paisanos had 
inserted themselves in the public affairs of Atitlan, questioned the purpose and 
role of the central social institution in town, attacked the integrity of their popular 
leader over email, and used the language of “nuestro pueblito” in an attempt to 
legitimate their role in decision-making in a town in which territorial residents 
regarded them increasingly as outsiders in response to their exclusionary practices 
with regard to coproduction activities.
RESIDENT S SANCTION CLUB ATITL AN FROM 
PARTICIPATION IN TOWN AFFAIRS
The Patronato decided to hold an emergency town hall meeting after the last slate 
of emails from Club Atitlan directed at Daniel. They invited everyone in the town 
to attend and gave everyone who wanted to an opportunity to speak their con-
cerns. I was responsible for keeping the minutes of the meeting, which would then 
be relayed back to the paisanos. The meeting was standing room only. More than 
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50 people attended and several others stood outside the double doors and listened 
to the discussion. No members of the HTA were present, but two former migrants 
whose brothers were members of the HTA came as representatives of the club. The 
Patronato treasurer, Angelica, began the meeting and she expressed what many 
locals had expressed to me in private and in their Patronato meetings:
I don’t understand his motives [Emilio]. I saw him at City Hall talking with the of-
ficials, with Pepe, with Antonio, with Jorge. But he never came and talked to us 
directly. I am completely against releasing any funds to these people. We have never 
even seen his face before. Have you seen his face? [Asking the crowd] I am worried. 
What if something bad happens? Will the neighbors still have faith in the Patronato 
if something happens to their money? . . . Who is he [Emilio]? Is he even Mexican 
anymore? He does not even live here and he wants to tell us what to do with the 
Patronato money? No.
Lydia, Daniel’s wife agreed. She was also skeptical about why the paisanos wanted 
residents to pay for a federal program in the first place:
How much money does this club actually have? How do we know they . . . are not 
holding out and making us pay? I saw those emails that Emilio sends Daniel and he 
says this is how much the citizens and the Patronato have to pay. They say this is a 
federal program. I know it is because I see signs in Jerez, in Tlatelnango, in Tepechit-
lan, 3x1 signs, and do they make those citizens pay? Who does he [Emilio] think he 
is? . . . We live in this town. We know everyone and everyone knows us. Why don’t 
we just go to all the neighbors and see what kinds of projects they would be interest-
ed in the Patronato supporting . . . we don’t need 3x1 or the paisanos . . . we live here.
As the mood in the room shifted to resolution and residents said they were ready 
to take an informal vote about whether to engage in any further correspondence 
with the club, the brother of the migrant club members attempted to cast the club’s 
contributions and intentions in a more favorable light. The residents proposed a 
motion to contribute some of the funds to the pavement project in solidarity with 
the paisanos but decided that they would tell the club that they needed to work 
together if they wanted to do any future projects. This was considered by many 
residents in attendance as a favorable neutral ground because they did not want to 
feud with the paisanos abroad.
At the close of the meeting, the Patronato decided to release half of the funds for 
the pavement project that was stipulated by the HTA and municipal government. 
By a show of hands, they agreed to donate complementary resources to the project 
to preserve peace. Residents characterized their contribution to the paisano proj-
ect as a good faith effort that tried to restore paisano-hometown relations, but that 
did not fully give in to Club Atitlan’s demands. Moving forward, though, residents 
overwhelmingly agreed that public works decisions would not be defined by the 
migrant club, but by the people of Atitlan who were represented by the Patronato 
and cared for the (town) festival funds. Daniel relayed the decision to the club in 
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an email addressed to the paisanos of Club Atitlan, the current and former mayors 
of Comarga, the Atitlan delegate to the municipal government, and the directors 
of public works and social development.
In follow-up conversations with members of the HTA they expressed confu-
sion with Daniel’s response. They reported feeling “attacked” for their generosity 
by the hometowners, especially by Daniel who had become the de facto voice 
of Atitlense residents in cross-border communications. Some members of the 
HTA suggested they “withhold” funds for future coproduction projects unless 
the town contributed an equal share. Other members recommended Daniel be 
replaced as president of the Patronato. They wanted a local leader more aligned 
with club interests.
The events that unfolded after the completion of the bridge project between 
December 2008 and August 2012 exacerbated social divisions in Atitlan, espe-
cially between nonmigrant and migrant households that sided with the club. 
Because the HTA failed to solicit the input of the Patronato, a trusted associa-
tion in the Atitlan community, and attempted to make decisions about public 
works projects on behalf of the people of Atitlan without consultation or inclu-
sion in project deliberations, conflict ensued. Residents no longer recognized 
Emilio and Esme, and by extension members of the HTA, as members of Atitlan 
with the legitimate voice to make decisions on behalf of the town. Exclusion 
of the Patronato would not be tolerated by local residents and they decided to 
push back.
Club leaders neither engaged in meaningful repertoires of community mem-
bership after departure nor maintained bonding and bridging ties in the social 
base of the hometown that imbued them with the authority to speak on behalf 
of community residents with the mayor with regard to issues that concerned 
public life in Atitlan. Emilio and Esme did not participate in the social life of 
the community, except for a visit now and then. Other members of the HTA had 
not visited Atitlan in years. Their social base of support in the community was 
limited to a few migrant families in the town. Moreover, the migrant club did 
not attempt to forge a relationship with key stakeholders in the community (the 
Patronato) who were respected leaders of the community and who represented 
the community to the delegate and to the municipality. Whether it was inten-
tional or not, paisanos’ emails to each other and to Daniel demeaned his role as 
the leader of the Patronato, which was perceived by the residents of Atitlan as 
an affront.
The paisanos’ emails were a frequent topic of conversation and gossip in town. 
When residents finally read printouts of the emails, some residents openly said 
that Emilio could no longer be trusted. Residents were open to being contributors 
to the coproduction process, but they wanted to be included as equal partners 
in deliberations about projects in their town. Residents including Don Nel, Don 
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Juan, Angelica, Lydia, Sofia, and others could not understand why Emilio acted 
like he was the “presidente municipal” of Atitlan, when, in fact, he was their pai-
sano. Being born in Atitlan and having gone to elementary school there neither 
endowed Emilio with more voice in public decision-making nor made him better 
than the people of Atitlan.
Emilio and migrant club members enjoyed the exclusive attention of local 
 politicians. For Emilio, community inclusion meant financial contributions, not 
decision-making authority. Moreover, club members valued their direct access 
to the elected officials of Comarga and influence in decisions about town affairs. 
Many paisanos described how living in the U.S. helped them see the extent to 
which Atitlan lacked public goods. Immigrating to the U.S. revealed how deficient 
public goods provision was in Atitlan and they wanted to help make it a better place 
than they left it. But paisanos’ affective ties and altruistic goals were not apparent 
to the residents of Atitlan, especially members of the Patronato. Residents who 
said they met Emilio and talked with him when he visited town described him as 
“boastful” (presumido) and “arrogant” (arrogante) and attributed these character 
traits to attitudinal changes brought about his emigrating to the U.S.
The transnational partnership, especially the completion of the bridge project, 
elevated Emilio’s social status among the other paisanos in the club.7 Club mem-
bers heaped praise on Emilio for his “leadership in Atitlan” and his “sacrifice.” 
Emilio recognized the benefits that his cross-border participation had for his iden-
tity. He said, “Here (Atitlan) I am someone important. I have meetings with the 
mayor. I am trying to do something good. I represent the paisanos. But over there? 
In Texas? I just own a little store.” Migrants from Atitlan hoped to use their social 
mobility to do something good for a town they loved from afar. But their attempts 
to reinsert themselves as a representative voice of the community as if they had 
never left was met with resistance. Members of the club were no longer perceived 
to be part of the social base of the Atitlan community and they did not univer-
sally represent residents’ interests. Migrants did not have the authority to charge 
local residents for 3x1 coproduction projects. Atitlan residents were involved in 
their community so when they were effectively excluded from decision-making 
about projects that both affected their lives and required a financial contribution 
from them, they in turn mobilized to resist outside influence from migrants who 
were perceived as allied with the local government. Nonmigrant citizens who were 
active in the social and political life of the hometown struggled for the same access, 
attention, and influence that migrants had in their transnational partnership with 
the municipal government. When they perceived themselves to be a disadvan-
taged group in their own town, they decided to compete for equality through col-
lective action. They were galvanized to take concerted action when Club Atitlan 
“schemed” to dislodge Daniel as leader of the Patronato and replace him with the 
brother of a migrant club member.
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CLIENTELISTIC BREAKD OWN? THE C OLLECTIVE 
RESPONSE OF MOBILIZED RESIDENT S OF ATITL AN
After several weeks of transnational discord between residents and paisanos in San 
Antonio, communications between the migrant club and the Patronato ceased. 
Residents of Atitlan continued to go about daily life and were under the impres-
sion that after contributing some funds to the pavement project, they had reached 
an understanding with the paisanos that future 3x1 projects would go through a 
process of collective decision-making in which residents would be equal, active 
participants in the selection and implementation of public goods projects. 
However, this is not how Emilio and other paisanos wanted to proceed. In club 
communications and meetings in San Antonio, Emilio and the paisanos decided 
that they would continue 3x1 projects in the hometown but needed new leadership 
in the Patronato in order to move forward with public projects and use part of 
the festival funds to do so. Emilio spearheaded an effort to get Ángel, a paisano’s 
brother who farmed the family land, to run for president of the Patronato. The 
paisanos believed that once Daniel was no longer the leader of the Patronato, and 
by extension the town, and replaced with a migrant club ally, they would be able to 
complete many projects for Atitlan through the 3x1 Program and residents would 
see how important the paisanos were for the betterment of the hometown.
When Angelica, treasurer of the Patronato, heard that Ángel planned to chal-
lenge Daniel for the leadership role, she organized an informal meeting with all 
the heads of household in town with Ramon, the delegate, in attendance. Since 
Ángel had never been involved in public life before, some residents thought it was 
odd that he wanted to take on a leadership role out of the blue. And everyone liked 
the job that Daniel had done for the festival and thought he was very careful with 
the town’s money. He had become even more respected when he was attacked by 
the paisanos and stood up to them for the people of the town. The Patronato’s con-
cern was not directed at Ángel, whom residents characterized as a “puppet” (títere 
de la club), but rather at the paisanos, Emilio in particular, whom they suspected 
to be behind the scheme.
Although Angelica and other concerned residents of Atitlan did not know for 
sure, their suspicions were correct. Emilio, at the urging of club members, called 
Ángel and encouraged him to challenge Daniel for the position so that they could 
do more 3x1 projects for Atitlan with Patronato resources. He had attempted to 
circumvent Daniel, whom Emilio believed to be the main obstacle to the use of 
Patronato festival money for 3x1 projects. What Emilio and members of the club 
never fully understood throughout the entire debacle was that residents had urged 
Daniel to take the leadership position. He was a humble, popular resident of the 
town and was highly regarded. To attack Daniel felt like an attack on everyone.
Residents of Atitlan rallied behind the Patronato. Daniel told the migrant club 
that their efforts to bully the Patronato in Atitlan would no longer be tolerated. The 
residents thanked the paisanos for their support in the bridge and road pavement 
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and sidewalk project. And while the paisanos were always welcomed to attend 
the fiesta patronal, additional efforts to be involved in public affairs were no lon-
ger welcomed. After a year of contentious discussion over email and in person, 
residents believed that the municipal government and the paisanos (especially 
Emilio) had schemed together to misappropriate the residents’ Patronato funds 
for official use. Club Atitlan was informally sanctioned from participating in town 
affairs. Ángel and his family no longer came to Patronato meetings.
CASE SUMMARY
The local government privileged the support of the HTA over local residents 
because they wanted to continue participating in the 3x1 Program. They believed 
supplying public works through the matching grants program was a clever way 
to extend municipal resources in the outlying community. This strategy back-
fired and may have cost the PAN in the next election. Citizens in Atitlan banded 
together and backed the opposition PRI candidate, a move designed to punish the 
PAN incumbent for not listening to their concerns and prioritizing the interests of 
the HTA. It is difficult to know how much Atitlan’s political mobilization contrib-
uted to the PAN’s loss (PRI vote share increased 12 percent from the 2010 to 2013 
elections), but this was the goal of Atitlan voters. They wanted to punish the PAN 
party for privileging the HTA’s contributions over the townspeople’s wants and 
needs. The PAN’s vote share declined 19 percent across the municipality and the 
PRI won handedly in 2013; the margin of victory was 31 percent.
The HTA’s inability to forge meaningful bridging ties with the Patronato, a 
group of community stakeholders well regarded in Atitlan, produced a more 
corporatist coproduction partnership. Even though residents of Atitlan made 
explicit requests to be part of project deliberations, they were excluded from 
meaningful participation but for the request for financial support. Club Atitlan’s 
privileged access and alliance with the local government received the full engage-
ment of the municipality. Both PAN mayors were eager to cofinance coproduc-
tion projects through the 3x1 Program and worked hard to cultivate ties with 
the paisanos from Comarga in the U.S.8 Emilio and paisanos in the U.S. enjoyed 
the exclusive attention of elected officials that they thought elevated their social 
status in Atitlan. But the perceived alliance with municipal officials and exclusion 
of residents from meaningful involvement in the coproduction process worsened 
state-society relations between paisanos and residents and between residents and 
municipal officials.
After the election many local residents said they were “done dealing with politi-
cians” and “none of them can be trusted.” While the HTA felt connected to their 
hometown and wanted to express that attachment by supporting public goods, 
they did not expect that physical exit complicated the ability to use voice as if they 
had never left. Migrant membership status in the social collective was far more 
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complex. Without a concerted effort to build meaningful bridges to social elites 
like Daniel, Don Nel, Don Juan, and other members of the Patronato inner circle, 
paisanos’ cross-border public goods efforts made in the name of the community 
ultimately reinforced political inequalities between migrants and nonmigrants 
and introduced more distrust in the political process. As a result, the corporatist 
partnership between the HTA and the local government was short-lived and Club 
Atitlan became inactive when the PRI administration came into office. Citizens of 
Atitlan reported they were more disenchanted with municipal representatives and 
participated less in politics than before, even if their exclusion motivated short-
term political mobilization against the PAN party incumbent.
In Atitlan’s more corporatist partnership, migrants’ organized interests and 
links to a cooperative local government took precedence over competing soci-
etal interests of local residents. This arrangement produced two kinds of political 
effects. First, citizen exclusion compromised plural interest representation. In this 
context, citizens felt slighted and reacted by challenging coproduction decisions 
publicly, sanctioning the HTA, and making independent political demands on the 
state to be heard. Migrant-state corporatism in places with an active civil soci-
ety increased the political participation of locals resulting from their exclusion in 
the coproduction process. Although I am reluctant to generalize from the Atitlan 
case alone as to the local conditions whereby citizen exclusion motivated political 
participation, one possibility is that places with latent or active social capital (e.g., 
an active social institution or citizen group like the Patronato) possess the social 
network ties of trust and reciprocity that can mobilize collective action more read-
ily than places without.
Second, corporatist coproduction also caused citizens to retreat from public 
life and depressed political interest and engagement. Patterns of motivated inac-
tion are often impelled by objective circumstances—people who know they can-
not win often do not try.9 Corporatist transnational partnerships are, therefore, 
also likely to “crowd out” citizens’ interest in and ability to use democratic chan-
nels to voice their preferences for public goods. Some residents, when they are 
excluded from meaningful participation in coproduction activities and perceive 
an alliance between the HTA and local government officials, stop trying to make 
their voices heard, which creates political disenchantment in some migrant home-
town communities. Corporatist coproduction partnerships produce different and 
sometimes opposing effects on local civic and political participation. They also 
strain state-society relations depending on preexisting social and political institu-
tions in the hometown.
FORMATION OF CLUB EL MIR AD OR
Club El Mirador was a smaller, more tightly knit group than Club Atitlan. While 
they only had about six core families active in club affairs, they were a dedicated 
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and energetic group of paisanos. Core members of the club engaged in circular 
migration in the 1980s and 1990s and traveled across the border together. The pai-
sanos from El Mirador worked for the same employer year after year in Illinois 
and Indiana, saved money, and returned home for stretches before they returned 
to the U.S. Before the spouses of the group joined them in the U.S., the men lived 
together and saved their earnings in order to send more remittances home to their 
families. They were “like family.” Not only had many of the men grown up together 
and emigrated at the same time, they supported each other in the U.S. so that they 
could better support their families who remained behind in El Mirador, Comarga.
Temporary, circular migration between El Mirador and the U.S. became more 
difficult in the early 2000s when the U.S. government tightened border security in 
the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Paisanos from El Mirador without docu-
ments decided they would stay more permanently in the U.S. or risk capture at the 
border and detention by U.S. authorities. In response, Efrain, a core member of the 
club, decided it was the time to legalize. As soon as he met the residency require-
ments he naturalized and became a U.S. citizen. He then started the paperwork to 
petition for his spouse and children to join him in the U.S. While some of the men 
in the close-knit group of paisanos had acquired their green cards, others who 
migrated in the 1990s had no path to citizenship and remained undocumented in 
the U.S. For some individuals who endured longer separations from their families, 
this was too much of a psychological burden to bear. When crossing the U.S. bor-
der became too difficult and dangerous, some paisanos returned home with their 
savings and stayed in El Mirador while others settled permanently in the Midwest 
after being rejoined by family members.
In the summer of 2005, Marco, Efrain, and Placido met with the PAN mayor of 
Comarga in Chicago. The paisanos traveled from Bolingbrook, Aurora, and Gary 
to have dinner with the political officials at their invitation. Pepe and members of 
his administration came to Chicago to tell the men about the 3x1 Program, but 
the migrants needed no introduction. Efrain and Placido knew of the program 
already. The small Zacatecas municipality of Tonitlan that borders El Mirador to 
the east had a migrant club that worked with the municipal government on sev-
eral projects. The two communities were geographically and socially close. They 
shared resources (a water well) and hosted festivals together since both localities 
were the farthest away from their respective county seats. Friends in Tonitlan had 
told the paisanos about their collaborative partnership with the municipality long 
before the municipal officials met with the paisanos in the U.S.
The club from Tonitlan had recently made plans with the municipal govern-
ment to build a rodeo ring (lienzo charro) with cofinancing from state and fed-
eral governments. When Pepe invited the paisanos from El Mirador to form their 
own club, they tentatively agreed on the condition that the first collaborative proj-
ect would be a rodeo ring for El Mirador so that they could enjoy competitions 
with neighbors in Tonitlan. Charreada, a collection of events involving horseback 
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riders (charros) and cattle inside a ring similar to a rodeo, was popular in the 
region. Several families in El Mirador practiced coleadero, a charrerada event 
that involved steer tailing, but they often had to travel long distances to compete 
because El Mirador was such a remote locality. The paisanos were excited about 
the rodeo project. If Tonitlan was also building a rodeo ring, they could have com-
petitions and invite other coleadero teams to compete in El Mirador and Tonitlan. 
Comarga’s mayor was not initially keen on using public resources for recreation 
projects in El Mirador since his administration’s development plan focused more 
on security and the provision of public services. But he eventually acquiesced with 
the tacit agreement that future coproduction projects would be more focused on 
basic service provision such as water, electricity, drainage, and road pavement.
Marco, Efrain, and Placido discussed the paisano club for several weeks after 
Pepe and others from his administration returned to Comarga. The men decided 
Placido should be the president of the club and Efrain and Marco serve as the sec-
retary and treasurer, respectively. The paisanos decided that no decisions would be 
made about the club or projects without taking it to the people of El Mirador first. 
Pepe was eager to propose the coproduction project to the state validation com-
mittee in his first year of office, but Placido did not want to start any project with-
out discussing plans with the residents of El Mirador, especially return migrants 
with whom they remained in close contact. They planned to discuss the mayor’s 
3x1 proposal with residents in El Mirador over the Christmas holiday when many 
of the paisanos planned to return for a longer visit to their hometown.
THE ROLE OF C OMMUNIT Y MEMBERSHIP AND 
SO CIAL CAPITAL IN EL MIR AD OR
The people of El Mirador were a close-knit, poor community. In the rural town, 
everybody knew everybody. High up in the mountains about a 30-minute drive 
from the county seat, families in El Mirador relied on each other to solve local 
problems. Many families relied exclusively on remittances for income and those 
without migrant members abroad made ends meet growing tomatoes, beans, corn, 
and other staple crops. Many children who worked in the fields with their parents 
stopped attending school altogether after they finished their primary education.
In 2005, most streets in El Mirador were dirt roads, only half the houses had 
access to electricity, and many lacked access to indoor plumbing and sanitation. 
But the residents of El Mirador had found ways to make life a little easier by work-
ing together. The town made a collective decision that the north and south sides 
of town alternated use of the public water system every other day to make sure all 
had periodic access. Parents also took turns driving the children 30 minutes down 
the high mountain switchbacks so that they could take the bus the rest of the way 
to the secundaria. And migrant families that were dependent on remittances sup-
ported one another with extra food when money from the U.S. failed to arrive.
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This is what Placido said he missed the most when living in the U.S.: the people 
of El Mirador took care of each other even though no one had very much to give. 
Before making the difficult decision to settle permanently in the U.S. with his fam-
ily, Placido always believed he would return to El Mirador. His decision to emi-
grate was not by choice, he explained, it was by necessity. “I thought I would be 
able to make enough in a few visits to come back and have enough money to fix 
the house and invest in the land. But it is not so easy in the U.S.,” he explained, “I 
had to go back for years just to earn enough to buy land and care for my parents.” 
Placido did not like living abroad. He had serious reservations about raising his 
sons in the big city and missed small-town, rural life in his community. His fam-
ily had lived in El Mirador for many generations and were a respected family. His 
uncles helped pressure the PRI administration in the late 1970s to build a one-
room schoolhouse for the children of El Mirador, which was applauded by local 
residents. It was Placido’s hope he would eventually return and be able to retire 
in El Mirador. Working with the municipal government was one way to help the 
people of El Mirador have a better life, which he reasoned would make the town a 
nice enough place that his sons might eventually return with him one day so long 
as economic conditions improved in Mexico.
During the Christmas holiday Efrain visited El Mirador. Efrain was the only 
migrant in Club El Mirador who had acquired a green card and could cross the 
U.S. border to visit the hometown without a serious hardship. From the U.S., the 
paisanos reached out to their families and friends and coordinated a day and time 
for the people of the town to meet and discuss the migrant club with Efrain. It was 
important, Placido recalls, for Francisco, a former migrant and local farmer, to 
be present at the meeting. Placido and Francisco migrated together and worked 
alongside each other for years. They stayed close friends even after Francisco 
returned to El Mirador. Unhappy in the U.S., Francisco returned to live with his 
family despite the continued difficulty making money selling crops in the region. 
Francisco said, “I never liked living in the U.S. It is just too different for me. I am a 
rural farm boy and so was my father. I had to come back.”
Francisco was admired in El Mirador. He used his migration experience to help 
young men find a respected smuggler to cross the border and used his connections 
to help people find work even though he tried to dissuade many from leaving. He 
and his wife also checked in on migrant families to make sure they were doing all 
right. Francisco had become a leader in El Mirador even though he never thought 
of himself that way. Placido knew this and thought very highly of Francisco. If the 
town was going to have a migrant club that worked with the local government to 
provide public goods projects, everyone agreed that Francisco should be involved 
every step of the way.
Francisco was initially suspicious of the government’s motives and questioned 
why migrants should be paying for public projects. But other paisanos in town 
for the holiday meeting with Efrain were more willing to give the partnership a 
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chance. Augustin, a local farmer, recalled telling his neighbors that they should 
hear what the mayor could do for El Mirador using the 3x1 Program and only 
make a decision after they heard what he had to say. Augustin was also familiar 
with the public projects completed in nearby Tonitlan with paisanos through the 
3x1 Program and was curious what good could be brought to El Mirador through 
the same channels.
In the meeting, the residents agreed to support the migrant club and copro-
duction projects with municipal officials. They also decided to create a public 
works committee that was a local extension of Club El Mirador. The townspeople 
in attendance overwhelming supported Francisco to lead the committee with a 
few other volunteers. At the meeting and after further discussions throughout 
the holiday season, Club El Mirador and the newly formed Comite pro Obras 
alerted the mayor’s office that they would propose the rodeo ring project to the 
3x1 Program, register the migrant club, and begin fundraising their share of proj-
ect costs in the U.S.
While Club El Mirador had only a few dedicated, core members, the network 
of migrants from Comarga and El Mirador was extensive. Paisanos from nearby 
Tonitlan also supported the club by attending their fundraising events in Chicago. 
Club Tonitlan was an older association and a member of the Zacatecan federation 
of migrant clubs in Chicago. They shared information with Efrain, Marco, and 
Placido about how other clubs successfully raised money, and Club El Mirador 
used the events of those clubs as a model. Club El Mirador’s fundraising events 
in the U.S. started small, but eventually became grand affairs with paisanos from 
Comarga and beyond in attendance. The club hosted picnics with live music, held 
raffles, and took donations from attendees. And together with Club Tonitlan and 
other clubs in the Zacatecan federation they hosted fundraising charreada events 
in the U.S. using ticket and foods sales for coproduction projects. The dense net-
works of migrants from the region in the Chicagoland area and Club El Mirador’s 
relationship with older, experienced clubs helped the club raise significant 
resources for El Mirador.
Placido and Club El Mirador quickly raised the 25 percent contribution for the 
first project and much more in the first few fundraising events. With Francisco 
leading the public works committee in El Mirador they held local meetings and 
visited the households in the town. They asked residents what kind of projects 
they would like to see the committee and the migrants propose to the municipal 
administration. By the following summer, they had drafted a list of several copro-
duction projects to work on in coordination with municipal government officials 
and the 3x1 Program.
Francisco increasingly served as the point of contact for the migrant club and 
the public works committee to the municipal government. While he initially had 
reservations about the partnership, he soon developed a relationship with Pepe 
and other members of his administration, especially the communications director 
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and the director of public works. When he was in the county seat, he would stop 
in to the municipal government building (ayuntamiento) and check in on time-
lines, budgets, hiring labor, and materials for different 3x1 projects. Francisco then 
convened with other members of the public works committee and they made deci-
sions together. When it was possible, they called Placido and other members of 
the migrant club on cell phones and everyone discussed coproduction projects 
together in the U.S. and Mexico on speakerphone.
In the coproduction partnership between Club El Mirador, Comarga’s munici-
pal administration, and the local public works committee, the partners completed 
several projects during Pepe’s administration. Through the 3x1 Program and effec-
tive coordination between residents, paisanos, and government officials they built 
a rodeo ring, and recreation court, paved roads, and erected streetlights through 
the central part of town. When Mayor Antonio took office in 2007 the partnership 
continued through the municipal transition. Antonio said:
The club in El Mirador is so easy to work with. I told the paisanos in Atitlan to call 
Placido and ask what they are doing up there [in the mountains] because, honestly, 
they tell me what projects they want and then they work with the directors [of social 
development and public works] and do everything down here. The trouble I have 
with them is telling them “no” . . . We can’t do so many projects because the other 
localities need attention too.
From the perspective of the municipal government, working on coproduction 
projects in El Mirador was efficient and effective.
While the mayor could not identify what about the partnership was “easier” 
than the partnership with paisanos in Atitlan, the answer was community inclu-
sion in the coproduction process. Paisanos from El Mirador were still socially 
embedded in El Mirador and drew on their extensive bonding and bridging ties to 
include residents in all coproduction decisions to the extent that residents wanted 
to be involved. For many residents I spoke with, the transnational partnership was 
welcomed, but they did not have the time to participate. They were happy to have 
Francisco, the public works committee, and the paisanos make decisions on behalf 
of them because they were seen as members of the El Mirador community. In 
short, they were trusted to speak on behalf of the community residents.
The municipal government of Comarga identified the 3x1 Program as a way to 
expand their budget and provide public goods and services to localities in Comarga 
with high emigration. Pepe’s PAN administration sought out the partnership with 
paisanos in the U.S. and helped create the clubs in 2005. Both PAN administra-
tions brought the same level of engagement to the coproduction partnerships in 
Atitlan and El Mirador. In El Mirador, political officials provided technical plan-
ning, financial contributions, materials, labor, and contractors to support imple-
mentation of the vehicle bridge, rodeo ring, public lighting, and road pavement 
coproduction projects. The provision of public goods through coproduction and 
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complementary financing from state and federal 3x1 Program partners became an 
effective strategy, the administration surmised, for public spending on local infra-
structure. They wanted the transnational partnership with all the migrant groups 
to work. And in the increasingly competitive municipal elections in which the 
PRI gained electoral ground, capturing the support of citizens in traditional PAN 
strongholds by improving public infrastructure in their communities was a politi-
cal strategy for victory.
CASE C OMPARISON:  KEY ROLE OF MIGR ANT SO CIAL 
EMBEDDEDNESS
As the two cases show, transnational partnerships were organized differently 
in two communities in the same municipality. In Atitlan, the social base of the 
migrant network was limited to a few migrant families connected to the club. 
Club Atitlan lacked social ties to key stakeholders in the community and excluded 
the Patronato from the selection, planning, and implementation of 3x1 projects. 
They valued the Patronato only for the resources they maintained on behalf of 
the town. By contrast, in El Mirador, paisanos had a more extensive social base of 
support and included residents in the coproduction process. The involvement of 
Francisco, a key bridging tie to several households throughout the town, scaled 
up the participation of other residents and signaled to them that the transnational 
partnership reflected their interests and needs. Unlike Emilio, who represented 
the migrant club to the residents of Atitlan but did not participate in the social 
life of the hometown, paisanos from El Mirador practiced cultural repertoires 
and were more visible in the social life of their hometown even after they had 
emigrated abroad.
During the summers, Placido’s children lived with their grandparents in El 
Mirador and traveled with Efrain when he visited for charreada events. The mem-
bers of Marco’s family who remained behind were neighbors of Augustin’s, and 
Augustin volunteered for the public works committee after Marco encouraged 
him to do so. The active recruitment of Francisco, a leader in El Mirador and 
former migrant, and the maintenance of social solidarity through bonding and 
bridging ties in the hometown community explained why residents were more 
included in the coproduction process.
Club Atitlan’s insistence that residents contribute financial resources for the 
street pavement project was rejected by the townspeople. They were willing and 
eager to contribute to the bridge project because they had a strong preference for it 
and had proposed the project to municipal officials across several different admin-
istrations. When the mayor supported Club Atitlan’s decision to demand collec-
tion of complementary resources from the townspeople, residents perceived his 
support of the club in a negative light and thought the administration was out of 
touch with the needs of Atitlenses. The municipal administration went along with 
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the club leader’s demand because he did not want to jeopardize the transnational 
partnership, but he was either unaware of the social cost of the alliance with the 
paisano club or did not anticipate it would lead to a worsening of state-society rela-
tions and political opposition to the administration. Moreover, the club’s decision 
to speak on behalf of the community in coproduction decisions without mutual 
recognition from hometown residents of their continued membership resulted in 
consternation and contestation in Atitlan.
The more synergetic partnership in El Mirador characterized by community 
inclusion and government engagement produced different social and political 
consequences than in Atitlan. The active involvement of residents in coproduction 
routinized interactions with political officials. Citizens of El Mirador started to 
believe that they could accomplish something by working together with the local 
government and the paisanos. Personal political efficacy was improved through 
the participation in the transnational partnership. Residents began to value 
democratic engagement because they witnessed firsthand how citizens’ quality 
of life was improved through participatory action. Municipal officials visited El 
Mirador to prepare technical plans for projects and workers hired by the govern-
ment showed up on time. Projects that the public works committee and Club El 
Mirador proposed to the government were completed in the town. Citizens were 
more empowered and checked the budget, observed the arrival of physical materi-
als according to a predetermined timeline, and monitored workers to ensure qual-
ity and completion. When materials did not arrive on schedule, residents in El 
Mirador visited the ayuntamiento and let the officials know. On occasion, some 
residents volunteered their own labor to help the municipal contractors.
In short, the involvement of local residents produced more participatory action 
including the deliberation in project selection, information exchange, and more 
regular interactions between elected officials and ordinary citizens. And while 
occasionally citizens and officials did not agree and miscommunications occurred, 
both residents and citizens valued the partnership and recognized the benefits of 
negotiation. Municipal officials, for example, acknowledged the administration 
had to make concessions. Pepe explained:
We let them tell us what they need and we do it. Enrique [director of public works] 
and I can’t use the whole budget in El Mirador because we have other localities, but 
we know Francisco and other people in the town well enough now that we can say, 
okay, this time we do this, but next time about how this project. Like with the water. 
We really need to extend the town’s access to water, but that is a big project. The citi-
zens wanted smaller projects first and then we decided to tackle the big water project 
in several phases.
The nature of the migrant social base in each town in the same municipality shaped 
the organization of the partnership and the corresponding changes in democratic 
participation and state-society relations.
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SUMMARY
Not all coproduction partnerships are organized such that many local citizens 
are included in the process or the local government is fully engaged. When one 
of these two organizing factors is variable, transnational partnerships are more 
likely to approximate fragmented or corporatist coproduction. In these two orga-
nizational forms, low citizen involvement based on weak social ties to migrant 
members of hometown clubs depresses the representativeness of local interests in 
public goods provision.
Coproduction partnerships in El Mirador and Atitlan in Comarga, Jalisco, were 
organized differently even though both clubs were created with the encourage-
ment and support of the municipal PAN government. The difference in the nature 
of the partnership in the two communities can be traced to differences in the 
degree to which migrants remained embedded in the social base of the hometown. 
In El Mirador, migrants maintained more extensive bonding and bridging ties in 
the hometown and were inclusive of local residence participation in most aspects 
of coproduction project planning and implementation. As such, citizens worked 
closely with political officials and interactions between state and society in El 
Mirador became more routinized and productive. Citizens became more involved 
in everyday affairs of El Mirador and worked collaboratively with the local govern-
ment to identify and execute public goods projects that improved local residents’ 
quality of life. In turn, the responsiveness of elected officials to their constituents 
in a remote locality where residents seldom encountered, much less worked along-
side, public officials in decision-making concerning public works also improved as 
a result of the synergy created by transnational coproduction.
By contrast, migrants from Atitlan were not well integrated into the social base 
of their hometown community after departure. They did not take steps to forge 
bridging ties with key stakeholders in the community even after community leaders 
requested to be more meaningfully involved in the coproduction process. Worried 
that they would alienate the paisanos from future 3x1 projects, the municipal gov-
ernment allied themselves with Club Atitlan, which further alienated citizens from 
coproduction. Despite short-term political mobilization in reaction to exclusion 
from coproduction to punish the incumbent political party, citizens’ political inter-
est and engagement in Atitlan declined. More corporatist coproduction in which 
migrant clubs’ preferences for public goods were aligned with local government 
interests crowded out citizen engagement.
In cases like Atitlan, citizen exclusion from coproduction reinforced social and 
political inequalities in the hometown based on social mobility acquired through 
international migration. When paisanos positioned themselves as more knowl-
edgeable and capable of making decisions on behalf of a town in which they no 
longer physically resided, this further created social division between residents and 
emigrants. Residents did not believe that the migratory experience had elevated 
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the social status of the paisanos and they resented the implication that because 
they stayed in Atitlan they were more backward and incapable of selecting and 
advocating for projects that improved their quality of life.
Analyzing the dynamics and organizational variation of transnational copro-
duction partnerships through case studies illuminates how migrant HTAs’ mobi-
lization of collective remittances for hometown development has important 
spillover effects for democratic governance and participation. My chief purpose 
is to draw attention to the ways in which coproduction is configured and how dif-
ferent organizational forms of coproduction correspond to political outcomes in 
places with emigration. In doing so, I trace how community inclusion and govern-
ment engagement interact at different levels to determine synergetic, corporatist, 
fragmented, and substitutive coproduction types. Through the cases I show how 
the organization of types changes as the social and political context in hometowns 
shape and are shaped by migrant-state interactions.
In the next chapter, I turn to a more systematic assessment of how transnational 
partnerships affect democratic governance and examine how generalizable the 
findings are across all municipalities and within only those cases that have part-
nerships. Using original survey data, longitudinal survey data from the Mexican 
Family Life Survey, and panel data on all Mexican municipalities from 1990 to 
2013, I show how cumulative participation in transnational partnerships through 
the 3x1 Program leads to substantial effects on citizen engagement in formal and 
informal politics and government responsiveness.
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Systematic Effects of Transnational 
Partnerships on Local Governance
In many decentralized democracies like Mexico, migrant social actors step in to 
supply public goods when the state lacks sufficient resources or the political will 
to do so on its own. Migrants’ cross-border investment often improves citizens’ 
access to essential goods such as drinking water, paved roads, and bridges, but 
the process of coordinating service provision also produces significant political 
consequences in the near and long term. I argue in chapter 1 that when transna-
tional partnerships include residents and local government is engaged, it creates a 
synergetic partnership. Synergetic partnerships produce new participatory spaces 
in which residents, migrants, and elected representatives interact, deliberate, and 
negotiate policy decisions about public goods provision. In this new participatory 
sphere, state and society become entwined, improving government responsive-
ness and citizens’ interest and engagement in civic and political activities. When 
the two main factors combine differently, corporatist, substitutive, and fragmented 
partnerships are more likely to emerge and have different consequences.
In the previous three chapters, I trace the political and social processes that 
organize partnership differently and link types to political effects. The political 
consequences include worsening of state-society relations, political disenchant-
ment, corruption, and offloading of responsibility for public goods onto migrant 
clubs. I also show how partnership types change when social interactions between 
migrants, residents, and political officials change over time, especially during peri-
ods of political party transition in local office. But how well does the theory hold 
up at meso and macro levels of empirical scrutiny? Are transnational partnerships 
organized into the types hypothesized in a representative set of cases? Are different 
types of partnerships associated with changes in political and civic participation 
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and government responsiveness? More generally, how systematic are the political 
effects of different transnational partnerships across places that have them and 
compared to all Mexican municipalities?
In this chapter, I examine these questions at two levels of aggregation using 
multiple data sources and statistical analyses. First, using original survey data of 
a representative sample of migrant-state partnerships, I examine how partner-
ships are organized. I use principal component and cluster analysis to observe 
whether partnership types are associated with different political effects in origin 
communities. In this part of the analysis, I focus on short-term effects given the 
cross-sectional nature of the survey data. This data represents only a snapshot in 
time for each partnership. The before-and-after effects focus on the most recent 
projects and immediate political outcomes. I find that in synergetic and corporat-
ist partnerships, government spending on public works increases, but the duration 
of the spending increases depends on the level of community inclusion. In substi-
tutive partnerships, the share of government spending on public goods decreases 
and local citizens become disenchanted with local politics as they become less 
likely to participate in local elections the longer that such partnerships continue. 
Fragmented partnerships are more likely to be associated with partnership failure 
and a worsening of public opinions of government performance.
Next, using panel and longitudinal data from the Mexican Family Life Survey 
(MxFLS), I examine whether transnational partnerships, regardless of organiza-
tional type, change the incidence and frequency of civic and political engagement 
at the local level. I operationalize civic engagement as local citizen participation in 
civic associations of varying sorts (social, political, religious) and political engage-
ment as participation in municipal elections. The panel data does not permit the 
evaluation of how organizational types affect civic and political engagement in the 
universe of municipal cases of 3x1 participation due to a lack of information on 
community inclusion and government engagement. To address this data limita-
tion, I move beyond a cross-section of partnerships surveyed at one point in time 
and investigate how cumulative participation in the program and the frequency of 
public goods projects affects local governance using panel data. With the addition 
of a longer observation window from 1990 to 2013 and data on civic engagement 
from 2000–13 provided by the MxFLS, I can more clearly address how preexisting 
histories of political and civic participation affect transnational partnerships and, 
in turn, how those partnerships affect political and civic participation and govern-
ment responsiveness at the municipal level.
The addition of the MxFLS longitudinal data provides a fruitful opportu-
nity to examine changes in the incidence, type, and frequency of community 
civic engagement while holding all other factors constant. I find that in places in 
which partnerships approximate synergy and substitution, the habitual engage-
ment of municipalities in transnational partnerships are associated with more 
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citizens participating in municipal elections and civic associations. Overall, in 
synergetic and substitutive partnerships civic and political participation increases. 
Additionally, findings reveal that municipalities that participate in the 3x1 Program 
are more likely to consistently devote more budgetary resources to programmatic 
spending. The increase in government social spending in response to transna-
tional partnerships signals improvements in government responsiveness in the 
realm of public goods provision. Taken together, results suggest that more fre-
quent and consistent coproduction activities that bring residents, migrants, and 
political officials into more routine contact increase civic and political engage-
ment and government responsiveness in local democratic governance. This find-
ing lends further support to the social learning hypothesis I advance in chapter 1.
SURVEYING MEXICAN TR ANSNATIONAL 
PARTNERSHIPS
Most research on Mexican migrant hometown associations in the United States is 
based on qualitative interviews with select clubs and ethnography in communi-
ties of origin.1 In the Mexican context, case-based research has primarily exam-
ined HTAs from the traditional sending states of Michoacán, Zacatecas, Jalisco, 
and Puebla and to a lesser extent the southern indigenous states of Oaxaca and 
Chiapas.2 There are two surveys that examine a larger cross-section of migrant 
HTAs.3 While these surveys enrich our understanding of migrant clubs even more, 
they lack representativeness because they are isolated to geographic areas of the 
U.S. and are limited because they do not ask about the structure of transnational 
partnerships with sending-state governments. Given the lack of systematic data, I 
developed a national original survey instrument and disseminated it to all regis-
tered leaders of Mexican HTAs in the U.S. in the fall of 2008.
The survey questionnaire includes a combination of multiple-choice, open 
answer, and rank order questions written in Spanish and asks about club for-
mation, goals, and structure, leadership and membership characteristics, trans-
national partnerships, and 3x1 Program participation, among other themes. The 
questionnaire was informed by 30 interviews with migrant club leadership in Los 
Angeles, San Diego, Chicago, Indiana, and North Carolina. Of the 800 associa-
tions that self-identified as hometown clubs and registered their clubs with the 
Mexican government in 2008, 500 listed up-to-date contact information and 
were sent a paper survey through the U.S. Postal Service. With support from the 
University of Chicago Survey Lab, surveys were collected and coded through July 
2009 with a 50 percent response rate (n = 250).4 I describe additional details about 
the transnational survey instrument and sampling strategy in Data Appendix B.
Since migrant clubs are located in the U.S. but provide public goods in their 
hometowns in Mexico, I also collected data that characterizes migrant sending 
and destination places. Taken together, this data creates a transnational statistical 
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profile for each club respondent in the survey sample. To my knowledge, this is the 
first survey to incorporate destination and origin place characteristics in a trans-
national research design. For each migrant HTA respondent, I compiled sociode-
mographic and political data for each side of the transnational dyad between 
destination city and state and origin municipality and state. Data was collected 
from the American Communities Survey (ACS), Mexican Census (CONAPO), 
National Institute of Statistic and Geography (INEGI), and Center of Research 
for Development (CIDAC). This step allows me to assess whether features of the 
origin and destination also affect partnership dynamics.
I use a three-pronged approach to examine how well survey respondents’ trans-
national partnerships with the Mexican sending state reflect different organiza-
tion types—synergetic, corporatist, substitutive, and fragmented partnerships. In 
the first stage, I use transnational survey data to construct a composite index of 
community inclusion and government engagement, the two multidimensional 
factors—I hypothesize—that organize coproduction partnerships and whose 
combination determines political outcomes. This data provides a window into fac-
tors that may affect coproduction partnerships at home and abroad as well as char-
acteristics of the HTA. I use principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce highly 
correlated variables reflective of the multiple dimensions of community inclusion 
and government engagement. I also develop an indicator for migrant club capacity 
and examine whether club structure, membership size, and leadership character-
istics, for example, are associated with levels of community inclusion and govern-
ment engagement.
In the second stage, I use the indicators for inclusion, engagement, and club 
capacity, among other sociodemographic and political characteristics, in a clus-
ter analysis and observe how configurations of all these multiple attributes group 
together to form groups or clusters of migrant partnerships. In the final stage of 
the survey analysis, I conduct multivariate statistical analyses to understand how 
partnership types affect civic and political participation and government respon-
siveness in the short term. Data Appendix C presents more detailed information 
on PCA and cluster analysis and Data Appendix D provides more information on 
the panel analysis.
C OMMUNIT Y INCLUSION AND GOVERNMENT 
ENGAGEMENT
The survey asks questions about how migrant clubs integrate local citizens into 
the coproduction process with the Mexican government. The questions asked 
migrant clubs how often local citizens in the hometown: (1) volunteered labor; 
(2) helped select projects; (3) donated resources (monetary or in-kind); (4) moni-
tored projects during and after implementation; (5) discussed project-related 
activities with municipal officials (i.e., hiring laborers and contractors, timelines, 
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technical plans); (6) participated in local committees or mirror clubs (clubes espejo); 
(7) were involved in the creation of the HTA; and the extent to which (8) the 
HTA perceived problems working with local citizens and citizen groups; and 
(9) whether other social, religious, business, and civic associations were involved 
in the provision of public goods with the HTA. Together, these questions comprise 
the index for community inclusion created using PCA.
With a combination of survey questions and 3x1 Program data I also construct 
an index for government engagement. Since sometimes more than one HTA par-
ticipates in coproduction in a given year, each survey respondent’s club name 
was matched against the 3x1 Program dataset and only the corresponding club 
information was extracted. Survey questions used to approximate government 
engagement included questions about municipal government involvement in and 
frequency of (1) selecting projects; (2) creating the migrant club; (3) providing 
matching funds and project materials in a timely manner; (4) problems working 
with the municipal government; (5) matching 25 percent or more of total project 
costs; and (6) failure to successfully complete coproduction projects.5 The survey 
also asked whether the HTA respondent was able to (7) access officials; (8) partici-
pate in decision-making; and (9) influence negotiations with municipal officials.
A few factors are consistently associated with more community involvement 
in transnational partnerships. First, the mayor’s political party affiliation is an 
important factor. Both the PRI and PAN are more likely to be the municipal 
party in power in places characterized by high levels of community involvement 
in transnational public goods projects. Second, community inclusion increases 
as more projects are designated for localities outside the county seat. This sug-
gests that inclusion is more likely in places with less population density and 
therefore a smaller social base to mobilize collective action.6 Third, places in 
which religious organizations have been actively involved in providing social 
welfare are more likely to have higher levels of community involvement. The 
role of churches both in providing social welfare to the community and in the 
formation of HTAs has been documented in other studies of migrant HTAs and 
is further supported by the survey findings.7 An active church association and 
affiliate groups are important preexisting social factors associated with com-
munity inclusion. Finally, a higher level of migrant club capacity is positively 
associated with community inclusion. Clubs with a larger membership base, 
resources, regular meetings and formal organizational structure, membership 
in a state-level federation of clubs, and leadership skills are likely to be more 
inclusive of local residents in transnational partnerships. I discuss migrant club 
capacity in more depth in the next section.
There are a few important attributes of municipalities that have higher levels of 
government engagement in coproduction partnerships. Consistent with hypoth-
eses presented in chapter 1, municipalities that have fewer fiscal constraints and 
therefore more budgetary capacity to invest public resources in coproduction are 
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more likely to have higher levels on the government engagement index. I also 
posit that political officials facing more competition from opposition parties in 
local elections are likely to engage in transnational partnerships; however, nei-
ther the closeness of elections nor party fragmentation is associated with govern-
ment engagement. Rather, years since the PRI was in power is highly correlated 
with government engagement. Municipal officeholders in places that have only 
recently transitioned to democracy—meaning an opposition party (PAN, PRD, 
Green, Worker, or alliance party, for example) has only recently won a municipal 
election—are likely to be more engaged in partnerships. This suggests that munici-
palities in which an opposition party has a shorter institutional memory and expe-
rience governing in local office are more likely to engage in partnerships. One 
interpretation of this finding is that transnational partnerships with migrants help 
to expand the incumbent party’s electoral base of support in places in which the 
PRI has a long-standing foothold in the municipality. Municipalities with higher 
levels of government engagement are also those with higher levels of international 
migration, lower levels of poverty, larger populations, more citizen turnout in local 
elections, and migrant clubs that have high levels of club capacity. Places in which 
the local government is more highly engaged are no more likely to be associated 
with a particular political party nor are they associated with any particular charac-
teristics of the U.S. destination.
MIGR ANT HOMETOWN ASSO CIATION CAPACIT Y TO 
C OPRODUCE PUBLIC GO ODS
During interviews with migrant club leaders that informed the survey question-
naire, several leaders remarked that being in a U.S. city where there are many 
immigrants, other hometown clubs, and state-level federations of migrant clubs 
created a network of people to converse with, exchange information, and com-
pare experiences about cross-border partnerships and club activities. In follow-up 
discussions with migrant club leaders who participated in the survey, and inter-
views with 3x1 officials in the U.S. and Mexico, several people explained to me 
that migrants learned tips on how to organize their clubs from training programs 
administered by the Mexican consulate and in discussions with other migrant club 
leaders in nearby municipalities to their hometowns in Mexico. For example, club 
leaders learned how to structure their club, employ methods for making decisions, 
develop a mission statement and bylaws, collect dues, and fundraise. Information 
shared between migrants and Mexican state officials in the U.S. and Mexico proved 
to be an important factor in how clubs set up and ran their associations and coor-
dinated projects in their respective hometowns.
Given the number of clubs that described the importance of club capac-
ity to their partnerships and evidence in the previous analysis that indicators of 
club capacity highly correlate with both community inclusion and government 
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engagement, I also construct on indicator of club capacity using PCA. Several 
survey questions ask HTAs about club leadership characteristics, organizational 
structure and decision-making, membership characteristics, and club activities.
I have found a few factors that are associated with club capacity. First, not sur-
prisingly, U.S. cities with a larger Mexican foreign-born population are more likely 
to have clubs with higher levels of club capacity. Second, clubs that have previous 
experience providing public goods projects in the hometown, independent of the 
Mexican sending state and the 3x1 Program, are associated with higher levels of 
club capacity. Third, clubs that have participated in the 3x1 Program for several 
years (prior to the year they took the survey) have higher club capacity scores. 
Finally, survey respondents that report mimicking some aspects of other HTAs’ 
organizational structure and decision-making also have higher capacity scores. 
Taken together, this evidence suggest more support for the social learning hypoth-
esis, or organizational isomorphism, at the migrant club level. Organizational iso-
morphism means that migrant clubs may become similarly structured to other 
clubs resulting from imitation or development under similar conditions or con-
straints. Clubs that have the opportunity to learn from each other and adopt best 
practices are able to improve their capacity to provide public goods and collab-
orate with state and local partners more effectively. Migrant club capacity is an 
important determinate of higher levels of community inclusion and government 
engagement and must be accounted for in the multivariate analysis accordingly. 
Place-based characteristics such as the density of the Mexican immigrant popula-
tion in the destination city and concentration of other hometown clubs are impor-
tant indicators of clubs with higher capacity.
Many club leaders also described how they struggled to retain members’ 
interest in club activities, which required extensive energy and time. The case of 
Ahuacatl illustrates this sentiment. Migrant leaders described having to frequently 
plead (some used the word “harass”) paisanos to donate resources and take part 
in the planning and execution of transnational projects. In fact, in several follow-
up phone calls, migrant club leaders asked me if I could share information about 
how other clubs who took the survey ran their associations so that they could 
learn how to retain membership involvement and better navigate the difficult pro-
cess of coordinating public goods projects across national borders.8 Many club 
leaders told me they were frustrated trying to rally the support of paisanos in the 
U.S. or were becoming aggravated working with political officials in Mexico. Many 
leaders also shared that they felt isolated in more rural U.S. destinations. Leaders 
lamented how they wished they were in closer proximity to metropolitan cities 
like Los Angeles, Chicago, Atlanta, Dallas, Houston, and San Jose so that they 
could be closer to other migrant clubs and participate in state-level HTA federa-
tions. That being said, for some clubs, a high level of club capacity was achievable 
in new destination areas and with a smaller core group of families or club leader-
ship in lieu of a large paisano membership organization. A dedicated membership 
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base was more feasible, some leaders reported, when they also had strong support 
from local residents and political officials back in the hometown. Developing and 
maintaining a strong network of paisano support in the U.S., which was key to 
determining high levels of club capacity, was partially dependent on preexisting 
community inclusion and government engagement suggesting a feedback effect or 
an endogenous relationship.
The results of the cluster analysis and interview data confirmed feedback effects 
inherent in transnational partnerships like those described above. Migrant clubs 
with high club capacity were not necessarily those that were more socially embed-
ded in the community and therefore more likely to include residents in the copro-
duction process. Nor were they necessarily the clubs that motivated political actors 
to engage in partnerships and complete their obligations. This is consistent with 
evidence in the case of Santa Catarina. But clubs that drew on the social resources 
in the social base of the hometown were able to overcome club capacity issues and 
learned new ways to encourage members to become more interested in club activi-
ties. Moreover, clubs learned about the benefits of community inclusion when they 
exchanged information with other clubs. Clubs that did not recruit local residents 
into the coproduction process implemented new outreach activities in the home-
town when other club leaders described to them the value of local resident par-
ticipation. Information sharing across migrant clubs both influenced the level of 
HTA capacity and had feedback effects on community inclusion and engagement.
Finally, analysis of the structure of migrant clubs revealed that despite many 
migrants’ best intentions and recruitment efforts, sometimes local residents did 
not want to engage in coproduction with migrant and state actors. While the mul-
tivariate analysis did not reveal that poverty or political histories were system-
atically associated with community inclusion, it is quite likely that long histories 
of distrust in political officials, especially in authoritarian enclaves, and places in 
which residents have fewer resources, skills, and time to participate in projects 
contribute to low levels of community inclusion despite a migrant club that has a 
higher capacity for public goods provision.
The case of Club Jilotepec from the state of Mexico and located in San Jose, 
California, supports this interpretation of the data. The club formed in 2008 with 
only a few members and grew to 30 active members and over 100 extended mem-
bers over the span of a calendar year. They fundraised through picnics and raffles 
and had the support of a large migrant network in San Jose. The club held regu-
lar meetings and most of the leadership had lawful permanent residency status 
(green card holders), which allowed them to visit the hometown at least once a 
year, sometimes more. Despite strong bonding ties to many migrant families in 
their hometown of 895 residents and consistent efforts to recruit residents into 
the partnership, club leaders explained that locals remained uninterested in their 
club activities. Migrants suggested that local residents were too politically apa-
thetic to participate in any activities that involve the local PRI government, which 
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was perceived to be too untrustworthy to partner with on coproduction projects. 
For Club Jilotepec, this was frustrating because they recognized that a lack of com-
munity involvement—that is, a lack of more “eyes and ears” on the ground—made 
them vulnerable to unscrupulous political officials. Since we spoke in 2009, com-
munity residents were content to be the beneficiaries of completed projects but 
remained uninvolved in the transnational partnership despite migrant club mem-
bers’ active efforts to recruit them into coproduction activities.
Community inclusion, government engagement, and club capacity are impor-
tant factors involved in the organization of transnational partnerships in migrant 
hometown communities. But do the key factors analyzed in the case studies and 
survey combine to create stable transnational partnership types consistent with 
the framework presented in chapter 1?
IDENTIFYING T YPES OF TR ANSNATIONAL 
PARTNERSHIP USING SURVEY DATA
I use cluster analysis to identify different clusters or “types” of transnational 
partnership using the original survey data. With this method, I differentiate and 
compare partnership types and examine the set of characteristics that are more 
associated with each type or cluster. Overall, the cluster analysis confirms that 
partnerships vary according to combinations of different levels of community 
inclusion and government engagement while holding migrant club capacity con-
stant. Including sociodemographic and political characteristics of origin and des-
tination, I consistently observe the formation of four stable partnership clusters: 
synergy (high community inclusion / high government engagement), corporat-
ist (low community inclusion / high government engagement), substitutive (high 
community inclusion / low government engagement), and fragmented (low com-
munity inclusion / low government engagement).9
Additionally, since we learn in the previous analysis that migrant club capac-
ity is an important attribute of both government engagement and community 
inclusion, I also relax the assumption that club capacity is constant and include 
the club capacity index as an additional variable in the cluster analysis. The 
objective here is to observe whether club capacity has an independent effect on 
how coproduction partnerships group together. When I include the index for 
club capacity (resources, leadership characteristics, organizational structure, 
membership size), an additional partnership type emerges along with synergetic, 
corporatist, substitutive, and fragmented partnerships. In this additional cluster, 
clubs with more capacity but low levels of community inclusion and government 
engagement form an additional, stable partnership type. I refer to this type of 
partnership as apex partnerships since migrant clubs complete the lion’s share of 
project coordination with minimal support from residents and political officials 
in their hometowns.
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Cluster analysis, while underutilized in sociological studies of international 
migration, gives me an opportunity to externally validate my claim that migrant-
state partnerships organizationally vary beyond the small number of cases I exam-
ine in the field. This additional methodological step provides more compelling 
evidence that transnational coproduction partnership types are more likely to be 
associated with different political consequences. Moreover, informed by the inter-
view data with migrant club leaders, I also had reason to suspect that levels of club 
capacity would affect partnership dynamics. The combination of inductive and 
deductive reasoning pushed me to analyze the role of capacity in the organization 
of partnerships. As a result, an additional hybrid partnership form emerged from 
the empirical data whose political consequences could also be analyzed along with 
the four main coproduction types that I originally theorized.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND 
GOVERNMENT SPENDING BEFORE AND AFTER 
TR ANSNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS
The cluster analysis consistently reveals four partnership types: 55 cases of syner-
getic partnership, 69 cases of fragmented partnership, 51 cases of substitutive part-
nership, and 38 cases of corporatist partnership. Of the 250 club respondents, 37 
were in places with usos y costumbres for which no political outcomes were avail-
able for analysis. For the 213 partnerships cases for which complete data is available, 
I use multivariate regression and assess the change in how many local citizens of 
voting age took part in municipal elections and the change in government spending 
on public works before and after the transnational partnerships, holding all other 
factors constant. Voter turnout and government social spending represent two key 
indicators of local democratic participation and government responsiveness.10 I 
also assess how partnerships affect civic and political participation using survey 
questions and data from the MxFLS. Data Appendix D contains more detailed 
information about model specifications, explanatory variables, and controls.
SYNERGETIC PARTNERSHIPS
In one group of partnerships, clubs had higher levels of community inclusion and 
government engagement consistent with the synergetic type of coproduction. In 
these partnerships, residents in the hometown were more frequently involved in 
volunteering labor, selecting projects, donating resources or labor, monitoring 
project implementation and upkeep, and discussing project activities with munici-
pal officials. Residents were also regularly involved in issues such as hiring labor-
ers and contractors for projects, timelines for completion, technical plans, and 
local committees or mirror clubs. The local government was also more likely to 
engage in selecting projects, providing the requisite matching funds in full and in 
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a timely manner, and completing projects according to the timeline when migrant 
clubs had more frequent access to and negotiating leverage with political officials. 
Results also reveal that synergetic partnerships were those in which the municipal 
government had more local-state capacity and were also more likely to be charac-
terized by medium levels of international migration and poverty. Synergetic part-
nerships were no more likely to be associated with a particular political party of 
the incumbent.
In the 55 cases that approximate synergetic partnerships, there was no system-
atic change in the number of citizens participating in local elections in the period 
immediately following the most recent coproduction project. Places with syn-
ergy were no more likely to experience more citizens turning out to vote in local 
elections than in municipalities with other kinds of partnerships in the electoral 
period immediately following the most recent coproduction project. I offer four 
interpretations of the nonfinding for voter turnout.
First, the citizens and citizen groups that were active partners in transnational 
public goods provision already may have been those individuals who turned out 
to vote in local elections, which explained why there was no systematic changes in 
voter turnout in the election immediately after the most recent coproduction project. 
Second, it could be that the number of citizens involved in partnership who voted 
were simply too small a number to be observed in the aggregate. Third, and by con-
trast, citizens included in partnerships may have been those who did not regularly 
participate in politics and required more time and information to develop political 
interest and personal efficacy before going to the polls. Finally, citizens are often 
motivated to participate in elections when they are unhappy and have recourse to 
punish the incumbent for poor performance in office. Citizens who became active, 
equal partners in the provision of public goods and helped set the spending agenda, 
selected projects, and interacted with government partners may have chosen to 
focus their political activity on nonelectoral forms of political engagement because 
they perceived local officeholders to have performed well in office.
While there is no observable relationship between the 55 cases of synergy and 
short-term voter turnout, there is an indication that local citizens became more 
involved in nonelectoral forms of participation and there were also indications 
of short-term, positive effects on government responsiveness. Survey results also 
showed that local citizens became more involved in community affairs beyond 
public goods projects and more active in local politics after synergetic coproduc-
tion. In terms of the effect that synergetic partnerships have on local government 
performance, clubs report that after the most recent transnational project, they 
“agree” and “strongly agree” that municipal officials were more trustworthy, more 
responsive to the needs of the local citizenry, and delivered on their promises to 
the community more consistently.
Synergetic partnerships are also more associated with increases in the share of 
total public spending on public goods and services in those municipalities in which 
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clubs participate more frequently. On average, with each additional project com-
pleted through a synergetic partnership, the share of public spending increases by 
1.2 percent in the electoral period immediately following the coproduction project. 
As synergetic partnerships continue in municipalities, local government is more 
responsive to programmatic spending on public works. While there is no associa-
tion between incidence of synergetic partnerships and the party affiliation of the 
incumbent mayor, after repeated cases of synergy, it is more likely that the PRI is 
the party in power and less likely that the PAN is the municipal incumbent.
Club Nochistlan, a large club with 250 members located in Los Angeles, 
California, formed in 1997 and spent 11 years coordinating public goods provision 
in their hometown in the state of Zacatecas independently and through the federal 
3x1 Program. After Club Nochistlan completed their very first project with the 
municipal government through the 3x1 Program, they reported that while reac-
tion from local residents and civic associations in the hometown was very positive, 
local officials were more difficult to work with and the club had an unfavorable 
opinion of them. However, over time and after the completion of several more 
projects, the club noted that access to the mayor and his staff and the club’s ability 
to influence decision-making improved considerably. In 2009 and later in 2010, 
club leaders described the partnership with the local government and citizens in a 
positive light. One club leader said she considered the transnational partnership to 
now be an important “local institution” for the provision of public goods regard-
less of the political party of the mayor in power. When I reviewed the changes in 
public spending on public works in Nochistlan for the years in which the club 
completed 3x1 projects, every additional year of project activity was associated 
with a $126 peso increase (per capita) in municipal spending on public works. The 
survey data on synergetic partnerships supports the findings from the case study 
analysis: civic engagement in community activities in and beyond coproduction 
activities, nonelectoral forms of political participation, and government respon-
siveness improve with synergetic partnerships.
C ORPOR ATIST PARTNERSHIPS
The 38 cases of corporatist partnerships were those characterized by low levels of 
community inclusion, but higher levels of local government engagement. In the 
short term, places with more corporatist partnerships are associated with more 
citizens participating in local elections. On average, 5 percent more citizens turn 
out to vote in municipalities with corporatist partnerships than in other partner-
ship types. But while more people turn out to vote, there is no change in voter 
turnout in the electoral period immediately following the partnership, all other 
things being equal. As the analysis of government engagement reveals, citizens are 
more likely to turn out to vote in municipal elections compared to other partner-
ship communities. Moreover, HTA leaders are no more likely to agree or disagree 
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that citizens become more civically or politically involved in the hometown in the 
period after transnational partnerships.
HTA leaders’ impressions of club involvement in local governance and political 
officials’ performance is more positive. HTA leaders are more likely to “agree” and 
“strongly agree” that transnational partnerships give them more access to political 
officials and grant them decision-making authority and influence during nego-
tiations with local officials. Leaders are also more likely to perceive local govern-
ment to be more responsive, trustworthy, and perform their duties consistency 
well. HTA leaders’ perceptions are supported by municipal budget data. In places 
with corporatist partnerships, the local government is more likely to spend more 
(4 percent) on public works in the electoral cycle after the partnership and even 
more than in synergetic partnerships following the most recent coproduction 
project. The positive spending effects disappear, however, after repeated munici-
pal engagement in partnerships. The data suggests that increases in government 
spending on public goods is more likely confined to the electoral period right after 
the active partnership, which may suggest political opportunism. One interesting 
association uncovered in this analysis is that places with more corporatist partner-
ships are more likely located in PRD municipalities.
While corporatist partnerships are more associated with active, engaged local 
government that works cooperatively with migrant clubs, the public spending 
returns to local citizens that occur in the periods directly after partnerships are 
short-lived. This provides some initial evidence that corporatist partnerships may 
benefit local government in politically expedient ways but do little to improve 
government responsiveness over the longer term. The lack of social inclusion in 
partnerships also suggests that while migrant-state relations are cooperative, resi-
dents have little say in how public goods decisions are made and how resources 
are allocated. Community exclusion may lead to some short-term political activ-
ism, as the case of Atitlan reveals, but over a larger number of corporatist cases, 
the finding in the aggregate is that these types of partnership are more likely to 
reinforce the status quo level of political participation or lead to a worsening of 
resident involvement in community and political affairs in the hometown.
SUBSTITUTIVE PARTNERSHIPS
The 51 cases of substitutive partnership characterized by high levels of commu-
nity involvement, but low levels of government support, produced mixed results 
for civic and political engagement and government responsiveness. Local citizens 
in these locales turned out to vote less in substitutive partnerships compared to 
other places before partnerships and there was no change in voter turnout after-
ward. However, as substitutive partnerships continued over time, there was a sig-
nificant decline in citizen voting behaviors. In places with repeated substitution, 
voter turnout declined by 11 percent. This is a significant decrease in the citizen 
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population participating in elections. Survey results revealed no systematic asso-
ciation between civic engagement after substitutive partnerships.
Additionally, local government officials in substitutive partnerships spent 
3 percent less on public goods and had significantly fewer 3x1 projects compared to 
other types of partnerships in the short run. Municipal governments involved in 
these partnerships are also more likely to fall short of their full 25 percent match-
ing contribution to migrant clubs. In substitutive partnerships, municipal govern-
ment matched less than one-to-one with other cofinancing partners (state, federal, 
and migrant partners). Survey data suggests that HTA leaders’ perceptions of gov-
ernment responsiveness were also more negative after coproduction activities. 
Leaders are more likely to “disagree” and “strongly disagree” that municipal offi-
cials did their jobs consistently well, were responsive to citizens’ needs, and were 
more trustworthy after experiences in coordinating public goods. Leaders’ percep-
tions of changes in citizens’ involvement in civic and community affairs, however, 
were considerably more favorable. After the most recent projects, migrant leaders 
were more likely to “strongly agree” that residents become more politically active 
and engaged in civic affairs.
While substitutive partnerships may be inclusive of the local citizenry through 
processes of social learning or because migrants are embedded in the social base of 
the hometown, a lack of government engagement has depressive effects on public 
spending and negative consequences for electoral participation in the short run. 
Survey findings suggested that while migrant clubs were able to use their collec-
tive resources to improve public goods provision with the help of local residents, 
partnerships do little to improve local government performance, depress voter 
turnout, and have no effects on citizen engagement beyond coproduction projects. 
Substitutive partnerships may scale up citizen participation in voting eventually, 
which may, in turn, encourage local government to be more responsiveness as the 
case of El Cerrito illustrates in chapter 3. Longitudinal data is necessary to uncover 
the durability of political effects within cases and across cases over time.
FR AGMENTED PARTNERSHIPS
The 69 cases of fragmented partnership produced more negative political conse-
quences in the period after migrant partnerships with the local government than 
in other coproduction types. In municipalities with fragmented coproduction, 
which are more likely to be characterized by low community inclusion and gov-
ernment engagement, partnerships had a much shorter lifespan than other types 
of partnerships. They were not only more likely to be clubs that reported being 
temporarily or permanently inactive, they were also more likely to have completed 
only one project through the 3x1 Program. HTA leaders in fragmented partner-
ships were also more likely to perceive negative consequences after their involve-
ment in public goods provision. Leaders were more likely to “strongly disagree” 
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that government officials are more responsive, reliable, and trustworthy and lead-
ers report a higher frequency of not finishing public goods projects “often” or 
“very often.”
Leaders’ perceptions of citizen involvement in community and political activi-
ties were also more unfavorable. Survey data suggests that HTAs are more likely 
to “strongly disagree” that in the period right after the most recent 3x1 project, 
citizens were more engaged in local politics and community activities. Unlike in 
other partnership cases in which the length of time a club leader resides in the 
U.S. has no systematic effect in organizing partnerships or political consequences, 
HTA leaders in fragmented partnerships were more likely to reside in the U.S. for 
longer periods of time. In fragmented partnerships, leaders are more likely to live 
in the U.S. for more than 20 years than in other types of partnerships.
Taken together, results of fragmented partnerships suggest few opportunities to 
improve local democratic governance in the short run. Cases of fragmented copro-
duction were more likely to fail without local social resources and more state capac-
ity involved in coproduction activities. The data also reveals that citizens are more 
likely to become politically disenchanted and are less likely to participate in civic 
and political affairs in the period following fragmented coproduction activities.
APEX PARTNERSHIPS
In the framework I present in chapter 1, the level of HTA capacity is held con-
stant. When I relaxed the assumption that HTA club capacity was similar across 
cases, the data revealed a hybrid form of coproduction. This partnership grouping 
was characterized by low levels of community inclusion and government engage-
ment but high levels of HTA capacity through which to provide local public goods 
without much support from other social and political actors. In these cases of 
coproduction, cofinancing from state and federal partners helped coproduce pub-
lic works projects, but the HTA was the “apex” provider of public goods, which 
allowed local government to be less responsive for service provision and shirk a 
core responsibility of local office.
In the survey sample, 31 partnerships were apex partnerships. In apex part-
nerships, HTA leaders reported near unanimous disagreement that municipal 
government officials became more responsive, reliable, and trustworthy after 
coproduction projects were implemented. These clubs were also more likely to 
report the local government was less cooperative, and clubs had consistently more 
problems completing projects and receiving matching contributions in a timely 
manner compared to other kinds of partnerships. Club leaders in apex partner-
ships were also more likely to “disagree” or “strongly disagree” that participation 
in public goods provision gives migrants more influence and decision-making 
authority in local governance. Data shows that while migrant clubs were able to 
complete public goods projects in their hometowns with less engagement from the 
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local citizenry and municipal government, apex clubs faced considerable obstacles 
to successfully completing coproduction projects.
There are some limitations in the survey analysis that suggest more caution 
when drawing conclusions. First, the number of cases of each partnership type 
is small, which limits confidence in the generalizability of findings. Second, the 
survey data is a representative sample of migrant partnerships, but only from a 
snapshot in time. Many of the projects that club leaders were referencing when 
completing the before-and-after questions on the survey occurred between 2007 
and 2009, although some referenced project experiences from earlier time peri-
ods. As such, migrant clubs’ reflections on how political engagement and govern-
ment performance changed after coproduction projects only reflect the kind of 
project in that snapshot of time. As we learned in the comparative case studies, the 
type of partnership is likely to change over time through social learning. It is quite 
likely the case that some of the partnerships surveyed, especially those in the very 
early years of coproducing public goods with the Mexican state, changed organiza-
tional forms in later periods. To address these limitations in the survey analysis, I 
also assessed with multivariate statistics how repeated partnerships affect political 
outcomes over a longer time horizon for each type of partnership. As the results 
show, habitual engagement between migrants, citizens, and the local government 
does produce important changes over time, but a longer observation window is 
necessary to draw more confidence in the conclusions.11
A final limitation of the cluster analysis is that the unit of observation is the 
club year for the most recent before-and-after period, but the political outcomes 
are aggregated at the municipal level of observation. Data is unavailable at the 
locality level where many clubs focus their coproduction activities. To isolate the 
effects of the survey respondent and political effects in the municipality, I con-
trolled for whether there were any other hometown associations in the municipal 
year. I also restricted the 3x1 coproduction data and municipal spending data to 
the specific survey respondent by matching the name of migrant club listed in the 
3x1 Program data. Nonetheless, I was unable to completely isolate how the survey 
respondent’s coproduction partnership produced changes in local civic and politi-
cal engagement and government responsiveness, especially when there were other 
hometown clubs active in the municipality in the same time period. In the HTA 
survey sample, 27 percent of the sample were in municipalities with other active 
3x1 partnerships in the same time period as the club observations. More micro-
level data at the locality level would be necessary to completely rule out the pos-
sibility that different partnerships had counteracting effects on political and civic 
engagement and government responsiveness. Cross-checking the survey data with 
data from the universe of partnership cases in the 3x1 data was an important step 
as it showed that partnerships types can vary in the same municipality and caution 
must be exercised when interpreting club-level results using municipal political 
outcome variables.
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The survey provides a window into how partnerships are organized and how 
this organizational variation is associated with different political effects in a cross-
section of partnership cases. Without the survey data and PCA and cluster analy-
sis, it would have been difficult to validate whether partnerships are structured 
differently. Small-n case studies cannot control for the multitude of factors that 
likely affect partnerships. Moreover, 3x1 Program data does not have the detailed 
information about the nature of partnerships to assess organizational variation. 
The survey analysis is the first opportunity to examine organizational variation 
in partnership types in the specific social, economic, and political contexts of U.S. 
destinations and Mexican origins.
In the final stage of the empirical analysis in this chapter, I turn to panel data 
and statistical analysis to determine the long-term political consequences of 
transnational partnerships. I assess if places with transnational partnerships have 
a systematic effect on voter turnout and government responsiveness compared 
to municipalities that never participated in the 3x1 Program between 1990 and 
2013. I also compare a subset of 3x1 participating municipalities. In that analysis, 
I analyze how municipalities that frequently engage in coproduction compare to 
those that participate less frequently between 2002 and 2013, the active period 
of the 3x1 Program. In this part of the statistical analysis, I move up a level of 
aggregation from club level to municipal level exclusively and examine the politi-
cal effects across all transnational partnership types. Using longitudinal data from 
the Mexican Family Life Survey and 3x1 Program project data at the municipal 
level, I assess how 3x1 Program participation and the number of coproduction 
projects affect civic and political participation and government responsiveness 
across migrant hometowns.
PANEL ANALYSIS  USING 3X1 PRO GR AM AND 
MUNICIPAL DATA
To test the hypothesis that transnational partnerships affect political and civic 
participation and government responsiveness, I must operationalize partnerships 
and political outcomes. I rely on municipal participation in the 3x1 Program to 
account for places that formally engage in the coproduction of public goods and 
services between the Mexican sending state and organized migrant hometown 
associations.12 As I describe in chapter 2, the 3x1 Program is a federally adminis-
tered social spending program that matches the collective remittances of migrant 
HTAs, three-to-one, at the local, state, and federal levels of government. While 
financing from all three levels of the Mexican government and migrant collective 
remittances fund project costs, all other aspects of project coordination occur at 
the municipal level. Project selection, planning, technical support, labor, materi-
als, implementation, and monitoring are coordinated between municipal govern-
ment officials and migrant hometown groups. I construct several indicators for 
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3x1 Program participation. Additional data on the main explanatory variables and 
controls is presented in Data Appendix D.
Data for the analysis includes annual municipal participation and project data 
in the 3x1 Program from 2002, the first year of the program, to 2013, the most 
recent year for which complete data is available. The Secretaría de Desarrollo 
Social, the Ministry of Social Development (Sedesol), maintains a database of all 
approved 3x1 projects. The database contains annual data on project location, type, 
funding sources and amounts, and total number of projects for each participating 
municipality. The unit of analysis is the municipal-year observation. Sedesol does 
not report information about projects that were proposed, but not approved, by 
state-level project validation committees.13
The project proposal process generally proceeds as follows. First, HTAs and 
local government officials agree to submit a proposal for approval to a Validation 
Committee (COVAM), which exists in every Mexican state. The COVAM is made 
up of two individuals for each kind of coproduction partner including municipal, 
state, federal, and migrant partners. The representative body typically meets one 
to three times a year to approve project proposals depending on the number of 
proposals in each Mexican state. After the COVAM approves or rejects propos-
als, each cofinancing partner deposits 25 percent of the total project costs into an 
independent banking account or the municipal treasury. The migrant HTA and 
local government authorities plan, hire labor, implement, and monitor projects at 
variable levels of engagement.
Between 2002 and 2013, 1,234 municipalities participated at least once in the 
3x1 Program, which is half (50.2 percent) of all Mexican municipalities. In 2008, 
for example, while 539 different municipalities participated, only 87 municipalities 
were participating in the program for the first time. The number of new munici-
palities starting the program for the first time decreases over the duration of the 
program. This indicates that a large number of municipalities repeatedly partic-
ipate rather than indicating more diffuse policy adoption across municipalities 
between 2002 and 2013.14
MEASURING LO CAL CIVIC AND POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS
Researchers have different approaches for conceptualizing and measuring demo-
cratic governance. Scholarship on political democracy ranges from regime change 
and democratic consolidation,15 democratic quality in terms of how well democ-
racy performs given some normative standards (for example, procedural mini-
mums including participation and competition),16 the effects of democracy on 
other indicators such as economic growth and wars, and government institutional 
performance.17 Since I am interested in how transnational partnerships affect local 
democracy across standard benchmarks, I measure political effects that provide 
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insight into procedural and results facets of democracy. The dependent variables 
of interest are political participation in elections, civic engagement in community 
activities and associations, and government responsiveness in terms of spending 
on social welfare and public works programs.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Political participation refers to the extent to which citizens exercise formal vot-
ing rights as well as organize, assemble, protest, lobby, join political parties and 
civil society organizations, and otherwise influence the decision-making process. 
Democratic quality is high when citizens participate in the political process, delib-
erate policy issues, communicate with and demand accountability from elected 
representatives, and monitor the conduct of political officials. Greater formal par-
ticipation makes democratic systems, in theory, more responsive to a larger share 
of the population. In this analysis, I restrict the focus to formal political participa-
tion and measure how many citizens of voting age cast a vote in local elections. The 
focus on nonmigrant citizen voting reflects the importance of electoral participa-
tion in studies of democratic participation and governance. Additionally, reliable 
panel indicators for more informal forms of political participation (for example, 
rallies, protests, and petitions) are scarce.
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
The MxFLS data allows me to assess how 3x1 Program participation affects non-
electoral forms of political and civic engagement in addition to voting. I observe 
whether transnational partnerships explain changes in the frequency of commu-
nity-level activities and the incidence and kind of civic associations such as social, 
religious, and political associations. I hypothesize that community inclusion is an 
important factor in organizing partnerships and that more citizen involvement 
increases information sharing, political interest, and awareness of government 
actions and behaviors while in office. Places in which the incidence of community 
activities increase during periods of municipal participation in the 3x1 Program 
provide a window into how partnerships may have positive spillovers on different 
forms of civic and political engagement.
Changes in levels of community activities that are positively associated with the 
incidence and frequency of 3x1 Program participation and the number of 3x1 proj-
ects suggest higher levels of community inclusion. I anticipate that more commu-
nity inclusion may be indicative of both the role of preexisting civic associations in 
transnational projects and the creation of new kinds of citizen activities. Over time 
and with repeated social interactions between citizens, migrants, and political offi-
cials, citizens’ routinized interactions will lead to more regular participation in the 
local civic and public affairs. In addition to analyzing the independent effects of 
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coproduction on civic and political activities, I also evaluate whether civic engage-
ment has a conditional effect on political participation. For example, if 3x1 par-
ticipation is associated with increases in community civic activities, I expect that 
this may further increase citizens’ interest and engagement in the formal electoral 
process. To capture the likelihood of a conditional effect, I estimate interactions 
between community civic engagement and 3x1 participation on voter turnout.
The MxFLS is a longitudinal, multi-thematic survey taken over three panel 
waves (2002, 2005–2006, 2009–2012). The survey is helpful for my purposes 
because in addition to an individual and household survey, there is also a com-
munity sample. The community survey includes questions about community 
activities across a random sample of Mexican municipalities. Using the MxFLS 
sample, I match municipal survey respondents with all the municipalities in the 
panel dataset used earlier in the chapter. Over the three panels of the MxFLS, the 
total number of respondent municipalities for which comprehensive data is avail-
able is 272 municipalities with some missing data. About 30 percent of MxFLS 
municipalities participated in the 3x1 Program during the period of study. The 
survey questionnaire includes a battery of questions related to community activi-
ties including whether the community organizes activities, meetings, and assem-
blies, and the type of community activities organized including religious, political, 
social, or other. The survey also collects data on whether activities are more recent 
and how many occur over the preceding 12-month period.18
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS
Government responsiveness to the needs, interests, expectations, and demands of 
citizens19 provides additional insight into the results dimension of transnational 
partnerships. Across Mexican municipalities, public goods provision is the central 
responsibility of local government and citizens base their evaluations of govern-
ment performance on access to public works. Mexican municipalities are respon-
sible for the provision of public goods and services and citizens know whom to 
reward and blame for this core responsibility.20 As per Article 115 of the Mexican 
Constitution, municipalities have exclusive authority over (1) provision of drink-
ing water, drainage, and sewage systems; (2) public lighting; (3) cleaning, collec-
tion, removal, treatment and disposal of waste materials; (4) markets and supply 
centers; (5) cemeteries and monuments; (6) slaughterhouses; (7) streets, parks, and 
gardens; and (8) public security and safety. Survey data shows that citizens know 
the issue areas that are the exclusive domain of municipal government, can differ-
entiate between state and local government policy responsibilities, and report that 
public utility provision (especially water and sewerage) are the “most important” 
municipal problems.21
By the same token, municipal presidents know that receiving credit for pub-
lic goods provision is a key factor in determining citizens’ evaluation of their 
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performance while in office. Municipalities rely on a combination of federal and 
state transfers and local sources of revenues to finance public goods and services. 
Some revenue transfers sent to municipalities are based on objective criteria 
including population size, poverty, and relative need, but other disbursements 
may be politically motivated.22 Municipal presidents maintain discretion con-
cerning how resources are spent once they arrive from state and federal transfers. 
Because participation in the 3x1 Program provides amplifying funds for municipal 
government to finance public works, transnational partnerships are likely to affect 
government responsiveness.
I evaluate the extent to which 3x1 participation achieves benefits for citizens 
in participating municipalities by analyzing changes in government spending as 
an indicator of their responsiveness to coproduction. Specifically, I analyze how 
3x1 participation affects municipal spending on public works (per capita) and the 
share of the total budget devoted to social spending. These measures are instruc-
tive because they reveal the share of funds being distributed for public works and 
any possible spending leakages that may occur from cofinancing from coproduc-
tion partners. For example, because I know the total budget for each 3x1 project, I 
can examine the difference in total municipal contributions that should be spent 
on 3x1 projects and actual expenditures by looking at different spending categories 
in the municipal budget for each three-year electoral period of a single political 
party in power.
If political officials were more responsive to citizen demands for public works, 
we would expect 3x1 Program participation to increase the spending on public 
works as opposed to increases on personal salaries or debt services. Moreover, 
when municipalities match program contributions one-to-one with state, federal, 
and migrant partners, we should expect municipal expenditures and shares of 
public works to increase. No change in public expenditures would provide evi-
dence that 3x1 participation is subsidizing public works spending that munici-
palities would have spent in the absence of program participation. A decrease 
would suggest that political officials are offloading responsibility to migrant (and 
state and federal government) partners and spending less than they would have 
spent without coproduction financing. A negative change in spending implies 
3x1 Program participation is allowing municipalities to shirk their coproduction 
financing obligations and spend what they would have spent on public works in 
other budget areas. Finally, if total expenditures increase, but not a concomitant 
increase in public works spending, we may deduce a spending leakage in response 
to 3x1 participation.23 In other words, we may infer that municipalities are shifting 
expenditures to other categories in response to program participation and away 
from social welfare spending, which is one of the primary objectives of the federal 
3x1 Program.
Civic and political participation and government responsiveness are three 
dimensions of governance likely affected by transnational coproduction facilitated 
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by participation in the 3x1 Program. Assessing the extent to which munici-
pal participation in the 3x1 Program affects multiple dimensions of democratic 
governance provides some insight into what some scholars refer to as vertical 
accountability.24 Vertical accountability refers to citizens’ awareness and access to 
information about representatives’ political actions and decisions while in office, 
their evaluation of the justifications officials provide for their actions, and their 
interest and capacity to impose consequences on representatives through partici-
pation in the democratic process.
SYSTEMATIC EFFECT S ON LO CAL DEMO CR ATIC 
ENGAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS
Using a difference-in-difference approach, I analyze first whether municipal par-
ticipation in the 3x1 Program has systematic effects on voter turnout and govern-
ment responsiveness compared to municipalities that never participated in the 
program from 1990 to 2013. Results show that 3x1 municipalities are more likely 
to experience significant changes in voter turnout and government spending than 
nonparticipating municipalities. I illustrate these findings in Figure 5. Specifically, 
more frequent participation in the 3x1 Program significantly increases political 
participation compared to municipalities that never participate. In the subset of 
municipal cases that participate at some point between 2002 and 2013, those that 
participate in the 3x1 Program less frequently have less citizens turning out to 
vote, holding all other factors constant. For every year of participation in the 3x1 
Program, the number of citizens turning out to vote increases by about 2 percent. 
Among the municipalities that participate in the 3x1 Program, the average fre-
quency of annual participation is four years. For these municipalities, every four 
years of participation leads to an 8 percent increase in the voting-age citizenry 
turning out to vote in municipal elections. If a municipality participates in the 
3x1 Program 10 times, for example (about 10 percent of the participating sample), 
the increase in voter turnout increases by about 20 percent. Since the voting-age 
population that turns out to vote is a relatively stable percentage in municipalities 
over time, the fact that participating in the 3x1 Program produces significant turn-
out effects is somewhat surprising and provides compelling evidence that transna-
tional partnerships have important consequences on local electoral politics.
The results also show that municipalities that participate in the 3x1 Program and 
that coproduce a higher number of public goods projects increase the odds of hav-
ing recent community activities (the reference group is not having any recent activ-
ity). For every additional year of municipal participation in the 3x1 Program and 
for each additional coproduction project that is implemented, the odds that local 
residents take part in community activities increase by 68 percent and 60 percent, 
respectively. The more that the migrant hometown participates in the 3x1 Program 
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While we cannot infer that recent community activities are a direct indication 
of community inclusion in coproduction projects, these findings offer initial sup-
port that transnational partnerships play some positive spillover role in more citi-
zens becoming involved in the civic affairs of their community compared to places 
that do not participate in the 3x1 Program. Additionally, results suggest additional 
support for the social learning hypothesis. As municipalities participate more in 
the 3x1 Program and complete more coproduction projects, the odds that commu-
nity activities increase to 10 or more increase by 16.5 percent. However, in places 
in which the citizenry is already highly engaged in civic associations and activities 
that predate 3x1 participation, there is no evidence that additional coproduction 
projects further increase civic engagement. In other words, additional 3x1 projects 
lead to higher propensities for community engagement in places with lower initial 
levels of civic engagement but have no effect in places in which the citizenry was 
already highly active in civic associations.
The final analyses using the MxFLS examines if 3x1 participation enhances 
political participation (voting) conditional on civic engagement. In other words, 
I observe how civic engagement and 3x1 participation together affect voter turn-
out. While the panel data shows that more people turn out to vote in municipali-
ties that participate in 3x1 projects, the MxFLS data more directly tests whether 
increases in citizen participation in local elections are conditional on transna-
tional partnerships that also spur more civic engagement in local community 
affairs. Results reported in Data Appendix D confirm the important condition role 
of civic engagement on coproduction projects and their political effects.
The number of citizens that turn out to vote in elections increases by an addi-
tional 4 percent when nonmigrant citizens engage in more than 10 community 
activities in the preceding year. The positive effect of civic engagement and 3x1 
participation holds across other indicators of 3x1 Program participation. For every 
additional project completed through the 3x1 Program, voter turnout increases 
by an additional 3 to 5 percent, depending on the level of civic engagement in 
the hometown. For example, in places with at least 50 community activities (a 
quarter of the sample), voter turnout increases by 3.4 percent for each additional 
3x1 project completed. In municipalities with high levels of civic engagement and 
that complete at least three public works projects through the 3x1 Program, we 
would expect voter turnout to increase about 10 percent. When community activi-
ties reach 100 (7 percent of the sample), voter turnout increases by 5.4 percent 
for every coproduction project completed. Figure 6 plots the marginal effects of 
program participation conditional on different levels of local civic engagement.
Results also show that the frequency of participation in the 3x1 Program and 
the number of coproduction projects have important effects on voter turnout 
given the type of civic engagement in migrant hometowns. When there are more 
social and religious kinds of community activities, each additional coproduc-
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1.8 percent respectively). Taken together, the interaction models confirm that the 
positive spillover effects on political participation in municipal elections are con-
ditional on citizens’ active participation in community civic affairs and magnify 
the positive effects that transnational partnerships have on nonmigrant citizens’ 
engagement in local governance.
The central findings for government responsiveness are generally less sanguine. 
When a municipality participates in the 3x1 Program, there is a decrease in total 
spending in the municipal budget and spending on public goods and services. 
Places that participate in the 3x1 Program are likely to spend $37 pesos (per capita) 
less on public works and $50 pesos (per capita) less on total spending across all 
categories compared to municipalities that never participate in the 3x1 Program. 
The only gains to citizens in terms of government spending on public goods from 
transnational coproduction occur when municipalities are consistently engaging 
in the 3x1 Program over time, which is consistent with the survey findings pre-
sented earlier in the chapter. From one electoral cycle to the next (about three 
years), municipalities that habitually participate in the 3x1 Program spend about 
$21 pesos (per capita) more on public works and increase the total share of the 
municipal budget by about 2 percent. When municipalities participate once or 
have more limited engagement in coproduction, officials are more likely to allow 
3x1 spending to subsidize for municipal spending on public works.
Municipal public spending as a share of total spending also suffers when 
municipalities participate in the 3x1 Program less consistently. The share of public 
works spending declines by almost 5 percent for municipalities that participate 
infrequently. By comparison, in those municipalities that participate more habitu-
ally, municipal spending increases, but very minimally. For example, in the elec-
tion year after 3x1 participation, municipalities are likely to allocate only about 
0.5 percent more of their total budget expenditures to public works and are only 
likely to spend an additional 0.37 percent with each subsequent year of partici-
pation. To put this in perspective, consider a municipality with the mean level 
of expenditures. The average municipality spends about 30 percent of their total 
municipal budget on public goods and services. If average total expenditures per 
capita are $1,912 pesos and mean public works expenditures are about $626, partic-
ipating in the 3x1 Program once corresponds to an additional $11 pesos of spend-
ing on public works per citizen. This amounts to about $1 USD more on public 
works spending per capita, which is negligible. But if a municipality participates 
six times, for example, public works expenditures increase by almost 2 percent. 
When municipalities participate once or only a handful of times, financial con-
tributions from state, federal, and migrant partners subsidize local public works 
budgets at best and decrease programmatic spending at worst. Improvements in 
municipal social spending only occur with more frequent, consistent participation 
in the 3x1 Program over time and even then, on average, social spending increases 
only amount to a few additional dollars per citizen.
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The findings on municipal spending in response to transnational coproduc-
tion reveal that in the absence of continuous participation in the 3x1 Program, 
municipal government partners have an incentive to offload public works spend-
ing on organized migrant groups. Even in cases in which municipalities are habit-
ual participants, on average, political authorities increase social welfare spending 
very little beyond what they commit to cofinancing public works through the 3x1 
Program. In other words, beyond meeting their obligations to match coproduc-
tion project budgets in very active 3x1 municipalities, political officials are not 
reorganizing their municipal budgets to increase social welfare spending signifi-
cantly. In those municipalities that participate in the 3x1 Program more erratically, 
municipal government is less responsive to the citizenry in social welfare spending 
than if they never participated in the program at all.
What characteristics do 3x1 participating municipalities that have the highest 
changes in social spending allocations share? Additional analysis shows that the 
places that have the highest increase in the share of public spending on public 
works are the poorest municipalities in the sample. Taking the results from the 
public spending models above into consideration, on average, when a municipal-
ity that is designated as “poor” or “very poor” by the Mexican census’s marginal-
ization index participates in the 3x1 Program 10 times, for example, the share of 
the total municipal budget spent on public works increases by 3 percent. For a 
relatively poor municipality this is a considerable increase, but this is not a major-
ity of municipal cases.
There are two other noteworthy results. First, when poor and very poor munic-
ipalities are participating in the 3x1 Program, the data shows they are spending 
more of their total budgets on public goods and services than when they are not 
participating in the program. Results show that relatively poorer municipalities 
spend more on public goods (per capita) relative to richer municipalities during 
active periods of program participation. Second, municipalities that are the most 
likely to participate the most frequently in 3x1 projects (6, 8, and 10 times) are 
not the poorest municipalities in Mexico. Rather, they are more likely to have a 
medium level of poverty according to the national marginalization index.
One policy implication from these results is that the 3x1 Program helps the 
worst-off Mexicans gain more access to essential public goods and services, but 
poorer municipalities are not participating with the same frequency as relatively 
wealthier locales. This may suggest that the 3x1 Program is regressive and leads to 
a widening of inequality in access to public goods and services in response to high 
levels of out-migration. However, there is an important exception to this. Since 85 
percent of projects are distributed to poorer localities outside the county seat, 3x1 
participation is helping poor, rural citizens gain more access to public goods in 
middle-income municipalities. In turn, in middle-income municipalities where 
poorer residents often live in outlying localities with worse public goods provision, 
3x1 participation is likely encouraging a more egalitarian distribution of public 
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resources. Finally, if more marginalized citizens are more civically and politically 
engaged in local politics as a result of 3x1 participation, perhaps concerns about 
widening inequality or the regressive nature of the program may be somewhat 
tempered. When marginalized citizens and citizen groups become more involved 
in local governance, they are using democratic channels to represent their interests 
and demand better government performance, which may have more long-lasting 
political consequences such as empowering poorer, more marginalized citizens to 
use their voice and demand better government performance from local officials.
While spending on public works increases in municipalities that habitually 
participate in the 3x1 Program, I do not observe a one-to-one increase in pub-
lic spending and total expenditures. The accounting anomaly suggests municipal 
spending leakages in the presence of state and federal 3x1 matching funds. On 
average, municipalities that participate in coproduction with state, federal, and 
migrant club partners are not allocating all of the matching funds to public spend-
ing. Rather, matching funds allow municipal officials to change how they allocate 
spending across budget categories. When I consider each expenditure category of 
the municipal budget, results show that 3x1 not only decreases total expenditures, 
but that program participation leads to increases in debt and “other” municipal 
spending. This suggests that municipal officials are allocating some of the 3x1 
monies to finance other parts of their budget such as debt obligations in lieu of 
spending all the money on public works and social welfare programs.25
However, the cumulative effects from continuous participation in the 3x1 
Program produce opposite effects. More participation in the 3x1 program leads 
municipal officials to pay down less debt over time. This may occur because there 
is less debt to pay down or because officials are become more responsive to the citi-
zenry and financing more public works projects the longer they engage in transna-
tional partnerships with migrant clubs. So while social spending on public works 
only increases a small amount, about $2 USD per citizen on average, municipali-
ties that participate in the 3x1 Program frequently change how they choose to allo-
cate public resources across different categories of the municipal budget.
The effects of 3x1 participation and civic engagement on government respon-
siveness using data from the MxFLS are consistent with findings from the panel 
analysis, but the magnitude of the effect is stronger. More recent community 
engagement is associated with a 4 percent increase in the share of social spend-
ing on public works in the municipal budget. The strongest conditional effects of 
3x1 participation and civic engagement are in changes to municipal spending on 
public works as a share of the total budget. Municipal governments spend more 
of their total budgets on public works as a function of participation in the 3x1 
Program when community activities reach 50 cumulative projects. But at low lev-
els of community involvement (10 activities), municipal governments allow 3x1 
participation to subsidize social spending. These findings suggest that in places 
in which local civic engagement is high, 3x1 participation increases municipal 
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spending even more on public goods and services including electricity, potable 
water, streets and roads, and other public infrastructures. At lower levels of civic 
engagement, however, 3x1 Program participation lets local public officials off the 
hook for public spending and decreases their responsiveness to the public.
Consistent results from two different data sources provide compelling evidence 
of the returns to social spending and civic and political participation in places that 
have transnational partnerships with an engaged, active citizenry. As more citi-
zens become actively engaged in coproduction activities and in community and 
political affairs more generally, local government becomes more responsive to citi-
zens’ demands for public goods and social welfare spending. As civic engagement 
increases, the positive effects of 3x1 participation are amplified. Participation in the 
3x1 Program spurs more civic engagement and, in turn, more civic engagement 
increases voter turnout in local political participation, all other things being equal. 
This account indicates evidence of a “virtuous circle” stemming from cumulative, 
repeated engagement in coproduction activities where state and nonstate actors 
learn new ways to deliberate and cooperate in the fuzzy space between the public 
and private spheres of local governance.26
The more that migrant, resident, and government actors work together to pro-
vide public goods and are more generally active in local civic and political affairs, 
the more likely coproduction activities strengthen municipal government respon-
siveness. Even though elected officials are often only increasing public goods 
spending by 2 and 3 percent, they are doing so in response to citizens demand-
ing programmatic spending increases, especially in localities that exist outside 
the municipal center. Survey results show that local citizens consistently identify 
public goods provision as the most pressing municipal concern when asked about 
government performance. When citizens are actively involved in deliberations 
about the distribution of public funds, more spending on public goods occurs in 
lieu of increases in other budget categories including debt spending, payroll sala-
ries, or targeted transfers to citizens in return for political support. Additionally, 
citizen deliberation in public decisions about how much municipal budgets spend 
on what kinds of public goods and services increases regular interactions between 
citizens and the representatives they elect to serve. As more citizens become regu-
larly involved in spending and allocation decisions concerning public goods, more 
equitable decisions are made that benefit a broader swath of the local citizenry in 
and beyond heavily populated town centers.
TESTING ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES
I argue that how much money migrants send collectively is not as important for 
understanding the effects of transnational coproduction on local governance as 
variation in the organization forms of partnerships. But this is an empirical ques-
tion. Maybe it is the case that when migrant clubs propose projects with higher 
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budgets that commit them to invest more money, local officials change their behav-
ior. Perhaps when migrant clubs propose more coproduction projects, govern-
ment responsiveness and local citizens’ civic and political engagement improve. 
I examine these alternative hypotheses and ask: Are places that have more 3x1 
projects or higher 3x1 expenditures more likely to observe changes in democratic 
functioning regardless of how transnational partnerships are organized?
Using the panel dataset, I examine how the total number of annual projects 
and 3x1 spending across municipalities affect civic and political participation 
and government responsiveness. Results show total 3x1 spending has a statistical 
effect on voter turnout, but the effects are overall negative and not substantively 
significant (see Data Appendix D). On average, total 3x1 Program expenditures 
lead to a decline in the number of voters turning out to cast a ballot in municipal 
elections by 0.3 percent. Those municipalities where 3x1 expenditures surpass 
$50,000 will see a decline in voter turnout by as much as 2.5 percent, but there 
are few municipalities with annual expenditures that high. There are no signifi-
cant effects for the number of total projects on political and civic participation or 
government spending.
These findings suggest that how much money migrant groups and their copro-
duction partners spend on public works is not the key for understanding how 
transnational collective action affects local democratic governance. Rather, the 
frequency of program participation and the nature of the involvement of local 
civil society and municipal government shed more light on the political conse-
quences at the local level. Interestingly, in places with higher than average spend-
ing through the 3x1 Program we see less formal engagement in municipal politics. 
I argue that how citizens are included and local government is engaged in part-
nerships and the frequency of interaction between migrant, political officials, and 
residents explains a great deal more of the variation in local democratic gover-
nance over time and place than how much money migrants send home in collec-
tive remittances for public goods provision.
SUMMARY
Migrant transnational partnerships are politically consequential for migrant 
places of origin. As more people leave their communities of origin, form migrant 
clubs, and partner with the sending state, more citizens take part in the formal 
electoral process, especially with more frequent, engaged coproduction activities 
across borders and in places with more robust civil society. As the survey analysis 
reveals, when citizens take part in partnerships with an engaged local government 
repeatedly, more citizens take part in formal and informal modes of political par-
ticipation. Moreover, when transnational coproduction creates civic engagement 
and builds on social assets available in the hometown, local democratic engage-
ment improves even more.
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The effects of partnerships on government responsiveness are more mixed. Survey 
results show that substitutive partnerships subsidize public works spending for 
local governments but increase the share of government social spending in corpo-
ratist and synergetic partnerships over time. The more positive effects on demo-
cratic governance emanating from transnational partnerships are realized with 
repeated participation in the 3x1 Program, lending more support to the hypothesis 
that social and political learning occurs through the repeated process of transna-
tional engagement in local public goods provision.
Findings from this chapter suggest that municipal 3x1 participation, in part, 
makes citizens more aware of and better informed about government officials’ 
decisions in office. When territorial and extraterritorial citizens alike engage in 
coproduction activities, the relational context serves as a “school of democracy.” 
And as the active civic and political engagement of the local citizenry improves, 
it has positive spillovers on government performance. The results suggest that 
transnational partnerships that are more inclusive of the local citizenry and spur 
civic engagement are also likely to induce a measure of vertical accountability— 
mechanisms that enable citizens as electors to evaluate government performance 
through formal channels like voting. Migrant collective action in hometown devel-
opment has an additive effect on both civic engagement and political turnout. But 
the results also suggest that synergy is not the only kind of partnership impor-
tant for affecting democratic engagement. Repeated, cumulative participation in 
coproduction spurs civic and political engagement and government responsive-
ness. Transnational partnerships structurally vary across cases and over time, 
producing short-term consequences for local democracy. But the most profound 
changes from partnerships occur over a longer time horizon in which organiza-
tional variation of partnerships is likely to change through repeated, cumulative 
participation in the coproduction of public goods across national borders.
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The Paradox of Cross-Border Politics
In places where roads are not paved, few sidewalks exist, and drainage and sanita-
tion are in short supply, citizens gain better access to these and other public goods 
when nonstate actors step in to complement and substitute for state action. In 
developing countries and transition regimes, citizens often have to rely on non-
state actors such as faith-based associations, private companies, nongovernmental 
organizations, neighborhood associations, sectarian groups, and migrant home-
town associations to fill the gap in public goods provision. As this book shows, 
migrants and their organized social groups abroad pool their resources to invest in 
public goods provision in places in which they maintain shared connections and 
attachments. In doing so, this practice enabled by international migration creates 
a mechanism by which citizens can enjoy better access to public goods but it also 
produces unintended, yet profound political consequences for local democracy.
When migrants organize partnerships with public agencies in the sending 
state to improve local development, cross-border collective action also changes 
who participates, and how they participate, in local democracy. Under certain 
conditions, the process scales up civic and political engagement and strengthens 
government responsiveness. Under other conditions, though, transnational part-
nerships reinforce elite power relations, social and political cleavages, and politi-
cal disenchantment. Mobilizing collective remittance resources for development 
projects back home creates political opportunities for migrants to participate and 
make decisions in local public affairs. But exercising the privilege of speaking with 
and for a community in which some members no longer physically reside raises 
fundamental social and political questions about who belongs and which voices 
should shape decisions that impact everyone in a political jurisdiction. Examining 
192    Conclusion
the transnational practice of providing public goods generates new insights into 
the ways in which international migration changes how citizens participate in 
local democracy, meanings of citizenship, and belonging in a world with millions 
of people on the move.
While there are several different kinds of nonstate actors involved in public 
goods provision, this book places the politics of migrant actors and the interme-
diary institutions of transnational public-private partnerships front and center. 
Public goods provision is a core function of subnational government in decentral-
ized political systems like Mexico; therefore, when migrant social actors become 
involved in decisions that concern public welfare and resources, it blurs the bound-
aries between public and private spheres. The blurring of boundaries between who 
provides public goods and how they are provided is not a neutral, technocratic 
policy issue.1 Rather, it is substantially consequential for political life in ways that 
have been poorly understood.
I attend to the political consequences of transnational partnerships in the stra-
tegic case of Mexico. Specifically, I study the process of coordinating public goods 
provision across the public-private divide, that is, between migrant hometown 
associations and public officials in the sending state, and highlight the ramifica-
tions of the process for three important political outcomes that bear directly on the 
quality of local democracy: civic and political participation, government respon-
siveness, and state-society relations. There are many dimensions of local democ-
racy that transnational migration is likely to affect, but in the previous chapters, 
I examine democratic engagement at the local level and government officials’ 
responses to transnational forms of collective action.
The book tackles the emergence, variation, and effect of migrant transnational 
partnerships at multiple levels of analysis, using original data collection and a 
mixed methodological approach. I find that while migrant resources create verti-
cal links to sending states keen on courting resources earned abroad for public 
projects back home, the structure of migrant social ties and migrants’ ability to 
negotiate meanings of belonging and membership in the hometown is also a criti-
cal determinant of democratic effects. By focusing much-needed attention on the 
intersection of social and political actors and institutions, I show how migrants’ 
horizontal and vertical ties in the origin community create new modes of political 
participation. Social and political relations in the migrant transnational network 
shape the organization of cross-border collective action and the political conse-
quences that result.
Specifically, migrant social embeddedness and political institutions at origin 
organize transnational partnerships differently. When partnerships are inclusive 
of the local citizenry and local government is engaged, the process of public goods 
provision creates more participatory governance. But when migrant groups are 
no longer embedded in the social fabric of the hometown or fail to forge ties to 
key stakeholders in the community and recruit them into the decision-making 
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process, social exclusion stokes inequalities and sometimes depresses local politi-
cal engagement. How migrants navigate the boundaries of social and cultural 
membership in their hometowns (when membership is no longer based on ter-
ritorial residence) has different implications for democratic governance or what 
Dahl refers to as polyarchy.2
When countries experience substantial emigration, paying close attention to 
how existing local democracies function requires looking beyond domestic politi-
cal borders and the messy space between the artificial walls of the “public” and 
“private.”3 Transnational actors, especially migrants and their organized social 
groups, transform how citizens engage the local government by inserting them-
selves back in local democracy, especially when newfound resources acquired 
abroad grant them decision-making opportunities in local politics not afforded 
to those without them. Aiming analytic attention at migrants’ cross-border prac-
tices shows how decentralized democracies with substantial emigration actually 
work. We see with new lenses how migrant intervention in the hometown after 
departure upsets, reinforces, and transforms the ways in which citizens engage in 
local democracies and interface with elected representatives. We also see the ways 
in which acquiring a bargaining voice in democratic politics is enabled by remit-
tances and not by territorial residence alone, which complicates traditional ideas of 
citizenship that are circumscribed by the political boundaries of the nation-state.
When migrants leave their countries seeking political freedom, economic 
opportunities, and family reunification, the people and places they leave behind 
rarely fall completely out of view. Certainly not all migrants are “transmigrants” 
taking action, making decisions, and developing subjectivities and identities in 
two or more nation-states.4 All people everywhere do not lead transnational lives, 
and among those who do there is considerable variation in the sources and types 
of practices they engage in across borders. As important research shows, indi-
viduals and foreign-born groups embrace different “ways of being” and “ways of 
belonging” in transnational social fields.5 But despite exit from the places of their 
birth, migrants continue to participate in quotidian and revolutionary practices in 
their places of origin that affect social, political, and economic life at home.6
C ORE FINDINGS
The empirical heart of the book examines when, why, and how transnational part-
nerships emerge and transform local democratic governance. I find in the Mexican 
case that since the 1980s, neoliberal market reforms advocated by development 
banks including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund prescribed 
a reduced role for the state in social safety nets and decentralization reforms 
that offloaded the responsibility of public goods to subnational levels of govern-
ment.7 Concurrently, state retrenchment and decentering administrative authority 
opened up opportunities for domestic, international, and transnational nonstate 
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actors and organizations to step in and assume a greater role in social welfare and 
public infrastructure provision. Political openings in former authoritarian states 
like Mexico meant more freedom for civic associations, including those in trans-
national civil society, to solve local problems through collective action without 
fear of state reprisal. Additionally, fiercer political competition meant more oppor-
tunities for opposition political parties to wrangle power and authority away from 
dominant parties such as the PRI and represent new constituencies, including 
migrant constituencies abroad.8
Moreover, since the late 1990s and early 2000s supranational organizations 
including the United Nations have sponsored migration and development initia-
tives in which government stakeholders, business elites, migrant organizations, 
and policy experts exchange best practices and the practical challenges of eco-
nomic development. Directing increasing attention at the migration-development 
nexus, supranational organizations identified family and collective remittances as 
possible sources to fight poverty and fuel income-generating enterprises.9 State 
retrenchment and decentralization efforts coupled with the rise in a “migration-
development” discursive agenda encouraged policymakers to look to their diaspo-
ras for much-needed financial and human capital.
While the analysis in chapter 2 shows that macrostructural factors created the 
conditions of possibility for migrant cross-border involvement in local develop-
ment, it also revealed that transnational partnerships are not necessarily auto-
matic outgrowths of international migration. Rather, organized Mexican migrant 
groups’ grassroots mobilization preceded the coordination of public policies to 
channel collective remittance resources for community development. Country-
specific historic factors were critical antecedents to the creation of transnational 
public-private partnerships. But migrant hometown associations’ bottom-up 
organizing and the sending state’s top-down outreach to migrants during a period 
of democratization and decentralization produced feedback effects that facilitated 
the widespread adoption of coproduction partnerships as a strategy for public 
goods provision at the local level.
While a majority of municipalities participate in the 3x1 Program, a closer look 
at transnational partnerships using surveys, interviews, and comparative field-
work shows that they are organized differently from place to place and over time. 
Partnerships vary in the degree to which local citizens are involved and local gov-
ernment engages in the coproduction process. Understanding this organizational 
variation provides a key window into why the political consequences also vary 
across and within migrant hometown communities.
The case studies show how migrants are embedded in varying degrees in the 
social bases of their origin communities after departure. The structure of pre-
migration social networks determines, in part, the nature of the partnerships they 
build across international borders because migrant social networks vary in the 
extent to which they maintain bonding and bridging ties. More heterogeneous 
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social ties reflect more social resources. They also reflect the variation of societal 
interests represented in negotiations, interactions, and decisions made between 
political officials and the local citizenry. When migrant social bases include both 
bonding and bridging ties in the hometown community, transnational coproduc-
tion is more likely to be inclusive and more egalitarian because it represents more 
of a plurality of societal interests. Since migrants are physically absent, they must 
draw on a wide array of social resources in the community for the coprovision of 
public goods to be most successful.
Although local government is administratively and politically responsible for 
provision, not all local government officials respond to coproduction opportu-
nities with the same interest and engagement. The political institutional context 
creates different incentives for local political officials’ engagement in partnerships 
with migrants. Moreover, in the Mexican context, municipal presidents (equiva-
lent to mayors) are barred from individual reelection after serving a three-year 
term. Political incentives to participate in transnational partnerships reflect politi-
cal parties’ strategies for winning and maintaining office, and disruptions in party 
representation at the local level during periods of electoral transition interrupt 
how partnerships continue. The case of Telepi shows how this process unfolds 
through the change in political party in municipal office.
It is the dynamic interaction between community inclusion and government 
engagement that organizes coproduction partnerships differently, making them 
more synergetic, fragmented, corporatist, and substitutive. These four ideal typi-
cal forms of coproduction emerge from the interaction of migrant social networks 
and local political context. This is why migrant social groups that are otherwise 
similar, with the same resources, same size club, organizational capacity, and des-
tination locale in the U.S., produce different consequences for local democracy.
The survey cluster analysis and statistical analysis using the Mexican Family 
Life Survey and panel data in chapter 6 provide a closer look into how partner-
ships vary and how emergent variation is associated with different short- and 
long-term effects on democratic functioning and state-society relations. When we 
telescope away from the organizational variation to assess the systematic effects 
of partnerships, the key finding is that repeated, continuous participation leads to 
more citizen participation in municipal elections and engagement in community 
activities such as neighborhood associations, religious groups, and social and civic 
associations like the Rotary and Lions clubs.
Finally, the panel analysis shows that transnational partnerships that occur 
in locales with preexisting endowments of social capital have more pronounced 
effects on democratic governance. In places where citizens are more engaged in 
community civic activities, local government devotes more public resources to 
social welfare spending. But preexisting bridging ties that enable more trust and 
cooperation between migrants and stay-at-homes are not a necessary condition 
for partnerships to succeed. Rather, the data shows that migrants who renegotiate 
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their membership in the hometown and construct social ties to key community 
stakeholders learn how to effectively deliberate and cooperate through repeated 
interactions over multiple projects. The social learning process that accompanies 
doing development projects with migrant and state partners helps scale up citizen 
interest and engagement in local democracy, giving more marginalized groups 
new avenues to discuss and make demands on their political representatives.
In places where transnational partnerships are more erratic and have less 
community involvement, transnational partnerships subsidize and substitute for 
government social welfare spending. Continuous participation in coproduction 
activities that draw on the social resources and assets of origin communities expe-
riences the highest gains in democratic engagement and responsive government. 
By focusing on multiple dimensions of local democratic quality and the organiza-
tional variation in transnational partnerships, empirical results from both qualita-
tive and quantitative data provide compelling evidence that migrant partnerships 
not only improve citizens’ access to public goods, they also enhance participatory 
governance when migrants’ social ties are multiplex.10
EMIGR ANT CITIZENSHIP
Migrant involvement in public goods provision decouples substantive citizen-
ship—that is, forms of civic and political participation—from territorial residence. 
Political and civic participation without territorial residence challenges neat con-
ceptions of the nation-state as a bounded political territory with fixed popula-
tions11 because migrant collective action complicates membership and belonging 
in the political community. These questions about membership, belonging, and 
ultimately citizenship emerge because the foray by migrants into collective action 
for development is in the public domain of the hometown and substantive, legiti-
mate participation in the public, political sphere is predicated on belonging.12
As Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) argue, there are differences between “ways 
of being”—ongoing cross-border activities—and “ways of belonging”—practices 
signaling an identity with another people or place. The results of this book reveal 
the need to pay careful attention to how particular kinds of transnational practices 
take belonging for granted. Membership in the hometown political community is 
not guaranteed after exit. International migration involves connections that cross 
territorial units, and while immigrants may be oriented toward their hometowns 
and those immigrants have an affiliation and affection with it, connectivity and 
social collectivity are analytically and practically distinct.13 Migrants have the 
power and legitimacy to use collective voice in political life in origin commu-
nities in which they no longer continuously reside when they renegotiate their 
cultural membership in the hometown community. When migrants are no longer 
perceived as members of the social and political community, but participate in 
public, political life as if they were territorial residents, nonmigrant citizens react 
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to migrants’ intervention either by struggling for recognition through democratic 
channels of participation or, in some cases, by retreating from political life and 
becoming more disengaged from civil society and politics. Exclusion often makes 
people stop trying to be relevant actors in local political affairs.
In some instances, as the case of Atitlan shows, the competition for recogni-
tion between extraterritorial migrants and territorial citizens can result in new 
social divisions and sources of political inequality that mobilize political activism 
in the short run, but ultimately displace nonmigrants’ interest and engagement in 
local politics as coproduction activities become more corporatist and, often, cli-
entelistic. But when migrants renegotiate their social membership by constructing 
social ties with local stakeholders, recruiting residents into the coproduction pro-
cess, and practicing cultural repertoires of community, these inclusive practices 
affirm social solidarity between migrant and nonmigrant citizens and legitimate 
migrants’ local authority. The case of El Cerrito provides compelling evidence of 
these processes taking shape over time.
Cross-border social solidarity between migrant and nonmigrant citizens enables 
substantive participation in the public sphere of decision-making around public 
goods provision. While these struggles for group recognition and boundary-mak-
ing can occur when organized migrant groups wield resources to be used in the 
local public domain, the sending state’s emigrant policies facilitate and foreclose 
migrant groups’ entrance into local political processes. The Mexican sending state, 
for example, does not allow extraterritorial citizens to vote in local elections, and 
although such citizens maintain certain rights and protections from the sending 
state while abroad (dual nationality, expatriate voting in national elections), their 
rights to participate and affect local politics are otherwise limited relative to Mexican 
territorial nationals.14 Mobilizing their collective remittances resources for develop-
ment projects is one way in which migrants channel their interests and ambitions 
and affect the democratic process, even if the political effects are unintended.
De jure citizenship or legal status citizenship is a guarantee extended by the 
country of origin to its nationals abroad. Even after departure the state promises 
emigrants that should they want or need to return and remain, they have indefi-
nite permission to do so in the territorial space of the homeland. But while emi-
grants maintain the right to return, their substantive citizenship, and their ability 
to participate as full rather than nominal citizens in the public and political life 
of the home country, remains predicated on political belonging.15 When migrants 
use collective resources and voice in the political affairs of their hometowns, 
they practice not just de jure citizenship but substantive citizenship as well. Legal 
scholar Kim Barry argues: “Citizenship is embedded in, as well as constitutive of, 
community, and its legitimacy depends on that community’s approval.”16 The find-
ings in this book buttress Barry’s theoretical contention and explore the implica-
tions of migrant transnational public goods provision across borders for meanings 
and practices of emigrant citizenship.
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Migrant membership in the hometown political community is a question that 
is contested, negotiated, and defined when migrants contribute resources and 
help make decisions about public goods provision from beyond national borders. 
Migrants’ legitimate participation in development processes in countries of origin 
is predicated on being socially embedded after exit because the structure of social 
ties and practices of solidarity effectuate membership in the political community.
THE PAR AD OX AND POLITICS OF CROSS-B ORDER 
C OLLECTIVE ACTION
Understanding the conditions under which citizens use voice, loyalty, and exit 
tells us a great deal about the quality of local democratic institutions as mecha-
nisms of political and social accountability in places beset by significant emigra-
tion. How citizens respond to government performance reveals the likelihood that 
government officials will respond to citizen dissatisfaction or lose out to the com-
petition. Albert Hirschman explored these processes through his seminal exit-
voice-loyalty triptych.
In Hirschman’s framework, exit and voice are mutually exclusive options and 
loyalty reflects citizens’ efforts to preserve the status quo. Either people “exit” the 
political system and take their support elsewhere or they use “voice” to try and 
change the behavior of the target, in this case the state. In the context of inter-
national migration, exit is a physical act. Migrants leave their countries of ori-
gin for greener pastures when the state has failed them. For migrants, it is exit 
that creates the condition of possibility for voice. By emigrating and voting with 
their feet abroad, migrants are able to save and send remittances. Migrants’ collec-
tive resources create opportunities to participate in local government affairs from 
abroad. But to understand migrant cross-border collective action in the home-
town, Hirschman’s “loyalty” concept must be refashioned to capture not just the 
preservation of the status quo of loyal citizens remaining behind, but as a neces-
sary precondition for migrants’ cross-border engagement.
As scores of studies in the transnational migration literature show, not all 
migrants maintain the same level of attachment to homeplace nor do they sustain 
the same kinds of transnational and translocal practices and passions across inter-
national borders. Those migrants who do choose to engage in cross-border con-
versations, information sharing, remittance sending, and public goods provision, 
for example, are those for whom loyalty is a given or has been cultivated by the 
sending state through outreach initiatives. The goal of this book is not to explain 
who is loyal and how much loyalty they have for the people and places they leave 
behind in Mexico or other countries of origin. Rather, I argue that loyalty is a pre-
condition for cross-border collective action. The migrants I study in this book are 
loyal to their hometowns, even if the use of voice and exit may be mired in conflict 
in some places and received with more open arms in others. The starting point for 
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this book is based on migrants’ shared connections and loyalty to their places of 
origin. The variation I explain is focused, instead, on how migrant groups’ ability 
to exercise voice and exit simultaneously is enabled and constrained by the social 
and political relationships that preexist in hometowns and is transformed by the 
process of cross-border collective action.
I posed a question at the beginning of this book. Can loyal migrants exercise 
voice and exit simultaneously? The answer this book provides is, well, yes and 
no. Although migrants form hometown clubs, pool resources, and work together 
to provide public goods projects in their places of origin, they are no longer ter-
ritorial residents yet maintain legal personhood. Territorial citizens are ascribed 
full membership status regardless of whether they participate in the political and 
social affairs of their town because they are denizens. Citizenship grants migrants 
certain rights to substantively participate in home country affairs from beyond 
national borders even though they are not directly subject to the policies they help 
enact precisely because they left and migrated abroad for a chance at a better life. 
But emigration constrains migrants’ collective participation in local public affairs 
when they are no longer socially embedded in the hometown nor perceived as 
members who still belong in the political community. Feeling socially connected 
to a hometown does not necessarily evoke consensus over meanings of belong-
ing and membership and legitimate voice is contingent on renegotiating cultural 
membership after exit.17 This is the paradox of cross-border collective action in 
local democracy and development.
Although many immigrants lack full membership in the destination country 
because they lack legal status citizenship, exercising voice in the home country 
may be one of only a handful of ways in which those who want to can engage in 
political life. For immigrants who wish to feel part of a polity, to be valued, to be 
included in a political and social community, investing in hometown development 
with remittances gives them an opportunity to participate in a political system 
as if they had never left. In many ways, migrants channel their political, social, 
and economic grievances in the destination country to the homeland where their 
substantive citizenship is not completely barred.18 But when voice in public affairs 
is materially conditioned by remittances and exit, some migrants are met with 
opposition from local residents who no longer identify them and their groups as 
legitimate members of the local political community with the authority to speak 
with and for the citizenry.
The “right” combination of exit, voice, and loyalty is difficult to achieve and 
transnational partnerships between migrants, states, and local citizens often fail, 
exacerbate inequalities, and reinforce elite power relations. It is not enough for 
migrants to be socially connected; they must also be able to overcome perceived 
status differences that arise when migrants leave their places or origin for richer 
countries abroad. Examining the process of coordinating public goods across the 
public-private divide reinforces how nonstate actors,19 be they nongovernmental 
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organizations (NGOs), sectarian and religious organizations, or migrant clubs, can 
nurture trust and cooperation and scale up local participation when they build on 
social assets and work through preexisting institutions in project recipient com-
munities. But negotiating the complex terrain of local politics and the transna-
tional social network to make local democracy work from abroad is a high bar for 
migrants and their groups to clear.
MOVING BEYOND THE MEXICAN CASE
The findings of this research underscore the importance of studying the sources 
of variation in transnational practices across geography and time. How migrants 
engage in hometown development is unlikely to be the same in Mexico as it is in 
China or Ghana or the Philippines and beyond.20 This variation is rooted in differ-
ences in the nature and composition of migratory streams, social networks, and 
other factors that are endemic to origin and sending states. Origin countries vary 
in the intensity of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, state capacity, sociodemo-
graphic characteristics of emigrants, and political regime dynamics, for example. 
Moreover, destination countries vary in the degree of civil liberties and freedom 
to associate into collective groups. And sending states develop vastly different 
emigrant incorporation strategies to their diasporas abroad. Migrant social ties 
are a key factor in explaining the kinds of migrant cross-border partnerships that 
prevail, but they are also determined, in part, by the ways in which sending and 
destination states make room for nonstate migrant actors to intervene.
The findings of this book illustrate the importance of unpacking the role of 
“the state” and migrant transnational social network ties simultaneously to better 
understand the roots and feedback effects and organizational dynamics of trans-
national public-private partnerships. When considering migrant development 
practices and the emigrant outreach initiatives of sending states across countries, 
researchers would be wise to heed sociologist David FitzGerald’s call to analyze 
from a neopluralist perspective; that is, one in which “the state” is disaggregated 
into multi-level constituent units wherein political actors at different levels of gov-
ernment compete for their interests.21 When researchers unpack sending states’ 
competing interests in this way, more variation across and within emigrant out-
reach policies may be explained. For example, Gamlen and colleagues have begun 
to typologize sending states’ “diaspora engagement” policies according to whether 
they are more aimed at discursively producing a state-centric diaspora, extend-
ing rights to the diaspora that legitimate sending-state sovereignty, and extracting 
obligations from loyal emigrants abroad.22
Disaggregating (local, state, national) state interests according to these three 
categories eventuates the identification of patterns across diverse sending states 
according to whether emigration policies are more exploitative, generous, or 
engaged in extracting obligations with or without also granting social and political 
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rights to the diaspora living abroad.23 As researchers identify the emigrant/dias-
pora engagement policies that differentially enable and constrain migrants’ inter-
est in developing their countries of origin through the extension of social rights, 
representation, national belonging and citizenship, what Bhagwati has called the 
“web of rights and obligations,”24 we can more easily compare and contrast trans-
national partnerships across more diverse institutional terrains.
The neopluralist state perspective will also necessitate a closer evaluation of 
the domestic political environment across sending countries. This should include 
assessing the extent to which political systems are decentralized, institutions con-
solidated, and state capacity sufficiently coherent bureaucratically to enable pub-
lic-private partnership with organized migrant groups to bloom and succeed. And 
as this book shows, a neopluralist state approach will also need to consider the 
nature of social relations in and across migrant hometowns. In doing so, research-
ers are likely to gain new insights into why some governments have been able 
to formally engage their organized diasporas abroad in various matching grants 
and co-development policies with grassroots migrant associations, and why other 
sending states are more likely to partner with more elite business and nongovern-
ment organizations. A neopluralist, comparative approach would also shed addi-
tional light on why some country cases pursue a more laissez-faire approach to 
emigrant outreach and home country development.25
Beyond Mexico, how migrants pursue public goods initiatives with mini-
mal or no material or symbolic support from public agencies in sending or 
destination countries continues to be an area ripe for further study. There is 
also very little accumulated knowledge concerning how migrant intervention 
in public goods provision across diverse countries of origin produces political 
and development consequences at the subnational and national levels. Research 
shows that migrant HTAs have worked independently and oftentimes at cross- 
purposes with local and state governments, and with the tacit support of sending 
states in the production of infrastructure and social welfare. But how well the 
theoretical framework I present here explains political consequences beyond the 
Mexican case to other country cases with (and without) cofinancing programs 
is as yet unknown.
I hope future scholarship will assess the external validity of the framework I 
offer in other country contexts. In testing the theory across more (or less) demo-
cratic sending and receiving country contexts, ethnically heterogeneous groups 
and migrant classes, for example, the theory may need to be amended to reflect a 
wider constellation of political and social incentives and network ties that govern 
cross-border public-private partnerships. The comparative framework may also 
be used to classify more hybrid forms of transnational public-private partnership 
for development beyond migrant hometown associations to include other kinds of 
migrant actors such as business elites and entrepreneurs and transnational sectar-
ian and religious-based organizations with migrant leadership in countries with 
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substantial emigration and engaged diasporas as diverse as India, China, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Lebanon, Syria, and the Philippines.
As I describe in the introduction, the Mexican case is unique in that the state 
and federal governments developed a social spending program to match migrants’ 
collective resources for community development ends that other emigration states 
have attempted to emulate in a variety of ways. It is as yet unclear how an end to 
the 3x1 Program would affect migrant groups’ ability to finance public goods or 
the extent to which the spillover effects on social capital and civic and political 
engagement would be able to mobilize collection action for public goods provi-
sion, or other objectives, in the absence of the state’s involvement. This question 
will be of importance in the Mexican context as increasing political competition 
at the national level leaves open the question of whether the federal 3x1 Program 
will continue through political party representation in the presidency. As of July 
2018, the PRD will command the presidency for the first time in Mexican political 
history, and relative to other major political parties (PAN and PRI) it is underrep-
resented in coproduction partnerships at the municipal level.
Furthermore, as Hirschman’s principle of conservation and mutation of social 
energy makes clear, collective action in one endeavor, even when it fails, can be 
mobilized for new purposes and political uses in future time periods.26 If the 3x1 
Program and transnational coproduction partnership ceased to exist, the posi-
tive spillovers from more inclusive partnerships such as improved political efficacy 
and interest in politics could be transformed and used in alternative participatory 
spheres at a later date and for other purposes. The long-term consequences of 
migrant partnerships for local democracy remain to be seen.
CIVIL SO CIET Y,  SO CIAL AC C OUNTABILIT Y,  AND 
TR ANSNATIONAL C OPRODUCTION
Beyond the role that democracy—narrowly understood as elections—has on gov-
ernment performance, this research shows how nonelectoral modes of engage-
ment affect democratic quality. Political participation, which includes a range of 
activities that have the intent or effect of influencing government action either 
directly by affecting the making or implementation of policy or indirectly by 
influencing the selection of people who make those policies, also improves gov-
ernment responsiveness.27 Through pestering, protesting, petitioning, and copro-
ducing public works with public agencies, resident and extraterritorial citizens 
work to improve their lot in life. These participatory strategies can be complemen-
tary to robust political competition,28 and these strategies influence local govern-
ment responsiveness directly when migrant-state coproduction is synergetic and 
ongoing.29 When citizens and migrant groups assume more than the “watchdog” 
function, they break the state’s monopoly on the responsibility of public goods 
provision and directly participate in this core function of local government.30 
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Being open to the role of migrant coproducer explains changes in political and 
civic participation even in places where we would expect substantial emigration to 
have more depressing effects.
Coproduction partnerships also serve as an additional collective mechanism 
in the provision of public goods and services, but when they approximate synergy 
they also expand the institutional terrain in which citizens and local representatives 
deliberate to solve local problems through nonelectoral channels. External social 
groups like migrant hometown associations mobilize new networks of engage-
ment and collective action across the public-private “divide.”31 These inclusive 
and engaging public-private partnerships generate alternative locales for negotia-
tions about the distribution of resources. Synergetic migrant-state coproduction 
improves development, but it also introduces new mechanisms of accountability 
through social action.
Social accountability refers to a broad range of actions beyond voting that citi-
zens, communities, and civic society organizations can use to hold government 
officials and bureaucrats accountable.32 The range of activities include citizen 
participation in public policy making, participatory budgeting, public expendi-
ture tracking, monitoring public service delivery, advisory boards, lobbying, and 
advocacy campaigns. Citizens’ direct involvement in managing public resources, 
selecting projects designed to meet their needs, and monitoring the implementa-
tion of projects is a novel mode of political participation that can be an effective 
means of exacting social accountability that is complementary to electoral institu-
tions of formal political accountability, especially when they are weak or absent.33
Electoral competition is a major mechanism of organizational “recuperation,” 
although voice is another significant alternative to this mechanism and can come 
into play either when political competition is unavailable or as a complement to it. 
Choosing projects, finalizing budgets, developing technical plans, and obtaining 
appropriate permits, for example, are not without the normal complications that 
accompany decision-making among multiple actors—coproduction partnerships 
are an arena for both contestation and compromise. How migrant clubs position 
themselves vis-a-vis the state and how the local state positions itself vis-a-vis the 
citizenry have important consequences for state-society relations. These kinds of 
messy processes are what we should expect in local democracies where citizens 
and political representatives are learning to interact in some places for the first 
time after protracted authoritarian rule. Negotiating mechanisms that incorpo-
rate the voices of more marginalized groups is the very essence of democratic 
decision-making.
But what of migrant sending communities and countries of origin in which a 
weak state is incapable or unwilling to provide even the most basic public good: 
public security? I focus exclusively on public infrastructure and social welfare 
provision and only discuss one case of a failed partnership in which a corrupt, 
weak local-state apparatus led to the demise of the transnational partnership in 
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the context of rising violence related to the drug trade. There are many countries 
around the world in which a weak and predatory state is anathema to external 
social actors’ involvement in state functions and the introduction of new forms of 
social accountability. What does the transnational public provision of goods and 
services look like in places where social order is not a given? The Mexican case 
provides another window into these questions after 2006 in which rising violence 
spread in the central western plateau states with high levels of migration.
RISING VIOLENCE,  MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE,  AND 
PUBLIC GO ODS PROVISION
On January 2, 2016, Gisela Mota was murdered by four armed gunmen in her 
home one day after being sworn in as mayor of Temixco, Morelos. Four weeks into 
her campaign, Aidé Nava González, a mayoral candidate for the municipality of 
Ahuacuotzingo, Guerrero, was decapitated and left with a narcomanta, a warning 
message, directed at other political candidates. This was after González’s husband, 
Francisco Quiñónez Ramírez, who was the mayor of Ahuacuotzingo from 2009 
to 2012, announced his plans to run again and was murdered in 2014 ahead of 
the election. Three weeks after Rogelio Sánchez Galán won the mayoral election 
in Jerecuaro, Guanajuato, he was shot dead at a bus stop. The list goes on and on. 
Over the last decade, hired killers called sicarios have killed more than 100 mayors 
and mayoral candidates, making Mexico the third-highest country with assassi-
nated mayors in the world.34
Drug-related violence in Mexico escalated in 2006 after Panista president 
Calderón announced a militarized war on the drug cartels. Cartels have been 
competing for territory, fighting for political power, and scouring new sources 
of revenue throughout Mexico in response to the crackdown on the drug trade. 
Migratory flows, remittance transfers, and transnational partnerships have not 
been immune to the rise in drug-related violence throughout the country. Many 
individuals, families, and HTAs have responded in strategic albeit different ways. 
In some cases, migrants have diverted their remittance resources earned abroad 
away from public infrastructure and community development projects and toward 
financing public security and social order, a different and essential public good. In 
others, HTAs ceased to invest transnationally in their communities of origin when 
security concerns became too threatening.
Migrants in the U.S. have had to adapt their investment strategies in Mexico 
in response to drug-related violence. When the Los Rojos in Morelos, Knights 
Templar (KTO) in Michoacán, and the Jalisco New Generation cartels, among 
others, identified municipal government coffers as new opportunities to control 
resources, cofinancing public goods with migrant groups was imperiled. In addi-
tion to extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and the drug trade, criminal organiza-
tions started to compete for political control of municipal government. The gangs 
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that worked for the larger cartel organizations threatened and murdered mayoral 
candidates and mayors in office were sent somber warnings of what would happen 
when they do not comply with the cartel’s demands.
Additionally, cartels and gangs associated with larger criminal networks forced 
mayors to yield percentages of their annual budgets to them, which affected their 
fiscal capacity to provide public goods including public security, public infrastruc-
ture, and social welfare independently and in cooperation with migrant HTAs. 
Cartels have also demanded contracts for building public projects and the selec-
tion of municipal police chiefs. Servando “La Tuta” Gómez, former leader of the 
KTO cartel before his capture in 2015, was known to meet face to face with may-
ors to make his demands. In other egregious cases, individuals who were directly 
affiliated with the cartels became municipal mayors. While in office they report-
edly ordered the assassinations of individuals of the political opposition and of 
other individuals with whom they had personal vendettas. The mayors were also 
alleged to have siphoned public resources to fund the KTO in the municipalities 
of Parácuaro, Aguililla, Apatzingán and Tacámbaro, Michoacán.35 News articles, 
photos, videos, and eyewitness testimony suggest this also became common prac-
tice across municipalities in southern Jalisco and Guanajuato as early as 2012. 
Cartel competition for political control of local government has sown terror across 
municipalities in Mexico and disrupted political officials’ interest and capacity to 
provide public works with and without migrant groups.
The rise and horror of La Violencia throughout Mexico has direct and indirect 
effects on the local governance of public goods and migrant transnational partner-
ships as the case of Santa Catarina shows. Migrant families have been murdered 
and targeted for kidnappings in which gangs demanded remittances as ransoms. 
Public insecurity and generalized fear have thwarted civic engagement as citizens 
have opted to stay safe by keeping low profiles and out of public spaces. This fear 
has depressed community participation generally and in transnational partner-
ships, specifically. Migrant leadership of hometown associations in high crime 
areas has also halted coproduction activities in response to the rise in criminal 
organizations and violence in hometown communities. Until some migrant lead-
ers feel conditions have improved and their activities will not put residents and 
paisanos in harm’s way, many choose to suspend coproduction partnerships with 
public agencies.
Furthermore, my discussions with migrant leaders of HTAs in Guanajuato and 
Jalisco reveal that criminal organizations have seized upon the 3x1 Program to 
extract revenue.36 Extracting a percentage of the matching funds from migrant, 
municipal, state, and federal partners, cartels and their gang affiliates have identi-
fied the federal program as a lucrative revenue stream. Local gangs require bribes 
for the completion of 3x1 projects as well as kickbacks from labor and building 
contractors hired for coproduction projects. In other cases, criminal organizations 
have required municipal officials and migrants to inflate the cost of 3x1 projects at 
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the project proposal stage and then skimmed the money directly from the munici-
pal treasury once it has been deposited by coproduction partners. Finally, some 
municipal administrators have fabricated HTAs, referred to informally as “ghost 
clubs,” to propose public goods projects and then delivered matching funds directly 
to criminal organizations. Since 2012 and likely before, the 3x1 Program has been 
co-opted by criminal organizations in some Mexican municipalities, especially in 
those in southern Guanajuato, Jalisco, Morelos, Michoacán, and Guerrero, which 
has discouraged the formation and continuation of many coproduction partner-
ships. And as the case of Santa Catarina shows, violence has also affected the orga-
nization of partnerships through its impact on the level of community inclusion 
and government engagement in the 3x1 Program.
How drug-related violence and public security concerns systematically impact 
partnerships is a known unknown. In many cases, HTAs temporarily stop their 
efforts and take a “wait and see” approach. In one of the synergetic partnerships 
I present in this book, a municipal official was allegedly extorted by the KTO in 
2013, which demanded a percentage of matching funds destined for public works 
projects through the 3x1 Program. Since gang leadership changed so frequently, 
paisanos had trouble identifying who the culprit was and the extent to which the 
continuation of 3x1 projects put members of their club and the public works com-
mittee in danger. In response, they decided to “lay low” until a new municipal 
administration came into power. In the meantime, the club sought out alterna-
tive state and federal programs to the 3x1 Program to finance social welfare in the 
hometown in less conspicuous ways.
By contrast, in other cases, especially in the state of Michoacán where the KTO 
has savagely attacked municipal authorities and migrant families, citizens have 
said enough is enough. In hard-hit regions where the state has failed to ensure 
public security and social order, locals and migrants abroad have taken up arms 
in the collective struggle against violence and property seizure. HTAs have also 
diversified their activities to support autodefensas in Mexico. Autodefensas are 
self-defense public security forces akin to militias that use violence to challenge 
criminal organizations themselves. Leaders and members of the autodefensas 
movement have links to migration and hometown associations.37 For example, the 
leader of the militia movement in Michoacán, Jose Manuel Mireles, is a former 
migrant from Sacramento, California, who returned to fight the militias when 
migrants’ wives and schoolgirls as young as 12 years old were being systemati-
cally raped by KTO members. The second in command, Antonio Torres Gonzalez, 
who is known as “El Americano” because he was born in the U.S., joined Mireles’s 
militia after he was kidnapped on an annual visit to his hometown and held for 
$150,000 ransom. Many members of autodefensas are migrants who have returned 
to their hometowns voluntarily or forcibly by the U.S. government through depor-
tation and taken up arms for income or for revenge against the cartels who have 
terrorized families in their hometowns.
Paradox of Cross-Border Politics    207
Many migrant returnees, individuals deported from the U.S., and leaders of 
hometown associations in conjunction with nonmigrant citizens have mobilized 
in response to the violence plaguing their communities. Since HTAs are unable to 
cofinance public security measures through the 3x1 Program, many associations 
have chosen to fund the militias using collective remittances in lieu of investment 
in public infrastructure and social welfare projects. Since their formation, these 
militias have been effective at disrupting the KTO’s operations and restoring some 
social order, efforts the Mexican military and local and state police forces have 
been unable to do in many high migration areas around the country.
Working together, migrants and residents have been effective at regaining some 
social order through transnational collective action. In response to the rise in vio-
lence and weak state capacity to supply public security and enforcement, migrants 
have mobilized the skills, remittance resources, and social network connections 
facilitated by public-private partnerships to invest time, energy, and resources 
away from public infrastructure and social welfare provision and toward the 
provision of public security. The role of migrant civic associations, transnational 
partnerships, and return migration has important implications for the study of 
public goods provision and state capacity. Researchers must focus attention on 
how endowments of social capital created by transnational collective action affect 
state capacity and public insecurity in conflict and postconflict states in Mexico 
and beyond. And because there is the possibility that armed militia, including 
autodefensas, may “turn bad,” researchers will need to better interrogate how inter-
national migration and remittances enable and constrain threats to public security 
and social order.
The Mexican case also calls attention to more general concerns about the like-
lihood of achieving development and public goods provision that improves citi-
zens’ quality of life in weak states. As migrant remittances surpass $600 billion 
worldwide with over $400 billion flowing directly to developing countries in 2016, 
many in the donor community are celebrating remittance-led development as the 
next solution to underdevelopment. Additionally, participatory development and 
cogovernance arrangement made possible by the range of nonstate actors and 
intermediary institutions involved in public goods provision have filled in where 
market failures and state provision left many without a modicum of social welfare. 
But remittance-led participatory development faces extreme obstacles if states 
cannot even ensure public security and social order. For migration to have positive 
effects on public goods provision and local democracy through cross-border col-
lective action, the state must be willing and able to restore security. If not, the col-
lective action and financial and social resources mobilized for development may 
next be used to challenge the state for authority in other public domains. It may 
also be used for transnational social mobilization to resist home country regimes 
as migrants from Syria, Yemen, and other countries did with varying levels of suc-




Comparative Fieldwork in Mexico
In chapters 3, 4, and 5, I traced the micro-foundations of transnational partnerships across 
six cases. Cases, in this context, refer to different transnational partnerships between mi-
grant hometown associations and municipal governments in Mexico. In each of the cases, 
I analyzed the process through which one or more public goods projects were completed 
with cofinancing from the Mexican municipal, state, and federal governments and migrant 
club partners in the 3x1 Program. The central objective of the case studies was to trace how 
local social and political factors shaped community inclusion and government engagement 
over time and combined to produce different organizational types of coproduction. Since 
I was in each town for only a few months, in addition to firsthand observations, informal 
chats, and in-depth interviews with key actors, I also conducted retrospective interviews 
with relevant migrant, citizen, and political actors. This combination of data collection in 
real-time and actors’ reflections on previous projects helped me to develop a more complete 
picture of how the coproduction process transpired over time.
I selected six cases for in-depth fieldwork that exhibited variation on both community 
inclusion and government engagement. The multi-sited, comparative fieldwork occurred 
in the states of Jalisco (Comarga and Santa Catarina), Guanajuato (Ahuacatl and Selvillo), 
and Zacatecas (Telepi). Four partnership cases were in four different municipalities, but in 
one of the municipalities in Jalisco, I studied two transnational partnerships in different 
localities in the same municipality. Originally, I planned to only study a partnership based 
in Atitlan, a locality located outside the county seat of the municipality of Comarga, but 
during my fieldwork, locals and political officials recommended I visit another locality that 
also had a migrant club that formed at the same time but had gone through a different ex-
perience during the coproduction process. This proved to be a fruitful, albeit spontaneous 
addition to the analysis. Since I studied variation in partnerships within one municipality, 
government engagement was held constant, but the level of community inclusion varied 
substantially across the partnerships. The case comparison in two different localities in the 
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same municipality showed me why and how migrant social embeddedness varied, led to 
different kinds of community inclusion, and resulted in different partnership types and 
political effects.
First and foremost, the cases selected for fieldwork exhibited variation in levels of 
community inclusion and government engagement according to how migrant leadership 
responded to questions in the original transnational survey. The survey included several 
questions about the frequency with which local residents participated in the selection of 
projects, volunteered their labor, contributed resources, monitored projects during and af-
ter implementation, and interacted with municipal officials. The survey also asked about 
when and how the club came together, sociodemographic characteristics of migrant club 
leadership, and included several questions about the involvement of municipal government 
officials. These and other survey questions provided an indication of the extent of local 
government and resident involvement in the coproduction process, and information about 
migrant club capacity, structure, and membership size. To complement this data, I also 
collected sociodemographic, fiscal, political, and 3x1 Program characteristics for each mu-
nicipality in which a migrant club reported coproduction activities. I evaluated how levels 
of migration and poverty, state capacity (municipal tax revenues), political party affiliation, 
and population size varied across partnership cases. Additionally, I analyzed 3x1 Program 
data for each partnership case including the number and types of projects, budget expendi-
tures, and frequency of program participation. I used all of the data from multiple sources 
to formulate a comprehensive profile of 250 transnational partnerships that represented 
clubs that took the survey.
Once I had complete data for all the survey respondents and their corresponding mu-
nicipalities and localities of origin, I stratified the sample based on the composite indices 
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FIGURE 7. DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BY PARTNERSHIP TYPE 
Figure 7. Schematic table showing the distribution of comparative case studies by transna-
tional partnership type.
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I created for community inclusion and government engagement (see Data Appendix C). 
Next, using difference of means tests, I analyzed whether political, fiscal, and sociodemo-
graphic characteristics were correlated with levels of community inclusion and government 
engagement. I identified cases that had different combinations of community inclusion and 
government engagement and analyzed whether levels of poverty, local-bureaucratic capac-
ity, party affiliation of the municipal incumbent, population size, migration intensity, club 
capacity, method of club formation, and leadership characteristics were statistically related 
to the inclusion and engagement indices using t-tests and ANOVA. Finally, I selected a 
group of partnerships that varied in their levels of community inclusion and government 
engagement but represented the average case in terms of the survey sample respondents that 
had high and low levels. I then contacted the club leaders and asked follow-up questions 
about their survey participation and discussed my plans to conduct fieldwork in Mexico.
On a preliminary trip, I visited several municipalities to assess the feasibility of more 
extended fieldwork. Based on observations and discussions with key informants, I selected 
five municipalities in Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and Jalisco, three traditional high-migration 
states, to conduct comparative case analysis. Initially, I hoped to conduct fieldwork in Mi-
choacán and Durango, but during my discussions with migrant club leaders and local infor-
mants, I was persuaded that the uptick in violence in these states made it unsafe for me to 
stay in the towns. In addition to the five municipalities I discuss at length in the chapters, I 
also made trips to San Luis Potosí and Colima to visit two municipalities for a few days that 
had active and failed transnational partnerships.
The partnerships and their places of origin ultimately selected for fieldwork shared sev-
eral similarities. First, they were all municipalities that had similar levels and history of 
migration intensity. In all but one municipality, there was a history of migration dating back 
to the Bracero period (1942–64), and a spike in migration during the late 1980s and early 
1990s in response to macroeconomic crises and the downturn in agricultural production. 
In all of the municipalities of origin, migration intensity according to the INEGI index that 
accounts for the percent of households with a migrant abroad, return migration, household 
remittances, and circular migration was classified as “medium” or “high.” In many cases, 
between 10 and 50 percent of households in the county seat or locality had received remit-
tances from the United States in the five-year period between 2000 and 2005.
Second, in all of the partnerships, the migrant club reported similar levels of club ca-
pacity, meaning the club had a core group of dedicated club members, ability to fundraise 
collective resources from paisanos, and an organizational structure for decision-making. 
Additionally, a few of the clubs were members of a state-level federation of migrant clubs 
in which information was exchanged between migrant club leaders that helped improve 
fundraising and navigating bureaucratic paperwork involved in the 3x1 Program. More-
over, most of the migrant club leaders had benefitted from the passage of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 and either became lawful permanent residents (LPRs) 
themselves or another member of the club leadership circle was an LPR and able to traverse 
the U.S.-Mexican border with relative ease. In most cases, the clubs selected for in-depth 
analysis had all formed in the early 2000s, except for the case of Familias de Telepi, which 
formed in the early 1990s. Finally, most of the club leaders had been in the U.S. for 10 years 
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the chapters. Leadership educational attainment was not correlated with either community 
inclusion or government engagement.
Finally, I examined hometowns with high or medium levels of poverty as measured by 
the Mexican census’s marginalization index. I use the language of hometown in this con-
text because in some partnership cases, projects benefitted the entire municipality (Telepi 
and Santa Catarina), but in others, the partnership coproduced public goods for a locality 
outside the county seat (Ahuacatl, Atitlan, El Mirador, El Cerrito). The marginalization in-
dex accounted for the percent of households with dirt floors, illiteracy, access to water and 
electricity, income that was two standard deviations below the mean household income, 
and other factors in the year 2000. In all of the municipalities of origin, marginalization 
was classified as “medium” or “low,” but the localities were worse off and were classified 
as having “high” or “medium” levels of poverty. I indicate the poverty classification for the 
relevant geography in Table 1. I allowed other characteristics to vary across transnational 
partnership type including level of political competition, party affiliation of the incumbent 
between 2008 and 2010, club membership size, population size, government capacity to 
provide public goods, and U.S. city where the migrant club was based. There was no clear 
statistical relationship between community inclusion and government engagement and 
these characteristics. Nonetheless, I selected cases where there was some variation on these 
indicators in the event there was more to be gleaned about how these characteristics shaped 
partnerships while I was in the field.
The six cases selected for fieldwork approximate different combinations of community 
inclusiveness and government engagement and organize transnational partnerships into 
four types—synergetic (high/high), substitutive (high/low), corporatist (low/high), and 
fragmented (low/low). The cases provide an example of each kind of partnership, but be-
cause interactions and relationships forged between migrant, political, and local actors were 
ongoing, the degree of community inclusiveness and government engagement sometimes 
changed. In each case, I highlight (chapters 3 and 4) how and why the two main factors 
that organized the partnerships increased and decreased over time and approximated more 
intermediate partnership forms. I did not conduct in-depth analysis of a “pure” substitutive 
partnership type. Initially, I selected the case of Telepi to investigate substitutive copro-
duction since at the time the migrant club leader who completed the survey responded 
that they exhibited low levels of government engagement and higher levels of community 
inclusion. However, I learned during my fieldwork more about the history of transnational 
coproduction in the hometown and how political party turnover disrupted a six-year syner-
getic partnership. I was able to observe in real-time the breakdown of a synergetic partner-
ship to a substitutive partnership as a result of local political conditions and chose the case 
for that reason.
Moreover, I selected the case of El Cerrito as emblematic of a synergetic partnership but 
learned during fieldwork that the case was best described as substitutive up to the year prior 
to my arrival in the town. I was able to witness firsthand how an increase in community 
inclusion led to increased government engagement, and the improvement in citizen-state 
relations and political participation that occurred as a direct result.
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Transnational Matched Survey 
Data Instrument
The Mexican government maintains a database of immigrant organizations updated annu-
ally at the Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME).1 When HTAs propose 3x1 projects, either 
individual HTAs or the state-level federations, they are members of register with the IME. 
The IME collects contact information for each club and federation, which is available for 
public use. In September 2008, we contacted every registered HTA in the database. Of the 
3,000 organizations listed, 800 self-identified as hometown clubs, and of those, 500 clubs 
had correct contact information. We contacted all 500 clubs by telephone to verify mailing 
address, explain the purpose of the survey, answer questions, and encourage club leaders 
to participate.2 After the initial round of calls, 500 active and inactive clubs with correct 
contact information were sent a hard-copy mail survey and small gift of appreciation. The 
total number of failed-to-contact potential respondents was 250. Of those failed-to-contact 
respondents, we identified approximately 80 clubs that existed “on paper” but did not have 
any membership or activities. These so-called “ghost clubs” were not targeted for the survey. 
For those clubs that did not wish to provide a home mailing address but wanted to par-
ticipate in the survey, an exact copy of the mail survey was electronically administered to 
migrant club leaders through the Survey Monkey application online tool.
Surveys were mailed to prospective HTA respondents over a five-week period with a 
short break during the general presidential election in November 2008. Throughout this 
period, the University of Chicago Survey Lab telephoned prospective respondents again to 
confirm receipt of the survey, encourage participation, and answer questions. Surveys were 
collected through July 2009 with a 50 percent response rate (n = 250).3 To assess whether 
the population of survey respondents was systematically different from the population of 
attempt-to- contact nonrespondents, I conducted difference of means tests on socioeco-
nomic indicators based on the nonrespondent contact addresses. For example, I examined 
whether poverty, foreign-born population, and population density based on the listed zip 
code of the potential respondent revealed whether those who did not respond to the survey 
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were more likely to be in poorer locales, more rural areas, or lived in places with less for-
eign-born population. Data for the statistical tests was collected from the American Com-
munities Survey. Statistical tests on these indicators did not reveal sampling bias.
Additionally, some of the HTA respondents we contacted reported that their clubs were 
no longer active. I recontacted leaders of clubs that reported failed or stalled partnerships 
to better understand the nature of partnership collapse. Respondents were also given the 
option to call me or the survey lab to provide more detailed information about club activi-
ties. I purchased a cellular phone exclusively for survey respondents to call and discuss the 
survey or anything else they wanted to discuss about cross-border participation. About 50 
club leaders called during the dissemination period of the survey. On several occasions, 
these calls led to longer, more formal telephone interviews that lasted from 30 minutes to 
over an hour.
The survey asked questions about when, where, and why the club formed, sociodemo-
graphic characteristics of club leadership, membership, and organizational structure, and 
experiences providing public goods and services in Mexican hometowns. Additionally, I 
also asked about the geographic location of the Mexican hometown where the club sup-
ported development projects and the U.S. destination where the majority of club members 
lived. Geographic information on the sending and receiving places in the U.S. and Mexico 
presented an opportunity to match club-level data in transnational space, so to speak. Situ-
ating the club in the transnational dyad of sending and receiving place allowed me to create 
a global picture of the club. Using the panel dataset described in chapter 6 and Appendix D 
and additional data collected from the American Communities Survey from the U.S. Cen-
sus, I compiled information about each Mexican municipality of origin and U.S. city where 
the respondent club was situated.
The transnational matched survey sample contains respondents from 24 of Mexico’s 31 
states (about half from Jalisco, Zacatecas, Guanajuato, and Michoacán) as well as the federal 
district. Survey respondent clubs were located in half of U.S. states (25) and the majority 
were based in the traditional immigrant receiving states of California, Texas, and Illinois. 
While three quarters of the sample formed after 2002, 17 percent of the sample formed be-
tween 1990 and 2001, and 6 percent before 1990.4
One of the limitations of the original transnational survey is the selection method for 
identifying migrant hometown associations engaged in remittance-funded public goods 
projects. I selected potential respondents from the universe of clubs that officially registered 
with IME at Mexican consulates and self-identified as a migrant hometown club, about 800 
clubs total in 2008. However, by some estimates, this number only represents between a 
quarter and half of all migrant clubs in existence at the time. There are a few notable impli-
cations of this selection problem in need of more discussion.
First, it is likely the case that smaller, more informal clubs that are more likely to au-
tonomously invest resources in origin locales are less likely to register with the IME because 
development projects are not coordinated with any level of the sending state. It is also likely 
the case that clubs that were more fragmented or only participated in coproduction part-
nerships once would be less likely to register with the consulate. As such, more substitutive 
and fragmented cases would be underrepresented in the IME database and censored by the 
selection protocol I used to identify survey participants.
Second, clubs from Oaxaca and Chiapas where the traditional system of self-governance 
called usos y costumbres is practiced may not have registered their clubs at the same rate 
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as club from other states where this form of government is less practiced. In traditional 
systems of self-government, the separation between government, civil society, and ethno-
religious institutions including the cargo system are not neat. There would be less formal 
government participation and thus less need to register the transnational partnership with 
IME. The underrepresentation of clubs from Oaxaca and other usos y costumbres origin lo-
cales may likely bias the recording of synergetic partnerships. Given these real-world limi-
tations, the identification and selection of migrant clubs from the IME database for partici-
pation in the survey was the best option in order to contact as many clubs as possible. That 
being said, it is an imperfect club selection strategy and likely biases the results toward more 
formal clubs with greater club capacity and those from traditional municipalities governed 
by elected representatives from organized political parties.
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Principal Component and Cluster 
Analysis Using Survey Data
In chapter 6, I assessed how transnational partnerships were organized and whether syn-
ergetic, corporatist, substitutive, and fragmented partnerships were more likely associated 
with more civic and political participation and government responsiveness. I asked whether 
the interaction of community inclusion and government engagement organized coproduc-
tion in the forms hypothesized and assessed if different partnerships were linked to observ-
able political outcomes. In addition to the two central factors organizing coproduction, 
the chapter also paid special attention to the ways in which HTA club capacity may have 
affected transnational partnerships. I relaxed the assumption that HTA club capacity was 
constant and analyzed how differences across HTAs affected community inclusion and gov-
ernment engagement as well as the possibility that club capacity had an independent effect 
on the formation of coproduction types. Table 2 presents select descriptive statistics of the 
survey sample.
PRINCIPAL C OMPONENT ANALYSIS
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a mathematical procedure for transforming a num-
ber of possibly correlated variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables called 
principal components.1 PCA identifies a linear combination of variables that maximizes the 
variance from the selected variables. The objective of the technique is to reduce the number 
of highly correlated variables to a smaller number of principal components without sacri-
ficing information. Since both community inclusion and government engagement are mul-
tidimensional conceptual constructs approximated by several variables, the PCA technique 
simplifies the number of variables into a composite index, making it easier to compare 
values in a cross-section of Mexican migrant hometown associations.
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C ONSTRUCTING THE C OMMUNIT Y INCLUSION PRINCIPAL C OMPONENT
The survey asked questions about how migrant clubs integrated local citizens into the co-
production process with the Mexican government. Questions asked migrant clubs how 
often local citizens in the hometown: (1) volunteered labor; (2) helped select projects; (3) 
donated resources (monetary or in-kind); (4) monitored projects during and after imple-
mentation; (5) discussed project-related activities with municipal officials (i.e., hiring la-
borers and contractors, timelines, technical plans); (6) participated in local committees or 
mirror clubs (clubes espejo); (7) were involved in the creation of the HTA; and the extent 
to which (8) the HTA perceived problems working with local citizens and citizen groups; 
and (9) whether other social, religious, business, and civic associations were involved in the 
provision of public goods with the HTA. Survey questions related to community inclusion 
were then transformed into consistent forms to conduct PCA, positively coded,2 and tested 
for internal consistency.3
C ONSTRUCTING THE GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT PRINCIPAL 
C OMPONENT
I also evaluated different dimensions of government engagement using survey questions and 
data from the Mexican panel municipal database (see Data Appendix D). Since sometimes 
more than one HTA participated in coproduction in a given year, each survey respondent 
club name was matched against the 3x1 Program dataset and only the corresponding club 
information was extracted. Survey questions used to approximate government engage-
ment included questions about municipal government involvement in and frequency of 
(1) selecting projects; (2) creating the migrant club; (3) providing matching funds and proj-
ect materials in a timely manner; (4) problems working with the municipal government; 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Transnational Survey.
  Summary Statistics
  Mean SD Min Max
Index
 Community Inclusion 2.498 1.119 1 4
 Government Engagement 2.502 1.127 1 4
 Club Capacity 2.512 1.118 1 4
Sociodemographic 
 Poverty Index –0.555 0.702 –1.993 3.192
 International Migration Index 0.879 0.936 –1.031 3.689
Politics
 Margin of Victory 24.48 17.51 0.681 99.81
 Effective Number of Parties 2.473 0.556 1 4.061
 Voter Turnout 53.39 10.07 12.15 75.40
Observations 250
Source: Calculations using data sourced from original survey, INEGI Simbad, INE, Conapo, and Sedesol.
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(5) matching 25 percent or more of total project costs; and (6) failure to successfully com-
plete coproduction projects.4 The survey also asked whether the HTA survey respondent 
was able to (7) access officials; (8) participate in decision-making; and (9) influence ne-
gotiations with municipal officials. Questions and variables related to municipal govern-
ment engagement were transformed into consistent forms, positively coded, and tested for 
internal consistency. The specific linear combination of these variables used to create the 
community inclusion and government engagement indices are housed on my professional 
website, but not included in the appendix due to space constraints.
For both inclusion and engagement, the variance explained by the first (main) compo-
nent is substantial (eigenvalues >1). This means that the first component explains more vari-
ance than any of the individual variables that helped construct the index. The eigenvalue 
thus reports the index of strength of each component. Using the main component for each 
index, which is a continuous number, I next transformed the index into a categorical vari-
able based on different cut points or levels based on deviance from the mean value of the 
index. For example, if the survey respondent’s government engagement level was 1.5 (out of 
a maximum of 4), engagement would be considered “low.” If another survey respondent’s 
engagement score was 3.5, the engagement score would be coded “high.” I tested several 
different cut points including both tertile (low, medium, and high) and quartile cut points 
(very low, low, high, very high). There is very little difference in how the data clustered 
when using tertile or quartile cut points. In the interest of ease of interpretation, I used a 
quartile cut point to signal low and high levels of inclusion and engagement. Low and high 
scores for each index are based on whether the continuous component is above or below 
the mean value.
C ONSTRUCTING THE HOMETOWN ASSO CIATION CLUB CAPACIT Y 
PRINCIPAL C OMPONENT
Several survey questions asked respondent HTAs about club leadership characteristics, 
organizational structure and decision-making, and club activities that approximated club 
capacity.5 Sociodemographic questions included: (1) employment status; (2) marital status; 
(3) educational attainment; and (4) number of years living uninterrupted in the U.S. for 
each migrant club leader completing the survey.6 I included additional questions in the 
index that related to club organizational structure including whether the club (5) invested 
in public works project independently (e.g., without cofinancing from the local, state, or 
federal government); (6) had membership in a state-level federation of migrant clubs; 
and the club’s (7) the total membership base size; (8) number of core, active leaders; (9) 
method of club decision-making and leadership selection (for example, by informal con-
sensus, committee, or formal voting process); and (10) whether the club modeled any 
aspect of their associational activities by watching or learning from other migrant clubs. 
Finally, the club capacity index included indicators of how frequently the club (11) met to 
discuss club affairs and (12) fundraised. The PCA shows that the main component of the 
HTA club capacity index explained a substantial proportion of the variance (eigenvalues 
>1). Using the continuous component, I created categorical variables from a quartile cut 
representing levels of HTA club capacity in a similar fashion as community inclusion and 
government engagement.
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CLUSTER ANALYSIS  USING PRINCIPAL C OMPONENT S
Cluster analysis is a technique to identify groupings or clusters of observational data. The 
technique determines groups based on information found in the data that describes data 
points and their relationships. The clusters that form from the data reflect how similar the 
data points are to one another within each distinct cluster and how different the data points 
are from the objects in other clusters groups. In the survey sample, levels of community 
inclusion and government engagement for each HTA respondent served as the individual 
data points. The greater the similarity within a group (the distance or tightness between 
points) and difference between groups, the more distinct the clustering.7 When clusters are 
tighter the researcher can be more confident that the cluster represents something mean-
ingful, in this case, transnational coproduction types.
I used a “kmeans” (nonhierarchical) cluster analysis and examined the formation of 
clusters of coproduction types based on the interactions of different values of community 
inclusion and government engagement. Specifically, this method determined if clusters of 
coproduction types emerged from the survey data and approximated synergy and frag-
mentation, which reflect “extreme” values of inclusion and engagement, as well as two in-
termediary partnership types, corporatist and substitutive, which reflected variable levels 
(high/low, low/high) of inclusion and engagement. Kmeans clustering is called a centroid 
approach. A centroid approach uses an algorithm (kmeans algorithm) to cluster data points 
by a single mean vector. In other words, each data point belongs to the cluster with the 
nearest mean value. Since I had theoretical expectations that community inclusion and 
Figure 8. Elbow method displaying four stable clusters. Source: Kmeans calculations 
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government engagement produced four main partnerships types, kmeans clustering was a 
more appropriate method than other clustering approaches.8
In the cluster analysis, I observed how different values of community inclusion and gov-
ernment engagement clustered together in combinations that approximate the four orga-
nizational types: synergetic (high/high), fragmented (low/low), corporatist (low/high), and 
substitutive (high/low). In this application, the (k) number of groups specified the number 
of clusters detected in the observations. Four clusters may be inappropriate, however, if more 
(or less) coproduction types existed in the data. I ran several diagnostics to determine the 
most appropriate number of k  clusters: the rule of thumb method (square root of n/2), elbow 
method (minimizes the within sum of squares such that all points in each cluster are very 
close), and silhouette method (using the difference between the within-cluster tightness and 
separations from the rest). After I ran the cluster analysis several times with each method to 
achieve stability (about 10 times), four clusters repeatedly emerged in the data.9 Even when I 
relaxed the categories from high/low to high/medium/low, four stable clusters that mimicked 
hypothesized transnational types clustered in the data. I present the elbow method diagram 
showing four main clusters in Figure 8.
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS EX AMINING THE POLITICAL 
C ONSEQUENCES OF PARTNERSHIP T YPES USING TR ANSNATIONAL 
SURVEY DATA
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for each transnational partnership type that emerged 
from the cluster analysis. Using the panel data from chapter 6, I matched the Mexican mu-
nicipality with the survey respondent and analyzed how the club’s most recent 3x1 project 
period correlated with changes in political participation measured by the percent of the 
voting-age population casting a ballot in the next municipal election year and govern-
ment responsiveness measured by municipal spending on public works (per capita) and 
municipal public works spending as a share of total budget spending. Since the municipal 
panel data was time-series, I observed political indicators before, during, and after the pe-
riod in which coproduction occurred that allowed me to create indicators for public works 
spending changes and voter turnout changes over the project observation period. Since 
both dependent variables were continuous, I used standard OLS estimations and included 
state-fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobservable factors at the state level. These 
data are not presented due to space constraints, but they are available in the online supple-
mentary file on my professional website for download or by request.
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Mexican Panel Data, Mexican Family 
Life Survey, and Statistical Analyses
MEASURING TR ANSNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS WITH 3X1 PRO GR AM DATA
Using the Sedesol 3x1 Program database, I constructed four measures of municipal partici-
pation in the 3x1 Program. Measuring program participation was not a straightforward en-
deavor in the context of the 3x1 Program since there was neither uniform start time across 
program participants nor continual participation by each municipality. Mexican munici-
palities started, stopped, and reentered the program annually throughout the observation 
period. These measures permitted a closer examination of temporal dynamics of 3x1 partic-
ipation. For example, I assessed the municipal effects of participation, electoral-cycle effects 
of participation (shorter term effects), and cumulative participation (effects accumulating 
over a longer time period). Municipal elections in Mexico are staggered across states every 
three years.
The first major measure (“program treatment”) was the baseline indicator for the treat-
ment effect, that is, participation in the 3x1 Program. “Program treatment” was a dichoto-
mous variable taking the value of 1 if a municipality participated in the program at least 
once between 2002 and 2013, and zero otherwise. The second major indicator of program 
participation reflected short-run effects of program participation (“electoral cycle”). Three 
treatment variables represent whether the municipality participated at any point in the 
present electoral cycle (current cycle), the previous electoral cycle (last three years), and 
the previous electoral cycle before that (last six years). I did not report the cycle models, 
but the results are available to interested readers upon request. Finally, since municipali-
ties entered and exited the program annually, the last treatment indicator was a continu-
ous variable (“cumulative treatment”) that measured the frequency of program participa-
tion over the entire program period. Cumulative treatment was a continuous variable that 
provided insight into the frequency of municipal participation in the 3x1 Program. The 
relevant reference group combined all municipalities that participated, but less frequently, 
and municipalities that never participated in the 3x1 Program to isolate the comparison of 
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cumulative treatment compared to all other municipalities. For all other treatment indica-
tors, the control group remained municipal nonparticipants in the 3x1 Program.
Formal political participation (“voter turnout”) represented the percentage of the citizen 
voting-age population casting a vote in municipal elections in the given election year. This 
data was adjusted to reflect the migrant population living abroad. Voter turnout data was 
calculated using the CIDAC database of municipal elections for the period from 1990 to 
2013 and state-level elections data for select years. Mexican municipal elections occurred 
every three years in a staggered electoral calendar across Mexican states during the observa-
tion period. I examined the effects of 3x1 participation on annual municipal observations, 
but I also converted the observations into three-year election cycles for ease of interpreta-
tion. Table 4 presents select summary statistics for the 3x1 panel dataset sample.
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Panel Dataset.
Full Sample 3x1 Participation
Mean SD   Mean SD
3x1 Participation
 DiD Treatment 0.12 0.33 0.25 0.43 
 Cumulative 3x1 0.46 1.39 1.75 2.25 
Sociodemographic 
 Poverty Index 0.00 1.00 –0.20 0.85 
 Poverty Index Squared 0.99 1.27 0.77 1.06 
 International Migration Index 0.02 0.98 0.33 1.04 
 Literacy Rate 78.63 11.15 84.38 7.13 
 Indigenous Population 19.99 31.42 12.97 25.39 
 Total Population (log) 8.84 1.53 9.21 1.40 
Politics
 Margin of Victory 21.40 21.53 26.43 24.69 
 Effective Number of Parties 2.63 1.02 2.45 1.08 
 Voter Turnout 58.48 16.68 54.41 16.35 
 Incumbent Win 53.54 49.87 51.01 50.00 
 PRI 53.48 49.88 70.44 45.63 
 PRD 9.22 28.93 8.20 27.43 
 PAN 17.27 37.80 14.28 34.99 
 OTHER 20.04 40.03 7.08 25.65 
 PRI Vote Share 46.96 20.69 37.62 21.45 
 PRD Vote Share 15.90 16.97 14.13 15.84 
 PAN Vote Share 22.36 18.51 27.02 17.62 
Public Finance
 Tax Revenue Per Cap 2,324 1,909 2,856 1,869 
 Expenditure Per Cap 1,912 2,234 3,321 2,157 
 Public Spending Per Cap 626 872 1,096 967
Observations 58,972   14,808 
Note: 3x1 participation includes all municipalities that participate in the 3x1 Program at least once between 2002 and 
2013. The full sample includes all Mexican municipalities from 1990 to 2013.
Source: Calculations using data sourced from INEGI Simbad, INE, Conapo, and Sedesol.
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C OMMUNIT Y CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
I also constructed indicators of civic engagement from the survey questions. “Recent activ-
ity,” “religious,” “political,” “social,” and “other” were all dichotomous variables that indi-
cated if there were recent community activities and meetings that occurred in the previous 
12-month period before the survey, and the types of community activities that were present 
in the community, respectively.1 I focused the analysis on recent community activities to try 
and isolate the effects of treatment in the corresponding period of observation. Addition-
ally, “activity level” was a continuous variable reflecting the total numbers of activities for 
which residents are most recently involved. Finally, “high activity level” was a dichotomous 
indicator that took the value of 1 if the community had greater than or equal to different 
thresholds of community activity (greater than or equal to 10; 20; 30; 50; and greater than or 
equal to 100 activities), and zero otherwise. These variables were labeled high activity level 
1 through 5. The minimum number of activities was zero and the maximum was 800. In 
the sample, 46 percent had at least 10 activities, 25 percent of the sample had 20 or more, 14 
percent 30 or more, 11  percent 50 or more, and 7 percent more than 100 activities. I coded 
the activity level as different dichotomous variables for ease of interpretation of interac-
tion coefficients. Observations for all indicators of civic engagement reflected community 
activities before 2002 (wave 1), between 2002 and 2004 (wave 2), and between 2005 and 
2008 (wave 3). This yielded three separate observations for the civic engagement variables.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS
I included three measures that proxied for government responsiveness. The first measure 
was an indicator of annual municipal expenditures on public goods and services (per capi-
ta). The second measure was an indicator of total expenditures (per capita), which included 
expenditures for debt, personal salaries, general services, materials and supplies, aid, as-
sets, and “other” expenditures. I included total expenditures since some indirect costs of 
coproduction were likely included in other expenditure categories (e.g., materials and sup-
plies). This variable also helped disclose whether and if total expenditures were increasing 
as a result of program participation, but not to public works, which would have suggested 
possible spending leakages as a result of program participation. The third measure was the 
annual share of total expenditures spent on public works. Annual municipal public finance 
data came from the Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI) Sistema 
Estatal y Municipal Base de Datos (Simbad).
DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCE AND FIXED EFFECT S MODELS
A key objective of the quantitative analyses was to mitigate the threat of selection bias often 
present when using quasi-experimental data. This form of bias occurs either when program 
participation is voluntary or when a municipal participant is selected into the program 
based on preexisting characteristics that may also be related to outcomes of interest. When 
such nonrandom selection occurs, if Mexican municipalities participating in the program 
are characterized by having systematically lower (higher) levels on democracy indica-
tors, then any difference observed on political outcomes between treatment (3x1 Program 
Panel Data, MxFLS, Statistical Analysis    227
participant) and control group (nonparticipation) may reflect pre-program biases and not 
necessarily the effect of the 3x1 Program on local democracy. Researchers use a variety of 
statistical techniques to analyze “treatment effects models” using observational data, where 
a policy of interest such as municipal participation in the 3x1 Program is the treatment 
variable.2
Confronted with observational data in which self-selection into treatment may be con-
founded with the outcomes of interest, I used the difference-in-difference estimator (DiD) 
to mitigate this form of bias as much as possible in the absence of randomized controlled 
municipal participation in the 3x1 Program.3 The DiD estimator is a simple and powerful 
tool for estimating treatment effects with observational data, and panel data is often best 
suited to maximize the method and generate causal inference.4 DiD measured the differ-
ence on democracy indicators between municipalities that participated in the 3x1 Program 
(treatment group) and those that did not participate (control group) before and after the 
start of the federal 3x1 Program in 2002. As such, it required repeated observations of the 
units over time to compare the difference in the differences between treatment and control 
groups before and after program participation. As Buckley and Shang (2003) argue, this strat-
egy helps ensure that any variables remaining constant over time (but unobserved) and 
correlated with both the decision to participate in the program and the outcomes of interest 
will not bias the estimated effect.
The panel dataset included data for all Mexican municipalities between 1990 and 2013 
(24 years).5 The time series included a 12-year pre-treatment period to analyze prior trends 
before possible selection into the 3x1 Program. It also included an additional 11 years of post-
treatment observations in which some Mexican municipalities participated in the 3x1 Pro-
gram and some did not. This allowed examination of how program participation affected 
the average change in different dimensions of democracy across all Mexican municipalities.
In addition to the standard assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) models, a key 
assumption of the DiD estimator was that average changes in democratic functioning were 
assumed to be the same for both the control group and the treatment group had they never 
participated in the 3x1 Program.6 In other words, the difference in the differences showed 
that whatever would have happened to the control group over time was what would have 
happened to the treatment group in the absence of municipal participation in the 3x1 Pro-
gram. Participation in the 3x1 Program was more likely in places with higher levels of mi-
gration. This was consistent across all of the three 3x1 participation measures. Moreover, 
local democracy had a nonlinear relationship with international migration. These statistics 
provided some initial evidence that 3x1 participation may have offset or reversed the general 
negative impacts on local democracy from international migration.7 In specifications in 
which the dependent variable was continuous, OLS was used to estimate treatment effects. 
Logistic regression was used when the outcome variable was dichotomous.
C ONTROLLING FOR C ONFOUNDERS
In the statistical analysis, I included several socioeconomic, demographic, and political 
conditions likely to affect voter turnout for both 3x1 municipal participants and nonpar-
ticipants. I also included additional covariates hypothesized to influence both the baseline 
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change common to all units of observation and the amount of change predicted by the 3x1 
participation.
First, “poverty” (and its quadratic term) was a continuous index of marginalization. The 
index of marginalization accounts for the percent of the municipal population that lived 
without primary education, drainage or toilet, electricity, piped water, and that were over 
the age of 8 and illiterate. It also included the percent of the population that lived with over-
crowding, earthen floor, income below poverty level, and in locations with less than 5,000 
people. Second, “international migration” was a continuous index variable that summarized 
the percent of households that received migrant remittances, had circular migrants, and had 
a member of the household living abroad in the previous five years. The migration index 
allowed me to analyze how the intensity of individual emigration in municipalities (family 
remittances, return migration, and absence of household members) affected democracy.
Third, I included a measure of the percent of the population that spoke an indigenous 
language (“indigenous”), since previous research showed that ethno-linguistic fractional-
ization affected public goods provision and democratic quality.8 Fourth, percent of the total 
population over the age of 12 that was literate (“literacy”) served as a proxy for political 
participation. Literacy is often correlated with both informal and formal forms of political 
participation in Mexico and the United States.9 Finally, log of the total population over the 
age of 15 was the final sociodemographic control included in all specifications. Population 
size served as a good proxy for both budget constraints of the municipal government and 
poverty. Migration, socioeconomic, and demographic indicators were obtained from the 
Mexican National Census, including the Censo General de Población y Vivienda (Mexican 
National Census conducted every 10 years), Conteo de Población y Vivienda (updated every 
five years), and INEGI.
Political variables were included to control for local government’s interest and ability to 
provide public goods. For example, electoral competition affected trends in political par-
ticipation and government responsiveness.10 I included the lagged effective number of par-
ties in all specifications with the exception of when the dependent variable of interest was 
electoral competition (margin of victory and effective number of parties) to control for this 
fact. Also, since different political parties provided public goods based on different political 
strategies,11 I included the party label of the municipal incumbent lagged one electoral cycle 
in all specifications.
Finally, to control for municipal government’s capacity to provide public goods I includ-
ed a lagged measure of total revenues (per capita). Total revenues measured government 
budget constraint and included all sources of funding for municipal government including 
state, federal, and locally sourced revenue. This measure was also sourced from the INEGI 
Simbad database of municipal public finance. Taken together, the political variables served 
as a proxy indicator of government engagement, one of the main factors, I argued, that pro-
duced variation on organizational forms of transnational coproduction. The panel dataset 
for Mexican municipalities did not provide an opportunity to assess the effect of citizen 
inclusion in the coproduction process because it lacked reliable estimates for civic engage-
ment in community activities, but I examined this later in chapter 6 using longitudinal 
survey data from the Mexican Family Life Survey.
Figure 9 graphs the time trends between 1990 and 2013 by treatment and control group 
for voter turnout. The figure shows that pre-treatment trends are similar and stable before 
2002, and the trends become different after 2002. Limitations still remained using the DiD, 
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however. Although the DiD models mitigated irregularities in the frequency and starting 
time of participation, the DiD models only captured the average treatment effects of 3x1 
participation. The results for the DiD models are reported in Tables 5 and 6. I also tested 
fixed effects models with a municipal-linear time trend and a state-linear time trend, al-
though only the municipal results are reported.12 Using different indicators of 3x1 partici-
pation reflected fluctuations in the specific linear trend that allowed me to better isolate 
the causal effects from 3x1 Program participation.13 The results are consistent in both the 
municipal- and state-specific linear time trend models. Finally, I examined the cumula-
tive effects of 3x1 Program participation on government responsiveness and voter turnout. 
Those findings, which include year fixed effects and the municipal linear time trend, are 
presented in Tables 7 and 8.
MEXICAN FAMILY LIFE SURVEY MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Civic engagement indicators were sourced from the MxFLS, while all other socioeconomic, 
demographic, public finance, political, and 3x1 Program indicators were sourced from the 
panel dataset. All of the same controls were included in the civic engagement models; how-
ever, controls were averaged for the pre-survey period for each panel wave. Similar to earlier 
specifications, I created a mean lag of each confounder leading up to the year in which the 
second and third panel waves observe municipal responses. Since I had comprehensive 
data on all Mexican municipalities before and after the start of the 3x1 Program period, I 
also examined whether survey respondents were systematically different on indicators of 
democracy prior to the observation period. Results yielded no concerns of selection bias.14
Figure 9. Voter turnout trend by treatment and control. Source: Calculations using 
data sourced from INEGI Simbad, INE, Conapo, and Sedesol.
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Several treatment variables indicated 3x1 Program participation. First, “treatment” was 
a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the municipality participated in the 3x1 Program in any 
year in the period before the survey years, and zero otherwise. Note, no municipalities in 
the MxFLS participated in the 3x1 Program in the first panel wave, the first year of the feder-
al program. Second, a cumulative treatment indicator (“cumulative treatment”) was incor-
porated to reflect the total number of years the municipality participated in the 3x1 Program 
between panel waves 2 and 3. Finally, since the 3x1 Program database contained information 
regarding the number of projects annually completed, I also included a continuous count 
Table 5. Difference in Difference Models, 3x1 Program Participation on Voter Turnout.
3x1 Participation 3.040*** 2.628***
(0.225) (0.215)
2002 Dummy –8.990*** –9.075***
(0.339) (0.334)




Poverty Squared –0.379*** –0.411***
(0.075) (0.074)
Migration Index 0.095 –
(0.094) –
Migrant Percentage – 1.508***
– (0.084)
Literacy Rate 0.255*** 0.248***
(0.017) (0.017)
Indigenous Population 0.076*** 0.095***
(0.004) (0.004)
Population (log) –3.690*** –3.608***
(0.078) (0.078)













Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. All models include 
state and time fixed effects.
Source: Calculations using data sourced from INEGI Simbad, INE, Conapo, and Sedesol.














3x1 Program 36.911*** 1.740*** 49.899*** 2.574***
(5.133) (0.273) (4.865) (0.262)
2002 Dummy 275.255*** 13.558*** 282.353*** 13.930***
(17.057) (0.366) (16.689) (0.364)
3x1*2002 Dummy –61.887*** –4.728*** –93.816*** –5.297***
(13.137) (0.351) (13.418) (0.350)
Poverty 238.177*** 8.829*** 246.457*** 8.982***
(9.479) (0.208) (9.338) (0.206)
Poverty Squared 30.006*** –0.587*** 25.415*** –0.666***
(3.788) (0.092) (3.674) (0.090)
Migration Index 37.116*** 1.288*** – –
(3.763) (0.100) – –
Migrant Percentage – – 63.606*** 0.703***
– – (8.096) (0.102)
Literacy Rate 8.808*** 0.250*** 9.151*** 0.251***
(0.840) (0.020) (0.824) (0.020)
Indigenous Population 0.051 0.003 0.032 –0.008+
(0.199) (0.005) (0.197) (0.005)
Population (log) 21.429*** 1.560*** 21.564*** 1.438***
(3.899) (0.085) (3.716) (0.084)
Number of Parties 38.093*** 1.738*** 36.881*** 1.730***
(3.430) (0.102) (3.394) (0.101)
Voter Turnout –0.528* –0.024*** –0.928*** –0.030***
(0.209) (0.005) (0.210) (0.005)
PRI 68.845*** 2.556*** 63.098*** 2.417***
(6.376) (0.238) (6.329) (0.236)
PRD 107.838*** 3.468*** 102.239*** 3.553***
(10.758) (0.378) (10.822) (0.376)
PAN 56.757*** 1.616*** 52.250*** 1.531***
(9.081) (0.287) (8.987) (0.285)
Tax Revenue (per cap.) 0.315*** –0.001*** 0.300*** –0.001***
(0.009) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000)
Constant 1,050.394*** –15.061*** 1,070.912*** –14.046***
(76.393) (1.897) (74.447) (1.837)
Observations 31,958 31,958 32,511 32,511
Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. All models include state and time 
fixed effects.
Source: Calculations using data sourced from INEGI Simbad, INE, Conapo, and Sedesol.
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variable for the number of total coproduction projects (“cumulative projects”). Results for 
the models that analyze how 3x1 Program participation and civic engagement interact to 
change voter turnout and government responsiveness are reported in Table 9 and Table 10.
HETERO GENEOUS TREATMENT EFFECT S
I learned from the data that program participation varied according to when a municipality 
started the program and the duration of program participation, which may have affected 
democratic participation and government responsiveness. The program flexibility in the 
Table 7. Fixed Effects Models, 3x1 Cumulative 3x1 Participation on Voter Turnout 
with Municipal Time Trend.
Voter Turnout




Poverty Squared –11.786** –10.966**
(4.076) (4.000)
Migration Index 4.157 –
(4.032) –
Migrant Percentage – 4.963***
– (0.802)
Literacy Rate –1.828** –1.969**
(0.668) (0.660)
Indigenous Population 0.972+ 1.001+
(0.507) (0.527)
Population (log) 48.325*** 7.559
(9.531) (11.993)













Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Source: Calculations using data sourced from INEGI Simbad, INE, Conapo, and Sedesol.
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starting and stopping of program participation necessitated capturing this heterogeneity 
of treatment dynamics with the inclusion of interactions between treatment indicators and 
additional covariates.15 I explored heterogeneous treatment effects by testing if, first, expo-
sure to treatment—the possibility that the intervention itself—affected outcomes, and if, 
second, treatment effects varied with time and duration.
Table 8. Fixed Effects Models, 3x1 Cumulative 3x1 Participation on Government Responsiveness 














3x1 Participation 15.285 0.371* 10.805 0.338+
(10.412) (0.171) (10.345) (0.173)
Poverty 327.681* 5.857* 289.717+ 5.835*
(149.571) (2.329) (151.674) (2.344)
Poverty Squared 70.431 –1.230 91.368+ –0.885
(53.658) (0.853) (54.134) (0.821)
Migration Index –13.411 –1.524+ – –
(53.227) (0.790) – –
Migrant Percentage – – 46.078* 0.481+
– – (19.669) (0.279)
Literacy Rate 63.527*** 0.267 58.101*** 0.175
(13.174) (0.217) (13.054) (0.211)
Indigenous Population 25.255+ 0.388+ 26.573+ 0.395+
(14.924) (0.228) (14.635) (0.220)
Population (log) –588.712** 6.445* –624.897** 6.046+
(226.905) (3.269) (228.258) (3.284)
Number of Parties 4.568 –0.142 4.165 –0.125
(8.463) (0.208) (8.514) (0.208)
Voter Turnout 2.380*** 0.032** 2.209*** 0.029*
(0.611) (0.012) (0.607) (0.012)
PRI 58.397* 1.701** 65.289* 1.752***
(29.164) (0.519) (29.119) (0.522)
PRD 31.963 1.630* 42.752 1.700*
(40.406) (0.752) (40.217) (0.758)
PAN 85.903* 1.880** 91.089* 1.846**
(41.629) (0.683) (41.424) (0.685)
Tax Rev. (per capita) 0.214*** 0.001*** 0.212*** 0.001***
(0.027) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000)
Constant –789.937 –58.320+ 2.364 –47.345
(2,257.191) (32.868) (2,296.995) (32.863)
Observations 9,382 9,382 9,425 9,425
Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects Models, 3x1 Program Participation.
Government Responsiveness
  Voter Turnout Public Spending 
Share of Public 
Spending
Frequency Interactions
3x1*Irregular –1.5 14.89 –0.441
(1.161) (75.240) (1.042)
3x1*Habitual –2.011+ –72.99 –0.817
(1.219) (73.100) (1.053)
Time Interactions
3x1*2006–2009 3.359*** 51.48* –0.0413
(0.633) (24.310) (0.521)
3x1*2010–2013 8.695*** 157.4*** 1.806***
(0.698) (34.910) (0.661)
3x1 Participation –3.844*** 32.08 1.411
(1.156) (69.310) (1.026)
Poverty 7.971*** –120.0* 1.947
(1.566) (48.130) (1.259)
Poverty Squared –0.952+ 102.3*** 1.950***
(0.527) (24.370) (0.485)
Migration Index 1.279* 29.85 1.514**
(0.649) (27.910) (0.559)
Literacy Rate –0.169*** 3.957** 0.693***
(0.044) (1.336) (0.041)
Indigenous Population 0.0485 11.68*** 0.134*
(0.080) (2.590) (0.066)
Population (log) 22.94*** –328.0*** –3.130*
(1.890) (60.240) (1.291)
Number of Parties 4.115*** 29.35*** 0.347*
(0.187) (4.676) (0.136)
Voter Turnout − –0.174 –0.00905
− (0.303) (0.009)
PRI –3.498*** 112.1*** 4.573***
(0.272) (7.943) (0.331)
PRD –0.0618 134.1*** 3.789***
(0.421) (14.510) (0.492)
PAN –0.587+ 109.2*** 3.467***
(0.340) (13.330) (0.397)
Tax Rev. (per capita) –0.00159*** 0.255*** 0.000475***
(0.000) (0.020) (0.000)
Constant –145.3*** 2,067*** –9.196
(17.510) (548.800) (11.950)
Observations 34,655 31,958 31,958
Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. All models include state and time 
fixed effects.
Source: Calculations using data sourced from INEGI Simbad, INE, Conapo, and Sedesol.
Panel Data, MxFLS, Statistical Analysis    239
Results indicated that the timing and duration of program participation produced treat-
ment effects on voter turnout, party competition, and incumbent winning probability, party 
vote share, and municipal spending. The late participation (2006–13) in the 3x1 Program 
was associated with a 3–8 percent increase in voter turnout, when compared with early 
participation (2002–5). The effect was stronger in 2010–13 than in 2006–10. The timing and 
duration of program participation also produced effects on government responsiveness: the 
public works spending (per capita) and public works spending as a share of total spending 
(per capita). Municipalities that participated in 3x1 after year 2010 were more likely to spend 
$157 pesos (per capita) on public works than those who participated in the early period, 
between 2002 and 2006. These late program adopters were also likely to spend 1.8 percent 
Table 12. Fixed Effects Models, 3x1 Municipal Spending and  
Project Totals on Voter Turnout.
  Voter Turnout
3x1 Municipal Spending –0.501+ –
(0.276) –




Poverty Squared –1.281 –1.272
(0.927) (0.928)
Migration Index –0.009 0.008
(0.979) (0.976)
Literacy Rate –0.620* –0.625*
(0.262) (0.262)
Indigenous Population 0.422* 0.423*
(0.213) (0.214)
Population (log) 23.079** 23.071**
(3.986) (3.995)













Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; 
***p < 0.001. All models include state and time fixed effects.
Source: Calculations using data sourced from INEGI Simbad, INE, Conapo, and Sedesol.
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more of the total budget on public works. This finding suggested that municipalities enter-
ing the program in the later period enjoyed greater returns on municipal spending on pub-
lic works and enhanced political competition. Heterogeneous effects models are reported 
in Table 11. The fixed effects specifications that model the effect of 3x1 Program spending 
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3 .  MICRO-POLITICS OF SUBSTITUTIVE AND SYNERGETIC PARTNERSHIPS
1. Reymundo and Francisco credit the expansion of club membership to the ability to 
keep track of friends, relatives, and acquaintances moving to different parts of the United 
States through social media, the Mexican consulate, and the Office of Migrant Affairs in 
Selvillo, which kept detailed records of paisanos’ whereabouts in the U.S. who were origi-
nally from the municipality. Reymundo, Francisco, and Octavio, core leaders of the club, 
contacted Cerritenses and asked them to set up club “branches” in cities where concen-
trations of paisanos settled, including California, Texas, Colorado, Georgia, and Illinois. 
The branches were primarily focused on fundraising activities, including door-knocking, 
picnics, dances, and raffles to collect money for public goods projects. Migrant club leaders 
along with a board of directors (mesa directiva) coordinated fundraising, project selection, 
and approvals through the 3x1 Program Validation Committees called COVAM.
2. As of 2013, the Club has coproduced the sixth highest number of projects through 
the 3x1 Program.
3. Like many municipalities, El Cerrito has a community delegate (delegado) that repre-
sents the town in municipal government.
4. See Kouri 2015 for a rich historical account of Cardenismo and the invention of the 
ejido in Mexico.
5. All face-to-face interviews with key informants occurred between April and June 
2009.
6. Selvillo is classified as a middle-income municipality by INEGI.
7. The mayor requested permission from local council officials (regidores) to create a 
municipal 3x1 position. The 3x1 liaison receives a municipal salary for overseeing all 3x1 
Program activities.
8. INEGI Conteo de Población y Vivienda 2005.
9. Face-to-face interviews with key informants in Telepi occurred between April and 
June 2009.
10. Face-to-face interview in Telepi, March 2009. Face-to-face interviews with Sarita 
and Leo took place between March 2009 and December 2009 in Telepi and over the phone 
when they returned to California.
11. There are a few HTAs that sporadically engage in coproduction in Telepi and one 
additional HTA that has had a long-term presence in the municipality.
12. Evans 1996.
4 .  EFFECT S OF VIOLENCE AND EC ONOMIC CRISIS  ON HYBRID 
TR ANSNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS
1. I did not choose the transnational partnership case in Santa Catarina because it had 
drug violence. In fact, I was unaware of the precarious conditions in the hometown when I 
selected the case and began the fieldwork in the summer of 2009. Had I known then what I 
learned in the field and subsequently, I would not have exposed local residents of the town 
to any unwanted attention that my presence may have brought.
2. “Rural” is classified as a population of less than 10,000 people.
3. All sociodemographic and economic information is taken from the INEGI munici-
pality database called SIMBAD.
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4. Interview with Miguel, September 2010.
5. All face-to-face interviews occurred in Santa Catarina in August 2009. I conducted 
several follow-up telephone interviews with club leaders and residents in Santa Catarina in 
September and October 2009 and face-to-face interviews in Chicago with Raul and Miguel 
in 2009 and 2010.
6. Interview with the pastor, August 2009.
7. Andrea Bocanegra, “Confirma SSP amenazas del narco a 8 presidentes mu-
nicipales de Michoacán,” Andrea Bocanegra, Marmor Informa, August 8, 2017, www. 
marmorinforma.mx/confirma-ssp-amenazas-del-narco-8-presidentes-municipales-
michoacan/. See also “Matan a alcalde de Michoacán que denunciaba pagos de cuotas al 
‘narco,’” Aristegue Noticias, November 8, 2013, https://aristeguinoticias.com/0811/mexico/
matan-a-alcalde-de-michoacan-que-denunciaba-al-narco/.
8. Interview with club leaders in Chicago, IL, July 2010.
9. Even with more citizen engagement, corruption may not have been thwarted, sug-
gesting more citizen inclusion may not necessarily prevent corruption by rent-seeking 
politicians.
10. Interview with Miguel, Chicago, IL, September 2010.
11. In this context mano negra means suspicious of wrongdoing.
12. In colloquial Spanish, guaje can refer to a “fool,” but in this context it is the nickname 
locals gave the municipal delegate to describe his physical appearance. Guajes are very long, 
thin pods from the wild tamarind tree that grows throughout the region. El Guaje was a tall, 
thin man with a zesty sense of humor.
13. Recall from chapter 2 that the Casas Guanajuato are nonprofit 501(c)3 organizations 
that serve as community centers and provide educational, cultural, and recreational sup-
port and services to the Guanajuato migrant community in the United States. Casas Guana-
juato are located throughout the U.S., but older, more established sites are located in Dallas, 
Texas, San Diego, and Los Angeles.
5 .  SYNERGY AND C ORPOR ATISM IN EL MIR AD OR  
AND ATITL AN,  C OMARGA
1. INEGI, Censo General de Población y Vivienda 2000.
2. INEGI, Censo General de Población y Vivienda 2010. INEGI uses the marginaliza-
tion index to categorize municipalities as very high, high, medium, low, and very low levels 
of marginalization. The marginalization index is a scalar index that reflects households’ 
access to essential public goods provision, income distribution, basic amenities in dwell-
ings including the number of households with earthen (dirt) floors and piping, and literacy.
3. Adida and Girod 2011.
4. The Patronato is the local association responsible for planning and executing the 
annual patron saint festival in Atitlan. The festival is the most important social event of the 
year.
5. Face-to-face interview in Atitlan, March 2009. All interviews in the municipality 
were conducted during fieldwork between March and August 2009.
6. Email correspondence dated April 5, 2009.
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7. Emilio told me he had political aspirations of his own in Mexico. Many former mi-
grants have successfully campaigned and won mayoral office after they returned to their 
hometowns.
8. HTAs created by the administration in the same period are still active and success-
fully coproducing in three other communities in Comarga. Local political participation and 
state-society relations have improved as a result of more synergetic coproduction in these 
places, where government engagement was consistent, but community inclusion was higher.
9. Piven and Cloward 1997: 276.
6 .  SYSTEMATIC EFFECT S OF TR ANSNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS  
ON LO CAL GOVERNANCE
1. See Bada 2014 and Smith 2006.
2. Goldring 2002; Zabin and Escala 2002; Lanly and Valenzuela 2004; Smith 2006; 
Smith and Bakker 2008; Bada 2014; Fox and Rivera-Salgado 2004; Alarcón 2000.
3. Orozco 2003; Portes, Escobar, and Arana 2008; Portes, Escobar and Radford 2007.
4. About 25 surveys had missing data.
5. These data were taken directly from Sedesol’s 3x1 database for the most recent project 
in which each club was involved. Separate from the variables that formed the government 
engagement index, I also collected all the available 3x1 data for each survey club respondent 
for the full time period, 2002–13. HTA survey responses were cross-checked with 3x1 data 
to ensure an additional measure of reliability.
6. Olson [1965] 2007.
7. FitzGerald 2008a.
8. All of the club leaders who participated in the survey could indicate if they wished to 
receive a copy of the survey results via email at the close of the project.
9. Filiz Garip’s (2016) use and presentation of cluster analysis in her research on Mexi-
can migration streams inspired this methodological step. I appreciate her leadership in the 
use of cluster analysis in the sociological study of international migration.
10. In addition to running OLS, I also ran logit models for each coproduction type sepa-
rately and I evaluated the degree to which coproduction types are statistically and substan-
tively different across the types using multiple methods including T-test and ANOVA tests. 
The full specifications with coproduction types as categorical dependent variables including 
all theoretically relevant controls were also evaluated. The results were consistent. I do not 
report the findings here, but they are available upon request.
11. Heterogeneous regression model results are not reported here due to space limita-
tions, but are available upon request. In these models, I compare how partnerships occur-
ring in different program periods—for example, “early program adopters” versus “late pro-
gram adopters,” and more and less “habitual program participants”—vary in their political 
outcomes.
12. This strategy excludes municipalities that may engage in informal forms of copro-
duction outside of the 3x1 Program as well as cases in which migrant HTAs may provide 
public goods without any involvement of local government. There is no data that helps to 
capture these additional cases, unfortunately.
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13. Sedesol does not report information about projects that were proposed, but not ap-
proved, by the validation committees that oversee project proposals (Comite de Validation 
y Atención a Migrantes or COVAM), which is a limitation of the data. Interviews with per-
sonnel at COVAM meetings in 2009, 2010, and 2011 in Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and Jalisco 
suggest that projects are typically rejected because (1) local government fails to sign on to 
overseeing projects, (2) previous projects have not been completed as proposed in earlier 
periods, and (3) the HTA has outstanding contributions from previous projects (Simpser 
et al. 2016).
14. Aaron Malone, PhD candidate in geography at Colorado, is conducting dissertation 
research on the spatial diffusion of policy adoption of the 3x1 Program across Mexico. His 
research is consistent with the findings described here. See Malone and Durden 2018.
15. Diamond 1999.
16. Schumpeter 1947; Dahl 1971; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond and Plattner 1999; 
Przeworski et al. 2000; Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán 2007; Altman and Pérez- 
Liñán 2002.
17. Putnam et al. 1993.
18. Additional information about the Mexican Family Life Survey is available at www.
ennvih-mxfls.org/english/index.html.
19. Diamond and Morlino 2005: xxix.
20. Mizrahi 1998; Cleary and Stokes 2006; Cleary 2010.
21. Cleary 2010.
22. Cleary 2010: 115.
23. Simpser et al. 2016.
24. Diamond and Morlino 2005.
25. This is consistent with results in Simpser et al. 2016.
26. Putnam et al. 1993.
C ONCLUSION:  THE PAR AD OX OF CROSS-B ORDER POLITICS
1. Cammett and MacLean 2011: 7–8.
2. Dahl 1971.
3. Ostrom 1996.
4. Basch et al. 1994.
5. Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004.
6. See Moss 2016 for the case of transnational uprising during the Arab Spring.
7. Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Grindle 2007; Falleti 2010.
8. Cammett and MacLean 2011.
9. Global Forum on Migration and Development, 2007–2018.
10. I thank David FitzGerald for suggesting this characterization of migrant social ties 
to me.
11. Barry 2006: 17.
12. Bloemraad 2006.
13. Waldinger 2015: 32. See also Levitt 2001 and Goldring 1998.
14. Fitzgerald 2006.
15. Barry 2006: 34; Bloemraad 2006: 9.
16. Barry 2006: 25.
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17. Waldinger et al. 2008.
18. Andrews 2018.
19. Cammett and MacLean 2014.
20. Tusalem 2018; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009; Zhou and Lee 2013; Agarwala 2015.
21. Fitzgerald 2006.
22. Gamlen 2006; Délano and Gamlen 2014.
23. See Diossa-Jimenez’s forthcoming dissertation for an explication of emigration poli-
cies in Latin America.
24. Bhagwati 2003.
25. A growing literature examines the causes and consequences of emigrant state de-
velopment policies and destination country codevelopment policies across countries as di-
verse as Morocco, the Philippines, Turkey, Mexico, Mauritius, Algeria, Bulgaria, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mali, Romania, Senegal, Ghana, India, Serbia, Spain, France, and the Netherlands 
to name a few (see Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002; Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010; Schmelz 2009; 
Orozco 2003; Baraulina et al. 2007; de Haas 2006; Østergaard-Nielsen 2009; Lacomba and 
Cloquell 2014; Iskander 2010; Lacroix 2014).
26. Hirschman 1984.
27. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Verba and Nie 1987.
28. Hirschman 1970.
29. Putnam et al. 1993; Verba et al. 1995.
30. Tendler 1997; Fox 2007; Ackerman 2004.
31. Ostrom 1996; Evans 1996; Tendler 1997.
32. Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006.
33. Tsai 2007.
34. Ioan Grillo, “Why Cartels Are Killing Mexico’s Mayors,” New York Times, January 15, 
2016. See also Trejo and Ley 2016, 2017 on the role of partisan politics in the escalation of 
violent murders of subnational political officials.
35. Justice in Mexico 2016. See https://justiceinmexico.org/three-michoacan-mayors- 
indicted-another-appears-in-images-with-la-tuta/.
36. Key paisano informants from Jalisco and Guanajuato, telephone interviews in July 
2013, May 2014, and August 2016.
37. See Guerra and Asencio 2015; Rivera Velázquez 2014; Fuentes Díaz and Paleta Pérez 
2015; Orozco-Aleman and Gonzalez-Lozano 2017; Phillips 2017; Trejo and Ley 2016, 2017 
on autodefensas and the vigilante movement in Mexico. See also Meseguer, Ley, and Ibarra-
Olivo 2017; Basu and Pearlman 2017; Pérez-Armendáriz and Duquette-Rury 2019 on migra-
tion and violence in Mexico.
38. Moss 2016.
DATA APPENDIX B
1. Many Mexican HTAs choose not to register with the IME for a host of reasons. Future 
research might address similarities and differences between registered and nonregistered 
clubs through snowball sampling methods. This is beyond the scope of this book.
2. With generous financial support from the National Science Foundation SBE grant 
SES-0819245, I contracted the University of Chicago Survey Lab to contact potential survey 
respondents. The results were coded by hand by me and a research assistant.
254    Notes
3. About 25 surveys had missing data.
4. Three quarters of the survey sample is between one and seven years old, while a quar-
ter of the sample is older than seven years. The oldest club formed in 1969.
DATA APPENDIX C
1. See Jolliffe 1986.
2. For instance, categorical variables were transformed into dichotomous variables for 
each main category and continuous variables transformed into dichotomous variables us-
ing the first quantile as the cut point.
3. We use the conventional test of Cronbach’s alpha (alpha >0.7).
4. These data were taken directly from Sedesol’s 3x1 database for the most recent project 
in which each club was involved. Separate from the variables that formed the government 
engagement index, we also collected all the available 3x1 data for each survey club respon-
dent for the full time period, 2002–2013.
5. Different facets that characterize a migrant club’s overall capacity—for example, reve-
nue generation activities, leadership characteristics, and organizational structure—together 
explain most of the variance on capacity.
6. I did not ask respondents explicitly about their legal status in the United States be-
cause I did not want to cause them anxiety. This is a limitation of the data that is important 
to acknowledge. I recognize that club leadership is likely to change. All of the indices thus 
reflect the current period of club activities, creating a snapshot of organizational form of 
coproduction and not reflective of the dynamism that is inherent to these partnerships.
7. Tan, Steinbach, and Kumar 2005. For information about the kmeans algorithm, see 
Kanungo et al. 2002.
8. Kmeans cluster analysis program in STATA initially creates the k clusters accord-
ing to an arbitrary procedure. The program calculates the means or centroids of each of 
the clusters. If one of the observations is closer to the centroid of another cluster, then 
the observation is made a member of that cluster. This process is repeated until none of 
the observations are reassigned to a different cluster. Unlike hierarchical cluster analysis, 
kmeans clustering does not produce all possible clusters of n observations. I have also run 
the analysis by assigning a type of coproduction based on low, high, medium values of the 
continuous index using a quartile cut point. I then ran interaction models with community 
inclusion and government engagement and controlled for all other factors likely to affect 
the organization of partnerships and observed how the interactions affected measures of 
democracy. The results are similar to the findings in the cluster analysis section, increasing 
confidence. These data are not reported, but available by request.
9. I tried several numbers of clusters (2, 3, 5, 6, and 10) using all three diagnostic meth-
ods. Four clusters emerged repeatedly as the “tightest” clusters with each method. The cluster 
analysis was also conducted using continuous values for all indices, but I use the categorical 
variables for ease of interpretation and explanation. The results hold using the continuous 
values. I also note for the reader that additional variables were included in the cluster analy-
sis including poverty and migration intensity, which did not produce significant changes in 
the clusters. As I detail in later sections, poverty and migration are associated with particular 
kinds of coproduction, but not in their formation.
Notes    255
DATA APPENDIX D
1. Each record includes the year that the survey was taken for each panel wave.
2. For example, researchers employ Heckman selection models, instrumental vari-
able approaches, difference-in-difference estimations, and nonparametric propensity score 
matching methods.
3. Results on OLS specifications, which are in all likelihood extremely biased, are avail-
able by request.
4. See Ashenfelter 1978; Buckley and Shang 2003; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009. For 
excellent examples of the application of DiD approaches to observational data, see Card and 
Krueger 2000; Hastings 2004; Watson 2006.
5. I would like to thank Zeke Chen for outstanding research assistance on data collec-
tion, cleaning, coding, and analysis.
6. This is also referred to as the parallel trend assumption. Data on pre-program period 
should show that the difference between treated and control is stable, not necessarily that 
the trends are precisely parallel. Moreover, data on post-program periods should show that 
the difference between treated and control occurs concurrent with program participation. 
All fixed effects DiD models were subjected to an AR (1) disturbance in the event of serial 
autocorrelation and estimated with bootstrapping. No significant differences were found in 
these specifications.
7. We also conducted Heckman selection models to observe selection into the 3x1 Pro-
gram and political outcomes of interest. The results are not reported but are available by 
request.
8. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1997.
9. For representative examples see Cleary 2010 and Verba et al. 1995.
10. Hiskey 2003; Cleary 2010.
11. Two strands of the distributive politics literature point to different political rationale 
for public goods provision (Aparicio and Meseguer 2012; Meseguer and Aparicio 2012). 
On the one hand, in competitive multiparty political systems, the size of the coalition of 
voters required for victory is small, and targeted spending is likely more effective than pro-
grammatic spending on public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Conversely, in less 
competitive locales, programmatic spending on public goods, which by definition are non-
rivalrous and nonexclusionary, benefit a larger number of voters and increase the likelihood 
of securing a winning coalition. On the other hand, other research contends that politicians 
use public projects to target politically competitive localities in order to win over swing 
voters, optimizing electoral returns (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Calvo and Murillo 2004; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Diaz Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni 2016). The competi-
tiveness of local elections is likely to affect public goods provision either because politicians 
seek to reward core supporters in less competitive locales or win over swing voters in more 
competitive locales.
12. We evaluate both state and municipal linear trends.
13. Zeke Chen, STATA wizard, figured out how to code the time interactions for treat-
ments with state and municipal fixed effects. The calculations sometimes took days to run. 
I thank him for his patience.
14. Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests were run to test for the possibility of endogeneity.
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